Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Joy Rugenstein, FILED Appellant-Respondent Oct 20 2026, 9:04 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court v. Court of Appeals and Tax Court Tyson Rugenstein, Appellee-Petitioner October 20, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-DC-2926 Appeal from the Morgan Circuit Court The Honorable Matthew G. Hanson, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 55C01-2309-DC-1626 Opinion by Judge May Judges Pyle and Scheele concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 1 of 8 May, Judge. [1] Joy Rugenstein (“Mother”) appeals following the dissolution of her marriage to Tyson Rugenstein (“Father”). She contends the trial court violated her right to due process when it issued its provisional order. Because Mother was not denied due process, we affirm. Facts and Procedural History [2] Mother and Father are the parents of Child. On September 14, 2023, Father filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and a motion for a provisional order. The trial court heard evidence over multiple days related to the motion for a provisional order. Mother appeared at hearings on November 28, 2023, and December 20, 2023. Following the December hearing, the trial court set the matter for another evidentiary hearing on January 19, 2024. On January 19, 2024, the trial court met in-chambers with the parties’ attorneys, but it did not hear any additional evidence related to the motion for a provisional order. Later that day, the trial court issued a provisional order granting Father custody of Child and ordering that Mother should have visitation with Child in accordance with a counselor’s recommendation. The order also required Mother to vacate the marital residence by January 31, 2024. [3] The dissolution action then continued before the trial court for approximately twenty-two months. The trial court held the final hearings over four days in 2025: September 15, September 16, October 6, and November 7. On November 13, 2025, the trial court issued a final decree of dissolution. The trial court Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 2 of 8 awarded Father full physical and legal custody of Child. The trial court also ordered that Mother be allowed supervised visits with Child for six hours every Sunday. Mother then filed this appeal. [4] After we obtained jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal, she filed a motion pursuant to Appellate Rule 31 asking us to remand the case back to the trial court so that she could file a statement of evidence related to the January 19, 2024 attorney conference because that proceeding was not recorded. We granted the motion and remanded the case back to the trial court. On March 4, 2026, Mother filed her verified statement of evidence with the trial court. In that statement, Mother asserted that she was available to testify on January 19, 2024, but she was not called to testify. On March 9, 2026, the trial court issued an order related to Mother’s verified statement of evidence. In that order, the trial court found: 4) That on January 19, 2024 the matter was set for a provisional hearing. 5) That on January 19, 2024 the attorneys and court met in chambers and no hearing was conducted. 6) That the court is unable to certify anything as requested by the Appellant as there was no court hearing, no transcript, no presentation of evidence and no decision made by the court from any hearing on January 19, 2024. (Amended Notice of Completion of Clerk’s Record.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 3 of 8 Discussion and Decision [5] We note at the outset that Mother proceeds pro se. We hold pro se litigants to the same standard as trained attorneys and afford them no inherent leniency because of their self-represented status. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Pro se litigants must “follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “One of the risks that a [litigant] takes when he decides to proceed pro se is that he will not know how to accomplish all of the things that an attorney would know how to accomplish.” Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We will not become an “advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. [6] In addition, Father elected not to file an appellee’s brief. “When the appellee fails to file a brief on appeal, we may reverse the trial court’s decision if the appellant makes a prima facie showing of reversible error. In this context, prima facie error is defined as at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Walking with Jesus Ministries v. Alexander, 240 N.E.3d 183, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Still, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 4 of 8 [7] Mother contends that the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process when it conducted the January 19, 2024, proceeding in chambers and did not record it so that a transcript could be prepared.1 She requests that we “vacate all orders entered or enforced on or after January 19, 2024, and remand for immediate remedial proceedings consistent with due process.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) [8] We review constitutional claims de novo. 624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Hous. Auth., 193 N.E.3d 381, 384 (Ind. 2022). The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “[T]he fundamental requirement of procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012). Here, the trial court held two evidentiary hearings before entering the provisional order, and Mother attended both hearings.2 [9] Mother emphasizes that a transcript of the January 19, 2024, attorney conference is not available because the conference was not recorded. However, 1 Mother’s notice of appeal identified several additional issues for appeal, but Mother failed to present cogent argument regarding any of those issues in her brief. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal[.]”). Therefore, those issues are waived. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 137-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding appellant waived all issues on appeal because of his failure to present cogent argument). 2 Mother failed to provide a transcript of the two evidentiary hearings on the provisional order, so we are unaware of what evidence was presented at those hearings. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 5 of 8 Indiana Appellate Rule 31 outlines the procedure by which a party may supplement the record if no transcript or evidence is available. Rule 31(A) provides: If no Transcript of all or part of the evidence is available, a party or the party’s attorney may prepare a verified statement of the evidence from the best available sources, which may include the party’s or the attorney’s recollection. The party shall then file a motion to certify the statement of evidence with the trial court or Administrative Agency. The statement of evidence shall be submitted with the motion. After the opposing party is afforded the opportunity to respond to a party’s verified statement of the evidence, the trial court “shall, after a hearing, if necessary, certify a statement of the evidence, making any necessary modifications to statements proposed by the parties.” Ind. App. R. 31(C). If the trial court’s actions or conduct are in controversy, and the trial court refuses to certify a party’s statement of the evidence, “the trial court judge . . . shall file an affidavit setting forth his or her recollection of the disputed statements or conduct.” Ind. App. R. 31(D). [10] Mother availed herself of the procedure outlined in Rule 31. She filed a verified statement of evidence noting that she was available to testify on January 19, 2024, and had discussed anticipated testimony with her attorney, but she was not called to testify on that date. Mother’s verified statement did not make any assertion regarding what was said between the trial court and counsel on that date. She also did not include a verified statement from her attorney relaying Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 6 of 8 his recollection of what occurred during the unrecorded conference. The trial court then submitted an affidavit regarding Mother’s verified statement of evidence in which it explained that it did not hold an evidentiary hearing on that date. The only thing that occurred was an attorney conference. Rule 31 afforded Mother an adequate opportunity to supplement the record regarding what occurred during the conference, and thus, her right to procedural due process was not violated. See, e.g., Ruetz v. State, 373 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ind. 1978) (holding requirement that defendant submit a statement of evidence because a transcript of his trial could not be prepared did not violate his right to due process). Therefore, we affirm the trial court.3 3 We affirm, but we do not pass over the state of this record in silence. The January 19, 2024, proceeding – a scheduled provisional hearing following which the trial court entered a two-page provisional order concerning child custody, directing Mother to vacate the marital residence, and ordering the marital home listed for sale – was not recorded, and no transcript exists. “Courts of record should record all proceedings they conduct,” and where a proceeding is not recorded, should “secure a waiver of recording on the record to leave no doubt in the minds of all of those involved as to the status of the record.” Graddick v. Graddick, 779 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Ind. T.R. 74(A) (Trial courts “shall arrange for the audio recording of all hearings and trials in all case types.”). Neither occurred here. Indiana Appellate Rule 31(D) is reserved for the circumstance in which “the statements or conduct of the trial court judge . . . are in controversy” and the judge declines to certify the moving party’s statement. On remand, rather than certify a statement of what occurred with counsel in chambers, the trial court filed an affidavit averring that no hearing was conducted and no decision was made from any hearing on January 19, 2024. That averment is difficult to reconcile with the chronological case summary, which reflects that a hearing on the motion for a provisional order “commenced and concluded” on that date, (Notice of Filing Verified Statement of the Evidence at 25), and that the provisional order was entered that same day. We need not resolve that obvious tension between the record and the trial court’s averment, however, to conclude that Mother’s constitutional right to procedural due process was not violated because she was afforded the opportunity to supplement the record. Nevertheless, we note the tension to make clear that the trial court should have recorded the proceeding. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 7 of 8 Conclusion [11] Mother’s right to procedural due process was not violated. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.4 [12] Affirmed. Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Joy Rugenstein Appellant, Pro Se 4 While Mother’s appeal remained under consideration, she filed several motions. We deny all pending motions by separate order issued concurrently with this opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2926 | October 20, 2026 Page 8 of 8