Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 30 2026, 9:44 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana J.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.S., Appellee-Petitioner October 30, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-PO-1074 Appeal from the Grant Superior Court The Honorable Thomas M. Lawson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 27D02-2601-PO-28 Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Foley and Felix concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 1 of 8 DeBoer, Judge. Case Summary [1] J.M. appeals the trial court’s issuance of a protective order for M.S., arguing the evidence is insufficient. We agree and reverse. Facts and Procedural History [2] In August 2025, M.S. ended her relationship with her boyfriend, V.R. At the time, M.S. was pregnant with his child. In mid-August, V.R.’s mother, J.M., traveled from Arizona to Indiana to discuss her son’s relationship with M.S. After their conversation, J.M. asked M.S. not to contact her again. Thereafter, J.M. reached out to M.S.’s mother to keep her updated about the pregnancy, and M.S. agreed to do so by email. In the meantime, M.S. sought and obtained a protective order against V.R. In late October, J.M. ordered and shipped a new car seat for the child to M.S.’s mother. When M.S. emailed J.M. to thank her, J.M. asked her why she had sought a protective order against her son. M.S. would not offer an explanation, and their contact ended for the time being. [3] In December, M.S. asked J.M. for her son’s address so she could serve him with a petition to establish paternity. J.M. responded by asking for M.S.’s address, which she refused to provide. Around the same time, M.S. made a series of posts on her Facebook account detailing abuse V.R. had inflicted on her during their relationship. J.M. read those posts and on January 3, 2026, sent the following email to M.S.: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 2 of 8 [W]hen you come in contact with a man who will choke you, punch you in the face, slap you across your face, punch you in your stomach, and so much more[,] you will look back on my son and think that was a walk in the park. . . . [H]e is controlling[,] yes, especially when finding out you are pregnant carrying his child, any man would want to be near his seed. Transcript at 7-8. In the same email, J.M. told M.S. the situation “doesn’t have a good ending” and that M.S. will “want [her] as a friend not [a] foe.” Id. at 8, 9. On January 5, M.S. responded by asking J.M. to stop contacting her. [4] On January 31, M.S. filed a petition for a protective order against J.M. alleging 1 she was “a victim of repeated acts of harassment.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 7. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition on April 7. 2 M.S. testified consistently with the facts above and repeatedly emphasized her belief that J.M. was contacting her for the sole purpose of gathering information for V.R. The court initially responded to that allegation as follows: [I]t’s the Court’s belief that that’s an issue with [V.R.]’s protective order[.] . . . [I]f [J.M. is] trying to obtain information for her son and [s]he’s doing [it] at his request then that’s a violation of his protective order allegedly, and it needs to be treated as such. Not necessarily as part of [this] protective order[.] . . . That would be a separate issue. 1 M.S. attached many exhibits to her petition, none of which were admitted as evidence during the evidentiary hearing or submitted to this Court on appeal. 2 M.S., who was pro se, was not under oath and testified in a narrative format. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 3 of 8 Tr. at 30. M.S. also called her father as a witness. [5] Then, J.M. testified in her case-in-chief that her sole purpose for contacting M.S. was to support the child. She maintained that she never relayed information to her son, and her son never asked her to speak to M.S. She added that approximately two weeks after M.S. asked her to stop contacting her, M.S. invited J.M. to dinner to show her pictures of her ultrasound. J.M. didn’t go but instead purchased another item from the baby registry and gave it to M.S. She also clarified that her emails to M.S. were not meant to be threatening but to emphasize the impact of a split family on a child. [6] When the hearing concluded, and after reciting the definition of harassment, the trial court stated, [T]he comments that were made . . ., specifically the walk in the park comment and other comments that have been noted through the communications[,] . . . could be reasonably construed as threats, and frankly I do reasonably believe that they could indicate that a person . . . would suffer emotional distress given the circumstances that have been outlined today . . . . .... [I]t’s hard for the Court to believe that with the . . . protective order that’s in place . . . with [V.R.] . . . that some of the communication wasn’t meant to obtain information . . . other than just what a grandparent would want to do. I also see that as being impermissible contact . . . along with . . . the comments that could be reasonably construed as . . . threatening type content. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 4 of 8 Id. at 48-49. The court granted the petition and issued the order for protection, finding that “[M.S.] ha[d] shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that repeated acts of harassment ha[d] occurred . