Scesa v. Smith
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket5-26-0708
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 260708-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 11/20/26. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-26-0708 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
STEVEN LEWIS SCESA, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Jackson County.
)
v. ) No. 26-CH-1
)
JEFFREY TYLER SMITH, ) Honorable
) Ella L. Travelstead,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOLLINGER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Vaughan and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in ordering that the plaintiff retrieve his personal
property from the defendantâs custody by a certain deadline, after which the
property would be deemed abandoned by the plaintiff and forfeited to the
defendant. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶2 Plaintiff Steven Scesa, a self-represented litigant, filed an interlocutory appeal from the
Jackson County circuit courtâs July 21, 2026, order directing that he had until August 15, 2026,
to arrange for the removal of his gun safe from the property of defendant Jeffery Smith. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On January 14, 2026, plaintiff filed a âVerified Complaint for Replevin, Sequestration, and
Emergency Injunctive Relief,â alleging that defendant had in his home certain personal property
1
belonging to plaintiffânamely, several firearms; various firearm-related accessories, such as cases
and ammunition; and a bag containing âpre-1965 US 90% silver currency (face value of $500.00).â
¶5 Plaintiff further pled that defendant had previously admitted under oath 1 that the property
belonged to plaintiff and was in defendantâs home, and also acknowledged possession of the
property in communications with law enforcement. Plaintiff alleged that he had emailed defendant
on December 18, 2025, proposing five different options for returning plaintiffâs personal property
to him, but defendant never responded. Plaintiff further alleged that he was informed that
defendant was not responding to calls from the county sheriffâs office to surrender the property.
¶6 Plaintiff sought emergency ex parte relief, claiming that the items of personal property
could easily be sold off or moved and hidden; that irreparable harm would come to plaintiff if this
were to happen, due to his great financial need; and that defendant had a âhistoryâ of conversion,
theft, and breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Plaintiff asked the circuit court to (1) issue an order directing
the county sheriff to seize the disputed property; (2) issue an emergency ex parte temporary
restraining order prohibiting defendant, his agents, and his family members from moving, selling,
or damaging the property; (3) waive the replevin bond as equitable relief to plaintiff, due to
defendantâs admission under oath that the property was plaintiffâs, plaintiffâs indigent status, and
defendantâs aforementioned alleged history; and (4) enter judgment against defendant in the value
of the property, if it could not be returned to plaintiff.
¶7 Also on January 14, 2026, plaintiff filed an emergency motion for âtemporary restraining
order and sequestrationâ (TRO), asking to have the sheriff seize and sequester the property and
1
This was allegedly during the creditorsâ meeting of a bankruptcy case defendant had filed in
Tennessee. Plaintiff explained that the property, as well as defendantâs home, was located in Jackson
County, Illinois. Plaintiff further attached as an exhibit to his complaint a copy of an order of the Tennessee
bankruptcy court identifying the disputed items as non-bankruptcy estate property.
2
Plaintiff alleged that while acting as the trustee of plaintiffâs special needs trust, defendant stole
and converted trust assets. That matter was the subject of unrelated litigation in Florida.
2
hold it in the custody of the court pending trial. According to the circuit courtâs docket entry on
January 21, 2026, the matter was called for an emergency hearing on that date. Plaintiff appeared
and testified that he and defendant were previously friends and co-workers, and defendant became
the trustee of plaintiffâs special needs trust after plaintiff was seriously injured and needed to
liquidate his business assets. Plaintiff further testified that defendant converted in excess of
$450,000 in trust assets for his own use and took possession of plaintiffâs firearms and silver for
safekeeping. Plaintiff was concerned that defendant would also convert those items. The circuit
court granted plaintiffâs emergency petition and entered the TRO.
¶8 Defendant filed an appearance through counsel on February 2, 2026. Following a hearing
on February 11, 2026, the circuit court entered an order reflecting that defendant had turned over
to the sheriffâs department a number of items that were undisputedly plaintiffâs property. The order
further noted that the sheriffâs department had filed with the court an inventory of these items. The
court authorized the sheriffâs department to release all items to plaintiff.
