In re K.W.

2026 IL App (1st) 251913 FIFTH DIVISION August 26, 2026 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT No. 1-25-1913 In re K.W., a Minor, ) ) Appeal from the (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) No. 19 JA 01584 v. ) ) Honorable E.H., ) Lisa M. Taylor, ) Judge Presiding. Respondent-Appellant). ) JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 The mother in this child protection case appeals from a final order closing the case and granting private guardianship of her now six-year-old son to his paternal grandmother. She argues the circuit court’s determination that this result is in the child’s best interest is against the manifest weight of the evidence, given her significant bond with the child, established through frequent and consistent visitation; her near-perfect record of compliance with recommended services; evidence suggesting that, absent court involvement, she will see far less of her son; and the unanimous recommendation of the assigned caseworkers and agencies that a single urine test positive for alcohol in 2023 did not justify a change from the permanency goal of return home. For the reasons No. 1-25-1913 that follow, we agree and reverse the decision of the circuit court. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 A. Initial Proceedings ¶4 The respondent in this matter, E.H., is the biological mother of K.W., born on November 25, 2019. K.W.’s biological father, alleged by the State to suffer from serious psychological conditions affecting his ability to parent, was defaulted in the circuit court and is not a party to this appeal. Just over a month after he was born, the State petitioned for K.W. to be made a ward of the court, on the grounds that he was neglected or abused, pursuant to section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2018)). ¶5 This case came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) when K.W. was born. At the hospital he was treated for respiratory failure in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). In investigating the case, the State learned that E.H. had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder and was receiving psychiatric and substance abuse services at the Bobby E. Wright Comprehensive Behavioral Health Center (Bobby Wright). The petition alleged that E.H. had admitted to a hospital social worker that she drank wine on a regular basis throughout her pregnancy and, later, to a child protection specialist, that she took prescribed psychotropic medication throughout her pregnancy without informing her doctor that she was pregnant. ¶6 The circuit court found probable cause to grant DCFS temporary custody of K.W. on December 30, 2019, and he was placed in foster care with A.S., his paternal grandmother. E.H. was granted supervised day visits of not less than three hours per week. ¶7 At adjudicatory and dispositional hearings held on January 15 and March 8, 2021, respectively, the circuit court found that K.W. was neglected due to an injurious environment (id. § 2-3(1)(b)) and that E.H. was unable to care for him (id. § 2-27(1)). Noting that DCFS was 2 No. 1-25-1913 recommending unsupervised day visits and that E.H. was consistently engaged in visitation, had been referred for a parent capacity assessment, and was beginning parenting coaching, the court set a permanency goal of return home within 12 months and ordered unsupervised day visits at least once per week and unsupervised overnight visits at DCFS’s discretion. The next permanency hearing was set for September 10, 2021. ¶8 B. Progress Under the Permanency Goal of Return Home ¶9 On June 9, 2021, the guardian ad litem (GAL) filed an emergency motion to suspend unsupervised day visits. The GAL alleged that several days earlier, E.H. and her adult son fought with and seriously injured K.W.’s father while at E.H.’s home. The court granted the motion without prejudice, pending a hearing on the matter, but the GAL dropped the motion before it was heard, and the prior visitation order was restored. ¶ 10 Following permanency hearings on September 10 and 22, 2021; November 30, 2022; and January 30, 2023, the permanency goal remained return home within 12 months. The court noted, despite one urine test that was positive for alcohol in April 2022, that E.H. was engaged in services, was consistent with visitation, and had made substantial progress toward the goal of return home. A comprehensive assessment by the Cook County Juvenile Court Clinic in January 2023 (Clinic Report) concluded that, while E.H. would always be at some risk for relapse, “she ha[d] always been good with [K.W.]” and was likely to make the gains necessary for him to return home. ¶ 11 Following the original trial judge’s retirement, in early 2023 the case was assigned to a different judge, and at a permanency hearing on July 5, 2023, the goal was changed to return home within five months. The court noted that