Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Jordan Fleschner, Nov 04 2026, 9:23 am Appellant-Petitioner CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Rachel Scheid, Appellee-Respondent November 4, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-MI-1005 Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court The Honorable Lakshmi Reddy, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D02-2511-MI-8945 Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Foley and Felix concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 1 of 17 DeBoer, Judge. Case Summary [1] Jordan Fleschner and Rachel Scheid (Mother) dated for approximately eight years before breaking up in 2023. During that time, Fleschner fulfilled a parental role in the life of Mother’s daughter (Child) even though he was not her biological father. After Fleschner and Mother broke up, he petitioned for visitation with Child. The trial court denied Fleschner’s petition, and he now appeals, arguing numerous ways in which the trial court erred in denying the petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. Facts and Procedural History [2] Mother started dating Fleschner in 2015 when Child was two years old. 1 The next year they began living together and as the relationship progressed, both Mother and Child began referring to Fleschner as Child’s dad. Mother involved Fleschner in decisions about Child’s education and medical care and “considered [him] to be filling a parental role” in Child’s life. Transcript at 71. However, Fleschner and Mother never got married. [3] Shortly after a physical altercation between Mother and Fleschner in 2023, the pair ended their relationship and moved into separate homes. Nonetheless, Mother agreed that Child could continue spending time with Fleschner, and 1 Shortly before Child’s second birthday, Child’s biological father stopped being involved in her life. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 2 of 17 over the next two years, they primarily observed a one-week-on-one-week-off schedule with Child. Mother also permitted Child to go on a week-long vacation with Fleschner and attend some holidays with his family. Fleschner also frequently communicated with Child via texts and phone calls. [4] In July 2025, when Child was twelve years old, Fleschner read her diary and found a reference to self-harm. Concerned about Child’s safety, he texted Mother about what he read. Mother told Child that Fleschner had read her diary, which upset Child. Mother believed reading Child’s diary was an unnecessary breach of Child’s privacy. After that incident, Child never returned to Fleschner’s home, but Mother allowed Fleschner to take Child out to dinner a few times. [5] On September 3, Fleschner filed 2 a Verified Petition to Establish Custodial and Parental Rights by a Third-Party. 3 He alleged he was Child’s primary caretaker between 2017 and 2023 while Mother worked, was listed on Child’s medical records as her other parent, and that he and Mother had split time with Child equally since their separation in 2023. Fleschner also included allegations stemming from the diary incident and alleged Mother had “avoided discussions 2 Fleschner originally filed the petition in Hendricks County, but it was transferred to Vigo County in November. 3 Fleschner’s petition alleged he was seeking visitation as well as “joint physical and joint legal custody” of Child, but he only pursued the issue of visitation at the subsequent evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 14. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 3 of 17 regarding therapy for” Child. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 14. The trial court set the petition for a hearing in February 2026. [6] At some point after Fleschner filed the petition, Mother blocked his phone number from Child’s cell phone. However, Child had an account for a messaging application called Discord which Mother had allowed Child to use in the past under her supervision. After Fleschner’s number was blocked from Child’s phone, Child created a separate Discord account without Mother’s knowledge and used it to communicate with Fleschner. In their conversations, Fleschner “tr[ied] to make [Child] feel guilty for not calling . . . or talking to him enough” and discussed the possibility of adopting Child. Tr. at 86. He also secretly sent Child packages and suggested that Child spend the night with one of her friends so he could go there and spend time with her without Mother knowing. [7] In December, Mother discovered the Discord messages between Fleschner and Child. In January 2026, she filed a petition on Child’s behalf for a protective order (PO) against Fleschner. Based on the allegations in Mother’s petition, the court entered an ex parte PO on January 16 prohibiting Fleschner from having contact with Child. [8] On February 12, the parties appeared for an evidentiary hearing on Fleschner’s visitation petition. Fleschner and Mother testified to the facts above, though they offered different versions of some events. Fleschner testified that Mother never explicitly told him he could no longer see or speak to Child. He believed Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 4 of 17 he was allowed to talk to Child through Discord, claiming he “had approval from . . . Mother since [2015] and [Mother] never changed her mind on that or stated that it should change or told [him] to stop talk[ing] to [Child] in any capacity.” Id. at 57. He knew Mother had blocked his number from Child’s phone, but “thought that [Mother] had to have known that [they] were communicating via [D]iscord . . . ,” claiming “there was no way that she couldn’t have known that.” Id. at 60. Mother testified that she explicitly told Fleschner to stop contacting Child on July 4, 2025. [9] The trial court entered its order denying Fleschner’s petition on March 17. 