¶9 On February 17, 2026, plaintiff filed with the circuit court what he entitled a âdeclaration,â
stating that there remained outstanding property that defendant had not returned, in the form of
two firearms, a case, a set of eye and hearing protection, magazines, and ammunition. Plaintiff
later filed another declaration listing additional personal property that he alleged was in
defendantâs possession, consisting of a saw, drill, and their respective accessories.
¶ 10 On March 10, 2026, plaintiff filed a motion to compel and rule to show cause. He asked
for the court to order defendant to produce the combination card and photos of plaintiffâs gun
vault, 3 and to issue a rule to show cause against defendant and/or his counsel for their alleged
3
There are references in plaintiffâs pleadings to a âsafeâ or âgun vault,â and it appears from the
record that this refers to the safe in which plaintiffâs personal property was held while in defendantâs
possession. While no safe or vault is mentioned in plaintiffâs complaint or in two of his subsequent
3
refusal to communicate and their âwillful failure to comply withâ the circuit courtâs deadline for
disclosing exhibits and witnesses. Plaintiff wrote that he had made good-faith efforts to meet and
confer with defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. Mar. 17, 2023), but
that defendant and counsel ignored his calls and emails for over two weeks.
¶ 11 The circuit court held a status hearing on March 16, 2026. A docket entry from that date
indicates that the court heard argument on plaintiffâs motion and there was no dispute regarding
the ownership of the safe. The court ordered plaintiff to make arrangements to have the safe
removed from defendantâs property within 21 days.
¶ 12 On May 4, 2026, plaintiff filed a pleading titled âUpdated Status Report and Motion to
Convert Replevin to Civil Conversion.â He stated that he had âexhausted all reasonable efforts to
secure professional moversâ to remove the safe as per the courtâs previous order, having allegedly
contacted 12 companies across 3 different states. Plaintiff continued, âProfessional movers have
uniformly refused to accept the job or provide a quote 4 because the object is excessively heavy,
[and] the location is remote.â Movers would also have to work without any prior inspection of the
safe or surrounding premises, because defendant was refusing to allow access to the removal site
or provide photos of the safe and premises. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant had not provided
him the safeâs combination card photos of the interior, which he would need if he wanted to sell
the safe.
declarations, it is referenced throughout the record, including by the circuit court, as part of the outstanding
personal property that defendant had not returned to plaintiff after the courtâs February 11, 2026, order.
4
Plaintiff also wrote that he did manage to obtain a quote from at least one moving company, which
was in excess of $1,500. The company also refused to cap the price before finishing the job. Plaintiff argued
that he was indigent, had significant medical expenses, and was unable to earn an income due to his
disability. He further referenced his ongoing litigation against defendant over the sum of approximately
$479,000 defendant allegedly took from plaintiffâs special needs trust.
4
¶ 13 Therefore, plaintiff concluded that defendant had made physical retrieval impossible, and
asked the circuit court to either (1) order defendant to deliver the safe to the sheriffâs department
at his expense, or in the alternative, (2) convert plaintiffâs cause of action from replevin to civil
conversion, and enter a monetary judgment against defendant in an amount that plaintiff proposed
as the fair market value of the safe and its contents. Plaintiff also requested statutory prejudgment
interest on said value, due to defendantâs âunreasonable and vexatious delay since December 2025
by continuously obstructing plaintiffâs attempts to recover and liquidate his property.â Lastly,
plaintiff requested punitive damages against defendant for his âfive-month campaign of bad-faith
obstruction, fabricated excuses regarding âmissingâ items, and outright refusal to obey [court]
orders.â Plaintiff attached a new itemization, with proposed replacement costs, of his alleged
personal property still held by defendant. This included the items he previously listed, as well as
the safe, approximately 50 plastic bins, and a moving dolly.
