In re Marriage of Howard

2026 IL App (1st) 252439 No. 1-25-2439 Opinion filed September 15, 2026 Second Division ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the CYNTHIA HOWARD, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) and ) No. 20 D 4202 ) JEFFREY HOWARD, ) Honorable ) Renee G. Goldfarb, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice D.B. Walker and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 The trial court defaulted respondent Jeffrey Howard as a discovery sanction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c)(v) (eff. July 1, 2002), due to his refusal to produce complete and updated copies of his financial records in this divorce case. Following a default prove-up hearing under section 405 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/405 (West 2024)), the court entered a default dissolution judgment. Jeffrey never attempted to vacate the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding, but he did move to vacate the default dissolution judgment, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Jeffrey challenges the trial court’s denial of his No. 1-25-2439 motion to vacate the default dissolution judgment, denial of his motion to continue the default prove-up hearing, and division of the marital estate. We affirm. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 The parties were married in 1995. They have two children who were teenagers when this case began but who are now adults. ¶4 On July 6, 2020, Cynthia filed a petition for dissolution of marriage citing irreconcilable differences. She alleged that Jeffrey abused alcohol and opioids at home and in front of the parties’ children. ¶5 Litigation in the trial court spanned more than five years and was contentious. Four different attorneys represented Jeffrey, and he was a self-represented litigant for much of the case’s final year in the trial court. Jeffrey’s fifth and current attorney appeared at the very end of litigation in the trial court. The Honorable William S. Boyd presided over most of the proceedings and entered the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding, which Jeffrey did not challenge. The Honorable Renee G. Goldfarb presided over the default prove-up hearing and entered the default dissolution judgment. Jeffrey challenges Judge Goldfarb’s rulings. ¶6 This appeal involves a default judgment resulting from discovery sanctions. Rule 219(c)(v) allows a trial court to default a party who unreasonably fails to comply with the supreme court’s rules governing discovery or any trial court order regarding discovery. Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c)(v) (eff. July 1, 2002). The first step in the default process is a default finding, which is different from a default judgment. In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 64. A default finding (sometimes called a default order) is an “interlocutory order that precludes the defaulting party from making any additional defenses to liability but in itself determines no rights or remedies.” Fidelity National -2- No. 1-25-2439 Title Insurance Co. of New York v. Westhaven Properties Partnership, 386 Ill. App. 3d 201, 211 (2007). In a divorce case, once the court has entered a default finding, it “shall proceed to hear the cause upon testimony of petitioner taken in open court” at a default prove-up hearing. 750 ILCS 5/405 (West 2024). Following the default prove-up hearing, the court enters a default dissolution judgment. See Venema v. Venema, 74 Ill. App. 3d 416, 417 (1979); In re Marriage of Cholach, 2024 IL App (1st) 230618-U, ¶¶ 58-60; Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. June 3, 2025) (we may cite unpublished Rule 23 orders issued on or after January 1, 2021, as persuasive authority). ¶7 A. First Contempt Proceedings ¶8 The first three years of litigation involved disputes about Jeffrey’s misuse of marital assets. Below is a much-simplified history of these disputes. ¶9 On September 7, 2021, the trial court ordered Jeffrey to deposit his income into the parties’ joint bank account, from which Cynthia would pay joint expenses such as the mortgage on the marital residence. On December 3, 2021, the court entered an agreed order prohibiting the parities from withdrawing or using marital assets without the other party’s consent and requiring the parties to account for their income. ¶ 10 Jeffrey disobeyed both orders. In January 2022, he withdrew $100,000 from one of the parties’ retirement accounts. In March 2022, he transferred $65,000 from the joint bank account to an account in his name