4 The court found Fleschner’s behavior “undermine[d] Mother’s parental authority” and concluded he had failed to overcome the presumption that Mother’s decision to cut off contact was in Child’s best interest. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12. Fleschner appeals. Discussion and Decision Standard of Review [10] Where, as here, a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52, “we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment.” Schaffer v. Schaffer, 884 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We will affirm the 4 On March 9, the court held an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s PO petition. On March 17, the same day the court entered its visitation order, the court entered an order granting the PO. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 5 of 17 judgment unless it is clearly erroneous, meaning “there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Brown v. Lunsford, 63 N.E.3d 1057, 1062 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [11] We show great deference to the trial court’s judgment in family law matters. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). As such, “it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by [the] appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Brown, 63 N.E.3d at 1062 (quoting Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124). It is not our role to weigh evidence or judge credibility. Id. Instead, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. Id. [12] Fleschner presents numerous arguments in support of his contention that the trial court erred in denying him visitation. We consolidate and restate his contentions as follows: (1) he proved he had standing to seek visitation; (2) the trial court applied the wrong legal framework in denying his petition; (3) he rebutted the presumption that Mother’s decision was in Child’s best interest; and (4) the trial court improperly considered the ex parte PO in its visitation determination. Appellant’s Brief at 23. We address each of these arguments in turn. 1. We question whether Fleschner has standing to seek third- party visitation with Child. [13] Indiana statutory and common law has established that in some limited circumstances, third parties may pursue visitation. See Ind. Code §§ 31-17-5-0.2 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 6 of 17 – 31-17-5-10 (Grandparent Visitation); Worrell v. Elkhart Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 704 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (Ind. 1998) (recognizing stepparent visitation). This Court has developed “a two-part common law test for determining whether to grant visitation to a non-parent,” which requires the third party to prove: (1) the existence of a custodial and parental relationship with the child; and (2) visitation would be in the child’s best interest. Dangerfield v. Suggs, 281 N.E.3d 595, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). The first prong is a matter of standing. Brown, 63 N.E.3d at 1062. Fleschner argues “[t]he trial court did not squarely decide the first prong” but nonetheless contends he established standing to seek visitation with Child. Appellant’s Br. at 19. [14] Exactly how far the common law “parental and custodial relationship” net can be cast, particularly as it applies to unrelated third parties, has yet to be determined. However, our appellate courts have been reluctant “to extend [common law] visitation rights to third parties who are not step-parents.” Worrell, 704 N.E.2d at 1029 (holding foster parents may not seek visitation). In fact, in Worrell, our Supreme Court explicitly “agree[d] with prior holdings [of this Court] limiting standing to step-parents.” Id. (emphasis added). We thus tread carefully here so as “not to ‘open the door and permit the granting of visitation rights to a myriad of unrelated third persons . . . who happen to feel Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 7 of 17 affection for a child.’” 