McDunn v. McDunn

2026 IL App (1st) 241419 No. 1-24-1419 SIXTH DIVISION June 5, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________ KEVIN McDUNN, WILLIAM McDUNN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of KATHLEEN McDUNN, and TIMOTHY ) Cook County. McDUNN, ) ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) No. 2022 CH 00959 v. ) ) SUSAN McDUNN, ) The Honorable ) Thaddeus L. Wilson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 In this action under the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (Heirs Property Act) (755 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 2022)), defendant Susan McDunn appeals from the circuit court’s order apportioning attorney fees and expenses that resulted in her owing a net of $2,753.43 to plaintiffs, the denial of her corresponding motion to reconsider that apportionment, and the denial of her motion to strike certain portions of plaintiffs’ submissions. For the following reasons, we reject defendant’s arguments and affirm. ¶2 BACKGROUND  1-24-1419 ¶3 This appeal arises from a partition action under the Heirs Property Act concerning real estate that the parties inherited from their late mother. Defendant and the four plaintiffs (Kevin McDunn, William McDunn, Kathleen McDunn, and Timothy McDunn) are siblings. Their mother, Evelyn McDunn (Evelyn), owned a townhome in Palos Hills, Illinois. ¶4 In November 2014, Evelyn executed a “Transfer on Death Instrument” (TODI) stating her intent that, upon her death, the townhome would be conveyed in equal shares to each of her five children, the parties herein. Evelyn died in March 2017. ¶5 The four plaintiffs herein subsequently expressed their desire to sell the townhome, but defendant was the lone sibling who declined to consent. In January 2022, the plaintiffs attempted to persuade defendant to agree to have a real estate agent list the property for sale, but defendant did not agree. ¶6 On February 3, 2022, this action commenced when Kevin filed a complaint for partition by sale. The original complaint named Kevin as the sole plaintiff and defendant as the sole defendant; it identified the three other siblings (William, Kathleen, and Timothy) as “interested parties.” ¶7 The complaint attached the TODI and pleaded that the parties had an undivided interest in the property as tenants in common. It pleaded that the partition action was brought “for the common benefit of the parties” to secure their respective interests in the property and that division in kind was unfeasible. The complaint sought an order for partition by sale of the property and disbursement of the sale proceeds in pro rata shares, subject to an accounting and “compensatory adjustments” according to principles of equity. ¶8 Defendant, who is an attorney and former circuit court judge, appeared pro se at all times in the trial court proceedings, although she consulted with an outside attorney. In May 2022, -2-  1-24-1419 defendant filed a motion arguing that the complaint was deficient because William, Kathleen, and Timothy were not named as defendants. On June 6, 2022, the court entered an order finding that those three siblings were necessary parties and directing Kevin to file an amended complaint that identified them as either plaintiffs or defendants. ¶9 On June 21, 2022, an amended complaint was filed that identified four siblings (Kevin, William, Kathleen, and Timothy) as plaintiffs; defendant remained the lone defendant. On July 26, 2022, defendant filed an answer in which she admitted that all parties had equal undivided interests in the property and that she had refused to sign an agreement to list the property with a realtor. ¶ 10 In September 2022, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. In opposition, defendant did not dispute that the property was co-owned by all siblings in equal shares and that it was “heirs property” subject to the Heirs Property Act. However, she opposed the motion because, inter alia, she did not believe the property was in condition to be sold and because its fair market value had not been established. In the same submission, defendant asked that the entire petition be dismissed with prejudice because plaintiffs’ amended complaint did not cite any statutory provision. ¶ 11 On January 31, 2023, the trial court issued a ruling in which it found no genuine issue of fact that each party held a one-fifth ownership interest in the property as tenants in common and that partition in kind is unfeasible. However, the court found that under the Heirs Property Act, it could not resolve the dispute until the property’s fair market value was determined. Thus, citing section 6 of the Heirs Property Act, it denied summary judgment as premature. See id. § 6 (specifying that the court