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 4. J.M. now appeals. Discussion and Decision [7] J.M. argues the evidence was insufficient to establish repeated acts of harassment needed to sustain the issuance of a protective order. We first note that both parties proceed pro se in this appeal. Litigants are “not given special consideration by virtue of [their] pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Rather, “pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences 3 of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. [8] We apply a two-tiered standard of review when a trial court issues a protective order. F.P. v. D.R., 277 N.E.3d 107, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). First, we consider whether the evidence supports the findings; then, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We neither assess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence, “and we consider only the evidence 3 On that note, we must address J.M.’s motion to strike portions of M.S.’s brief. Every statement in M.S.’s brief that J.M. challenges is contradicted by the transcript, not included in the transcript, or tied to evidence that the trial court excluded. Also, as J.M. points out, M.S. fails to cite any legal authority in her brief or comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 46. Thus, we grant J.M.’s motion by separate order issued in conjunction with this decision. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 5 of 8 favorable to the trial court’s decision.” J.T. v. A.H., 255 N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. We will reverse if “there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the order.” Id. It is the appellant’s burden to prove the court’s decision was “clearly erroneous, meaning a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id. [9] Under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act, “[a] person who is or has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b) (2021) (emphasis added). The term “harassment” is defined as “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actually causes the victim to 4 suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-80(a) (2025) (emphasis added). The term “‘[i]mpermissible contact’ includes (1) following or pursuing the victim; (2) communicating with the victim; and (3) posting on social media if the post is directed to the victim or refers directly or indirectly to the victim.” J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517 (citing Ind. Code § 35-45-10-3(a) (2022)). This list is nonexclusive. I.C. § 35-45-10-3(b). [10] To obtain a protective order, the petitioner must show the respondent “represents a credible threat to the safety of [the] petitioner . . . .” Ind. Code § 4 The trial court and J.M. incorrectly cited Indiana Code section 34-6-2-51.5, which was repealed effective July 1, 2025. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 6 of 8 34-26-5-9(h) (2024). A “credible threat” is one that is “plausible or believable.” S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020). “The burden is on the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ‘that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent presently intends to harm the petitioner . . . .’” J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517 (quoting S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 220). [11] Here, M.S.’s petition alleged repeated acts of harassment. The trial court’s finding of harassment was based on two determinations: (1) the likelihood that J.M. was sharing information with V.R. and (2) J.M.’s threatening statements to M.S. in the January 3, 2026 email. As to the former, M.S. provided no evidence—other than her mere belief—that J.M. was funneling information to V.R. The only evidence offered at trial about this issue came from J.M.’s testimony. And J.M. testified that V.R. never asked her to speak to M.S. and that she never gave information to V.R. Moreover, as noted by the trial court, if J.M. was trying to obtain information for V.R. at his request, that is an alleged violation of his protective order and would need to be addressed in that cause. [12] Regarding the second determination, M.S. testified multiple times that she felt threatened by statements J.M. made to M.S. in the January 3 email. But a close review of the record reveals that these statements were made by J.M. in a single email to M.S. And “a single incident of harassment is insufficient to support” the issuance of a protective order. C.S. v. T.K., 118 N.E.3d 78, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); see also I.C. § 34-6-2.1-80(a) (contact must be “repeated or continuing”). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 7 of 8 [13] Moreover, even after M.S. received this email, she initiated contact with J.M. so the pair could go to dinner and look at her ultrasound pictures, which seemingly undermines M.S.’s consistent assertion that she feared for her safety. Rather, M.S.’s fear was rooted in the potential actions of V.R., not of J.M. We conclude that M.S. did not show reasonable grounds to believe that J.M. represented a present, credible threat and intended to harm her. Thus, the trial court’s findings to the contrary are clearly erroneous. Conclusion [14] For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. [15] Reversed. Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur. APPELLANT PRO SE J.M. Surprise, Arizona APPELLEE PRO SE M.S. Marion, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-PO-1074 | October 30, 2026 Page 8 of 8