5 Brown, 63 N.E.3d at 1062 (quoting Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921, 923-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). [15] We find Brown v. Lunsford enlightening. There, ex-boyfriend moved in with mother when her daughter was sixteen months old. 63 N.E.3d at 1058. He lived with them for three years and had a son with mother before the couple separated. Id. After the separation, ex-boyfriend exercised visitation with mother’s daughter during his parenting time with his son. Id. In total, this arrangement lasted for a year and a half. Id. at 1059. However, when daughter started exhibiting distressing behaviors, mother ended ex-boyfriend’s visits with her. Id. Almost four years later, ex-boyfriend petitioned for parenting time with the daughter, which the trial court granted. Id. A panel of this Court reversed. Id. at 1065. On the issue of standing, the panel explained: [W]e acknowledge that custodial and parental relationships may exist with third parties other than stepparents and former same- sex partners. [See A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that same-sex domestic partners have standing 5 In light of this policy concern, perhaps third-party visitation should be a question reserved for the People through its elected representatives in the legislature. Indiana’s constitution vests legislative authority in the General Assembly, and the separation-of-powers provision makes clear “that each branch of the government has specific duties and powers that may not be usurped or infringed upon by other branches of the government.” Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 814 (Ind. 2011) (quoting State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied). Yet in Collins v. Gilbreath, this Court affirmed an order awarding visitation to a stepparent despite finding the enactments of our legislature were “silent on the existence of such rights for nonparents.” 403 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Eight years later, this Court declared that by passing the Grandparent Visitation Act in 1981, the legislature had “tacitly approved . . . the judicially- recognized visitation rights of other parties” and delegated its law-making authority in that arena “to the sound discretion of the courts.” Tinsley v. Plummer, 519 N.E.2d 752, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 8 of 17 to seek third-party visitation). 6] However, in light of the very limited circumstances in which this court and our [S]upreme [C]ourt have allowed a third party to request visitation, we do not believe we may conclude [ex-boyfriend] had standing to request visitation with [the daughter] in this case. Id. at 1064. [16] Similarly, while we recognize that Fleschner was involved in Child’s life for an extended period and assumed certain parental responsibilities, we question whether Fleschner, as Mother’s ex-boyfriend, has standing to pursue visitation with Child. However, we need not definitively decide this issue given our conclusion that Fleschner failed to rebut the constitutional presumption that Mother’s decision was in Child’s best interest. 2. The trial court correctly applied the constitutional presumption that Mother’s decision was in Child’s best interest. [17] Fleschner argues the trial court failed to apply the proper legal framework in its analysis. “Overlaying [Indiana’s] two-part test is a constitutional framework” protecting parents’ fundamental right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Dangerfield, 281 N.E.3d at 601 (quoting In re L.J.S., 923 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). This framework establishes that in “visitation proceedings, fit parents are presumed 6 The A.C. decision was issued before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 9 of 17 to act in their children’s best interest.” Id. Thus, in addition to the elements of the two-part test, the third party seeking visitation “bears the burden of overcoming this parental presumption.” Id. at 602. [18] Fleschner claims the trial court erroneously required him to prove Mother was unfit even though “[n]othing in the third-party visitation framework requires a petitioner to prove parental unfitness.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. In its order, the court reasoned Fleschner was “required to present evidence that Mother was unfit in making the decision to terminate [his] visits with [Child]” and concluded that Fleschner did not carry that burden. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 11. But the constitutional framework does not necessarily require a third party to prove the parent is unfit. Rather, parental unfitness is simply one argument a third party could present in these circumstances. [19] Fleschner argues the trial court’s imprecise framing of this issue constitutes reversible error because “as a result, [the court] never engaged with the actual visitation inquiry: whether [he] rebutted the presumption” that Mother’s decision was in Child’s best interest. Appellant’s Br. at 18. We disagree. As an initial matter, though a third party seeking visitation is not required to prove unfitness, parental fitness is nonetheless a central feature of this constitutional framework, as “fit parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interest.” Dangerfield, 281 N.E.3d at 601 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court highlighted the importance of parental fitness in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000), a foundational case on third-party visitation rights. The Court began its analysis by establishing that the third party “did not allege, and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 10 of 17 no court ha[d] found, that [the parent] was an unfit parent.” 