In re V.O.

2026 IL App (1st) 252497 No. 1-25-2497 Opinion filed August 24, 2026 Third Division ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re V.O., a Minor-Appellee ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Cook County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) No. 25 JA 281 v. ) ) P.C., ) Honorable ) Demetrios G. Kottaras, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Rochford and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 After a hearing on the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship, the trial court found that the child had been neglected by being subjected to an injurious environment and by lack of necessary care. After a dispositional hearing, the court found that the respondent mother was unable to parent the child and placed him in the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). No. 1-25-2497 ¶2 On appeal, 1 the mother argues that (1) the trial court should have dismissed the petition because the adjudication hearing did not commence within 90 days of the mother’s appearance in court, and (2) the trial court’s finding of neglect based on an injurious environment and lack of necessary care was against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶3 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 2 ¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 The mother is the parent of V.O., a minor, who was born in January 2020. ¶6 On April 10, 2025, the State filed a petition for adjudication of V.O.’s wardship and a motion for temporary custody. For the father, the petition listed Mr. O., deceased, and “All Whom It May Concern.” The petition alleged that V.O. was abused and neglected due to the substantial risk of physical injury and an environment injurious to his welfare. Specifically, the petition alleged that the mother had a prior indicated report for death by neglect and inadequate supervision; three of her minor children died in a 2018 house fire when they were left home unattended; the mother admitted to using an illegal substance and on April 3, 2025, tested positive 1 This appeal is subject to expedited procedures under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). Paragraph (a)(5) of Rule 311 requires us to issue our decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, except where good cause is shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). Here, the notice of appeal was filed on December 8, 2025. Consequently, we would have been required to issue our decision by May 7, 2026. However, we extended the deadlines for respondent to file a supplement to the record and for the parties to file their briefs with this court. Specifically, a supplement to the record was allowed on February 2, 2026, and respondent sought and received three extensions of time to file the appellant’s brief, which was filed on May 4, 2026. Thereafter, the petitioner sought and received three extensions of time to file the appellee’s briefs. Specifically, the Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney filed its brief on June 23, 2026, and the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian filed its brief on July 24, 2026. Thereafter, respondent filed her reply brief on July 31, 2026. Under these circumstances, we find good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day deadline contemplated by Rule 311(a)(5). 2 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. -2- No. 1-25-2497 for cocaine, yet minimized her substance abuse issues; V.O. had a diagnosed seizure disorder and was autistic; and the mother indicated that V.O.’s putative father, Mr. O., was deceased but paternity had not been established. ¶7 An attached affidavit documenting DCFS’s efforts revealed that, on April 5, 2025, a hotline call indicated that the mother, who was the sole provider for V.O., used crack cocaine at the family residence and in the presence of V.O. either every other day or on a daily basis. The hotline call also indicated that the mother recently consumed crack cocaine while lying in the bed with V.O. After the mother consumed the cocaine, she passed out for about 10 hours and V.O. was up and moving around the home with no supervision. During this incident, V.O. was not fed and was seen eating from the trash can in the home. The affidavit further stated that a drug toxicology screening conducted on the mother on April 5, 2025, returned a positive result for cocaine. The DCFS investigator noted that V.O. is autistic, nonverbal, and suffers from a severe seizure condition and that the mother’s use of cocaine could impair her judgment and prevent her from providing proper care for V.O. in the event of a seizure episode. ¶8 The court appointed counsel for the mother and appointed the Cook County Public Guardian as attorney and guardian ad litem for V.O. Thereafter, the court took temporary custody of V.O. ¶9 On April 17, 2025, the court ordered that publication of service be issued to V.O.’s unknown father. At a July 5, 2025, status hearing on the State’s efforts to perfect service on putative and unknown fathers, the State informed the court that no voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP) existed