Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Nov 02 2026, 9:17 am Christopher T. Chisler, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court Appellant-Respondent v. Krysta Chisler, Appellee-Petitioner November 2, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-DR-880 Appeal from the Hancock Circuit Court The Honorable Christopher J. Evans, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 30C01-1309-DR-1638 Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Mathias and Pyle concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 1 of 20 Weissmann, Judge. [1] Krysta Chisler (Mother) petitioned for a modification of child support from Christopher Chisler (Father). The trial court ordered Father to pay increased child support to Mother for his two children (Children), a child support arrearage retroactive to the first Friday following the filing date of Mother’s petition, part of Children’s preadmittance postsecondary educational expenses, and attorney and expert fees. On appeal, Father challenges: the calculation of his income; a credit accorded to Mother for child health insurance premiums; his arrearage payment schedule; his preadmittance postsecondary educational obligation; and the award of fees to Mother. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. Facts [2] Mother and Father’s marriage was dissolved in 2014. Mother is a nurse practitioner, and Father is a dentist. Under a 2020 order, Mother was granted physical custody of Children, and Father was ordered to pay $220 per week in child support. Mother’s current spouse pays health insurance premiums for Children, while Mother pays premiums for the Children’s vision insurance. [3] Father has an interest in three businesses. He and his current spouse formed Detail Dental, LLC in 2019, while Mother had a previous child support petition pending. According to Detail Dental’s operating agreement, Father owns 10%, and his spouse owns 90%, although she invested no capital into the company. Tax records indicate Father works for the company full-time. His spouse, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 2 of 20 meanwhile, devotes no time to Detail Dental and has her own dental practice. In 2024, Detail Dental distributed around $310,000 to Father and his spouse in a 10:90 split. And the company deducted from its income over $37,000 in meal, travel, and entertainment expenses. Detail Dental purchased a Tesla Cybertruck costing around $130,000 for Father’s use in 2024. The company took a tax deduction for the purchase price as depreciation, then sold the truck the same year for $55,000. [4] Father also owns 50% of Indy Ohana, LLC and 100% of Tulsa Properties. Indy Ohana leases commercial real estate to Detail Dental and other tenants, while Tulsa Properties leases two residential parcels. The record shows Indy Ohana generated an aggregate net income over $34,000 across 2023 and 2024, and it distributed over $96,000 in that period. One of Tulsa Properties’s parcels produced net income of $5,444 in 2024. Between them, Indy Ohana and Tulsa Properties deducted from their income $35,519 for depreciation of real estate purchases in 2024. [5] In 2024, Mother petitioned to modify child support. During two evidentiary hearings in 2025, the trial court heard testimony from Mother, Father, and each party’s financial expert witness. In March 2026, the court entered written findings and conclusions. It calculated Father’s annual income as $470,917 and Mother’s as $130,002. [6] As relevant to this appeal, the court ordered Father to pay: • $964 per week in child support; Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 3 of 20 • a $39,265 arrearage accrued as of November 14, 2025, in a lump sum within 30 days, plus any additional undisputed arrearage within 90 days (or, if disputed, in accordance with a supplemental order); • 78% of Children’s preadmittance postsecondary educational expenses, “such as college applications, SAT/ACT testing, Dual and/or College Credit Courses taken in high school and deposit fees”; and • $15,000 toward Mother’s attorney fees and $5,000 toward her expert fees within 60 days. App. Vol. II, p. 53. Discussion and Decision [7] Father contends that the trial court erred in ordering each of the payments listed above. In addressing his arguments, we follow the “well-established preference in Indiana ‘for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.’” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)). [8] “Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, our review is for clear error under Trial Rule 52(A).” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026). “In conducting this review, we determine whether the evidence supports the court’s findings and whether those findings support the court’s judgment.” Id. “We do not reassess witnesses’ credibility or reweigh evidence.” Id. “And we will reverse only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 4 of 20 I. Father’s Income [9] We reframe Father’s challenges to the calculation of his income as four alleged errors and address them individually. A. Detail Dental Distributions and Expenses [10] The trial court included 50% of the around $310,000 in distributions from Detail Dental in Father’s income. The court also found that 50% of the more than $37,000 in meal, travel, and entertainment expenses deducted by Detail Dental in 2024 was unnecessary for generating income and included 50% of those non-business-related expenses in Father’s income too. [11] Father argues the trial court erred in including 50% of the distributions and expenses because he formally owns just 10% of Detail Dental, and his spouse 90%. He maintains the court “made no finding that this allocation was fraudulent or a sham designed to evade” child support. Appellant’s Br., p. 18. Father also claims his expert’s analysis of the disputed expenses shows he benefited from less than 10% of them. Mother responds that the court “made additional findings about the economic reality” that show Father receives much more than 10% of the benefits from the distributions and expenses. Appellee’s Br., p. 13. [12] Generally, the income of a parent’s spouse is not included in the parent’s weekly gross income for child-support purposes. Stanke v. Schmitt, 273 N.E.3d 89, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). But under Indiana’s Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”), weekly gross income includes not only a parent’s traditional Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 5 of 20 forms of income like a salary and partnership distributions, but also “potential income if unemployed or underemployed” and “‘in kind’ benefits received by the parent.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1). “Both types of income may come into play when a parent remarries, and the new relationship affects the parent’s employment or reduces the parent’s living expenses.” Stanke, 273 N.E.3d at 96. “Whether or not the value of in-kind benefits should be included in a parent’s weekly gross income is fact-sensitive and requires careful consideration of the evidence in each case.” Child Supp. G. 3(A) cmt. 2(d). “[R]egular and continuing payments made by a . . . subsequent spouse . . . that reduce the parent’s costs for housing, utilities, or groceries, may be included as gross income.” Id. Weekly gross income also includes “gifts.” Child Supp. G. 3(A)(1). And personal expenses paid by a parent’s closely held business may be included in the parent’s income. Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100, 107–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). [13] Here, the trial court’s findings support including 50% of Detail Dental’s distributions in Father’s income based on economic reality. Father formally owns 10% of the company but works there full-time. His spouse, by contrast, devotes no time to the company. Nor did she invest money in it in exchange for her 90% ownership stake (though Father testified she provided collateral for a loan). These ownership shares were allocated when the company was formed, at a time when Mother had a pending motion to modify child support. These findings support an inference that Father under-compensates himself for his work as a dentist. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 6 of 20 [14] The trial court further found that 60% of Detail Dental’s 2024 distributions were used for Father’s individual benefit or the joint benefit of Father and his spouse—namely, joint tax returns and vacations for Father and his spouse, reimbursement for their personal vehicle that was stolen, and a bank transfer to Father’s account. These findings support an inference that Father’s spouse supports him by means of in-kind benefits and gifts funded from her share of the distributions. Given this economic reality, the trial court was not obligated to assign Father just 10% of the Detail Dental distributions. [15] As for Detail Dental’s meal, travel, and entertainment expenses, Father’s expert analyzed a “sampling” to assess the balance of business and personal benefits, and she analyzed “whether or not [Father] participated in” each expense. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 93, 128. She concluded that less than 10% of the expenses benefited Father personally. But Mother’s expert criticized the sample as too small to reliably reflect the balance of personal versus business benefits. He assessed that 50% of Detail Dental’s expenses were not business-related and provided a “conservative” estimate that 50% of those personal expenses benefited Father. Id. at 29. He reached this conclusion because Father drew benefits from Detail Dental for himself and Children, while Father’s current spouse presumably drew benefits for herself from her own practice. Id. Additionally, Father’s expert stated on cross-examination that she had not counted Children’s expenses toward Father’s income when calculating Father’s 10% share of the expenses. Given the