Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Nov 13 2026, 8:54 am Michael W. Clark, CLERK Appellant-Plaintiff Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Elisa Mrozinski, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of James L. Clark, Deceased, and as a corporate officer of TransAmerican, Inc., Appellee-Defendant November 13, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-MI-538 Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court The Honorable Jeffrey L. Thorne, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46D03-2109-MI-1749 Opinion by Judge Scheele Judges May and Pyle concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 1 of 13 Scheele, Judge. Case Summary [1] Following a dispute regarding their late father’s estate, Michael W. Clark and Elisa Mrozinski entered into a mediation settlement agreement. Soon after, disagreements arose over the parties’ performances under that agreement, and the trial court issued an order in part resolving these disputes and ordering the parties to comply with the agreement. Later, Mrozinski filed a rule to show cause, asserting Clark had failed to comply with the court’s order and with the agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed and ordered sanctions. Clark now appeals. Facts and Procedural History [2] Clark and Mrozinski are half-siblings and the children of James L. Clark, who died intestate on September 8, 2021. For years prior to James’s death, Mrozinski acted as his power of attorney (POA), and following his death she was named personal representative of his estate. On September 15, Clark filed his verified action for mandate in the LaPorte Superior Court, requesting a written accounting of actions Mrozinski took as POA. 1 Thereafter, an estate case was opened in California to handle the disposition of property in that state. 1 An Indiana estate case was opened in September 2021. The trial court denied Clark’s request to consolidate that case with this one. In 2023, Clark filed a separate action seeking corporate records of TransAmerican, Inc., a corporation owned by James prior to his death and managed by Mrozinski for many years. That action was later consolidated under this cause number. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 2 of 13 For the next several years, the parties continued to litigate various issues relating to the estate. [3] On July 9, 2024, the parties participated in mediation and signed a mediation settlement agreement (the Agreement). The Agreement provided in relevant part that the estate would convey to Clark certain California real estate, and that Clark would purchase certain Indiana real estate from the estate. However, soon after the Agreement was executed, a dispute arose over the California real estate, and both parties accused the other of failing to perform under the Agreement. In August, both parties filed motions to enforce the Agreement, with Clark requesting in the alternative that the court terminate the Agreement. [4] On September 16, the court issued an order (the September 2024 Order) denying Clark’s motion and ordering the parties to proceed under the terms of the Agreement in good faith. The court stated that “any issues regarding the transfer of the . . . California property” were to be determined by the California court but specified it would retain jurisdiction over Clark’s contentions that Mrozinski failed to comply with the Agreement. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 93. [5] On October 31, Clark filed in the California estate case a series of objections, some of which argued the Agreement was unenforceable based on Mrozinski’s alleged failure to comply. In November, Mrozinski filed a rule to show cause, alleging Clark to be in contempt of court for failing to comply with the September 2024 Order and to have violated the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Rules by failing to comply with the Agreement. Specifically, Mrozinski argued the objections Clark filed in the California case were an attempt “to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 3 of 13 avoid the terms of the [Agreement]” and to “collaterally attack” the trial court’s September 2024 Order, which retained jurisdiction over Clark’s challenges to the Agreement. Id. at 98. [6] A hearing was held in December, after which the trial court took the matter under advisement pending the outcome of the California case. In May 2025, the California court issued an order denying Clark’s objections. Mrozinski then filed notice of this ruling with the trial court and again requested the court enforce the Agreement and award “attorney fees and costs incurred in enforcing” the Agreement. Id. at 141. A hearing was held in August, after which the court allowed both parties to file additional briefing. [7] In October, the trial court issued an order (the October 2025 Order) finding the following: 15. While CLARK certainly had the right to litigate in the California estate, the issues he had relative to whether or not the Preliminary Commitment to Title Insurance would constitute warrantable title free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, his objection to MROZINSKI’S Final Account and the entirety of Section 3 entitled: “The Settlement Agreement is Unenforceable” consisting of paragraphs 42 through 80, are in clear violation of Court’s Order of September 16, 2024. *** 19. CLARK’S actions in violation of this Court’s Order of September 16, 2024 were knowing and willing which constitutes contempt of court. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 4 of 13 20. As a result of CLARK’S failure to comply with the [Agreement], as well as this Court’s Order of September 16, 2024, MROZINSKI and the entities for which she serves as representative have incurred taxes, insurance and security expenses totaling $117,655.50 for which CLARK should be ordered to reimburse to MROZINSKI. 21. ADR 2.7(E)(3) and ADR 2.10 provides that the Court may impose sanctions including costs and attorney’s fees. MROZINSKI, personally, and the entities for whom she serves as representative, incurred attorneys’ fees totaling $51,617.75 plus expenses of $8,579.61 for a total of $60,197.36, which CLARK should be ordered to reimburse to MROZINSKI. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that MROZINSKI’S request for a finding of contempt against MICHAEL CLARK should be, and the same, is hereby granted and MICHAEL CLARK is found to be in contempt of this Court's Order of September 16, 2024. Id. at 199 (formatting altered). The final paragraph of the court’s order stated: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that MICHAEL CLARK be, and he is hereby ordered by way of sanctions and violation of the Court’s Order, to pay to Defendant, ELISA MROZINSKI, in her personal and representative capacities, the total sum of $177,852.86 payable within 45 days of the date of this Order. Failure to comply may result in further sanctions including, but not limited to, interest. Id. (formatting altered). