Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Logansport City Fire Department and City of Logansport, Appellants-Defendants FILED Nov 16 2026, 8:51 am v. CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court Scott M. Jones, Appellee-Plaintiff November 16, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-3273 Appeal from the Cass Circuit Court The Honorable Shane M. Evans, Special Judge The Honorable Troy M. Hawkins, Special Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 09C01-2307-PL-17 08D01-2308-CB-18 Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 1 of 25 Weissmann, Judge. [1] Scott M. Jones was on medical leave from the Logansport City Fire Department (Department) when he was charged with two felonies and one misdemeanor in connection with a domestic incident. The Logansport Board of Public Works and Safety (Board) initially placed him on administrative leave with pay but, a week later, modified the leave to be unpaid. After a jury trial three years later, Jones was acquitted of the felonies but found guilty of the misdemeanor charge, for which he was sentenced to a short term in jail. The Board later fired Jones after he repeatedly failed to undergo a required evaluation to determine whether he was fit to return to work. [2] By statute, a firefighter charged with a crime may be sidelined without pay until resolution of the criminal charges. The same statute allows the Board to “award back pay if the member is exonerated in the criminal matter.” Ind. Code § 36-8- 3-4(n) (Administrative Leave Provision). Although Jones was convicted of one of the three counts, the trial court ordered the City of Logansport to pay him $307,606.18 in back pay for the five years between the day his pay stopped and the day the Board fired him. [3] The Department and the City of Logansport (collectively, City) appealed, challenging the back pay order on numerous grounds. We agree the award cannot stand. For the period before resolution of Jones’s criminal charges, the Administrative Leave Provision forecloses back pay because Jones was convicted, at least in part, not exonerated. For the period after his conviction Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 2 of 25 and sentencing, the trial court erroneously set aside the Board’s factual findings in favor of its own. We reverse the trial court’s judgment relating to back pay and remand with instructions to reinstate the Board’s decision denying Jones back pay. Facts [4] While on medical leave from his job as a captain with the Department, Jones was involved in an alleged domestic violence incident at his home in January 2018. The State charged him with criminal confinement and domestic battery— both felonies—and misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime. [5] On January 31, 2018, the Board unanimously placed Jones on indefinite administrative leave with pay pursuant to the Administrative Leave Provision. A week later, on February 7, 2018, the Board modified that leave to unpaid effective May 1, 2018. Jones earned no pay from City after May 1, 2018. [6] Shortly after Jones received written notice of the leave modification, Jones requested a hearing before the Board. City responded that the governing statute afforded no hearing while charges were pending against him. [7] The criminal case took years to resolve. In June 2021, a jury acquitted Jones of the felonies but convicted him of the misdemeanor. Two months later, on August 12, 2021, the criminal court sentenced him to one year in jail, with all but thirty days suspended to probation. Jones completed his jail sentence and, in November 2021, requested reinstatement and back pay in a letter from his counsel to City officials. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 3 of 25 [8] The Department’s Fire Chief informed the Board of his intent to require Jones to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation pursuant to the Department’s standard operating procedures, given that Jones had been “out of service” for three years. Exhs. Vol. III, p. 116. The Fire Chief had met with Jones and found that he appeared “run down.” Id. at 215. The Fire Chief needed the Board’s approval to proceed with the evaluation because the Department would have to pay for it. [9] The Board approved the evaluation, which was scheduled four times between December 2021 and April 2022. Jones never completed it. He canceled the first appointment and, because of illness, missed the second. At the third, he refused to proceed with the drug screen and psychological portions, although his physician had excused him only from the physical testing that day. Jones did not appear for the fourth appointment. [10] On June 30, 2022, Jones’s counsel wrote to City’s counsel to question the need for the evaluation, given that Jones “does not ultimately wish to return to work.” Id. at 126. The letter specified that Jones was seeking reinstatement only to obtain the back pay and related benefits that he believed he was owed as a result of the Board’s allegedly improper modification of his administrative leave to unpaid in 2018. [11] The Board’s counsel wrote to Jones’s counsel on January 13, 2023, noting that the Board had set a hearing on Jones’s reinstatement for February 9, 2023. The letter explained that the hearing was necessary because, despite his lawyer’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 4 of 25 representations that Jones did not wish to return to active duty, Jones had appeared at City offices and inquired about the status of his job. The letter reiterated that Jones would need to complete a fitness-for-duty evaluation before he could be reinstated. Jones thereafter did not undergo the evaluation. [12] The Board rescheduled the reinstatement hearing to early June 2023, at which time Jones appeared and presented evidence. After the hearing, the Board terminated Jones on June 7, 2023, citing both his misdemeanor conviction and his failure to complete the fitness-for-duty process. It also denied his request for back pay. The Board specifically found that Jones “failed to complete any one of these requested testings,” “waffled between his desire to return to the department and retiring,” and engaged in “tactics in delaying any return to the Department.