discrepancies between the experts’ calculations and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 7 of 20 opinions, the trial court could reasonably find Mother’s expert more persuasive and adopt his conclusions. We will not reweigh that credibility determination. [16] For these reasons, Father fails to show that the trial court erred in calculating his share of the Detail Dental distributions and expenses. B. Indy Ohana Distributions [17] For 2023, Father’s 50% share of Indy Ohana’s distributions was $45,668. And for 2024, his share was $2,500. The trial court roughly averaged these figures to $24,000 and included that figure in Father’s annual income. [18] Father argues the 2023 figure was inflated by a tenant’s “one-time lease buyout” and the court’s $24,000 average did not, therefore, reflect his regular income from Indy Ohana. Appellant’s Br., p. 25. Mother contends, however, that the “2023 income was inflated and 2024 income deflated because [the tenant] prepaid the lease.” Appellee’s Br., p. 17. [19] Father fails to demonstrate error. His own expert stated that the tenant “prepaid the monies for 2024 in 2023.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 99. Thus, the trial court appropriately averaged the 2023 and 2024 distributions to account for the distorting effect of the prepayment. C. Real Estate Depreciation [20] The trial court included in Father’s income $35,519 in tax-deductible depreciation for properties owned through Indy Ohana and Tulsa Properties. The court found that the “parcels subject to depreciation appear to be long-term Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 8 of 20 investments” and “produce minimal income.” App. Vol. II, p. 45. Nor was evidence presented, the court continued, “as to necessary repairs or costs actually expended such that could otherwise offset adding back the entirety of the depreciation deduction.” Id. [21] Father maintains the trial court should have deducted depreciation from his income because “the properties at issue . . . are actively leased commercial and residential properties that generate rental income.” Appellant’s Br., p. 22. But Mother argues the court’s findings support its conclusion and contends the Guidelines do “not require a reasonable deduction for necessary capital expenditures.” Appellee’s Br., p. 17. [22] In federal tax law, “[d]epreciation is an annual income tax deduction that allows you to recover the cost or other basis of certain property over the time you use the property.” How To Depreciate Property, IRS Pub. 946, at *3 (Mar. 13, 2026). “To claim depreciation on property, you must use it in your business or income-producing activity.” Id. at *6. However, “the deductions allowed by the Guidelines may differ significantly from those allowed for tax purposes.” Child Supp. G. 3(A) cmt. 2(a). Thus, “depreciation, although properly calculated for tax purposes, may be overstated for purposes of determining income to measure child support.” Glass v. Oeder, 716 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ind. 1999). [23] In the Guidelines, weekly gross income “from . . . rent . . . is defined as gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses.” Child Supp. G. 3(A)(2). “In general, these types of income and expenses from . . . operation of a business Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 9 of 20 should be carefully reviewed to restrict the deductions to reasonable out of pocket expenditures necessary to produce income.” Id. “The trial court has broad discretion, but should have as a goal the direction of Guideline 3(A)(2) to measure ‘a reasonable yearly deduction for necessary capital expenditures.’” Glass, 716 N.E.2d at 417 (quoting Child Supp. G. 3(A)(2)). [24] Here, the record shows over $34,000 in aggregate net income for Indy Ohana across 2023 and 2024, and $5,444 net income for one of Tulsa Properties’s parcels in 2024. And the trial court included $24,000 in annual distributions from Indy Ohana in Father’s income—which does not square with its finding that Father’s properties generated “minimal” rental income. App. Vol. II, p. 45. Under Guideline 3(A)(2), Father may deduct from his rental income a reasonable amount for necessary, income-generating capital expenditures. Hence, the trial court erred in allowing Father no deduction for the cost of the Indy Ohana and Tulsa Properties rental units. On remand, the trial court should deduct an amount reasonably related to the rental income produced. D. Vehicle Benefit [25] The trial court included in Father’s income the Tesla Cybertruck that Detail Dental purchased for Father’s use in 2024. The court calculated the value of this in-kind vehicle benefit to Father as the $130,000 deduction Detail Dental took for depreciation minus a $75,000 loss sustained upon the truck’s sale, for a total of $55,000. The truck was sold before the hearings in this case. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 10 of 20 [26] Father argues the trial court’s methodology “conflates [Detail Dental’s] own depreciation-and-loss accounting with the separate question of [his] personal fringe benefit from his use of [the truck].” Appellant’s Br., p. 28. And, he adds, the court erroneously treated the vehicle benefit as an ongoing component of his income even though the truck was sold before the hearings. Mother responds that the trial court’s calculation “was derived from evidence about the vehicle’s cost, depreciation, use, sale, and loss.” Appellee’s Br., p. 19. [27] A “company car that may be used for personal travel” contributes to a parent’s income. Child Supp. G. 3(A) cmt. 2. Here, the truck’s value to Father could have been calculated based on the “personal living expenses” it saved Father. Child Supp. G. 3(A)(2). But the truck was also an asset of Detail Dental, which Father part-owns and draws benefits from. We understand, therefore, why the trial court calculated the truck’s value to Father using its depreciation value minus the loss sustained on its sale. But, in that case, the trial court should have allocated to Father’s income either a 10% share, based on his ownership stake in Detail Dental, or, if appropriate, the 50% share the court applied to the company’s distributions and expenses. [28] More fundamentally, we see no reason to treat the truck as an ongoing component of Father’s income, rather than as an element of his 2024 income. The depreciation deduction was a one-time event, and the truck was sold before the hearings. On remand, the trial court should reconsider whether the record supports including any vehicle benefit in Father’s ongoing income and, if so, recalculate its value. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 11 of 20 II. Health Insurance Credit [29] Father argues the trial court erroneously credited Mother $21.76 per week in child health insurance premiums that Mother’s current spouse pays. Mother responds that she pays $5.52 weekly for Children’s vision insurance herself, although the record shows that figure includes coverage for Mother’s family: Mother and her spouse, as well as Children. Mother also argues she should be credited the entire $21.76 because it is an expense borne by her household. [30] We apply the Guidelines’ text to the record to resolve this issue. “The weekly cost of health insurance premiums for the child(ren) should be added to the basic obligation whenever either parent actually incurs the premium expense or a portion of such expense.” Child Supp. G. 3(E)(2) (emphasis added). “The parent who pays the weekly premium cost for the child(ren)’s health insurance should receive a credit towards his or her child support obligation in most circumstances.” Child Supp. G. 3(G)(3) (emphasis added). And “[i]n circumstances where coverage is applicable to persons other than the child(ren) subject of the child support order, such as . . . a subsequent spouse, the total cost of the insurance premium shall be prorated by the number of persons covered to determine a per person cost.” Child Supp. G. 3(E) cmt. 2 (emphasis added). [31] Applying these principles, the trial court should have credited Mother for no more than the $2.76 she directly pays in prorated weekly vision insurance premiums for Children. See Ashworth v. Ehrgott, 934 N.E.2d 152, 162 (Ind. Ct. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 12 of 20 App. 2010) (“a parent should receive a health insurance credit in an amount equal to the premium cost the parent actually pays for a child’s health insurance.”). III. Arrearage Schedule [32] The trial court ordered Father to pay a $39,265 arrearage retroactively accrued from the Friday following the filing date of Mother’s petition up to November 14, 2025, in a lump sum within 30 days on the basis that he had “the financial resources” to do so. App. Vol. II, p. 51. The court further ordered Father to pay any additional undisputed arrearage within 90 days and $20,000 in attorney and expert fees within 60 days. [33] Father argues no substantial evidence established his “actual liquid ability to pay” the initial arrearage within 30 days, considering the other obligations the order imposed. Appellant’s Br., pp. 30–31. Mother responds that the record reflects that Father has substantial resources adequate to pay in compliance with the schedule. Although Father’s arrearage will change on remand, we address this issue to facilitate resolution of this case.1 [34] A trial court should “determine a reasonable arrearage payment schedule.” In re Paternity of J.M., 3 N.E.3d 1073, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Here, the record contains substantial evidence that Father has significant financial resources 1 Father represented to the trial court in May 2026 that he had tendered both his initial arrearage payment and Mother’s attorney and expert fees. See infra ¶¶ 42–44. Mother has not asked us to deem these issues moot. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 13 of 20 adequate to pay the arrearage as ordered. He admitted putting 90% of his net income from his salary of around $160,000 into investment accounts. The trial court also included 50% of around $310,000 in distributions from Detail Dental in Father’s income. And he recently made gains from selling his home and transitioning to renting a smaller one. Additionally, Father is an owner or part- owner of real estate worth several million dollars through his rental companies, Detail Dental was able to provide him with a $130,000 vehicle for his personal use, and his current spouse purchased a house in Hawaii in their joint names— all of which corroborate Father’s access to financial resources and assets. What’s more, Father admitted he has a joint bank account with his spouse that he failed to disclose in discovery. It remains unclear, however, what debt obligations Father and his businesses are carrying, or how soon he can liquidate his assets. [35] Despite this small gap in the evidence, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father has the resources to pay a significant arrearage as ordered. We therefore find no error on this issue. IV. Preadmittance Postsecondary Educational Expenses [36] Father argues the trial court lacked statutory authority under Indiana Code § 31-16-6-2 to order him to pay preadmittance postsecondary educational expenses, including “college applications, SAT/ACT testing, [and] Dual Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 14 of 20 and/or College Credit Courses taken in high school.”2 App. Vol. II, p. 53. He also contends the court erred in failing to consider whether Children can contribute toward their expenses. Mother responds that dual-credit courses are secondary educational expenses and that the other items are “consistent with Guideline 8’s direction that educational support be tailored to the child’s needs and the parties’ ability to pay.” Appellee’s Br., p. 24. [37] A child support order may “include, where appropriate . . . amounts for the child’s education in elementary and secondary schools and at postsecondary educational institutions, taking into account . . . the child’s aptitude and ability,” their “reasonable ability to contribute to educational expenses” through work, loans, or financial aid, and “the ability of each parent to meet these expenses.” Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2(a)(1). [38] Guideline 8 further provides that “[e]xtraordinary educational expenses may be for elementary, secondary or post-secondary education, and should be limited to reasonable and necessary expenses for attending private or special schools, institutions of higher learning, and trade, business or technical schools to meet the particular educational needs of the child.” Child Supp. G. 8. Courts “should consider post-secondary education to be a group effort, and weigh the ability of each parent to contribute to payment of the expense, as well as the ability of the student to pay a portion of the expense.” Child Supp. G. 8(b). “If the court 2 Father does not dispute postsecondary “deposit fees.” See App. Vol. II, p. 53. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 15 of 20 determines that an award of post-secondary educational expenses is appropriate, it should apportion the expenses between the parents and the child, taking into consideration the incomes and overall financial condition of the parents and the child, education gifts, education trust funds, and any other education savings program.” Id. “[E]ducational expenses . . . will generally include tuition, books, lab fees, course related supplies, and student activity fees.” Id. “Room and board may be included when the child does not reside with either parent.” Id. [39] Father argues that, because application and admissions testing fees are incurred before a child is admitted to a postsecondary institution like a college, they fall outside a court’s authority to order “amounts for the child’s education . . . at postsecondary educational institutions.” Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). We decline to read the statute so narrowly or to place so much weight on the preposition “at.” Rather, we “avoid interpretations that depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational and disharmonizing results,” Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023) (quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)), and “presume the ‘legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and goals,’” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019)). [40] We conclude that application and admissions testing fees are expenses “for the child’s education . . . at postsecondary educational institutions” because they are generally indispensable to gaining a postsecondary education. Ind. Code § Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 16 of 20 31-16-6-2(a)(1). We do not believe the General Assembly intended parents to share in the expense of undertaking postsecondary education but not in the expense of applying. We