Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana In Re the Trusts of Rodolfo Echeverria, Sr., and Dido Echeverria, Sr. FILED Rodolfo Echeverria, Jr., and Dido Gamble, Oct 02 2026, 9:14 am Appellants/Petitioners CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Dido Echeverria, Sr., Appellee/Respondent October 2, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-TR-2618 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Andrew M. Hicks, Judge Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-TR-2618 | October 2, 2026 Page 1 of 7 Trial Court Cause Nos. 20D02-2505-TR-1 20D02-0906-TR-2 Opinion by Judge Bradford Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Bradford, Judge. Case Summary [1] In 2009, Rodolfo E. Echeverria, Sr. (“Rodolfo”), and his wife, Dido Echeverria, Sr. (“Dido”), set up reciprocal trusts (“the Rodolfo Trust” and “the Dido Trust” collectively, “the Trusts”). Among other things, the Trusts provided for the future creation of a trust for the benefit of their four children (“the Children’s Trust”), who are Rodolfo Echeverria, Jr., Dido Gamble (collectively, “the Children”), Connie Smyth, and Elisa Nilsen. In 2013, Rodolfo died, funding the Dido Trust, and, in 2017, Dido removed the Children as future beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust, which was now to dissolve upon her death. In November of 2024, the Children petitioned the probate court for accountings of the Trusts, which petitions were denied. The Children contend that the probate court abused its discretion in denying their petitions for accountings. We affirm. Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 1, 2009, Rodolfo executed the Rodolfo Trust Instrument, which was an amended version of a trust he had created in 1995, and Dido executed the Dido Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-TR-2618 | October 2, 2026 Page 2 of 7 Trust Instrument (collectively, “the Trust Instruments”). The reciprocal Trust Instruments provided that, if either spouse survived the other, the trust property would be divided into two funds, the marital share, which would fund the Marital Trust for the benefit of the survivor, and the exempt share, which would fund the Exempt-Share Trust. The Trust Instruments also provided for the creation of a Children’s Trust, which would remain unfunded until it had received the remaining principal from the Exempt-Share and Marital Trusts upon the death of the surviving spouse. The four beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust were designated as the Children, Smyth, and Nilsen. [3] Rodolfo died in 2013, which funded the Dido Trust. On July 1, 2017, Dido amended the Dido Trust to provide that the Children’s Trust would terminate upon her death, and the property that would have funded it would be distributed to Nilsen, removing the Children and Smyth as beneficiaries. On November 22, 2024, the Children petitioned the probate court to order an accounting for both the Rodolfo Trust and the Dido Trust. On May 13, 2025, the probate court ordered that the petitions be addressed in separate cause numbers. [4] On July 23, 2025, the probate court denied both petitions. Regarding the Rodolfo Trust, the probate court found the Children were, at best, remainder beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust, not the Rodolfo Trust, and that their “double-contingent remainder interest in the unfunded Children’s Trust does not imbue them with any present interest in the Rodolfo Trust.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 172. As for the Dido Trust, the probate court concluded that the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-TR-2618 | October 2, 2026 Page 3 of 7 Children were neither direct, income, nor remainder beneficiaries of it, noting that they were, at best, remainder beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust and that, in any event, Dido had altered the Dido Trust in 2017 to effectively eliminate the Children’s Trust. [5] On August 22, 2025, the Children moved to correct error, which motion the probate court denied on September 24, 2025. In November of 2025, we granted the Children’s motion to consolidate both of their appeals of the probate court’s denials of their petitions for accountings into this cause number. Discussion and Decision [6] The Children contend that the probate court abused its discretion in denying their requests for accountings of the Rodolfo and Dido Trusts. The sole question before us is whether the Children are entitled to request an accounting of the Trusts because they qualify as beneficiaries of them. Pursuant to Chapter 5, section 12, of the Indiana Trust Code (the “Trust Code”), upon a petition by a beneficiary, “the court may direct the trustee to file a verified written statement of accounts[.]” Ind. Code § 30-4-5-12(c). “The term ‘may’ in a statute ordinarily implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion.” Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision whether to order an accounting.” Kovenock v. Mallus, 660 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs “if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court[.]” DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Brown, 29 N.E.3d 729, 732 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-TR-2618 | October 2, 2026 Page 4 of 7 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence but, instead, determine whether the evidence before the trial court can serve as a rational basis for its decision. Id. [7] Three types of beneficiaries may be entitled to an accounting: a trust, income beneficiaries, and remainder beneficiaries. Ind. Code § 30-2-14-2(2). The Children are not a trust and have never been income beneficiaries of the Trusts, who are “person[s] to whom net income of a trust is or may be payable.” Ind. Code § 30-2-14-5. This leaves only the possibility that the Children are “remainder beneficiaries,” who are “person[s] entitled to receive principal when an income interest ends.” Ind. Code § 30-2-14-11; see also Ind. Code § 30-4-1- 2(20) (“‘Remainderman’ means a beneficiary entitled to principal, including income which has been accumulated and added to the principal.”). [8] The Children are not remainder beneficiaries of the Dido Trust because the Children’s Trust will not be funded upon Dido’s death, leaving no principal for them to receive. As for the Rodolfo Trust, the Children seem to be remainder beneficiaries of it, but that does not mean that they are automatically entitled to an accounting; as we have stated, “it appears that in order to be considered ‘entitled to principal,’ and thus entitled to the rights and remedies of a ‘beneficiary’ under the Trust Code, a remainder beneficiary must have a vested interest in the trust estate.” Lewis v. Clifton, 837 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A remainder is vested when there is a present fixed right of future enjoyment; in other words, it is given to an ascertained person and is not subject to a condition precedent. A contingent remainder is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-TR-2618 | October 2, 2026 Page 5 of 7 merely the possibility or prospect of an estate which exists when what would otherwise be a vested remainder is subject to a condition precedent, or is given to an uncertain person or persons. Id. at 1019 (citations omitted). In other words, “vested” means that the only scenario in which you will not receive the remainder is if you die before it passes to you. Although the Children claim that their interests in the Rodolfo Trust are vested, this is incorrect; whatever interest they may have is contingent (at the very least) upon Dido dying before them. Consequently, they do not qualify as “beneficiaries” of the Rodolfo Trust and are not entitled to seek an accounting of it. See id. at 1018 n.1, 1019. [9] The Children draw our attention to Marshall v. Ilsley Trust Co., N.A. v. Woodward, 848 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), in which we concluded that a contingent beneficiary could obtain an accounting, but only if he or she was a named beneficiary in the trust instrument. Id. at 1184. Marshall does not help the Children, however, because they are not named as beneficiaries in the Rodolfo Trust, the Children’s Trust is, and Marshall specifically “limit[s] the right of an accounting to those remote contingent beneficiaries who are named in the trust document.” Id. (emphasis in original). We conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Children’s petitions for accountings of the Trusts. [10] We affirm the judgment of the probate court. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-TR-2618 | October 2, 2026 Page 6 of 7 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS Robert J. Palmer Brad L. Varner Cortney N. Sweat May • Oberfell • Lorber LLP Mishawaka, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Mark D. Boveri Alex C. Bowman Krieg DeVault LLP Mishawaka, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-TR-2618 | October 2, 2026 Page 7 of 7