¶ 14 Defendant filed his answer to plaintiffâs complaint on June 26, 2026. He admitted that
plaintiff owned and was entitled to the personal property that defendant placed into the custody of
the Jackson County Sheriffâs Department in February 2026 and further admitted to being in
possession of a gun safe belonging to plaintiff. Defendant denied being in possession of any other
items alleged in the complaint, and denied that he had ever wrongfully possessed any of plaintiffâs
personal property. Defendant also pled the affirmative defense that he had acted as a gratuitous
bailee of plaintiffâs personal property, and should not be found liable for any loss of that property
unless plaintiff proved that defendant actually possessed it, and that it was unreturnable due to
defendantâs gross negligence.
5
¶ 15 On July 2, 2026, plaintiff filed a motion asking the circuit court to enter summary judgment
against defendant regarding the gun safe, 5 as well as issue a writ of assistance âexplicitly
commandingâ the sheriffâs department to seize the safe using âall necessary forceâ to gain entry
and execute the seizure. In a docket entry dated July 8, 2026, the circuit court rejected plaintiffâs
proposed order on his motion.
¶ 16 The court repeated its finding from its March 16, 2026, order that there was âno dispute as
to the ownership of the gun safe,â and further noted that defendant had âpreviously indicated to
the Court he [wa]s willing to allow retrieval of the gun safe,â by âappropriate moversâ who could
âcome on to his property one time to remove the safe.â In March, the court had ordered plaintiff
to remove the safe from defendantâs property within 21 days, which he had failed to do. Lastly,
the court ordered that plaintiff âshall hire appropriate movers and make arrangements through
Defense Counsel to schedule removal of the safe.â
¶ 17 On July 21, 2026, defendantâs counsel filed a proposed order denying plaintiffâs motion
for summary judgment. The circuit court signed and entered the order that same day. The order
reflected the courtâs prior findings, as referenced above. The court further denied plaintiffâs request
to direct the sheriffâs department to remove the safe, repeating its prior instructions to plaintiff that
he was to provide appropriate movers. Lastly, the court ordered that if the safe was not removed
by 5 p.m. on August 15, 2026, âsaid gun safe will be deemed abandoned by plaintiff and forfeited
to Defendant.â
¶ 18 Also on July 21, 2026, plaintiff filed an objection to defendantâs proposed order, arguing
that the language deeming the safe to be abandoned and forfeited if not removed by the courtâs
5
While not explicitly stated in his motion, based on plaintiffâs attached proposed orders, mentions
of the gun safe are intended to refer to both the actual safe and its contents, all of which plaintiff claims are
his personal property. For simplicity, we will continue the circuit courtâs usage of âthe safeâ to refer to any
and all personal property belonging to plaintiff, whether that be the safe itself or the items contained therein.
6
deadline should be stricken from the order because the circuit courtâs July 8, 2026, order regarding
his motion for summary judgment made no such findings or instructions. Therefore, plaintiff
contended that defendant was abusing the routine proposed order drafting process to âengineer an
unadjudicated, self-executing forfeiture of property that Defendant ha[d] already admitted under
oath belong[ed] exclusively to Plaintiff.â He also noted that the court had set the case for trial on
August 19, 2026, and the August 15 deadline was prior to that date.
¶ 19 Plaintiff next again raised his indigencyâwhich he claimed was in large part due to
defendantâs conversion of his trust assetsâand the unaffordable quotes he had obtained from
professional movers. He further argued that the possibility of awarding the safe to defendant,
despite the undisputed fact that it belonged to plaintiff, would amount to rewarding defendant for
his alleged bad-faith actions obstructing plaintiffâs efforts to regain his property. Thus, plaintiff
asked the court to reject defendantâs proposed order and instead enter an order that either
âaccurately reflectsâ the July 8 docket entry, or to reserve any determinations on the safeâs removal
until after defendant repaid plaintiff the amount he allegedly took from his special needs trust.