shall order an appraisal to determine fair market value, unless the parties agree to the value or if the court determines that the evidentiary value of an appraisal is outweighed by the cost of the appraisal). -3-  1-24-1419 ¶ 12 In February 2023, an independent appraiser assessed the fair market value of the property as $210,000. ¶ 13 On March 7, 2023, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in which she argued the amended complaint was deficient because it “does not cite any statute at all as a basis for the relief that they seek.” She acknowledged that the Heirs Property Act provides for partition by sale but claimed plaintiffs’ failure to specifically cite that statute rendered the complaint deficient and entitled her to summary judgment. ¶ 14 In March 2023, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint with a single count for partition by sale, specifically referencing the Heirs Property Act. That pleading also incorporated the February 2023 appraisal and attached it as an exhibit. ¶ 15 The parties subsequently agreed that the fair market value of the property was $200,000; the court adopted that value in an order dated June 27, 2023. At that time, it directed plaintiffs to send the required notice to defendant of her right to buyout plaintiffs’ interest in the property. See id. § 7(a) (after the determination of fair market value, “the court shall order the plaintiff to send notice to the parties that any cotenant except a cotenant that requested partition by sale may buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale”). ¶ 16 On August 21, 2023, defendant filed a notice of her election to purchase the plaintiffs’ interests in the property. On September 24, 2023, the court entered an order reflecting that the defendant’s purchase price was $160,000 “for a buyout of all four of the cotenant/Plaintiffs’ interests.” The court ordered her to pay that sum by December 4, 2023. ¶ 17 Defendant did not pay the purchase price by December 4, 2023. On December 8, 2023, plaintiffs filed a “motion for partition expenses and attorneys’ fees” pursuant to section 12 of the Heirs Property Act. Id. § 12 (the court shall “apportion the costs of the proceedings, including a -4-  1-24-1419 reasonable fee for the plaintiff’s attorney, among the parties in interest in the action, as the court deems just and equitable”). Plaintiffs alleged that, as defendant had “consistently attempted to delay resolution of this matter,” plaintiffs incurred court costs and attorney fees totaling $22,866.88. Plaintiffs attached a corresponding fee affidavit and billing records from their counsel. ¶ 18 Plaintiffs additionally averred that since the February 2022 filing of the partition, they had incurred expenses to maintain the property (including insurance, utilities, homeowners’ association fees, and repairs) totaling $30,126.85. Plaintiffs asked that their attorney fees and their share of expenses should be offset against the value of defendant’s ownership interest in the property. ¶ 19 On December 12, 2023, (eight days after defendant missed the deadline to tender funds to purchase the property) plaintiffs filed a motion to appoint a real estate broker and list the property on the open market. ¶ 20 On December 14, 2023, plaintiffs filed an amended motion for partition expenses and an amended motion for attorney fees and costs, in which they averred that defendant’s delay caused them to incur fees of $23,100. Of that amount, plaintiffs sought an award of $19,110 for attorney fees, as well as costs of $966.88. In these motions, plaintiffs urged that due to defendant’s acts and omissions since their mother’s passing in 2017, the townhome had been sitting vacant for nearly seven years, and that defendant undermined “every good faith attempt” to settle the matter. ¶ 21 On December 18, 2023, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ complaint contained an error in the last three digits of the townhome’s property index number (PIN). The complaint stated the PIN was 23-11-401-036, but the correct PIN was 23-11- 401-109. On that basis, defendant argued that plaintiffs’ complaint was deficient and she was entitled to judgment in her favor. -5-  1-24-1419 ¶ 22 The parties appeared before the court on December 18, 2023, at which time the court granted plaintiffs’ oral motion to amend the complaint to reflect the correct PIN number. In a written order, the court noted that defendant was not prejudiced by such amendment, as the parties agreed which property was the subject of this action. The court set a January 2024 hearing date on plaintiff’s motion to appoint a real estate broker to list the property for sale. ¶ 23 On January 2, 2024, defendant filed various objections to plaintiffs’ motion to appoint a real