530 U.S. at 68. “That aspect of the case [was] important,” and “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself” in these matters or “further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of [their] children.” Id. at 68-69. [20] Logic tells us the fit-parent presumption does not apply when a third party seeking visitation proves the parent is unfit. And here, Fleschner’s position could be construed as challenging Mother’s parental fitness, as his primary allegations were that Mother “avoided discussions regarding therapy for the child” despite the concerning content he found in Child’s diary. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 14. He testified similarly at the hearing, alleging Child’s diary included a reference to self-harm and claiming Mother “would not communicate with [him] about therapy at all.” Tr. at 36. Given that Fleschner raised Mother’s fitness in his petition and testimony, we cannot say the trial court erred by analyzing that issue. [21] And even if the trial court erred, we find no reversible error given the court’s determination that Fleschner failed to rebut the constitutional presumption. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error or defect in any ruling or order . . . by the trial court . . . is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). The court explicitly concluded—with reference to specific evidence—that Fleschner “has not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 11 of 17 overcome the presumption that [Mother’s] decision to deny visits was in [Child]’s best interest.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12. While Fleschner challenges that conclusion (which we address in Part 3), the court properly considered the presumption in this case and thus applied the correct legal framework. 3. The trial court did not err in determining that Fleschner failed to overcome the fit-parent presumption. [22] Fleschner argues he rebutted the presumption that Mother’s decision to terminate visitation was in Child’s best interest. The State’s authority to “intrude into family decision-making” is substantially limited in the face of “a parent [who] adequately cares for her child.” Dangerfield, 281 N.E.3d at 601. Thus, when considering the constitutional presumption that a fit parent acts in her child’s best interest, courts must give “special weight to a fit parent’s decision to deny or limit contact” while also affording “some weight to the fact that a parent has previously agreed to some visitation.” Id. (quoting Schaffer, 884 N.E.2d at 427). [23] Here, the trial court explicitly recognized that Mother and Fleschner “exercised equal time with” Child after their separation but ultimately gave more weight “to Mother’s decision to terminate visits,” concluding Fleschner did not rebut the fit-parent presumption. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 9, 12. And contrary to Fleschner’s assertions, the record supports that determination. As noted in the court’s order, there was extensive evidence about Fleschner’s secret communications with Child in which he consistently undermined Mother’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 12 of 17 authority. He and Child exchanged hundreds of messages on a social media platform Child wasn’t old enough to use and did so through an account Mother did not know about. Fleschner also discussed adopting Child, sent her secret packages, and asked her to arrange a sleepover at a friend’s house so he could see her there without Mother knowing. [24] Fleschner directs our attention to evidence that he lived with Mother and Child for over six years, took Child to appointments, spent significant time with Child after the break-up, and claimed Child on his 2024 and 2025 tax returns as evidence that he overcame the constitutional presumption. But this is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence. And viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s decision, we cannot say its judgment was clearly erroneous. [25] Within Fleschner’s argument on this issue, he disagrees with the trial court’s reliance on Brown. Instead, he argues the court should have relied on A.C., Schaffer, and Dangerfield. We disagree. [26] First, we find no error, let alone reversible error, in the trial court’s reliance on Brown. We discussed Brown’s underlying facts in Part 1 regarding standing, as we too find it instructive in this case. In addition to concluding that the ex- boyfriend did not have standing to seek visitation, the Brown panel considered whether ex-boyfriend had overcome the constitutional presumption, ultimately concluding he had not. Brown, 63 N.E.3d at 1065. Given the similarity of both the underlying facts and legal issues, Fleschner’s qualms are unfounded. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 13 of 17 [27] Second, the cases Fleschner claims are more analogous to his circumstances, in fact, are not—A.C. involved a same-sex domestic partnership; Schaffer involved a stepparent; and Dangerfield involved an ex-boyfriend but was decided strictly on procedural grounds. Taking a closer look, the A.C. panel held that “a partner who did not give birth to the child ha[d] standing to seek visitation . . . .” 