only. On April 8, 2022, the court designated the $100,000 withdrawal as a pre-distribution to Jeffrey from the marital estate and prohibited him from using the remaining $65,000. Jeffrey still did not deposit his income into the joint bank account. Instead, he used that account to pay off his own credit cards. On July 22, 2022, the court entered an agreed order requiring Jeffrey to place the balance of the $65,000 withdrawal in escrow. -3- No. 1-25-2439 ¶ 11 On July 27, 2022, the court entered an agreed order requiring Jeffrey to pay 70% of the parties’ daughters’ college expenses; Cynthia would pay 30%. ¶ 12 In emergency filings on September 15, 2022, and April 6, 2023, Cynthia alleged that Jeffrey had emptied the joint bank account to pay his own expenses. The court ordered Jeffrey to pay his personal and business expenses with his own credit cards. ¶ 13 On June 23, 2023, Cynthia filed a petition for a rule to show cause based on Jeffrey’s failure to deposit his income in the joint bank account, provide an accounting of his income, and pay his portion of their daughters’ college expenses. ¶ 14 On July 21, 2023, the court held Jeffrey in contempt and set a purge of $20,000. Jeffrey did not purge the contempt because he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Florida the following month. On May 3, 2024, the Florida bankruptcy court dismissed Jeffrey’s case. On May 24, 2024, the trial court issued a body attachment against Jeffrey. On May 28, 2024, Jeffrey quashed the body attachment by paying $10,000, but the other half of the purge remained outstanding. ¶ 15 B. Second Contempt Proceedings and Default Sanctions ¶ 16 The fourth and fifth years of litigation primarily concerned Jeffrey’s refusal to produce complete and updated financial records. ¶ 17 Cynthia served written discovery requests upon Jeffrey on December 4, 2020. On January 11, 2024, Cynthia sent Jeffrey a Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. March 17, 2023) letter requesting that he supplement his production with 27 categories of updated financial records including his tax filings, bank statements, investment account records, payroll records, digital payment application data, credit card statements, and expense records. On February 22, 2024, Cynthia moved to compel those documents. -4- No. 1-25-2439 ¶ 18 While Cynthia’s motion to compel was pending, she sent Jeffrey a second Rule 201(k) letter concerning 16 of the 27 categories of documents her first Rule 201(k) letter addressed. This second Rule 201(k) letter reflected that as to all 16 categories, Jeffrey claimed he had already produced the documents, did not have any such documents, or would not produce documents because Cynthia could obtain them from third parties. On July 23, 2024, the court granted Cynthia’s motion to compel and ordered Jeffrey to produce the 16 categories of documents by August 13, 2024. ¶ 19 On August 6, 2024, the court set the case for trial on December 2, 3, and 9, 2024. ¶ 20 On August 20, 2024, Cynthia filed a petition for a rule to show cause alleging that Jeffrey did not produce 12 of the 16 categories of documents at issue. Cynthia also requested that the court sanction Jeffrey pursuant to Rule 219(c) by finding him in default, barring him from presenting evidence at trial, and ordering him to pay her attorney fees and costs. ¶ 21 While the petition for a rule to show cause was pending, Cynthia sent Jeffrey a third Rule 201(k) letter requesting updated production of 44 categories of documents and a Rule 214 affidavit of completeness. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 214(c) (eff. July 1, 2018) (“The producing party shall furnish an affidavit stating whether the production is complete in accordance with the request.”). ¶ 22 On October 9, 2024, Cynthia filed a second motion to compel. She argued that Jeffrey continued to falsely insist that he had complied with his discovery obligations. Cynthia explained that Jeffrey’s failure to produce his financial records prevented her from meeting the October 21, 2024, discovery closure date, submitting expert reports by the November 4, 2024, deadline, and proving the value of the marital estate at trial in early December 2024. Cynthia again requested -5- No. 1-25-2439 that the court sanction Jeffrey under Rule 219(c). In the alternative, she requested that the court extend the discovery deadlines and reset the trial date. ¶ 23 On October 24, 2024, the trial court struck the December trial date. Jeffrey’s attorney withdrew and he proceeded as a self-represented litigant beginning on October 28, 2024. ¶ 24 On