estate broker and list the property for sale. She sought an extension of the buy-out period, citing her discovery of the incorrect PIN number and filing of a new complaint. She also claimed a new determination of the property’s fair market value was warranted because prior appraisals, including that from February 2023, were “outdated.” ¶ 24 On January 22, 2024, defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees. Although she had always appeared pro se, defendant stated she had consulted with a probate attorney, Cary Lind, in connection with this matter. She attached corresponding invoices from Lind for fees totaling $5,256.25. Defendant claimed she was entitled to recover that sum from plaintiffs under section 12 of the Heirs Property Act, which provides that: “If any defendant interposes a good and substantial defense to the complaint, the party or parties making such substantial defense shall recover their costs against the plaintiff according to justice and equity.” Id. Defendant asserted that she had made “a good and substantial defense to each of the three complaints” filed in this action, citing her May 2022 motion regarding the naming of certain siblings as “interested parties,” her March 2023 motion for summary judgment based on the complaint’s failure to cite a statute, and her December 2023 motion for summary judgment based on the incorrect PIN. -6-  1-24-1419 ¶ 25 On January 24, 2024, the court granted defendant a “final extension” of her buyout period to February 7, 2024. She was directed to deposit $160,000 with plaintiffs’ attorney, with such funds to be held in trust until further order of court. ¶ 26 Defendant failed to tender the funds by the February 7 deadline. The following day, plaintiffs filed a motion to sell the property on the open market. Shortly thereafter, defendant tendered a cashier’s check in the amount of $160,000 to buyout plaintiffs’ interests in the property. On February 15, 2024, the court acknowledged the payment and stated that a judicial deed would issue. The deed was issued on March 7, 2024. ¶ 27 After the buyout, the parties continued to dispute the proper apportionment of attorney fees and expenses pursuant to section 12 of the Heirs Property Act, with defendant and plaintiffs blaming each other for the delayed resolution of the matter and seeking reimbursement of their expenses and fees from each other. ¶ 28 On March 7, 2024, defendant filed a “motion for expenses and credits” in which she alleged that shortly after this action was filed in 2022, she proposed that the parties lease the townhome, but plaintiffs refused. She claimed that had plaintiffs agreed, the property would have generated a profit and expenses would have been avoided. Thus, she averred she was entitled to reimbursement from plaintiffs for her 20% portion of expenses to maintain the property, which she calculated to be $2,615.08. She also sought a $3,993.74 credit for a tax refund that defendant obtained through her efforts for year 2017 taxes, as well as a credit of $1,811.06 corresponding to certain work on the property (window repair and painting) done without her consent. She also sought “her 20% share of lost profits for each year since 2018 due to Plaintiffs’ refusal and failure to lease the Townhome,” “to the extent it would be greater than an award of her share of expenses.” -7-  1-24-1419 ¶ 29 Defendant then requested leave to file an amended motion for attorney fees and costs, as well as an amended motion for expenses and credits. By agreement, she was given until April 10 to do so. On April 9, she filed an “emergency motion” seeking an extension. The trial court entered an order making her amended motions due on or before April 15. ¶ 30 On April 16, defendant filed a brief in support of her motion for attorney fees, arguing she was entitled to an award for all the fees that she paid to the attorney (Lind) whom she consulted about this matter. ¶ 31 On April 18, defendant filed a combined response to plaintiffs’ motion for fees, as well as an amended motion for partition expenses. In it, she claimed that she had always been willing to prepare the townhome for lease (rather than sale), but plaintiffs’ refusal caused it to remain vacant for seven years. Defendant sought her share of lost profits from the failure to lease the property, which she believed was $13,500. She denied that she had caused any delay in this matter. Rather, she argued that plaintiffs’ counsel had delayed the case through numerous wasteful, baseless, or inappropriate filings. She asked that plaintiffs’ attorney fees should be taken from the $160,000 defendant had already tendered to buyout plaintiffs’ interest. ¶ 32 Defendant also sought reimbursement of the fees she paid to her outside counsel, Lind. She asserted