¶ 20 In a July 24, 2026, docket entry, the circuit court noted and overruled plaintiffâs objection
to the proposed order. The court again referenced plaintiffâs failure to remove the safe from
defendantâs property by the deadline in the courtâs March 16, 2026, order, and repeated that he
now had until August 15. The court further wrote that the trial set for August 19 âwill have no
bearing on the safe.â
¶ 21 On July 30, 2026, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the courtâs July 21 and 24
rulings, as well as a stay of the August 15 deadline pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305
(eff. July 1, 2017). Plaintiff stated that on July 29, the Florida circuit court presiding over his case
against defendant regarding his trust assets entered partial summary judgment against defendant
7
on the issue of liability. He attached a copy of said order to his motion, which contained the Florida
courtâs findings that defendant was liable for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and exploitation
of a vulnerable adult.
¶ 22 Plaintiff asserted that the ruling in the Florida case constituted newly discovered evidence
that âfundamentally alters the equitable dynamicsâ in the present matter and warranted
reconsideration of the circuit courtâs July orders. He further stated that if his safe were to be
forfeited to defendant due to plaintiffâs inability to afford its removal, defendant would be profiting
from his wrongful acts of converting plaintiffâs trust assets.
¶ 23 Plaintiff also requested a stay pursuant to Rule 305 âmaintaining the status quo until after
plaintiff secures a monetary judgment against Defendant in the Florida trust litigation that would
enable plaintiff to pay for the extraction of his safe.â He argued a stay would maintain the status
quo and not prejudice defendant in any way, as the safe would simply continue to be on his
property.
¶ 24 Defendant filed a response in opposition to plaintiffâs motion, arguing that he had
âgratuitously storedâ plaintiffâs property for him since 2021, and plaintiff had never once
attempted to arrange a date with defendant or his counsel to retrieve the safe. Defendant asserted
that plaintiffâs motion was a request to compel defendant to âcontinue to gratuitously store the safe
for an indefinite period.â He also noted that the Florida partial summary judgment order was a
non-final order in an unrelated case, and furthermore did not constitute newly discovered evidence
for the purpose of a motion to reconsider.
¶ 25 According to an August 10, 2026, docket entry, the circuit court noted the filings and took
plaintiffâs emergency motion to stay the matter under advisement. On August 14, 2026, plaintiff
8
filed a notice of interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Oct.
15, 2026).
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 On appeal, plaintiff challenges the circuit courtâs July 21, 2026, order denying his motion
for summary judgment and setting the abandonment and forfeiture deadline, its July 24, 2026,
docket entry order overruling his objections to that order, and the courtâs âimplicit denialâ of his
motion for reconsideration and stay before the August 15, 2026, deadline.
¶ 28 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 29 Before we may consider plaintiffâs arguments on appeal, we must review whether we have
jurisdiction to address it on the merits. Defendant has not filed a response and therefore does not
challenge jurisdiction. However, as our supreme court has stated, a reviewing court âmust ascertain
its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of whether either party has raised
the issue.â Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009).
¶ 30 Plaintiff asserts that we have jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) of Rule 307, which allows
for interlocutory appeals as of right from an order âgranting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or
refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.â Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). He cites
to our supreme courtâs decision in In re A Minor stating that when determining what constitutes
an appealable injunctive order, we look to its substance, rather than its form, reflecting a policy of
broadly construing the meaning of âinjunction.â In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 260-61 (1989).
¶ 31 An injunction is a â âjudicial process operating in personam and requiring [a] person to
whom it is directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.â â Id. at 261 (quoting Blackâs
Law Dictionary 705 (5th ed. 1983)). However, not every nonfinal order is appealable, âeven if it
compels a party to do or not do a particular thing.â Id. at 261-62. Instead, the relevant distinction
9
is whether the order âmay be characterized as ministerial or administrativeâregulating the
procedural details of the litigationâor is instead an order which affects the relationship of the
parties in their everyday activities apart from the litigation.â Ebulon Financial Group, LLC v.
Politanska, 2025 IL App (1st) 240948, ¶ 23 (citing In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 262).
