Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified. MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. FILED Oct 29 2026, 8:52 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Scotty G. Nabors, Appellant-Respondent v. Jill A. Nabors, Appellee-Petitioner October 29, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-DC-699 Appeal from the Bartholomew Circuit Court The Honorable Kelly S. Benjamin, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 03C01-2405-DC-2770 Memorandum Decision by Judge Foley Judges Vaidik and Altice concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 1 of 17 Foley, Judge. [1] Scotty G. Nabors (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying custody for the child (“Child”) he shares with Jill A. Nabors (“Mother”). He raises several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it modified custody to award Mother sole legal custody and primary physical custody; and II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees. [2] We affirm. Facts and Procedural History [3] In July 2014, while Father and Mother were married, Child was born. The marriage between Father and Mother was dissolved by decree, issued in December 2024. At that time, the parties were awarded joint legal and shared physical custody of Child with “one week on and one week off” parenting time. Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 28. At the time of the decree, Father and Mother both resided in Bartholomew County. [4] On June 23, 2025, Father filed a notice of intent to relocate and a petition to modify physical custody based on Father obtaining new employment out of state. In his motion, Father stated that he believed that it was in Child’s best Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 2 of 17 interest that he be awarded primary physical custody in light of this move. On June 26, 2025, Mother filed a counter petition to modify custody and a notice of relocation. In her petition, Mother objected to Father’s request of temporary or permanent relocation of Child and stated that she intended to move to Fairmount, Indiana to be closer to her family. Mother asserted that there had been a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties since the dissolution decree, which justified modification of custody and that it was in the best interest of Child to remain in Indiana with Mother and for Mother to be awarded primary physical custody. Over the next few months, several motions for contempt were filed by each party. A hearing on all pending matters began on November 19, 2025, was bifurcated due to lack of time, and completed on February 4, 2026. On February 6, 2025, the trial court conducted an in-camera interview with Child. [5] In March 2025, Father had been terminated for his employment at Cummins, where he had been employed for twenty-six years and earned $350,000 per year, plus bonuses, at the time of his termination. Father claimed that Mother caused his termination by sending disparaging photos to his employer that made it appear that he was drinking at work. Mother contended that Father’s drinking caused his termination. Father testified that he used to drink 1.75 liters of “Jack Daniels” every one to two weeks, but that, at the time of the hearing, he no longer drank “that much anymore” because he did not have “all of the stress of having to live with [Mother.]” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 46–47. He also testified that he never drank while working. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 3 of 17 [6] When he was terminated, Father received a severance package and continued to live locally while pursuing new employment. However, he found no comparable employment in Indiana and accepted employment at American Woodmark Corporation in Virginia. In his new position, he earned approximately $280,000 per year with no possible bonuses. He testified that the corporation may merge with an Ohio company, and he was not sure what would happen with his position. [7] Father moved to Virginia in August 2025 and purchased a new home where he lived with his new wife at the time of the hearing. The home was located in Stephens City, Virginia and had four bedrooms, including a bedroom for Child. The area had good schools and extracurricular activities for Child, and the neighborhood had children his age. [8] In the fall of 2025, Mother had relocated to Fairmount, Indiana, with her new husband who she had married in February 2025. Mother stated she had moved to be closer to her family. Her home in Fairmount was located on three acres that contained two homes and a barn. Child had his own room and loved his eight cats and two dogs and all of the acreage at the home. Due to the move, Mother enrolled Child in a new school, Park Elementary, without Father’s consent. Child liked his new school more than his old school and had made several new friends since enrolling at Park Elementary. He was also still able to spend time monthly with a good friend from Columbus. In his first semester at Park Elementary, Child had received all As and one B-. Although Father Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 4 of 17 believed that Child’s grades were slipping in the new school, Mother stated that his grades had not been affected by the move. At the time of the hearing, Mother was working at IU Health in Muncie as a clinical medical assistant making a gross weekly income of $825 per week. [9] Toward the end of summer 2025, when both parties were making arrangements to relocate, both Father and Mother failed to constructively communicate, which caused Father to miss some parenting time. On one occasion, in September 2025, Father used derogatory and offensive language toward Mother in a text exchange regarding an exchange of Child for parenting time. There was testimony that both Mother and Father acted poorly toward each other, sometimes in front of Child and that their relationship was contentious and hostile. [10] In May 2025, Father removed Child from school without notifying Mother or the school. Instead, he took Child with him out of town, and Child spent the day with his wife’s adult son while Father went to Churchill Downs. Because Father did not notify the school of Child’s absence, the school contacted Mother, and when she tried to text Father multiple times, he failed to answer. Only after Mother contacted the police for a welfare check, did Father communicate to the school later that afternoon that Child would be absent. At the hearing, Father testified that he did not “realize you had to call the school on those things” and admitted it was his fault that the school was not notified. Id. at 138. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 5 of 17 [11] On March 6, 2026, the trial court issued its order on the parties’ competing petitions. The trial court found that each parent’s relocation was made in good faith and for legitimate reasons, those being an employment opportunity for Father and being closer to family for Mother. As a result of the parties’ relocations, they lived approximately eight hours apart by car and about one hour and forty-five minutes away by plane, and the trial court found that the “equal week-on/week-off parenting time [was] not possible and constitute[d] a substantial change of circumstances” since the dissolution decree. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The trial court awarded Mother sole legal custody and primary custody of Child subject to Father’s parenting time as set out in the order. The trial court based its custody determination on the following factors: 1. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the parents, and other individuals who are significantly involved. a. [Child] has a close bond with both parents. b. [Child] has a good relationship with Father’s current spouse . . . as well as Mother’s husband . . . . c. [Child] has a close relationship with his Columbus, IN friend and gets to see him at least one time per month at Mother’s home. This is beneficial and important to [Child]. 2. The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 6 of 17 a. [Child] enjoys, and has adjusted well, to his Mother’s home in Fairmount, Indiana. [Child] loves the outdoors with three acres, taking care of his cats and dogs, and enjoys playing soccer. b. [Child] was removed from Columbus schools due to the relocation of each parent. [Child] enjoys Park Elementary School in Grant County, Indiana, where he has attended since August 2025. [Child] likes it better than the Columbus schools and he has adjusted well, earning straight A’s and one B- at the end of the first semester. [Child] likes the teachers, the smaller school size, and has made good friends at the school. c. Father has moved to a community with good schools and activities available for [Child], but the Court finds no reason to uproot [Child] from his current school and friends. It is also uncertain whether Father would be required to move if his current employer merges with a[n] Ohio company, or if Father would be offered a position earning more money elsewhere. 3. Communication between parents: a. Mother and Father have shown a consistent and unhealthy hostility toward one another, that has at times, been observed by [Child]. b. The ability to contact and communicate with each other in a respectful manner, other than through Our Family Wizard, has proven to be futile and contrary to the best interests of [Child]. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 7 of 17 c. With distance now a factor, in addition to the lack of respectful communication between Mother and Father, joint legal custody is no longer in the best interest of [Child]. Id. at 19–20. The trial court also ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,000 due to a disparity in the parties’ income. Father now appeals. 1 Discussion and Decision I. Custody Modification [12] Initially, we note that Father has chosen to proceed pro se. A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his or her pro se status. Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted). [13] We review custody determinations for an abuse of discretion. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “There is a 1 Since filing his notice of appeal, Father has filed numerous documents with this court, including a “Verified Motion to Supplement the Record Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 32” filed on August 12, 2026, and a “Verified Emergency Motion for Immediate Interlocutory Stay of Enforcement Pending Disposition Pursuant to Appellate Rule 39” filed on September 29, 2026. In an order issued in conjunction with this decision, we deny all of Father’s pending motions. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 8 of 17 well-established preference in Indiana for granting significant latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Id. (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)). Appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence[.]” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, on appeal we will not “reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). We will reverse the trial court’s custody determination only if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288 (quoting In re Paternity of C.S., 964 N.E.2d 879, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). “[I]t is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307 (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 204 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 1965)). [14] Here, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions, which are required under Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2. Accordingly, we apply a two-tiered review and will “affirm when the evidence supports the findings, and when the findings support the judgment.” Aulakh v. Aulakh, 273 N.E.3d 431, 441 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 9 of 17 Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. We do not “set aside the findings or judgment unless [they are] clearly erroneous,” and we must give “due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when they have no factual support in the record[,]” and “a judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Aulakh, 273 N.E.3d at 441–42. We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Gittings v. Deal, 109 N.E.3d 963, 970 (Ind. 2018). [15] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion 2 when it awarded Mother sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child. He contends that the trial court disproportionately weighed his actions against those of Mother, specifically that it focused on his inappropriate text messages to Mother on one occasion and on the time he failed to call the school when he took Child out of town. Father also asserts that it was abuse of discretion for the trial court to not put in place a structured schedule for communications between Child and Father when Child was not in his custody, which Father claims is necessary 2 We note that Father’s brief contained a case cited for the standard of review for custody modification determinations that does not exist. See Appellant’s Br. p. 8 (Betclean v. Anstavel, 123 N.E.3d 22, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). Although Mother identified this nonexistent citation, Father provides no explanation for it in his reply brief. Citations to fictitious, AI-generated authority is a growing problem nationwide, and we admonish Father for citing a fictitious case in his brief. We caution both attorneys and pro se litigants against using AI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated. Judges must be able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 10 of 17 because of Mother’s interference with his ability to communicate with Child. Father further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its custody determination because evidence was presented that Mother’s new husband has a prior battery conviction, which constituted a safety hazard for Child. [16] Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21 provides that a trial court “may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under [Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8] . . . .” I.C. § 31- 17-2-21(a). Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 provides that the trial court is to consider all relevant factors, including: (1) The age and sex of the child. (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents. (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age. (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with: (A) the child’s parent or parents; (B) the child’s sibling; and (C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 11 of 17 (5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s: (A) home; (B) school; and (C) community. (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent. (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian . . . . [17] In its order, the trial court concluded that both parents’ relocations were made in good faith and for legitimate reasons and that such relocations constituted a substantial change in circumstances since the decree. The trial court also examined the factors listed above, specifically giving weight to the interaction and interrelationship of Child with Father and Mother and other important individuals in Child’s life, such as the parents’ new spouses and Child’s close friend from Columbus. The trial court also gave weight to Child’s positive adjustment to Mother’s home in Fairmount, his new school, and community, and the fact that moving Child to Virginia with Father would uproot Child from his current school and friends. The trial court also considered the unhealthy hostility between Father and Mother and their inability to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 12 of 17 communicate respectfully. Based on all of this, the trial court concluded that joint legal custody was no longer in the best interests of Child, awarding Mother sole legal custody, and that it was in the best interests of Child for Mother to have primary physical custody. We conclude that there was ample evidence in the record to support a determination that there was a substantial change in the circumstances and that a custody modification was in Child’s best interests. [18] Father does not assert that the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the trial court’s findings or that the findings made by the trial court did not support the trial court’s conclusions. Instead, he argues that the trial court disproportionately assessed the fitness of each parent, focusing more on Father’s negative actions and minimizing actions by Mother and an alleged safety hazard posed by Mother’s new husband. We grant latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters, Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124, and here, the trial court was able to observe the witnesses and scrutinize their testimony and then make a determination on what evidence it deemed to be pertinent and credible. The trial court was within its authority to do so, and we do not second guess the trial court’s determinations. Father’s arguments are simply a request for this court to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, which we do not do on appeal. Id. [19] As to Father’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not “implement a rigid, self-executing long-distance schedule [for telephone Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 13 of 17 communications and digital access] that leaves zero operational discretion to Mother,” Appellant’s Br. pp. 9–10, he does not cite to any law, statute, or rule that requires such a requirement. He cites to Indiana Parenting Time Guideline I(A)(3), but it simply states that, “Both parents shall have reasonable phone access to their child. Telephone communication with the child by either parent to the residence where the child is located shall be conducted at reasonable hours, shall be of reasonable duration, and at reasonable intervals, without interference from the other parent.” In its order, the trial court ordered that, “[e]ach parent shall facilitate reasonable phone and video contact between [Child] and the other parent.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 22. We conclude that the trial court’s order complied with the parenting time guideline and was not an abuse of discretion. [20] Ultimately, when it comes to child custody, “[o]n appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by [the] appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307 (first alteration in original) (quoting Brickley, 210 N.E.2d at 852). Despite Father’s arguments to the contrary, we conclude that the trial court’s custody decision has sufficient evidentiary support. We are therefore unpersuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination to modify both legal and physical custody in favor of Mother. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 14 of 17 II. Attorney’s Fees [21] Father asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees. “A determination regarding attorney[’s] fees in proceedings to modify a child support award is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion.” Milcherska v. Hoerstman, 56 N.E.3d 634, 642 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [22] Indiana Code section 31-17-7-1 applies in all post-dissolution cases. Under that statute, trial courts have the discretionary power to “periodically . . . order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending” the action, “and for attorney’s fees and mediation services[.]” I.C. § 31-17-7-1(a). “To award attorney’s fees under [the statute], the trial court ‘must consider the parties’ resources, their economic condition, their ability to engage in gainful employment and earn adequate income, and any other factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award.’” Reel v. Reel, 231 N.E.3d 915, 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 59 N.E.3d 343, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied). [23] Here, the trial court concluded that, “[d]ue to the disparity in income,” Father shall pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,000. Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 23. Father argues that the trial court’s order constituted “economic distortion” because it failed to take into account certain wealth transfers that Mother received in the decree and rental income Mother Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 15 of 17 was forgoing because she allowed a friend to stay rent free in a rental unit Mother owned. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. The evidence did establish a stark disparity in the income of the parties. Father earned approximately $5,384 per week, while Mother earned around $825 per week. Although Father points to wealth transfers that Mother received in the dissolution decree, he does not direct us to evidence in the record that establishes that these wealth transfers were liquid or able to be accessed by Mother at the time of the hearing. And, as to the rental income, there was no evidence as to what the rental rate would be and how it would affect the disparity in the income between the parties. Because the evidence presented supported the trial court’s finding of a disparity in income between Father and Mother, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees. Conclusion [24] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its custody determination, nor was it an abuse of discretion to order Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees. [25] Affirmed. Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 16 of 17 APPELLANT PRO SE Scotty G. Nabors Stephens City, Virginia ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Morgan L. Wieneke Greg S. Morin Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, LLP Seymour, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026 Page 17 of 17