she interposed a “good and substantial defense” to the action pursuant to section 12 of the Heirs Property Act. Id. In this regard, defendant noted that she had filed motions causing the complaint to be amended multiple times, including to add William, Kathleen, and Timothy as plaintiffs and to correct the PIN number. ¶ 33 Defendant opposed plaintiffs’ request for reimbursement of expenses such as real estate taxes, insurance, utilities, and homeowner association fees. Defendant reiterated her position that -8-  1-24-1419 she should be awarded lost profits due to plaintiffs’ failure to agree to lease the townhome in the years since Evelyn’s passing. ¶ 34 On April 29, 2024, plaintiffs filed a response in which they denied that defendant ever asserted a substantial defense to the partition action within the meaning of section 12 of the Heirs Property Act, as her motions were “procedural rather than substantive.” Plaintiffs also reiterated that defendant “refused to sell the townhome for five years” and had undermined good faith efforts to resolve the matter. ¶ 35 On May 20, 2024, the court held a hearing at which it heard oral argument on the parties’ pending motions regarding apportionment of attorney fees, expenses and credits. Notably, no transcript is in the record on appeal. ¶ 36 The court entered a written order in which it granted in part and denied in part the parties’ requests. In doing so, the court commented: “[T]he actions of Defendant [in] relation to this litigation were counterproductive and calculated to cause harassment and delay. Defendants’ conduct was mean-spirited and vindictive *** and not conducive to amicably resolving the case, knowing full well that given the facts, partition would ultimately be ordered. Defendant insisted that Plaintiffs dot every ‘I’ and cross every ‘T’ and balked at every request for additional time made by Plaintiffs, which of course is her right. Yet, Defendant cared little about delay when the ‘shoe was on the other foot’ when she made constant and unreasonable requests for delay.” -9-  1-24-1419 ¶ 37 The court proceeded to grant plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees in part. The court found that plaintiffs’ request for an award of $20,076.88 in attorney fees and costs was reasonable. The court determined that a “fair and just apportionment of attorneys’ fees and costs” among the parties was for “40% of same to be chargeable to the Defendant and 60% chargeable to the Plaintiffs pro rata.” ¶ 38 In the same order, the court granted in part defendant’s motion for attorney fees related to services provided to her by attorney Lind. Although defendant requested $5,256.25, the court awarded defendant $1,500. ¶ 39 Separately, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for partition expenses in part and denied it in part. It found that plaintiffs Kevin and William were entitled to reimbursement for repairs to the property totaling $19,666.54, to be paid “from the bank account customarily used by the parties to pay such expenses.” ¶ 40 Separately, the trial court partially granted defendant’s motion for expense and credits, finding she was entitled to a credit for the “2nd Installment of the 2023 year real estate property taxes and the 2024 property taxes attributable to the period of January 1, 2024 through March 7, 2024.” The trial court otherwise denied defendant’s request for expenses. ¶ 41 On June 4, 2024, defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider. In it, she asked that the court vacate the paragraph in the May 20, 2024, order that negatively characterized her conduct in the litigation. She maintained that any delay in this case was “caused by the Plaintiffs’ counsel and his wasteful actions,” not by her. In the same submission as the motion to reconsider, defendant made a “motion to strike” any language in filings by plaintiffs’ counsel where he suggested she was “obstinate, vindictive, irrational and chaotic” or where he otherwise “disparaged” her. -10-  1-24-1419 ¶ 42 Defendant separately averred that plaintiffs’ counsel was “entitled to no more than half of the approximately $20,0000 in fees” and costs that had been awarded, and that in any event, she should not be responsible for any of plaintiffs’ attorney fees. On the other hand, defendant asserted she should be reimbursed for the entirety of the fees she paid to attorney Lind. Defendant also asked that plaintiffs be ordered to pay her “the lost income that she would have received from leasing the townhome” from early 2022 through February 2024, when she bought out plaintiffs’ interests. ¶ 43 The record reflects that the court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion to reconsider and motion to strike, although no transcript is in the appellate