for Mr. O., who was not listed on V.O.’s birth certificate and had died on June 17, 2019. The State asked the court for leave to publish to unknown father respondents, and -3- No. 1-25-2497 no party objected. On July 7, 2025, the court again ordered that publication of service be issued to V.O.’s unknown father. On July 8, 2025, the State filed an affidavit for service of publication, stating that service by publication was required because V.O.’s unknown father could not be located. On the same date, the clerk of the circuit court issued a notice of publication to V.O.’s unknown father respondents and “all whom it may concern” that a petition was filed under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2024)), that an adjudicatory hearing would be held on the petition on September 15, 2025, and that the court had the authority to take from the father the custody and guardianship of the minor, to terminate parental rights, and to appoint a guardian with power to consent to adoption. ¶ 10 On July 15, 2025, the mother moved to dismiss this matter under section 2-14(b) of the Act (id. § 2-14(b)), which provides that an adjudicatory hearing on a petition alleging that a minor is abused or neglected “shall be commenced within 90 days of the date of service of process upon the minor, parents, any guardian and any legal custodian.” The mother argued that she had not waived the 90-day period and the court should have commenced the adjudicatory hearing by July 9, 2025, i.e., within 90 days of the mother’s appearance at the April 10, 2025, temporary custody hearing because V.O. did not have a legal father and the State’s attempts to serve unknown fathers were improper. In response, the State argued that it had a duty to attempt to give notice to unknown fathers and Mr. O. was not on V.O.’s birth certificate and did not sign a VAP. The court denied the mother’s motion to dismiss. ¶ 11 On September 15, 2025, the court admitted into the record the State’s publication notice to unknown father respondents and, as no putative father had appeared in court, defaulted all unknown fathers. -4- No. 1-25-2497 ¶ 12 In October 2025, the State moved to amend the petition to add factual allegations that the mother had stated that V.O. has not been vaccinated since he was two years old; after a January 2025 hotline investigation of medical neglect was deemed unfounded, an intact case 3 was opened in March 2025 to offer family preservation services; V.O. was diagnosed with a seizure disorder and Dravet syndrome (a rare, severe, and lifelong form of genetic epilepsy that begins in infancy or early childhood); and there was a concern that V.O. may be autistic. The mother argued that the court should deny the motion and dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim because the proposed amendments did not establish that she had breached her parental duty. The court allowed the State to amend the petition and denied the mother’s motion to dismiss. ¶ 13 The adjudicatory hearing commenced on November 5, 2025, by videoconference and the parties stipulated to the following facts. ¶ 14 Assistant Commanding Fire Marshal Bradley Batka would testify that, on August 26, 2018, he was dispatched to a fire at a residence on South Sacramento Street in Chicago. When he arrived at about 4 a.m., there were no adults in the home and eventually the parents, the mother of V.O. and another woman, arrived at the address. Ten minors died in that fire. ¶ 15 DCFS investigator Nancy Rodriguez would testify that she was assigned to V.O.’s case based on allegations of a substantial risk of physical injury and welfare due to the mother using crack cocaine and neglecting V.O. In 2018, the mother lost three children in a fire, where seven other children also died. On April 5, 2025, Rodriguez met with the mother at her home and observed V.O., who laughed with his mother, was able to follow her verbal instructions, and did An intact case refers to a family service file where children remain living at home rather than 3 being removed into State custody. -5- No. 1-25-2497 not have marks or bruises on his body. Rodriguez found working smoke detectors in the home, was shown V.O.’s epilepsy medication (which had been recently refilled), and believed that V.O. had access to every room in the home, which was clean and without any apparent child safety hazards or drug paraphernalia. The mother did not appear to be impaired and told Rodriguez that she (the mother) last used cocaine on Thursday, April 3, 2025, at a bar to celebrate a deceased cousin’s birthday. The mother also said that she uses marijuana to sleep. The mother works at a homeless shelter, was engaged in intact services, and would soon start counseling. ¶ 16 DCFS intact family caseworker Tiona Watkins would testify that she worked with V.O.’s family from March 18, 2025, until the week of April 7, 2025. An intact case was opened after a hotline call was made against the mother for medical neglect because V.O. was missing medical appointments. Although the hotline call was deemed unfounded, intact services (i.e., housing services, parenting services, and individual therapy) were provided for preventative