also conclude that dual-credit courses are part of a “child’s education in . . . secondary schools.” Id. Hence, the trial court was authorized to order amounts for the disputed expenses.3 [41] However, the trial court failed to consider Children’s ability to contribute toward their application and admissions testing fees. On remand, the court should conduct this analysis—just as it did for other postsecondary educational expenses—and revise Father’s obligation as necessary. V. Attorney and Expert Fees [42] Finally, Father contests the order to pay $20,000 toward Mother’s attorney and expert fees within 60 days. The trial court found “a substantial disparity of income between the parties,” that Mother had paid over $40,000 in attorney and expert fees, that Father had paid no attorney fees, and that he had “the financial resources to contribute towards Mother’s fees.” App. Vol. II, pp. 50– 51. Father argues the trial court failed to determine either that Mother’s fees were reasonable or that he was able to pay $20,000 within 60 days on top of his other obligations. Mother responds that the “substantial income disparity and Father’s ability to contribute” justify the fee-shifting award, as does Father’s 3 Father briefly argues the trial court failed to consider whether Mother alone wishes to provide Children with any benefits deemed secondary educational expenses. But Father testified that he invests money in “529s,” from which the trial court could infer he concurs in funding dual-credit classes. Tr. Vol. III, p. 51. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 17 of 20 approach to the litigation. Appellee’s Br., p. 25. She also claims her expert “materially assisted the court rather than merely duplicating an advocacy position.” Id. at 26. [43] A trial court “may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for” attorney fees and legal services in a child support case. Ind. Code § 31-16-11-1(a). Trial courts are considered to be experts on attorney fees “and may judicially know what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Glover v. Torrence, 723 N.E.2d 924, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Both parties cite Eads v. Eads, which states that “trial courts should consider the parties’ resources, their economic condition, their ability to engage in gainful employment and earn income, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award.” 114 N.E.3d 868, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “A party’s misconduct that directly results in additional litigation expenses may also be considered.” Id. “When one party is in a superior position to pay fees over the other party, an award is proper.” Id. [44] Here, we find no grounds to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The court awarded around half of the fees Mother requested, and Father cites no evidence or case law to suggest the award was unreasonable or excessive. Father does not dispute that he has superior financial resources. And, as previously discussed, the record demonstrates he has access to considerable funds. The court also found that Father had an undisclosed joint bank account and “complicated the disclosure of financial records.” App. Vol. II, p. 47. We will not reweigh the trial court’s determination that its fee order was reasonable. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 18 of 20 Conclusion [45] We affirm the trial court as to: • distributions and expenses from Detail Dental; • distributions from Indy Ohana; • the arrearage payment schedule; • dual-credit course fees; and • the award of attorney and expert fees. [46] But we reverse as to: • the denial of a deduction for income-generating capital expenditures on Indy Ohana’s and Tulsa Properties’s rental properties; • the calculation of a vehicle benefit for 2024 based on the Tesla Cybertruck and the inclusion and calculation of an ongoing vehicle benefit based on the truck; • the amount of Mother’s health insurance credit; and • Father’s portion of postsecondary application and admissions testing fees. [47] On remand, we instruct the trial court to: • deduct from Father’s income a reasonable amount for capital expenditures on Indy Ohana’s and Tulsa Properties’s income-generating rental properties; • reconsider whether to include a vehicle benefit in Father’s ongoing income and the value of any such benefit; • adjust Mother’s health insurance credit to $2.76 per week; • recalculate Father’s child support obligation and arrearage in accordance with this decision; and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 19 of 20 • reconsider Father’s postsecondary application and admissions testing obligation under Guideline 8(b)’s “group effort” approach. Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Denise F. Hayden Lacy Law Office, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Janet L. Manship Manship Law Office Fortville, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DR-880 | November 2, 2026 Page 20 of 20