¶ 32 For example, an order granting an individual immediate possession of a property was found
to be in the nature of an injunction, as it ordered the plaintiff to immediately tender the property to
her, and affected the relationship of the parties outside of the courtroom by requiring the plaintiff,
as the property owner, to permit a nonowner to occupy the premises. Id. ¶ 24. By contrast,
discovery orders are not ordinarily subject to interlocutory appeal, even if they compel a party to
take or refrain from some action, as they only regulate the procedural aspects of the litigation. See
Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 2012 IL App (4th) 120359, ¶¶ 48-49.
¶ 33 Here, the circuit courtâs July 21, 2026, order denied plaintiffâs request to have the sheriffâs
department remove the gun safe, and instead directed plaintiff to âhire appropriate movers and
make arrangements through Defense counsel to schedule removal of the safe.â The court further
ordered that if plaintiff did not remove the safe from defendantâs property by 5 p.m. on August 15,
2026, âsaid gun safe will be deemed abandoned by plaintiff and forfeited to Defendant.â The order
also included the circuit courtâs findings that defendant was willing to allow plaintiff to retrieve
the safe and have âappropriate moversâ come onto his property to do so.
¶ 34 It is clear that the July 21 order is not merely an administrative or ministerial order
addressing procedural matters in the litigation. It does, in a sense, compel plaintiff to take certain
action by a specific deadline. The courtâs decision to deem the safe abandoned by plaintiff and
forfeited to defendant altered the status quo and affected the partiesâ relationship in their lives
outside of the courtroom, or at least did so if plaintiff failed to take the instructed action by the
10
stated deadline. As such, the order effectively created a path for defendant to come into ownership
of plaintiffâs personal property, which did not exist previously.
¶ 35 A notice of interlocutory appeal must be filed within 30 days of the interlocutory order
being challenged. Ill. S. Ct. R. 307. A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order does not toll that
deadline, as the denial of reconsideration does not grant, modify, refuse, dissolve, or refuse to
dissolve or modify an injunction. See In re Marriage of Gabrys, 2023 IL App (1st) 221763, ¶¶ 7-
8. Plaintiffâs pleading entitled âPlaintiffâs Objection to Defendantâs Proposed Order Denying
Motion for Summary Judgment,â filed approximately an hour after the circuit court signed and
entered the proposed order, could be construed as a motion for reconsideration, despite his
subsequent filing of a motion specifically requesting reconsideration. Regardless, plaintiff filed
his notice of appeal within 30 days of July 21, 2026, and thus timeliness is not an issue.
¶ 36 Lastly, plaintiff does not provide any authority for our ability to review what he refers to
as the circuit courtâs âimplicit denialâ of his motion for stay. As he acknowledges, the court entered
no order ruling on his motion. The August 10, 2026, docket order states only that the court took
the matter under advisement. Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal prior to the abandonment and
forfeiture deadline. Furthermore, plaintiff does not provide any support for his position before the
circuit court that he was entitled to a stay based on proceedings in an entirely unrelated action
involving the parties in Florida. We therefore need not reach this issue, as there is no actual ruling
to review.
¶ 37 B. Circuit Courtâs Removal Deadline
¶ 38 Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. He argues that the circuit court erred by âsua sponte
declaring personal property abandoned and forfeited without statutory or procedural authority.â
He also argues that the court violated his procedural due process rights by âdivesting him of title
11
and possession without an evidentiary hearing or trial.â Lastly, he states that the court âimproperly
entered a mandatory injunction that altered, rather than preserved, the status quo pending final
judgment.â
¶ 39 Defendant has not filed an appelleeâs brief. Nevertheless, because the record is simple and
the issues straightforward, we will consider the merits of plaintiffâs claims pursuant to the
principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128,
133 (1976) (â[I]f the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily
decide them without the aid of an appelleeâs brief, the court of review should decide the merits on
appeal.â).
¶ 40 We understand plaintiffâs challenge to be directed at the circuit courtâs decision to deem
the safe abandoned and forfeited if plaintiff did not remove it, at his own expense and/or efforts,
by the deadline. The court did not, as plaintiff characterizes it, divest him of any personal property
or declare the property abandoned and forfeited. Insofar as plaintiffâs arguments on appeal rely on
such a mischaracterization, we need not address them.