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 5 of 13 [8] Clark filed a motion to correct error. Following a hearing on that motion, the court issued an order in January 2026 amending the final paragraph of the October 2025 Order to the following: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that MICHAEL CLARK be, and he is hereby ordered by way of sanctions under ADR 2.7(E)(3) and ADR Rule 2.10 and violation of the Court’s Order, to pay to Defendant, ELISA MROZINSKI, in her personal and representative capacities, additional expenses incurred including taxes, insurance and security totaling $117,655.50, as well as attorney’s fees of $51,617.75 plus expenses of $8,579.61 totaling $60,197.36 for a grand total of $177,852.86 payable within 45 days of the date of this Order. Failure to comply may result in further sanctions including, but not limited to, interest. Id. at 25 (formatting altered). The court ordered that “all other portions” of the October 2025 Order “shall remain in full force and effect.” Id. Clark now appeals. Discussion and Decision I. Waiver [9] We first address Mrozinski’s contention that Clark has waived certain arguments due to violations of our Indiana Appellate Rules. A failure to comply with our appellate rules can result in waiver of a claim. Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “Although we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant’s noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial that it impedes our appellate Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 6 of 13 consideration of the errors, we may deem the alleged errors waived.” Id. “We will not become an advocate for a party, nor will we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.” Id. (quotation omitted). [10] Clark’s first argument appears to be a challenge to the trial court’s finding of contempt. We note that both parties state that the trial court removed its finding of contempt in its amended order following Clark’s motion to correct error. 2 Thus, it is unclear why Clark is challenging a finding he claims was amended in his favor. Nonetheless, we find this argument waived for other reasons. Clark purports the trial court could not have found him in contempt for violating the September 2024 Order because that order violated his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. But Clark does not support this argument with any citation to specific legal authority, instead merely contending that he “cites the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and all decisional law construing it[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 26. 3 Such vague assertions do not comply with Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which requires each argument to be supported by citations to relevant legal authorities. Nor 2 Both parties contend the trial court removed its contempt finding when it amended its order following Clark’s motion to correct error. Our review of the record leaves us unconvinced. The trial court’s October 2025 Order includes a finding of contempt, a finding of ADR Rule violations, and an award of sanctions. The January 2026 Order amended only one paragraph of the October 2025 Order—a paragraph relating to damages—and stated all other parts of the October 2025 Order remain. Thus, it appears the contempt finding from the October 2025 Order survived the January 2026 Order. Nonetheless, because we find Clark’s challenge to the contempt finding is waived, this has no effect on the outcome of our decision. 3 We further note that Clark did not raise this issue in the trial court, and for that reason alone this argument is waived. Est. of Thompson v. Thompson, 284 N.E.3d 688, 696 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (“It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived, including constitutional issues.”). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 7 of 13 does Clark support his contention with cogent reasoning. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring each argument to be supported by cogent reasoning). [11] Clark next argues the trial court made “an error of contractual interpretation,” apparently as to the requirements of the Agreement. Appellant’s Br. p. 29. This argument again is not sufficiently supported by legal citation or cogent argument. See id. at 28-29. [12] We have previously stated: We demand cogent argument supported with adequate citation to authority because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal. A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator. Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990). A brief should not only present the issues to be decided on appeal, but it should be of material assistance to the court in deciding those issues. Hebel v. Conrail, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 652, 659 (Ind. 1985). On review, we will not search the record to find a basis for a party’s argument . . . nor will we search the authorities cited by a party in order to find legal support for its position. Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (footnote omitted). [13] Given the lack of cogent argument and citation to relevant legal authorities, we cannot address these arguments. However, where possible, we prefer to address arguments on their merits. Thus, we will address Clark’s arguments as to sanctions, as these are sufficiently developed so as not to meaningfully impede our review. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 8 of 13 II. Sanctions [14] Clark argues the court erred in ordering him to pay damages as a sanction for violating the ADR Rules. We generally review a case involving a sanction against one party made at the request of the opposing party for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Archer, 812 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. [15] Here, the trial court awarded sanctions under ADR Rules 2.10 and 2.7(E)(3). See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 25. ADR Rule 2.10 provides, “Upon motion by either party and hearing, the court may impose sanctions against any attorney, or party representative who fails to comply with these mediation rules, limited to assessment of mediation costs and/or attorney fees relevant to the process.” ADR Rule 2.7(E)(3) provides, “In the event of any breach or failure to perform under the agreement, upon motion, and after hearing, the court may impose sanctions, including entry of judgment on the agreement.” [16] Clark first asserts that sanctions were improper because he did not act in bad faith. But a showing