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, pp. 32-33. [13] Jones filed a complaint against City in the Cass Circuit Court, seeking judicial review of the Board’s action. The complaint sought Jones’s reinstatement to the Department, back pay, and unspecified other damages. The court ultimately affirmed the Board’s termination of Jones but reversed its denial of back pay. It ruled that once the Board placed Jones on administrative leave on January 31, 2018, the Board was statutorily prohibited from taking any other action, meaning the Board’s order changing Jones’s administrative leave from paid to unpaid was “void.” Id. at 14. The court determined that his unpaid status after disposition of his criminal charges “can only be construed as a suspension” for which the Board never offered a timely hearing as required by statute. Id. The Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 5 of 25 court ordered City to facilitate payment of the back pay and benefits to Jones but did not specify an amount of back pay. [14] City appealed but soon asked this Court to stay the appeal because no final judgment had been entered and to remand for a hearing on the amount of back pay. This Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice and remanded for further proceedings in the trial court. This Court noted that after entry of final judgment, any aggrieved party could appeal upon timely filing of a notice of appeal. [15] On March 14, 2025, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the damages owed by City to Jones. On June 13, 2025, City sought appointment of a new special judge under Indiana Trial Rule 53.2, given that more than ninety days had elapsed since the hearing without judgment being entered. Our Supreme Court appointed a new special judge who, in October 2025, awarded $307,606.18 in back pay for the period May 1, 2018, through June 7, 2023. [16] City filed a motion to correct error, which the new special judge denied. The order explained: Because Jones was not exonerated in the criminal matter, the Board would have been unable to authorize backpay [sic] to Jones for the period from May 1, 2018 (when Jones no longer received pay) until August 12, 2021 (when Jones was sentenced). However, the Board’s subsequent vote to place Jones on administrative leave without pay should have been stayed and Jones should have been entitled to pay during the administrative leave. . . . Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 6 of 25 Jones continued to go unpaid from August 13, 2021 (the day after his sentencing) until his June 7, 2023 termination. This Court determined Jones’s administrative-leave-without-pay status was actually a suspension under Indiana Code subsection 36-8-3- 4(c). . . . The Board was required by this subsection to offer Jones an opportunity for a hearing. Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 24. [17] Based on the Board’s alleged failure to offer Jones a hearing relating to the “suspension,” the special judge found that Jones was also entitled to back pay for the period August 13, 2021, through June 7, 2023. City appeals. Discussion and Decision [18] City argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the governing statutes in awarding back pay. As to the back pay awarded for the period that Jones’s criminal charges were pending, City contends the trial court erroneously interpreted the Administrative Leave Provision as barring the Board’s modification of its decision to place Jones on administrative leave with pay. See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). Any award of back pay for this period was prohibited by statute because Jones was not exonerated, according to City. [19] City also challenges the trial court’s determination that Jones’s unpaid leave was a suspension requiring a hearing under Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(c) (Disciplinary Hearing Provision). Jones largely adopts the trial court’s analysis, contends the lack of a disciplinary hearing violated his right to due process, and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 7 of 25 otherwise disputes City’s contentions.1 Jones does not challenge the Board’s ultimate termination of him—only its decisions denying him pay while on five years of administrative leave. I. Standard of Review [20] The standard of review here is layered. City appeals from the denial of its motion to correct error—a decision that is normally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ind. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Elmer, 171 N.E.3d 1045, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). But we review the matter de novo “when the resolution of a motion to correct error rests on an issue of statutory interpretation.” Id. [21] City claims the trial court violated the statutory standard governing the trial court’s review of the Board’s decision when it reversed the Board’s denial of back pay. Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(h) specifies that “[a] decision of the safety board is considered prima facie correct, and the burden of proof is on the party appealing.” This statute further provides that the appeal to the trial court “shall be heard de novo only upon any new issues related to the charges upon which the decision of the safety board was made.” Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(h). [22] This phrasing does not mean “that the issues at the hearing before the board are heard and determined anew, but rather that new issues are formed and 1 City and Jones raise additional issues, including waiver, equitable estoppel, whether any procedural defect rendered the Board’s action void or voidable, and the proper remedy. Given our disposition, we do not address them. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 8 of 25 determined.” City of N. Vernon v. Brading, 479 N.E.2d 619, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, 310 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ind. 1974)). Absent a genuinely new issue, “the job of the trial court” is to “look for an abuse of discretion by the Safety Board” rather than “to view each finding in a de novo fashion.” Burke v. City of Anderson, 612 N.E.2d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). [23] Within that framework, judicial review is confined to whether the Board had jurisdiction and whether its decision was made pursuant to proper procedures, rested on substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not violate a constitutional, statutory, or legal principle. Rynerson v. City of Franklin, 669 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Ind. 1996). “Substantial evidence ‘means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Peru City Police Dep’t v. Martin, 994 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Davis v. City of Kokomo, 919 N.E.2d 1213, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). “Neither the trial court nor this [C]ourt is permitted to reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility.” Id. [24] Questions of statutory interpretation, by contrast, are questions of law that, as noted earlier, we resolve de novo. Knox Cnty. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Davis, 100 N.E.3d 291, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Statutory interpretation underlies much of this dispute. The propriety of the trial court’s denial of City’s motion to correct error rests on the court’s interpretation of the Administrative Leave Provision and other sections of Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 9 of 25 [25] We conclude that the trial court misinterpreted Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4 and disregarded the deference owed the Board’s findings, and we therefore reverse. We divide the back pay award into two distinct periods: the pre-disposition period during which Jones was on administrative leave without pay while the criminal charges against Jones were pending (May 1, 2018, to August 12, 2021) and the post-disposition period after his conviction and sentencing (August 13, 2021, to June 7, 2023). Different rules govern each, but the awards for both periods necessitate reversal. II. The Pre-Disposition Period [26] City claims the Administrative Leave Provision permitted the Board to change Jones’s leave from paid to unpaid. This statutory provision specifies: If the member is subject to criminal charges, the board may place the member on administrative leave until the disposition of the criminal charges in the trial court. Any other action by the board is stayed until the disposition of the criminal charges in the trial court. An administrative leave under this subsection may be with or without pay, as determined by the board. If the member is placed on leave without pay, the board, in its discretion, may award back pay if the member is exonerated in the criminal matter. Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). [27] Neither City nor Jones claims this statute is ambiguous, although they differ in their interpretations of its meaning. Normally, “[i]f a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words and phrases ‘in their plain, ordinary, and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 10 of 25 usual sense.’” Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. 2018) (quoting KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898-99 (Ind. 2017)). We also consider the structure of the statute as a whole. West v. Off. of Ind. Sec’y of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016). “[I]nterpretations that depend on ‘selective reading of individual words’ that lead to irrational and disharmonizing results” are to be avoided. Id. at 355 (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. 2007)). If no ambiguity in the language exists, delving into legislative intent is unnecessary. Tom James Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 221 N.E.3d 1261, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012)). And, finally, as we interpret a statute, “we are mindful of both what it does say and what it does not say.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A. The Administrative Leave Provision Does Not Bar Revisions to Administrative Leave Once Ordered [28] The Board viewed the Administrative Leave Provision as authorizing it to modify Jones’s administrative leave from paid to unpaid. The trial court read the second sentence of the Administrative Leave Provision—“[a]ny other action by the board is stayed”—as freezing the Board’s initial choice of paid leave in place until the criminal case ended. The court concluded that the Board therefore had no authority on February 7, 2018, to change the leave from paid to unpaid. As a result, the unpaid leave order was void, according to the court, and Jones was entitled to back pay for that period. That reading of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 11 of 25 Administrative Leave Provision cannot be reconciled with the rest of the subsection or with our precedent. [29] In its first sentence, the Administrative Leave Provision expressly authorizes the Board to place a criminally charged member on administrative leave until the disposition of those charges. Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). The next sentence stays “[a]ny other action by the board” until that criminal case’s disposition. Id. The issue in this case is whether “[a]ny other action” includes a modification of the administrative leave from paid to unpaid. We conclude from the plain language of the Administrative Leave Provision that the answer is no, given its third sentence: “An administrative leave under this subsection may be with or without pay, as determined by the board.” Id. [30] The Administrative Leave Provision unambiguously grants to the Board the authority to place a criminally charged member on administrative leave and to determine whether that leave shall be paid or unpaid. It does not state that this authority applies only to initial decisions and not to later modifications based on changed circumstances. Reading “[a]ny other action” to limit the Board’s authority to set the pay status of administrative leave is inconsistent with the plain language of the entire Administrative Leave Provision. See West, 54 N.E.3d at 353 (requiring consideration of the statute as a whole). [31] The alternative interpretation endorsed by the trial court leads to illogical results. For instance, under that interpretation, the Board would have no authority to modify its decision to impose administrative leave with pay if, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 12 of 25 before disposition of serious criminal charges, the member publicly admits committing the charged offense. The governmental employer would have to continue to pay the member until the final disposition of the charges the member had already admitted, despite the conduct rendering the member unfit for service. And the statute identifies no means for the employer to recoup that pay after a conviction. We will not read the statute to produce such a result. See Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind. 2000) (“The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result.”). [32] The plain meaning of “[a]ny other action” is that it refers to actions other than the administrative leave decisions the Administrative Leave Provision authorizes, such as the formal disciplinary measures listed in Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(b) and (c): demotion, dismissal, reprimand, forfeiture, and suspension. That is also the reading the Board adopted. So read, the stay ensures that a board need not adjudicate conduct being prosecuted in criminal court before that court completes its work. Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). Changing the pay status of existing leave is not a separate “action”; it is part of managing the leave itself. [33] In Dennis v. Bd. of Pub. Safety of Fort Wayne, 944 N.E.2d 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), this Court explained that Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4 “provides the safety board may revisit its initial decision that the suspension should be unpaid.” Id. at 58. The Court further ruled that the board’s initial placement of the criminally charged member on leave is not a final decision at all, precisely because “how long the suspension would last,” “how much pay [the member] would forfeit,” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 13 of 25 and “whether [the member], if reinstated, would recover any of [the member’s] back pay” all remain open. Id. at 59. Applied here, Dennis supports the view that a decision leaving the pay question open is not frozen when made. The plain language of the Administrative Leave Provision authorized the Board’s modification of Jones’s leave to unpaid on February 7, 2018. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise. B. Because Jones Was Convicted, the Administrative Leave Provision Forecloses Back Pay for This Period [34] Jones was not entitled to recover the pay he was denied while on unpaid administrative leave before his criminal case was resolved. The final sentence of the Administrative Leave Provision permits back pay “if the member is exonerated in the criminal matter.” Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). Jones was not exonerated because he was not “clear[ed] from accusation or blame.” “Exonerate,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/exonerate (last visited October 21, 2026) https://perma.cc/XYN9-SRWB. Jones was convicted on the misdemeanor count. Although the jury acquitted him of the felonies, the statute asks whether the member was exonerated ‘in the criminal matter,’ and a conviction on any count forecloses that. The Administrative Leave Provision’s plain terms prohibit the very remedy the trial court granted: an award of back pay. [35] The trial court recognized that Jones’s conviction precluded the Board from ordering back pay, but the court nonetheless awarded it to him. In denying City’s motion to correct error, the court acknowledged that, “[b]ecause Jones Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 14 of 25 was not exonerated in the criminal matter, the Board would have been unable to authorize backpay [sic] to Jones for the period May 1, 2018 . . . until August 12, 2021.