record. On June 6, 2024, the court issued an order denying the motion to reconsider and motion to strike “for the reasons stated more fully on the record in open court.” The court noted that it “stands firmly by its observations and findings and why equity and justice requires the allocations and assessments made by the Court.” ¶ 44 The same order clarified that, given the court’s prior apportionment of the parties’ respective liability for attorney fees and expenses (including credits awarded to defendant for real estate taxes), the final calculation of defendant’s net liability to plaintiffs was $2,753.43. It directed that defendant pay that amount. ¶ 45 The court specified there was no just reason to delay the order’s enforcement or appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. ¶ 46 ANALYSIS ¶ 47 On appeal, defendant challenges the court’s apportionment of costs and attorney fees among the parties that resulted in her owing $2,753.43. With respect to the award of plaintiffs’ attorney fees, she asserts the court erred when it found that $19,110 was a reasonable amount of fees. She also avers the court erred in finding that she was liable for 40% of the plaintiffs’ attorney -11-  1-24-1419 fees and costs. She maintains that, considering “justice and equity factors,” she should not have to pay any of plaintiffs’ fees. ¶ 48 Defendant also maintains that she was entitled to recover from plaintiffs the full amount of fees that she paid to the attorney she consulted, (not just $1,500) because she raised “good and substantial defenses” to the partition action. ¶ 49 Separate from attorney fees, defendant maintains she was entitled to lost profits and the 2017 tax credit. Finally, she also asserts error, insofar as the trial court denied her motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ submissions that negatively characterized her. For the following reasons, we find these arguments without merit and affirm. ¶ 50 Governing Statute and Standard of Review ¶ 51 In order to assess the merits, it is helpful to review the background of the Heirs Property Act, which was enacted in 2019 (Pub. Act 101-520 (eff. Aug. 23, 2019)), and its relationship to article XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/art. XVII (West 2022)), which otherwise governs partition actions not covered by the Heirs Property Act. ¶ 52 As explained in a 2023 article from the Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), the Heirs Property Act served “as an add on to the existing Code of Civil Procedure Partition Actions offer[ing] enhanced due process protections for heirs of real property in Illinois to protect the value of inherited real property.” Michael J. Fleck, The Illinois Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, Trs. & Ests. (Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Springfield, Ill.), April 2023, at 4, https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/sections/trustsandestates/newsletter/Trusts%20and%20Es tates%20April%202023.pdf [https://perma.cc/T85S-9FTY]. ¶ 53 Generally, partition actions are governed by article XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/art. XVII (West 2022)). Under article XVII, when lands are held in joint tenancy or -12-  1-24-1419 in common, “any one or more of the persons interested therein may compel a partition thereof.” Id. § 17-101. Prior to the Heirs Property Act, heirs who disagreed on whether to keep or sell inherited real estate would be required to seek relief under article XVII. As explained by the ISBA article, “This could often lead to unfortunate results for families of inherited property” because “[o]nly one tenant in common c[ould] force partition or sale. If one of the heirs want[ed] out or s[old] their interest to a third-party speculator, that one interest could force the partition action.” Fleck, supra, at 2. ¶ 54 In order to “provide protections and mechanisms for heirs who find themselves in the position of having to deal with the potential loss of inherited property” (id.), in 2019, the legislature enacted the Heirs Property Act, which “provides due process protections, such as (1) notice, (2) appraisal, (3) right of first refusal, and (4) if a sale is ultimately required, then a court supervised sale.” Id. ¶ 55 That is, the Heirs Property Act “supplements Article XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure,” and if a partition action falls within its scope, the Heirs Property Act “replaces provisions of Article XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure that are inconsistent with” the Heirs Property Act. 755 ILCS 75/3 (West 2022). If the court in a partition action determines that the property at issue is “heirs property,” then the Heirs Property Act applies unless all