purposes. Watkins visited the mother’s home three or four times and did not observe her to be impaired by drugs, forgetful, or unfocused. The mother told Watkins that she used drugs after the death of three of her children in 2018. Watkins observed that the mother was able to meet V.O.’s needs as expressed non-verbally and V.O. was comfortable with her. However, after learning about the mother’s admission of drug use, Watkins no longer agreed that the mother’s home was safe. ¶ 17 The mother’s work supervisor Jose Lopez would testify that he supervised her as a residential aide at a nonprofit homeless shelter in Chicago. As a mandated reporter, Lopez never made a hotline report regarding the mother. The mother’s two drug tests while employed at the shelter were negative. -6- No. 1-25-2497 ¶ 18 DCFS child protection investigator Ayleene Woodard would testify that she was assigned to this matter after an April 5, 2025, hotline call involving V.O.’s family. She noted three hotline calls involving the mother—the first in 2018 for death by neglect and inadequate supervision; the second in January 2025, which was deemed unfounded; and the third in April 2025. When Woodard spoke to the mother by phone on April 7, 2025, the mother said that she had used cocaine since 2018, had used it in December 2024, and used it on April 5, 2025. She also said that she drank alcohol when partying and smoked marijuana to help her sleep. Furthermore, she refused services through Lurie Children’s Hospital because she believed it “was trying to use [V.O.] as a guinea pig.” The mother also did not have a primary care physician for V.O., who had not received vaccines since he was two years old, because the mother said that he would get fevers whenever he received vaccines, which would then cause seizures. ¶ 19 The court also admitted into evidence, without any objection, V.O.’s medical records from Lurie Children’s Hospital. The records indicate that V.O. had his first seizure in July 2020, when he was five months old. He was hospitalized for another seizure two months later in September 2020. In the notes from that hospitalization, the hospital staff noted a caregiver who was referred to as “dad” was present at 8 a.m. that morning when V.O. woke up and experienced the seizure. The records state that V.O. lived with his mom, dad, and extended family members. Further, V.O.’s parents reported that he received a vaccine the day prior to the seizure, and he had a seizure when he received his previous vaccination as well. The hospital staff noted that both parents were concerned about V.O. not meeting developmental milestones. V.O.’s discharge notes from this hospitalization stated that he required daily medication to prevent seizures. Upon discharge, the -7- No. 1-25-2497 mother and a person identified in the records as “father” were given education regarding seizure disorders, including literature, an in-person explanation, video education, and demonstrations. ¶ 20 V.O. experienced another seizure less than a month later in September 2020, and upon discharge from the hospital the mother was informed that V.O. required medication twice per day to prevent seizures. V.O. was also scheduled to have a follow-up appointment with the neurology team. In September 2020, a neurology fellow at the hospital spoke with the mother regarding the genetic testing required to determine V.O.’s diagnosis, and the mother provided her and the father’s birth dates for that genetic testing. In March 2021, V.O.’s neurology team called the mother to ask how V.O. was doing, and the mother reported that he was seizure free between August 2020 to March 2021 but had a seizure in early March because he missed a few days of his seizure medication. By that time, V.O. was diagnosed with Dravet syndrome, and the neurology team recommended switching him to a medication more attuned with that diagnosis. The mother stated that she wanted to consider the side effects and do more research and would discuss it further at a telemedicine appointment scheduled for April 2021. ¶ 21 By October 2021, the mother reported that V.O. was having more frequent seizures including seizures where he would stop breathing. At that time, the mother reported that V.O. was delayed developmentally and she had contacted therapists but did not enroll him in early intervention therapies to address developmental concerns. ¶ 22 At a November 4, 2021, appointment at the Lurie Epilepsy Center, the mother confirmed with staff that she knew the importance of following up with the epilepsy team and ensuring V.O.’s seizures were controlled. However, beginning on November 30, 2021, the mother stopped attending V.O.’s neurology appointments consistently. On January 5, 2025, the mother took V.O. -8- No. 1-25-2497 to the hospital because she was contacted by DCFS and asked to have V.O. evaluated after a hotline call. On that date, the mother admitted she had not followed up with the neurology clinic in “several years.” V.O.’s medical chart confirmed his last office visit to the neurology department was in November 2021. The mother also stated that V.O. had not taken his antiseizure medication for at least two years, but his seizures