¶ 41 In his argument, plaintiff places great significance on the fact that his ownership of the safe
was undisputed. However, he ignores that the circuit court previously ordered him to retrieve his
property within 21 days of its March 16, 2026, order. The circuit courtâs July 8, 2026, docket entry
reflects that the court denied plaintiffâs request to have the sheriffâs department remove the safe,
because defendant had been willing to allow movers to come onto his property to take the safe.
and plaintiff had already been instructed to make his own arrangements for the safeâs removal. On
July 21, the circuit court gave plaintiff additional time until August 15 to remove the safe, even
though plaintiff was already in violation of the courtâs prior instructions and had been reminded
of this approximately two weeks earlier.
12
¶ 42 We note that August 15 was over four months past when plaintiff was supposed to have
the safe removed from defendantâs property. While plaintiff informed the court of his seemingly
extensive and thorough efforts to hire movers as far back as early May 2026 but claimed no movers
would take the job, he admitted to having obtained at least a few quotes from movers for how
much they would charge to remove the safe. Accordingly, throughout the case, plaintiff was aware
that he was responsible for retrieving his safe from defendantâs property.
¶ 43 Additionally, while the record on appeal is lacking any transcripts 6 or alternative
summaries of hearings in this case, it appears from the circuit courtâs orders that the court did not
sua sponte declare plaintiffâs property abandoned and forfeited. The July 21 order did not actually
terminate plaintiffâs ownership rights to the property. Moreover, that order was proposed by
defendant, and entered as written. The court granted and entered a proposed order drafted by
defendantâs counsel. The court also reviewed plaintiffâs objection to that order, and decided to
overrule it. Plaintiff thus had the opportunity for the circuit court to consider his challenges to the
proposed order.
¶ 44 A trial court possesses âinherent powers that are governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palos Community Hospital
v. Humana Insurance Company, Inc., 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 35 (quoting Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S.
40, 45 (2016)). The recognition of this inherent authority âis necessary to prevent undue delays in
6
See Foutch v. OâBryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984) (â[A]n appellant has the burden to present
a sufficiently complete record *** to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal,
it will be presumed that the order entered by the ***court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient
factual basis. Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against
the appellant.â).
13
the disposition of cases caused by abuses of procedural rules, and also to empower courts to control
their dockets.â Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48, 66 (1995).
¶ 45 This matter began by plaintiff filing suit to recover his personal property from the custody
of defendant. The circuit court found that plaintiffâs ownership of the property was undisputed.
Defendant did not deny that he had it in his home. The court further found that defendant was
willing to have plaintiffâs movers come onto his property and take the safe and was not obstructing
removal efforts, as plaintiff had alleged. 7
¶ 46 However, plaintiff went months without retrieving his possessions. Indeed, it would appear
that plaintiff was attempting to use his lawsuit to get the circuit court to retrieve the safe for him,
as the record shows that defendant did not pose any obstacle to him, neither by contesting his
ownership nor preventing him from taking the safe back. Plaintiff was not entitled to continue
delaying the matter until he obtained the assistance he sought. We find that the circuit courtâs
decisions that plaintiff challenges on appeal fall within the proper exercise of that authority.
¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the reasons stated, the circuit court did not err in ordering that plaintiff retrieve his
personal property by the given deadline. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 49 Affirmed.
7
The record on appeal does not indicate the basis for the courtâs findings regarding the partiesâ
conflicting assertions as to whether plaintiff made any effort to retrieve the safe and whether defendant
obstructed that process in any way. The same applies to the courtâs findings relating to plaintiffâs
descriptions of his efforts to have the safe removed. Plaintiff provides us with no basis to disturb these
findings. See Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 318-19 (2003) (Appellant bears the
duty of providing a sufficiently complete record of the lower court proceedings to support the claims on
appeal.)
14