February 13, 2025, Cynthia sent Jeffrey a fourth Rule 201(k) letter. The next day, the trial court ordered Jeffrey to produce the documents identified in that letter within 21 days. ¶ 25 The court heard Cynthia’s petition for a rule to show cause on April 4, 2025. Jeffrey admitted that he did not produce documents such as Colorado state tax returns for one of his businesses, Salveo Partners (Salveo), or a current statement for his Scotiabank account in Mexico. But the hearing mostly consisted of Jeffrey arguing with Cynthia’s counsel and the court. The following exchange, which concerned Jeffrey’s credit card statements, illustrates how most of this hearing went: “THE COURT: It says missing January 21st, 2017 statement, closing state[ment] September 2018. MR. HOWARD: I provided that. THE COURT: September 24th to February 25th. MR. HOWARD: I have provided that. [CYNTHIA’S COUNSEL]: He has not. MR. HOWARD: I have. [CYNTHIA’S COUNSEL]: Prove it. MR. HOWARD: You will see when you get back to your computer.” -6- No. 1-25-2439 Because Jeffrey did not bring any of the documents at issue to the hearing, he could not show that he had complied with the court’s orders to produce them. ¶ 26 The court held Jeffrey in contempt, finding that his noncompliance with discovery was willful and contumacious. The court stayed Jeffrey’s incarceration for two weeks so he could produce the outstanding documents to Cynthia and prove his compliance in court. The court continued the matter, including Cynthia’s request for default sanctions, to April 18, 2025. ¶ 27 At the April 18, 2025, hearing, the parties again argued about whether Jeffrey had produced the outstanding discovery. The court found that Jeffrey admitted he had not contacted his financial institutions and that he had not even attempted to learn what a Rule 214 affidavit of completeness was. Therefore, the court took Jeffrey into custody, set a $5,000 bond, and continued the matter to April 21, 2025. ¶ 28 Jeffrey bonded out the following morning and appeared at the April 21, 2025, hearing. The court entered a default finding against Jeffrey as a Rule 219(c)(v) sanction for his failure to comply with discovery. The court’s order stated that Jeffrey “ha[d] no objection to being held in default.” The reports of proceedings reflect the following exchange: “MR. HOWARD: What does a default mean? THE COURT: It means that once I default you we can go to prove-up and prove the case up and you’ll be divorced. MR. HOWARD: And then whatever assets are there she gets 100 percent? THE COURT: Not necessarily. MR. HOWARD: Okay. THE COURT: You’re not objecting to a default? -7- No. 1-25-2439 MR. HOWARD: If it doesn’t—I’m not—I don’t really know what a default means. THE COURT: I just explained it to you. MR. HOWARD: If it just means we can get divorced today then I’m up for it. It if means that we— THE COURT: No, you’re not going to get divorced today. MR. HOWARD: Okay. THE COURT: I’m going to grant [the] Motion for Default.” The court instructed Cynthia to notice a prove-up hearing. ¶ 29 Jeffrey did not move to vacate or reconsider the default finding. ¶ 30 C. Prove-Up Hearing ¶ 31 1. Prehearing Proceedings ¶ 32 On July 15 and 16, 2025, Cynthia served Jeffrey with notices of a default prove-up hearing on July 29, 2025. Cynthia attached a proposed dissolution judgment to the notices and submitted it to the court. ¶ 33 On July 17, 2025, Jeffrey filed a motion to continue the default prove-up hearing. He acknowledged receiving the notices but claimed he did “not have sufficient time to review, respond to, or adequately prepare the documentation requested, which spans approximately five years.” Jeffrey did not propose a new date for the default prove-up hearing. ¶ 34 On July 25, 2025, Jeffrey filed a “response and objection” to Cynthia’s proposed dissolution judgment. This document was essentially Jeffrey’s proposed dissolution judgment. It addressed his income and employment, business interests, investment and retirement accounts, marital debts, maintenance payments to Cynthia, his dissipation of marital assets, attorney fees, -8- No. 1-25-2439 and sanctions. Even though Jeffrey was present when the court entered the default finding, he claimed that he “was unaware of the entry of the default order until July 15, 2025, when he received the Notice of Prove-Up.” ¶ 35 2. Default Prove-Up Hearing ¶ 36 At the July 29, 2025, default prove-up hearing, the court stated that it had reviewed the case’s procedural history. The court denied Jeffrey’s request for a continuance, finding that it was not in good faith and was for