were controlled. The mother stated that she felt the seizure medications did not reduce seizures and made V.O. drowsy and less engaged. She also confirmed that V.O. did not have a pediatrician and explained that this was because she did not want V.O. to be vaccinated since he experienced adverse reactions whenever he received vaccines. ¶ 23 During V.O.’s January 2025 hospitalization, an occupational therapist evaluated him. The mother told the occupational therapist that V.O. was not enrolled in school and never received any developmental therapies. The occupational therapist noted that V.O. would benefit greatly from those services. Similarly, during a speech therapy evaluation, the evaluator recommended that V.O. would benefit from school-based speech therapy and outpatient services. Finally, the attending physician of the pediatric epilepsy department discussed with the mother the importance of following up with medical appointments and restarting antiseizure medication. ¶ 24 The mother attended a February 2025 follow-up appointment with the epilepsy center. However, she did not show up for a March 2025 outpatient pediatric appointment. When she attended a March 27, 2025, telemedicine appointment with the epilepsy center, she reported that V.O. had not taken his epilepsy medication for two weeks because she ran out of it. ¶ 25 During closing argument, the State asked for leave to amend the pleadings to conform the petition to the evidence. Specifically, the State sought to add an allegation of neglect based on lack -9- No. 1-25-2497 of necessary care and withdraw the allegation of abuse due to a substantial risk of injury. The court granted the State’s request for leave to amend over the mother’s objection. ¶ 26 On November 5, 2025, the court entered an adjudication order, finding that V.O. was neglected based on an injurious environment and lack of necessary care. The court stated that the mother had been “self-medicating,” and V.O. had special needs that were not being met where the mother was not keeping medical appointments and pursuing special education. ¶ 27 On November 13, 2025, the court conducted the dispositional hearing by videoconference. The court admitted the State’s exhibits, including the June 23, 2025, integrated assessment, over the mother’s objection. The integrated assessment stated, in part, that the mother was reported to use cocaine on a daily basis; she was the sole caretaker for five-year-old V.O.; the family was involved with intact services due to the mother missing several medical appointments for V.O.; there were concerns that the mother would pass out for 10 hours after using cocaine, leaving V.O. without supervision; the mother tested positive for cocaine on April 5, 2025; three of her children died in a fire after she left them unsupervised; and her current use of cocaine impaired her judgment and prevented her from providing proper care for V.O. in the event of a seizure episode. ¶ 28 Nichole Schwartz-Acevedo, the assigned DCFS caseworker, testified that V.O. is diagnosed with Dravet syndrome, severe autism, and global developmental delay. He is enrolled in special education at school and has been referred for autism services. He is taking an antiseizure medication, which controls his seizures. The last seizure he had was in July 2025, when it was very hot, as heat triggers his seizures. ¶ 29 Schwartz-Acevedo testified that the mother was recommended to engage in individual therapy, a parenting program, a psychiatric assessment, and substance abuse services. The mother - 10 - No. 1-25-2497 completed parenting classes in September 2025 and a psychological assessment in August 2025, but those were the only services she completed. The mother began individual therapy in July 2025 but was unsuccessfully discharged in October 2025 for lack of engagement. The agency re-referred her for individual therapy in October 2025, but that provider had not been able to get in touch with her. The mother completed a Juvenile Court Assessment Program (JCAP) substance abuse assessment in July 2025, which recommended outpatient substance abuse treatment. The mother was referred for outpatient services but missed two intake appointments. In October 2025, the agency referred her to a different provider for outpatient services, but that provider could not get in contact with her. The outpatient JCAP dismissed the mother for lack of engagement in October 2025. Finally, the mother was referred for random urine drug testing but failed to appear for most of those tests. The mother knew that any test she failed to appear for was considered a positive result for drug use. The mother attended only 4 of the 17 random urine tests to which she was referred. She also tested positive for cocaine on her May 6, 2025, and July 9, 2025, tests. Regarding the mother’s visitation with V.O., Schwartz-Acevedo testified that the mother participated in weekly supervised visits in the community. ¶ 30 After hearing argument, the court found that the mother was unable to care for V.O., adjudged him a ward of the court, and placed him in the custody of the DCFS guardianship administrator with the right to place the minor. The court set a