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 24. But the court concluded that the Board’s modification of the administrative leave to unpaid was “void” and that Jones should be treated as though he had remained on paid leave all along. That conclusion rested on the court’s erroneous view that the Administrative Leave Provision barred the modification. Because that premise fails, so does the court’s “void” conclusion, and the exoneration clause forecloses back pay for the pre-disposition period. C. No Disciplinary Hearing Was Required Before the Board Changed the Pay Status of Jones’s Leave [36] City claims the trial court erroneously determined that the modification to unpaid leave was a suspension exceeding five days that triggered the Disciplinary Hearing Provision. See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(c).2 In response, Jones adopts the trial court’s analysis. He further claims the Board’s failure to follow 2 Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(c) specifies in relevant part: Before a member of a police or fire department may be suspended in excess of five (5) days without pay, demoted, or dismissed, the safety board shall offer the member an opportunity for a hearing. If a member desires a hearing, the member must request the hearing not more than five (5) days after the notice of the suspension, demotion, or dismissal. Written notice shall be given either by service upon the member in person or by a copy left at the member’s last and usual place of residence at least fourteen (14) days before the date set for the hearing. The hearing conducted under this subsection shall be held not more than thirty (30) days after the hearing is requested by the member, unless a later date is mutually agreed upon by the parties. . . . The safety board shall determine if a member . . . who is suspended in excess of five (5) days shall continue to receive the member’s salary during the suspension. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 15 of 25 those hearing procedures in Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(c) violated his right to due process and, therefore, justified the trial court’s award of back pay. [37] A firefighter may hold a legally protected property interest in continued employment. City of Clinton v. Goldner, 885 N.E.2d 67, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Before deprivation of a protected right, due process ordinarily requires “notice and opportunity for hearing.” Howard v. Inc. Town of N. Judson, 661 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Ind. 1996). Because Jones was not suspended, demoted, or dismissed before his termination, he was not deprived of a protected interest without the process the statute provides. [38] In support of his claims, Jones relies on Dennis, in which this Court concluded that the member’s “indefinite unpaid [administrative] leave pending the outcome of the criminal charge [filed against him] was a suspension of greater than five days.” 944 N.E.2d at 57-58. We decline to extend Dennis for two reasons. [39] First, although Dennis referred to the administrative leave there as a “suspension,” it did so in deciding when judicial review ripens, not whether subsection (c) required a hearing. Id. at 58. Dennis did not mention the Disciplinary Hearing Provision. Dennis therefore did not rule that a board must convene a hearing under the Disciplinary Hearing Provision while criminal charges remain pending and before any request for back pay has been made. See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(c). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 16 of 25 [40] Second, even if Dennis is applicable, its analysis does not support a finding that entry of administrative leave without pay under the Administrative Leave Provision is a suspension that triggers the requirements of the Disciplinary Hearing Provision. See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(c). Neither party cites, nor have we found, any Indiana appellate decision resolving this question. The Board’s attorney took the position that the Disciplinary Hearing Provision was not activated by the Board’s administrative leave decisions under the Administrative Leave Provision. Exhs. Vol. III, p. 107; see Ind. Code § 36-8-3- 4(c), (n). The plain language of Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4 supports the Board’s position and points away from the contrary interpretation adopted by both the trial court and Jones. [41] The Administrative Leave Provision stays “other action” once the Board places “the member on administrative leave until the disposition of the criminal charges in the trial court.” Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). The Disciplinary Hearing Provision requires that the Board provide the member with the opportunity for a hearing before a “member may be suspended in excess of five (5) days without pay, demoted, or dismissed.” Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(c). [42] But the Board’s authority to enter a demotion, dismissal, or suspension in excess of five days without pay arises from a different provision within Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4—subsection (b) (Disciplinary Authority Provision). This subsection specifies: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 17 of 25 Except as provided in subsection (n), a member may be disciplined by demotion, dismissal, reprimand, forfeiture, or suspension upon either: (1) conviction in any court of any crime; or (2) a finding and decision of the safety board that the member has been or is guilty of any one (1) or more of the following: (A) Neglect of duty. (B) A violation of rules. (C) Neglect or disobedience of orders. (D) Incapacity. (E) Absence without leave. (F) Immoral conduct. (G) Conduct injurious to the public peace or welfare. (H) Conduct unbecoming an officer. (I) Another breach of discipline . . . . If a member is suspended or placed on administrative leave under this subsection, the member is entitled to the member’s allowances for insurance benefits to which the member was entitled before being suspended or placed on administrative leave. In addition, the local unit may provide the member’s allowances for any other fringe benefits to which the member was entitled before being suspended or placed on administrative leave. Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(b) (emphasis added). [43] The italicized language in the Disciplinary Authority Provision marks the first mention of administrative leave in that subsection and distinguishes Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 18 of 25 “administrative leave” from a “suspension.” Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(b). The earlier portion of the Disciplinary Authority Provision speaks only to “discipline[] by demotion, dismissal, reprimand, forfeiture, or suspension.” Id. This language in the Disciplinary Authority Provision shows that administrative leave is something different from a suspension, although the Disciplinary Authority Provision may encompass both. [44] By contrast, the Administrative Leave Provision, under which the Board acted, authorizes administrative leave only “[i]f the member is subject to criminal charges” and only until disposition of those charges. Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). This distinction between the Disciplinary Authority Provision and the Administrative Leave Provision reflects that administrative leave without pay under the Administrative Leave Provision cannot be a “suspension,” given that a “suspension” cannot arise solely from the filing of criminal charges. See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(b), (n). [45] We need not determine whether the Disciplinary Authority Provision reaches administrative leave generally because by its terms it does not apply here. The Board imposed administrative leave without pay under the Administrative Leave Provision because criminal charges had been filed against Jones. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 39, 42; Exhs. Vol. III, p. 107. The Board did not rely on any other grounds—including any of the circumstances listed in the Disciplinary Authority Provision—for its placement of Jones on administrative leave without pay. Id. Because the mere filing of criminal charges is not grounds for suspension under the Disciplinary Authority Provision, the administrative Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 19 of 25 leave cannot be a suspension that triggers the hearing requirements of the Disciplinary Hearing Provision. See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(b)-(c). [46] The statute’s structure also supports this result—that is, refusing to treat an administrative leave as a suspension when the administrative leave is based solely on the filing of criminal charges. When a disciplinary hearing occurs under Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(c), that statute allows a board to determine whether any resulting suspension will be paid or unpaid. If administrative leave were a suspension, the sentence in subsection (n) allowing leave “with or without pay” would duplicate the authority in subsection (c) to decide whether a suspension is paid. We avoid interpretations that render statutory language meaningless. ESPN, Inc., 62 N.E.3d at 1199. [47] For all these reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in determining that administrative leave without pay triggered the Disciplinary Hearing Provision. We likewise reject Jones’s argument that the Board’s failure to follow those disciplinary procedures violated his right to due process. III. The Post-Disposition Period [48] As the trial court and parties treated it, “disposition” of the criminal charges for purposes of the Administrative Leave Provision occurred when Jones was sentenced on August 12, 2021.3 See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(n). The stay in the 3 Jones did not appeal his conviction. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 20 of 25 Administrative Leave Provision therefore expired on that date, triggering a change in our analysis. See id. The trial court held that Jones’s continuing unpaid status after his sentencing became a suspension requiring a hearing under Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(c), that the Board failed to provide this hearing, and that the resulting defect entitled Jones to full back pay through his termination. In reaching these decisions, the trial court erroneously disregarded the Board’s factual findings. [49] The Board’s position, reflected in the record, was that Jones’s lack of pay after disposition resulted not from a suspension but from his own failure to pursue reinstatement. The Board determined that Jones failed to complete any of the requested tests, waffled between returning to the Department and retiring, failed to appear for the final test appointment, and engaged in delaying tactics. The Board added that it would not have awarded back pay in any event “because of the serious nature of the criminal offense and [Jones’s] tactics in delaying any return to the Department and refusing to even take any of the necessary Fit for Duty tests.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 33. The Board described Jones’s conduct as “a total failure of the testing.” Id. [50] Those findings rest on substantial evidence: the Fire Chief’s testimony, the sequence of scheduled and missed evaluations, Jones’s refusal to complete the drug screen and psychological portions when he had no medical excuse, and the June 2022 letter from Jones’s counsel stating that he “does not ultimately wish to return to work.” Exhs. Vol. III, p. 126. Under the deferential standard of review applicable to safety board decisions, the trial court could not engage Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-3273 | November 16, 2026 Page 21 of 25 in de novo factfinding. See Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(h). Such independent factfinding may occur on judicial review only on new issues. Id. Jones’s purported entitlement to pay while on administrative leave and whether he was justified in failing to undergo the evaluations were not new issues on which the trial court could e