the purpose of undue delay. The court explained that because Jeffrey was in default, he could observe the prove-up hearing but could not participate in it. ¶ 37 Cynthia was the only witness. She essentially read her proposed dissolution judgment into the record through a direct examination consisting of leading questions. Throughout the hearing, Cynthia and her attorney referred to the exhibits attached to her proposed judgment but did not formally move them into evidence. ¶ 38 Relevant here, Cynthia testified that she and Jeffrey had been married for 30 years as of 2025. They “enjoyed a nice lifestyle during the marriage.” Jeffrey was employed by “Deel d/b/a Nonco” (Nonco). His annual salary was approximately $250,000, and in January 2025, he received a $143,916.67 bonus. Jeffrey also had a 50% interest in Kief Capital Management (Kief), from which he received management fees, and was a partial owner of Salveo, from which he received distributions. The parties’ experts valued Jeffrey’s interests in Kief and Salveo as of December 2021, which was the most recent valuation available due to his refusal to produce updated financial records. Cynthia’s expert valued Jeffrey’s business interests at $2,022,000 and Jeffrey’s expert valued his interests at $2,247,557, resulting in an average value of $2,134,778.50. The parties had -9- No. 1-25-2439 a joint investment in Cornerstone Opportunity Partners (Cornerstone) worth $20,000. Cynthia was the sole owner of Howard Design Group; her income in 2025 was approximately $60,000. ¶ 39 During the marriage, Jeffrey was the family’s primary earner and Cynthia was chiefly a homemaker. Jeffrey had a master of business administration (MBA) degree and “significantly higher earning capacity” than Cynthia. Cynthia sought $7,634.50 per month in statutory maintenance. ¶ 40 The parties’ marital residence had an appraised value of $1,550,000. The mortgage balance was $411,828.56 and the equity was $1,138,171.44. Jeffrey moved out of the marital residence in July 2020. ¶ 41 Cynthia requested that the court award her Jeffrey’s Merrill Lynch individual retirement accounts (IRAs) as well as her own IRA. She requested that the court award Jeffrey his Fidelity 401(k) account. Cynthia requested that the court award her a Merrill Lynch bank account and two Wintrust checking accounts and that it award Jeffrey the accounts in his name, including two Chase checking accounts, a Scotiabank account, and his PayPal and Venmo accounts. She also requested that the court award Jeffrey all his own investment and cryptocurrency accounts. ¶ 42 In his Florida bankruptcy case, Jeffrey claimed to owe the IRS $130,000 in back taxes. Both parties had incurred post-separation debts, including $330,348 that Cynthia borrowed from her parents to pay her attorney fees and $113,372 the parties jointly borrowed from Cynthia’s parents to pay for their daughters’ high school education. Cynthia requested that Jeffrey “be solely responsible for the debts listed in the proposed judgment” “in consideration of the taxes and penalties incurred by [him] from the liquidation of his retirement accounts, as well as the - 10 - No. 1-25-2439 dissipation claims.” Cynthia proposed that she be responsible for her parents’ loan to pay her attorney fees. ¶ 43 Cynthia testified that Jeffrey did not deposit $128,971.63 into the parties’ joint bank account as the court ordered. He did not pay $57,793.55 for their daughters’ college expenses. Jeffrey spent $115,769.42 more than what the court allowed for his housing costs, $26,496.13 more than what the court allowed for his pet expenses, and $116,099.95 in unapproved business and furniture expenses. In addition, Jeffrey had not paid $10,000 to purge the first contempt order. Cynthia requested that the court enter judgment as to all the above amounts. ¶ 44 3. Default Dissolution Judgment ¶ 45 Immediately following the default prove-up hearing, the court entered Cynthia’s proposed dissolution judgment with a few handwritten changes. ¶ 46 Relevant here, the court awarded Cynthia $7,634.50 in monthly maintenance, which would terminate upon either party’s death, Cynthia’s remarriage or de facto remarriage, or further court order. The court also awarded Cynthia the marital residence. ¶ 47 As to retirement accounts, the court awarded Cynthia her own Merrill Lynch IRA as well as Jeffrey’s two Merrill Lynch IRAs. Jeffrey received his Fidelity 401(k). The court awarded Cynthia a Merrill Lynch bank account and two Wintrust checking accounts and awarded Jeffrey his Chase checking accounts, Scotiabank account, and PayPal and