permanency goal of return home within 12 months. ¶ 31 Following the dispositional ruling, the mother’s attorney, Benjamin Ginzky, stated that he wanted to make a record regarding a brief colloquy he had with the judge after the adjudication - 11 - No. 1-25-2497 hearing the previous week about the judge having earlier practiced medical malpractice litigation. The following discussion occurred. “MR. GINZKY [(RESPONDENT MOTHER’S ATTORNEY)]: *** And I made some kind of joke about getting a job in that field in response. *** THE COURT: What exactly are you referring to[? C]ould you be a little bit more specific as to what you are mentioning[?] I don’t recall what I stated. MR. GINZKY: *** I believe the Court’s words were something very close to[: ‘Mr. Ginzky, f]or your information my first job out of law school was medical malpractice litigation at a law firm and I don’t recall it.[’] And I responded, [‘O]h, great, well are they hiring[?’] and the Court said [‘I]t was a good place to be[.’] [T]hat is my entire recollection of the exchange, [although] the parties are free to comment or dispute if their recollection is different. THE COURT: I am searching to see what the significance of it was. I believe you had made some sort of comment that the evidence or the information that was provided might have been somewhat communicated because it was medical type evidence, is that correct, Mr. Gin[z]ky? MR. GINZKY: Such that it was part of my trial argument. I just wanted *** the court colloquy to be on the record. *** THE COURT: And what significance, if any, do you feel that may or may not have? MR. GINZKY: Well, judge, it might reflect on how the Court was resolving ambiguity in the evidence that you just suggested.” - 12 - No. 1-25-2497 ¶ 32 Thereafter, the mother timely appealed the court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the petition for adjudication of wardship and the court’s adjudication order finding V.O. neglected due to lack of necessary care and an injurious environment. ¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 34 The Act provides a two-step process the trial court must use to decide whether a minor child should become a ward of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. The first step of the process is the adjudicatory hearing, at which the court considers only whether the minor child is abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. ¶ 19; 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2024). If the circuit court determines that the minor child is abused, neglected, or dependent at the adjudicatory hearing, then the court holds a dispositional hearing, in which the court determines whether it is consistent with the health, safety, and best interests of the minor child and the public for the minor child to be made a ward of the court. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21; 705 ILCS 405/2-22 (West 2024). In any proceeding brought under the Act, including an adjudication of wardship, the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. ¶ 35 A. Motion to Dismiss Petition ¶ 36 The mother argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the petition for adjudication of wardship because the adjudication hearing failed to commence within 90 days of her appearance in court. Specifically, she argues that the statutory 90-day period to commence the adjudicatory hearing began running on April 10, 2025, when she appeared in court at the temporary custody hearing date. According to the mother, the deadline to commence the adjudicatory hearing lapsed on July 9, 2025, so the court failed to comply with the Act when the adjudicatory hearing commenced on November 5, 2025. She contends that the State’s attempts to - 13 - No. 1-25-2497 serve V.O.’s unknown father did not toll the Act’s 90-day period because she is V.O.’s only legal parent, the definition of a parent under the Act does not include putative or unknown fathers, and hypothesized putative and unknown fathers are not necessary parties and do not have any rights to notice of child neglect proceedings under the Act. ¶ 37 The State responds that the court properly denied the mother’s motion to dismiss because the State was attempting to serve process on V.O.’s unknown father via publication and the unknown father had not yet been defaulted. ¶ 38 In interpreting a statute, our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 194 (1992). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 455 (1989). Statutory interpretation and other issues of law are reviewed de novo. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001). ¶ 39 The Act shall be liberally construed to carry out its purpose and policy, which includes securing for the minor the care and guidance that will serve the minor’s safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare and the best interests of the community. 