cotentants otherwise agree. Id. “Heirs property” is defined to mean real property held in tenancy in common which satisfies all of the following requirements: “(A) there is no agreement in a record binding all the cotenants which governs the partition of the property; (B) one or more of the cotenants acquired title from a relative or, if a cotenant is an entity, from a relative of a beneficiary, -13-  1-24-1419 shareholder, partner, or member of the entity, whether such relative is living or deceased; and (C) Any of the following applies: (i) 20 percent or more of the interests are held by cotenants who are relatives; (ii) 20 percent or more of the interests are held by a cotenant who acquired title from a relative, whether living or deceased; or (iii) 20 percent or more of the cotenants are relatives.” Id. § 2. ¶ 56 In this appeal, defendant does not challenge the applicability of the Heirs Property Act or her buyout of her siblings’ interests in the townhome for $160,000. Rather, she challenges the trial court’s apportionment of costs, including attorney fees. The parties agree that the governing provision is section 12 of the Heirs Property Act, which states: “In all proceedings for the partition of heirs property, the court shall apportion the costs of the proceedings, including a reasonable fee for the plaintiff’s attorney, among the parties in interest in the action, as the court deems just and equitable. In determining the just and equitable apportionment of the costs and attorney’s fees, the court may consider, among other things, the good faith attempt of the parties to agree prior to the initiation of the complaint. If any defendant interposes a good and substantial defense to the complaint, the party or parties making such substantial defense shall -14-  1-24-1419 recover their costs against the plaintiff according to justice and equity.” Id. § 12. ¶ 57 Notably, the parties disagree as to the standard of review concerning a trial court’s apportionment under section 12. Defendant asserts (without citing any case law) that all of the trial court’s challenged rulings are subject to de novo review, whereas plaintiffs maintain that such rulings may be reversed only if the trial court abused its discretion. ¶ 58 We acknowledge there are few reported decisions interpreting section 12 of the Heirs Property Act. Nonetheless, we think it is clear that abuse of discretion is the proper standard. This is apparent from the statutory language that the court shall apportion costs, including attorney fees “as the court deems just and equitable.” (Emphasis added.) Id. This clearly expresses a legislative intent to afford the trial court discretion to determine what it believes to be “just and equitable” under the circumstances. ¶ 59 Moreover, as plaintiffs point out, article XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure contains an analogous provision regarding the equitable apportionment of costs in other partition actions: “Costs. In all proceedings for the partition of real estate *** the court shall apportion the costs among the parties in interest in the action, including *** a reasonable fee for plaintiff’s attorney, so that each party shall pay his or her equitable portion thereof, unless the defendants, or some of them, interpose a good and substantial defense to the complaint. In such case the party or parties making such substantial defense shall recover their costs against the plaintiff according to justice and equity.” 735 ILCS 5/17-125 (West 2022). -15-  1-24-1419 In reviewing apportionment of attorney fees under that analogous provision, this court has repeatedly applied the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Bargman v. Wilson, 407 Ill. App. 3d 656, 661 (2011) (“we cannot say that the circuit court’s decision to deny John’s request to apportion the fees of his retained counsel was an abuse of discretion); Clayton v. Bradford National Bank, 250 Ill. App. 3d 775, 784-85 (1993) (“The fixing of attorney fees and the allowance of those fees as apportioned costs are largely matters residing in the discretion of the trial court.”). ¶ 60 This is consistent with the principle that “ ‘Generally, a trial court’s decision to award attorney fees is not reversed absent an abuse of discretion.’ ” Peleton, Inc. v. McGivern’s Inc., 375 Ill. App. 3d 222, 225 (2007) (quoting Guerrant v. Roth, 334 Ill. App. 3d 259, 262 (2002)). “The rationale for this standard is that a party challenging a trial court’s decision regarding attorney fees is actually challenging the trial court’s discretion in determining what is reasonable.” Guerrant, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 262-63 (citing Pietrzyk v. Oak Lawn Pavilion, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1046 (2002)). ¶ 61 This standard is highly deferential. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41. ¶ 62 With this standard in mind, we turn to the specific challenges to the trial court’s apportionment of attorney fees. ¶ 63 The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining That 40% of Plaintiffs’ Attorney Fees Should Be Chargeable to Defendant ¶ 64 We first conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, when it determined that it was just and equitable for defendant to be charged with 40% of plaintiffs’ attorney fees. -16-  1-24-1419 ¶ 65 Defendant urges that because the case was “strongly contested” and because she “raised good and substantial defenses” to the action, “[a]s a matter of law, Plaintiffs’ attorney is not entitled to have any fees that he may be awarded charged to the Defendant; there may be no apportionment of Plaintiffs’ attorney[ ] fees to the Defendant.” This is contrary to the plain language of section 12 of the Heirs Property Act, which broadly gives discretion to “apportion the costs of the proceedings, including a reasonable fee for the plaintiff’s attorney, among the parties in interest in the action, as the court deems just and equitable.” (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 75/12 (West 2022). There is simply no language in the statute suggesting that the court is precluded from apportioning plaintiffs’ attorney fees, even assuming arguendo the case is strongly contested and substantial defenses are raised. ¶ 66 Certainly, the court was free to consider a wide range of factors in determining whether it was “just and equitable” to apportion some of plaintiffs’ fees to defendant (or vice versa). Here, it is apparent from the court’s orders that it found that apportionment of 40% of plaintiff’s fees to defendant was just and equitable, because defendant’s conduct had excessively delayed the resolution of the case (and in turn, drove up legal fees). We cannot say this was an abuse of discretion, given the record before us. ¶ 67 To the contrary, the record shows that defendant filed numerous submissions, many of which lacked merit, repeatedly sought extensions of time, and missed deadlines for payment even after she agreed to buyout plaintiffs’ interests. That is, the record bears out the court’s observations that defendant’s conduct was dilatory and excessively litigious, which drove up costs for all parties. ¶ 68 We acknowledge that defendant pointed out some technical mistakes in the plaintiffs’ filings, which led to amendments of the complaints. Specifically, defendant pointed out that -17-  1-24-1419 (1) three of the siblings were named as “interested parties” in the original complaint when they should have been named as plaintiffs, (2) the original complaint did not specifically cite the Heirs Property Act, and (3) defendant found an apparent scrivener’s error in the complaint’s recitation of the PIN. Notwithstanding these defects, there was never any genuine dispute about the application of the Heirs Property Act, the identity of the subject property, or the fact that each sibling had an equal, 20% interest in the property. ¶ 69 The contentious manner in which defendant elected to raise these issues is consistent with the court’s observations. Certainly, such technical defects could easily have been corrected by notifying plaintiffs’ counsel informally to give them a chance to amend, without need for adversarial motion practice. Significantly, however, defendant (an attorney) elected to file three dispositive motions, suggesting the case should be dismissed entirely on these technicalities. This, in turn, forced plaintiffs’ counsel to spend additional time on the matter. ¶ 70 As plaintiffs’ brief points out, defendant’s decision to file motion for summary judgment in December 2023 based on the PIN error was especially egregious and unnecessary, insofar as it came after defendant admitted the address of the subject property, after the court had already found no genuine issue of material fact, and several months after defendant had filed notice of her intent to buyout out her siblings’ interest in the subject property. That is, the case was essentially resolved when defendant sought to derail it based on a typographical error. Certainly, the court could reasonably find that this represented a delay tactic on defendant’s part, rather than a good faith defense. ¶ 71 We also note that, although the record reflects that the circuit court heard oral argument on several occasions, there is no transcript in our appellate record. It is well-settled that the appellant (here, defendant) has the “burden to present a sufficiently complete record” to support claims of -18-  1-24-1419 error. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144,