Venmo accounts. In addition, the Court awarded Jeffrey all his own investment accounts, cryptocurrency accounts, and Nonco stock. The court awarded Cynthia her interest in Howard Design Group and Jeffrey his interests in Kief and Salveo, as well as the parties’ interest in Cornerstone. - 11 - No. 1-25-2439 ¶ 48 The court allocated all marital debt to Jeffrey except for Cynthia’s loan from her parents to pay her attorney fees. The court explained that it allocated debt to Jeffrey “[i]n consideration of the taxes and penalties incurred by Jeffrey from his liquidation of the retirement accounts which were previously award[ed] to Jeffrey as a pre- distributions of marital funds and in consideration of Cynthia’s dissipation claims against Jeffrey in the sum of $115,769.42 in excess housing costs pursuant to the November 16, 2021 court order; the sum of $26,496.13 in excess pet related costs pursuant to the November 16, 2021 [court order]; the sum of $116,099.95 pursuant to the September 28, 2022[,] [o]rder, whereby Jeffrey continued to erroneously pay business expenses from his bank accounts and failed to reimburse same or charge same to the separately designated credit card and Jeffrey’s withdrawal of marital assets during the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage while failing to account for same and significant and excessive funds on furniture/furnishings and Jeffrey’s unilaterally incurring *** debts since the parties’ separation.” ¶ 49 Finally, the court entered three monetary judgments against Jeffrey: $10,000 for the outstanding contempt purge, $128,971.63 for his failure to deposit his income in the parties’ joint bank account, and $57,793.55 for his failure to contribute to the children’s college expenses. ¶ 50 The dissolution judgment included 11 exhibits marked A through K. Five exhibits are attached to the judgment: (A) an Illinois maintenance worksheet, (B) a July 27, 2022, agreed order regarding the parties’ children’s educational expenses, (C) a September 7, 2021, agreed order regarding housing expenses, (D) an October 7, 2022, order regarding distributions of marital funds from escrow, and (J) an April 8, 2022, order enjoining Jeffrey from unilaterally withdrawing - 12 - No. 1-25-2439 marital funds and designating $100,000 he had already withdrawn as a “pre-distribution from the marital estate.” The other six exhibits are “by reference only,” meaning that the documents themselves are not attached to the judgment. The cover sheets for these exhibits indicate that they were (E) a “Spreadsheet of Monies Owed from Jeff[’s] Income,” (F) “College Expenses Owed,” (G) “Dissipated Housing Costs,” (H) “Dissipated Pet Expenses,” (I) a “Dissipation Spreadsheet,” and (K) a “Marital Balance Sheet.” ¶ 51 D. Motion to Vacate ¶ 52 On August 25, 2025, Jeffrey’s current counsel appeared and moved to vacate the default judgment pursuant to sections 2-1203(a) and 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a), 2-1301(e) (West 2024)). Jeffrey’s motion did not claim that he had or would comply with discovery, and it did not challenge the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding. Rather, it challenged the trial court’s (1) denial of his motion to continue the prove-up hearing, (2) handling of evidentiary issues at the default prove-up hearing, (3) division of the marital estate, (4) maintenance order, and (5) money judgments related to the first contempt proceedings. ¶ 53 On October 12, 2025, Cynthia filed a response to Jeffrey’s motion to vacate. She argued that Jeffrey did not even acknowledge his noncompliance with discovery much less offer an excuse for it. Cynthia also contended that because Jeffrey was in default, he had no right to present evidence at the prove-up hearing. Cynthia concluded that the trial court properly relied on her unopposed testimony in entering the default dissolution judgment. ¶ 54 The court heard Jeffrey’s motion to vacate on October 30, 2025. Jeffrey emphasized that he was not an “inactive non-participant” during this case; rather, he had “been deeply involved in the litigation on an ongoing basis.” Jeffrey contended that he was entitled to “a trial on the merits” - 13 - No. 1-25-2439 because Cynthia’s testimony at the default prove-up hearing did not support the default dissolution judgment. Cynthia contended that although Jeffrey demanded a “trial on the merits,” such a trial was impossible because he never produced the discovery that would be necessary to try the case. The court denied Jeffrey’s motion to vacate. ¶ 55 On November 25, 2025, Jeffrey filed a notice of appeal