705 ILCS 405/1- 2(1) (West 2024). The court may direct the course of all proceedings under the Act to promptly “ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully gather information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to this Act.” Id. § 1-2(2). ¶ 40 The parents of the minor who is the subject of proceedings under the Act have a statutory right to be present and participate in child protection proceedings arising under the Act. Id. § 1-5. - 14 - No. 1-25-2497 The Act defines a parent as “a father or mother of a child and includes any adoptive parent. It also includes a person (i) whose parentage is presumed or has been established under the law of this or another jurisdiction or (ii) who has registered with the Putative Father Registry in accordance with Section 12.1 of the Adoption Act [(750 ILCS 50/12.1)] and whose paternity has not been ruled out under the law of this or another jurisdiction. It does not include a parent whose rights in respect to the minor have been terminated in any manner provided by law. It does not include a person who has been or could be determined to be a parent under the *** Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, or similar parentage law in any other state, if that person has been convicted of or pled nolo contendere to a crime that resulted in the conception of the child under [specified sections of the Criminal Code of 2012 concerning sexual assault, sexual relations within families, and sexual abuse], or similar statute in another jurisdiction unless upon motion of any party, other than the offender, to the juvenile court proceedings the court finds it is in the child’s best interest to deem the offender a parent for purposes of the juvenile court proceedings.” Id. § 1-3(11). ¶ 41 The purpose of section 2-14 of the Act, which addresses the adjudicatory hearing, is to ensure that the State acts “in a just and speedy manner to determine the best interests of the minor.” Id. § 2-14(a). Moreover, the “legislature recognizes that serious delay in the adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the minor and the family and *** frustrates the *** best interests of the minor and the effort to establish permanent homes for children in need.” Id. Our supreme court has concluded that the legislature intended a mandatory construction of section 2-14. In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 482 (1997). - 15 - No. 1-25-2497 ¶ 42 Section 2-14 of the Act provides, in relevant part: “(b) When a petition is filed alleging that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent, an adjudicatory hearing shall be commenced within 90 days of the date of service of process upon the minor, parents, any guardian and any legal custodian, unless an earlier date is required pursuant to Section 2-13.1[, which pertains to the State’s motion for early termination of reasonable efforts to reunify the minor and the parents]. Once commenced, subsequent delay in the proceedings may be allowed by the court when necessary to ensure a fair hearing. (c) Upon written motion of a party filed no later than 10 days prior to hearing, or upon the court’s own motion and only for good cause shown, the Court may continue the hearing for a period not to exceed 30 days, and only if the continuance is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor. When the court grants a continuance, it shall enter specific factual findings to support its order, including factual findings supporting the court’s determination that the continuance is in the best interests of the minor. Only one such continuance shall be granted. A period of continuance for good cause as described in this Section shall temporarily suspend as to all parties, for the time of the delay, the period within which a hearing must be held. On the day of the expiration of the delay, the period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended. The term ‘good cause’ as applied in this Section shall be strictly construed and be in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 231(a) through (f). Neither stipulation by counsel nor the convenience of any party constitutes good cause. If the adjudicatory hearing is not - 16 - No. 1-25-2497 heard within the time limits required by subsection (b) or (c) of this Section, upon motion by any party the petition shall be dismissed without prejudice. (d) The time limits of this Section may be waived only by consent of all parties and approval by the court.” (Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-14 (West 2024). Our supreme court concluded that, since section 2-14 begins to run on the date of the service of process, the date the default was entered against absent fathers who were served by publication was the starting point of the 90-day statutory time period. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 483; see In re V.Z., 287 Ill. App. 3d 552, 559 (1997) (recognizing S.G.’s holding and finding that the 90-day period began after the minor’s father had been defaulted following service by publication); In re Kh. M., 2023 IL App (1st) 230261, ¶ 38 (discussing S.G.’s holding in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for waiving the statutory 90-day time period). ¶ 43 Here, the mother previously had indicated that Mr. O. was V.O.’s father and Mr. O. had signed a VAP. However, the State was unable to locate any such VAP, and Mr. O. was not listed as V.O.’s father on V.O.’s birth certificate. Furthermore, Mr. O. had died in June 2019. The circuit court ordered on April 17, 2025, and again on July 7, 2025, that publication of service be issued to V.O.’s unknown father. The notice of publication to V.O.’s unknown father and “all whom it may concern” was issued on July 8, 2025, stating that a petition was filed under the Act and an adjudicatory hearing would be held on the petition on September 15, 2025. Then, on September 15, 2025, the court defaulted V.O.’s unknown father for want of appearance or answer by publication. Thus, the 90-day period began running on September 15, 2025, as that was the date on which all parties had been served or defaulted. See Kh. M., 2023 IL App (1st) 230261, ¶ 38. - 17 - No. 1-25-2497 Moreover, the November 5, 2025, adjudicatory hearing timely commenced 51 days after September 15, 2025. ¶ 44 We reject the mother’s assertion that the court had no obligation to order that publication of service be issued to V.O.’s unknown father. A parent is entitled to notice of a petition filed under the Act because “[p]roviding effective service is a means of protecting an individual’s right to due process by allowing for proper notification of interested individuals and an opportunity to be heard.” In re J.B., 2018 IL App (1st) 173096, ¶ 32 (citing In re Dar. C., 2011 IL 111083, ¶ 61). “When a petition is filed, the clerk of the court shall issue a summons with a copy of the petition attached. The summons shall be directed to the minor’s legal guardian or custodian and to each person named as a respondent in the petition ***.” 705 ILCS 405/2-15(1) (West 2024). If service of the summons and petition is not made on any respondent within a reasonable time by leaving copies thereof with the respondent or at his usual place of abode with a resident of the age of 10 years or upwards, service may be made by certified mail. Id. §§ 2-15(5), 2-16(1). “The appearance of *** a respondent *** in any proceeding under this Act shall constitute a waiver of service of summons and submission to the jurisdiction of the court ***.” Id. § 2-15(7). ¶ 45 If a respondent’s usual place of abode is not known and cannot be ascertained after a diligent inquiry, the Act provides for service by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the action is pending. Id. § 2-16(2). “Notice by publication is not required in any case when the person alleged to have legal custody of the minor has been served with summons personally or by certified mail, but the court may not enter any order or judgment against any person who cannot be served - 18 - No. 1-25-2497 with process other than by publication unless notice by publication is given or unless that person appears.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The Act also provides: “The court shall state for the record the manner in which the parties received service of process and shall note whether the return or returns of service, postal return receipt or receipts for notice by certified mail, or certificate or certificates of publication have been filed in the court record. The court shall enter any appropriate orders of default against any parent who has been properly served in any manner and fails to appear.” Id. § 2-21(1). ¶ 46 Under the plain language of the Act, unless unknown or putative fathers are served “by publication, any order regarding the minors’ adjudication or disposition could not be entered [against the unknown or putative fathers], and the court could not consider all parents in the same proceeding.” Kh. M., 2023 IL App (1st) 230261, ¶ 56. Accordingly, a court acts in the best interest of the minor by resolving issues concerning the service of any unknown father and entering any orders against all parents because the minor’s need for permanence (which includes the child’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures) would not be advanced without an order against the unknown father. Id. ¶ 57. The court directs the course of proceedings under the Act to promptly “ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully *** gather information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to this Act.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2(2) (West 2024). We conclude that the trial court’s orders that achieved personal jurisdiction over V.O.’s unknown father by serving him by publication and then defaulting him comports with the Act’s concerns for the just and speedy administration of justice and fundamental fairness of the proceedings. See In re D.E., 314 Ill. App. 3d 764, 770-71 (2000) (holding that “a - 19 - No. 1-25-2497 respondent’s rightful claim of entitlement to substitution of the judge” tolled the running of the 90-day period to commence the adjudication hearing because “the legislature intended, not slavish adherence to an arbitrarily fixed period of time, but concern for the overall purpose of the [Act]”— i.e., a just and speedy adjudication, allowing for a period of delay if necessary to ensure a fair hearing). ¶ 47 Contrary to the mother’s assertions on appeal, the plain language of the Act does not limit the definition of a parent by excluding putative or unknown fathers. Moreover, the plain language of the Act does not limit service of