of bad faith is not necessarily required. “[B]efore sanctioning a party for violating an ADR rule, trial courts should examine not only whether a rule violation has occurred, but also whether the violation was intentional or in bad faith and whether it resulted in prejudice to the party moving for sanctions.” Smith, 812 N.E.2d at 221. Here, while the court did not explicitly find Clark acted intentionally, it did find Clark’s actions were “knowing and willing[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 199. The record supports Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 9 of 13 this finding. The trial court’s September 2024 Order clearly retained jurisdiction over Clark’s challenges to the Agreement and ordered him to comply with the Agreement. Notwithstanding this order, the following month Clark filed a motion in another court attempting to challenge the enforceability of the Agreement. From this, we can infer that Clark acted intentionally in violating the ADR Rules. [17] Clark also argues the court should not have imposed sanctions following the show-cause hearing because Clark received “no notice” that the issue of damages would be presented at the hearing. Appellant’s Br. p. 31. We first note that Clark did not object to the hearing on this basis, nor did he request a continuance, and thus he has waived this argument on appeal. 4 See B.A. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 134, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding a party cannot argue they were denied notice where they failed to object or move for a continuance). Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion here. On May 28, 2025, Mrozinski filed a motion requesting an order enforcing the Agreement. The motion also requested Clark be ordered to pay “attorney fees and expenses incurred in the enforcement of the [Agreement].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 141. The court then set a hearing for August. This was sufficient notice to Clark that the issue of damages would be presented. Furthermore, after the presentation of 4 At the hearing, Mrozinski did “tender to the [c]ourt for filing a memorandum in support of the motion to enforce” which included “a summary of what” Mrozinski was requesting and what evidence she would present. Tr. Vol. II pp. 106-07. Clark objected to the memorandum on the basis that he had not had time to review it. But he did not object on this basis to any of the other evidence, nor did he object to the court holding the hearing or ask for a continuance. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 10 of 13 evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to submit additional briefing on the issue. Given this, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in holding the hearing and in making a determination as to damages. 5 III. Appellate Attorney Fees [18] Finally, Mrozinski contends Clark’s appeal “is an example of procedural bad faith” and asks us to remand for an award of appellate attorney fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E). Appellee’s Br. p. 24. Our court’s discretion to award Rule 66(E) appellate attorney fees is limited to circumstances where the appeal is “permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “[T]he sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit but something more egregious.” Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted), trans. denied. As such, our court exercises caution in awarding appellate attorney fees because of the “potentially chilling effect the award may have upon the exercise of the right to appeal.” Holland v. Steele, 961 N.E.2d 516, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. 5 The trial court ordered Clark to pay $177,852.86 in sanctions pursuant to ADR Rules 2.10 and 2.7(E)(3). At times, Clark appears to characterize the award as erroneous. See Appellant’s Br. p. 31 (arguing the award was a “travesty of justice); see also Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 21 (noting the trial court’s award was a “shocking injustice”). However, he makes no cogent argument challenging the sanction amount or type. Rather, he frames his argument only as a challenge to the court’s decision to hold a hearing on damages. We similarly confine our review to this issue. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 11 of 13 [19] Mrozinski argues appellate fees under Rule 66(E) are warranted here because Clark’s brief shows procedural bad faith. Procedural bad faith occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court. Thacker, 797 N.E.2d at 346-47. Mrozinski points to Clark’s “non-compliance with the appellate rules, the most glaring of which is the absence of cogent argument and citation of authorities” as well as various citation errors included in the brief. Appellee’s Br. p. 24. We agree Clark’s brief fails to comply with our appellate rules in these respects, at times resulting in waiver of his claims due to the hindrance of our review. Nonetheless, we “use extreme restraint when exercising our discretionary power to award attorney fees” and do not believe the violations here rise to such a level that appellate attorney fees are warranted under Rule 66(E). Wagner v. Spurlock, 803 N.E.2d 1174, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We therefore deny Mrozinski’s request. [20] Mrozinski next argues we should remand the case for the trial court to determine whether Clark’s violations of the ADR Rules warrant imposition of appellate attorney fees. “Simply because attorney fees may not be appropriately awarded by this court under our appellate rules, a trial court is not precluded from awarding reasonable fees for an appeal based upon another statute, rule, or agreement allowing for such an award.” Id. at 1185. As noted above, ADR Rule 2.10 allows for the award of sanctions, including attorney fees, against any Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 12 of 13 attorney or party representative who fails to comply with the mediation rules. And ADR Rule 2.7(E)(3) allows for the award of sanctions for breach or a failure to perform a mediation settlement agreement. We thus remand for the trial court to consider whether appellate attorney fees are warranted here. See id. (determining attorney fees were not warranted under Rule 66(E) but nonetheless remanding for the trial court to determine whether such fees were warranted under the ADR Rules). [21] Affirmed and remanded. May, J., and Pyle, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Michael T. Sawyier Chesterton, Indiana Benjamin T. Ballou Crown Point, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Robert J. Palmer R. William Jonas, Jr. May Oberfell Lorber LLP Mishawaka, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-538 | November 13, 2026 Page 13 of 13