challenging the default dissolution judgment and the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate it. ¶ 56 Litigation continued in the trial court. While the parties were briefing Jeffrey’s motion to vacate, Cynthia filed a petition for a rule to show cause based on Jeffrey’s failure to pay maintenance and reimburse her for their daughters’ college expenses. That petition remained pending after Jeffrey filed his notice of appeal. The electronic docket indicates that the trial court held Jeffrey in contempt on January 9, 2026. See TCF National Bank v. Richards, 2016 IL App (1st) 152083, ¶ 50 (we take judicial notice of the trial court’s electronic docket). Cynthia filed a petition for attorney fees and costs on March 13, 2026, and Jeffrey responded on May 12, 2026. On July 30, 2026, the trial court ordered Jeffrey to pay Cynthia’s attorney fees and struck the case from the call. ¶ 57 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 58 Jeffrey challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate the default dissolution judgment, denial of his motion to continue the default prove-up hearing, and division of the marital estate. ¶ 59 A. Jurisdiction - 14 - No. 1-25-2439 ¶ 60 The parties do not contest our jurisdiction, but we have an independent duty to consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See In re Marriage of Duggan, 376 Ill. App. 3d 725, 727 (2007). ¶ 61 “Every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). To appeal a final judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal “within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against th[e] judgment.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). Jeffery filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of his motion to vacate the default dissolution judgment. ¶ 62 But after Jeffrey filed that notice of appeal, contempt and attorney fee proceedings continued in the trial court. Those postdissolution proceedings were “claims” separate from the petition for dissolution of marriage. See In re Marriage of Crecos, 2021 IL 126192, ¶ 45; In re Marriage of Teymour, 2017 IL App (1st) 161091, ¶ 41; Sachdev v. Sachdev, 2026 IL App (1st) 241431-U, ¶¶ 16-21; When an action involves multiple claims, a party may appeal from a final judgment that disposes of some but not all the claims only if the trial court finds that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal or if some other exception applies. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304 (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). In a divorce case, if a party tries to appeal a final judgment as to one claim when other postdissolution claims are still pending, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction unless the trial court included Rule 304(a) language. Crecos, 2021 IL 126192, ¶ 45. In this case, the trial court did not include Rule 304(a) language in either the default dissolution judgment or its order denying Jeffrey’s motion to vacate. Therefore, Jeffrey’s notice of appeal was premature. See id. ¶ 63 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017) “acts to save appeals that would otherwise be premature.” Duggan, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 727-28. It provides that - 15 - No. 1-25-2439 “When a timely postjudgment motion has been filed by any party, whether in a jury case or a nonjury case, a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion, or before the final disposition of any separate claim, becomes effective when the order disposing of said motion or claim is entered.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). Jeffrey filed a timely postjudgment motion within 30 days of the default dissolution judgment. The trial court denied that postjudgment motion, and Jeffery filed a notice of appeal “before the final disposition of any separate claim,” namely, the postdissolution contempt and attorney fee claims. See id. On July 30, 2026, the trial court disposed of those separate postdissolution claims. Jeffrey’s notice of appeal became effective on that date. See id. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 303(a)(2). ¶ 64 B. Motion to Vacate Default Judgment ¶ 65 Jeffrey did not challenge the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding in the trial court, and he does not challenge it on appeal. He does not, for example, claim that he complied with the trial court’s discovery orders or properly withheld documents pursuant to privilege or discovery objections. Jeffrey’s brief vaguely notes that he produced some documents, most of which occurred long before the issues that led to the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding. Tellingly, Jeffrey is careful to avoid claiming that he complied with the discovery orders that led to the default finding. We take that as a tacit admission that Jeffrey did not comply with those discovery orders and that the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding was proper. ¶ 66 Jeffrey challenges only the statutorily required consequences that resulted from the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding: the default prove-up hearing and default dissolution judgment. See 750 - 16 - No. 1-25-2439 ILCS 5/405 (West 2024). Essentially, Jeffrey claims that even though the trial court properly defaulted him as a Rule 219(c)(v) discovery sanction, the case should have proceeded to a full dissolution trial as if he had never been defaulted. That is illogical. Accepting Jeffrey’s position would render default sanctions meaningless. ¶ 67 We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to vacate a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hansen, 2016 IL App (1st) 143720, ¶ 14. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person could find as the trial court did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Betsy M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151358, ¶ 61. ¶ 68 1. Section 2-1301(e) ¶ 69 Section 2-1301(e) provides that “[t]he court may in its discretion, before final order or judgment, set aside any default, and may on motion filed within 30 days after entry thereof set aside any final order or judgment upon any terms and conditions that shall be reasonable.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2024). Under section 2-1301(e), Jeffrey could have moved to set aside the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding before the court entered a default dissolution judgment (see id.) by showing that “his failure to comply with discovery orders was justified by extenuating circumstances” and “a willingness to comply with discovery orders in the future.” See Koppel v. Michael, 374 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1004 (2007). But he did not. Jeffrey sought only vacatur of the default dissolution judgment without challenging the underlying basis for that judgment: the Rule 219(c)(v) default finding. Despite this unusual approach, Jeffrey’s section 2-1301(e) motion was timely because the trial court entered the default dissolution judgment on July 29, 2025, and Jeffrey moved to vacate it within 30 days, on August 25, 2025. See id. - 17 - No. 1-25-2439 ¶ 70 When a party seeks to vacate a default judgment under section 2-1301(e), “the overriding consideration is simply whether or not substantial justice is being done between the litigants and whether it is reasonable, under the circumstances, to compel the other party to go to trial on the merits.” Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 57. To determine whether substantial justice has been achieved, a court may consider the movant’s diligence or lack thereof, whether the movant has a meritorious defense, the severity of the penalty, and the relative hardships on the parties. In re Marriage of Harnack, 2014 IL App (1st) 121424, ¶ 45. We review the trial court’s ruling on a section 2-1303(e) motion for an abuse of discretion. 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2024); Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. King, 2014 IL App (1st) 132073, ¶ 26. ¶ 71 a. Diligence and Meritorious Defense ¶ 72 The first substantial justice factor considers the movant’s diligence or lack thereof in presenting the motion itself and any defense he attempts to raise. McNulty v. McNulty, 2022 IL App (1st) 201239, ¶ 45. Jeffrey timely filed his section 2-1301(e) motion, but he was not diligent in presenting it. Jeffrey did not even notice the motion to be heard. Rather, Cynthia requested a hearing on September 30, 2025, more than a month after Jeffrey filed the motion to vacate. ¶ 73 Nor was Jeffrey diligent in presenting a defense. This consideration overlaps with the second substantial justice factor, which is whether the movant demonstrated a meritorious defense. Harnack, 2014 IL App (1st) 121424, ¶ 45. Jeffrey’s brief insists that he raised “meritorious defenses” but does not explain what they were. He claims that he included these “defenses” in his “response and objection” to Cynthia’s proposed dissolution judgment. But that filing did not identify anything as a defense. - 18 - No. 1-25-2439 ¶ 74 Jeffrey’s motion to vacate did not identify any defenses either. On the contrary, it argued that he was not required to show a meritorious defense to obtain vacatur of the default judgment. It is true that a party seeking vacatur under section 2-1301(e) does not have to show a meritorious defense; rather, it is simply one factor in the substantial justice analysis. Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 57. But if Jeffrey actually had a meritorious defense, we expect that he would have clearly identified it by this point. He has not. ¶ 75 Jeffrey also argues that in denying his motion to vacate, the trial court overemphasized his history of disobeying the court’s orders. We disagree; that consideration was proper. “In determining whether substantial justice is being done under section 2-1301, a court should consider all the events leading up to the judgment.” Wolkowitz v. Jamison, 2024 IL App (1st) 230455, ¶ 39. The diligence and meritorious defense factors weigh in favor of finding that the trial court’s denial of Jeffrey’s motion to vacate accomplished substantial justice. ¶ 76 b. Severity ¶ 77 A default judgment is a drastic sanction that a trial court should impose only when a party’s actions show a deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranted disregard of the court’s authority, and only after all other enforcement powers have failed. Shimanovksy v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 123 (1998). Yet in this case, even default sanctions did not compel Jeffrey’s compliance with discovery. He chose to spend the night in jail rather than produce his own financial records, and he never moved to vacate the default finding by showing a willingness to comply with discovery going forward. See Koppel, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1004 (To justify setting aside a default sanction resulting from a party’s refusal to comply with court ordered discovery, the movant must establish “that his failure to comply with discovery orders was justified by extenuating - 19 - No. 1-25-2439 circumstances and must show a willingness to comply with discovery orders in the future.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). This factor also weighs in favor of denying Jeffrey’s motion to vacate. ¶ 78 c. Relative Hardships ¶ 79 When the trial court ruled on Jeffrey’s motion to vacate, this case had been pending for more than 5 years and was almost 11 months past the December 2024 trial date. Granting Jeffrey’s motion to vacate and resetting the trial would have further delayed this case and forced Cynthia to incur more attorney fees and costs. “It would be unreasonable to subject petitioner to further delays and expense in reaching an end to this litigation, or to reward respondent for his wilful refusal” to comply with discovery. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Drewitch, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1097 (1994). Vacating the default dissolution judgment also would have undone the court’s detailed division of the parties’ substantial assets, which would have harmed Cynthia’s financial stability and ability to plan for the future. Hardship to Cynthia favored denying Jeffrey’s motion to vacate. ¶ 80 Jeffrey contends that vacating the default dissolution judgment would have caused little hardship to Cynthia because she “is an in-county, in-state resident, and thus would not incur travel expenses or be forced to be away from her home during additional proceedings.” But the fact that a party lives in Illinois does not, on its own, warrant reversing a trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment in a divorce case. Id. Jeffrey also claims that he could have reimbursed Cynthia for lost work and additional attorney fees a reset trial would have caused. This argument illustrates Jeffrey’s unreasonable approach to this case: he would rather spend more money to prolong the litigation than resolve this case as the law requires. - 20 - No. 1-25-2439 ¶ 81 Jeffrey also argues that not vacating the default judgment caused him hardship because it resulted in a dissolution judgment based solely on Cynthia’s testimony at the default prove-up hearing. But that is exactly what the Act requires: “If the respondent is in default, the court shall proceed to hear the cause upon testimony of petitioner taken in open court ***.” 750 ILCS 5/405 (West 2024). The balance of hardships favored leaving the default judgment intact. The court’s denial of Jeffrey’s section 2-1301(e) motion to vacate accomplished substantial justice and was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 82 2. Section 2-120