1 N.E.3d at 697. However, it limited its decision to “the particular factual circumstances of th[e] case,” which are not present here. Id. And again, A.C. was decided before the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). [28] In Schaffer, a stepparent was granted visitation when his marriage to the child’s mother was dissolved. 884 N.E.2d at 425. When the mother later petitioned to terminate visitation, a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of her petition, reasoning that: (1) the stepparent’s custodial and parental relationship with the child had already been established during the dissolution proceedings; and (2) the mother did not present sufficient evidence to prove it was in the child’s best interest for visitation to be modified, i.e., terminated. Id. at 429. None of those facts are present in this case—Fleschner was never Child’s stepparent; the existence of a parental and custodial relationship between himself and Child had not been previously adjudicated; and he filed an initial petition for visitation, not a petition to modify an existing visitation order. [29] Lastly, Fleschner compares this case to Dangerfield. There, the trial court granted an ex-boyfriend visitation, but a panel of this Court reversed on procedural grounds because “[t]he trial court applied the third-party visitation Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 14 of 17 test without first tilting the scale in [the] [m]other’s favor as constitutional requirements demand.” 281 N.E.3d at 602. The trial court there “neither required [ex-boyfriend] to overcome the parental presumption that [the] [m]other’s decision to end [the child’s] contact with [ex-boyfriend] was in [the child’s] best interest nor made any finding that [he] had met that burden.” Id. Fleschner argues we should reverse on similar grounds, asserting the trial court “inverted the [constitutional] presumption into an unfitness inquiry” and ignored his and Mother’s post-separation visitation arrangement. Appellant’s Br. at 23. But as we previously stated, we find the court correctly applied the constitutional presumption, and it recognized the visitation arrangement between Fleschner and Mother. Thus, the procedural circumstances here are not at all comparable to those in Dangerfield. 4. The trial court did not improperly consider the ex parte PO. [30] Under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act, “[t]he fact that an order for protection is issued . . . does not raise an inference or presumption in a subsequent case or hearings between the parties.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(j) (2024) (amended July 1, 2026). Here, Fleschner argues “[t]he trial court erred by considering the ex parte [PO] in its visitation ruling before the contested PO hearing had been held.” Appellant’s Br. at 23. He claims the allegations made in the PO petition were “weave[d]” throughout the court’s visitation order. Id. at 28. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 15 of 17 [31] First, the trial court’s order on the visitation matter was entered after the contested PO hearing had taken place. Thus, the premise of Fleschner’s argument lies on shaky ground. Second, the court’s order made only one mention of the PO when recounting the parties’ procedural history. The facts and analysis focused on the evidence presented at the visitation hearing. Notably, Fleschner concedes that “section 9(j) does not prohibit consideration of the conduct underlying a [PO] petition when that conduct is properly before the court.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14. Thus, whether the “order’s closing catalogue of ‘concerns’ about [Fleschner]’s conduct . . . substantially overlaps with the very allegations pled in the PO petition” is of no consequence. Appellant’s Br. at 28. Rather, the critical inquiry is whether that “catalogue” was supported by the evidence presented at trial, and Fleschner concedes that it was. [32] While the trial court did note at the visitation hearing that there was an ex parte order in place, there is no evidence the court relied on its existence when it denied Fleschner visitation. Again, the court’s visitation order only mentions the ex parte order in the procedural overview of the case—not in the facts or the analysis. Accordingly, Fleschner has failed to show the court imputed an inference or presumption against him in the visitation decision as a result of the ex parte order. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 16 of 17 Conclusion [33] Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s decision denying Fleschner’s petition for visitation with Child. [34] Affirmed. Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Rachelle N. Ponist Harshman Ponist Smith & Rayl Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Joseph K. Etling Smock & Etling Terre Haute, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-1005 | November 4, 2026 Page 17 of 17