E.H. “continue[d] to fully participate in services and to visit with [K.W.] regularly.” Unsupervised day and overnight visits continued to be permitted at DCFS’s discretion. Although the precise visitation schedule is unclear, statements made by both 3 No. 1-25-1913 the GAL and the ASA at later hearings suggest that K.W. was spending four to six nights a week with E.H., unsupervised. E.H. also reported to her doctor around this time that her son had “been with her 4 days per week for 6 months.” ¶ 12 The case, which was set for a “motion to return home” on March 6, 2024, appeared to be drawing to a close with a return home of K.W. to his mother. ¶ 13 C. Change of Permanency Goal ¶ 14 A year and nine months after her last positive urine test in April 2022, E.H. tested positive for alcohol on January 23, 2024. Stating that her “participation in services need[ed] to be clarified,” on March 6, 2024, the circuit court changed the permanency goal back to return home within 12 months and ordered E.H. to complete 75 hours of intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment. E.H. promptly obtained and engaged in this treatment. The court entered an order for supervised visits, with unsupervised visits only at DCFS’s discretion. ¶ 15 Although DCFS continued to recommend that K.W.’s permanency goal be a return home within 12 months, on April 18, 2024, the State, joined by the GAL, asked the court to change the goal to private guardianship. A multi-day permanency hearing was held throughout the spring, summer, and early fall of 2024. Documentary exhibits received by the court in connection with that hearing, which this court has reviewed, included E.H.’s mental health, clinical, and substance abuse treatment records and parenting assessment reports, including the comprehensive January 2023 Clinic Report. ¶ 16 The assistant State’s attorney began the hearing by expressing her belief that K.W.’s longtime caseworker, Tanya Knight, was biassed in E.H.’s favor and should be removed from the case. A.S., K.W.’s paternal grandmother and foster parent, had reported that Ms. Knight was hostile to her and had expressed her frustration that K.W. had not already been returned to his 4 No. 1-25-1913 mother. E.H.’s counsel objected to Ms. Knight’s removal, arguing that she had done her best, given a history of tension between E.H. and A.S., and knew the case “pretty much inside and out.” The court reserved ruling on the matter, and Ms. Knight took the stand. ¶ 17 Ms. Knight testified that she had been K.W.’s caseworker for two years, since March 2022. She had last him the week before at A.S.’s home, which had appeared safe and appropriate, with no signs of abuse or neglect. Ms. Knight was concerned, however, that K.W. was still sleeping in the same bed as his grandmother. When she asked A.S. about this, A.S. explained that she had been startled one night by K.W. standing in her doorway, “like Chuckie” from the horror film, and decided he should just sleep in her bed after that. E.H. had also reported to Ms. Knight that A.S. was letting K.W. ride in the front seat of her vehicle, a van in which the rear rows of seats had been removed, even after Ms. Knight had warned her that this was not safe, and A.S. had agreed not to do it anymore. ¶ 18 Ms. Knight also related that parent-child interaction therapy, a recommended service, was not occurring because there was no way to get K.W. to those sessions. The transportation company that brought him to supervised visits would not transport him to what it considered medical appointments, and another available company required someone over the age of 18 to ride with any minor. Although Ms. Knight agreed with the State that it was her agency’s job to ensure K.W. attended all required services, she was not able to transport K.W. herself because she had parent- child visits in another case at the same time. Ms. Knight expressed her frustration with the fact that A.S., as the foster parent, had made no effort to help. ¶ 19 Ms. Knight testified that when E.H. thought K.W. was going to be returned home to her soon, she had arranged for him to attend preschool, as recommended by DCFS. Since the permanency goal was changed, however, he had not been enrolled. A.S. told Ms. Knight that she 5 No. 1-25-1913 had tried to enroll him but was not able to. He was enrolled, however, for kindergarten the following year at the University of Chicago Lab School. K.W. was classified as “specialized,” and there was a Clinical Intervention for Placement Preservation (CIPP) scheduled for him on the following day, to see if his case should be moved to a specialized agency. ¶ 20 Ms. Knight agreed that since the last court date, visits had been supervised, some by a driver, whose notes Ms. Knight received and which she testified reported only positive interactions and no concerns. Ms. Knight had also personally observed four in-home visits and saw no sign that E.H. had been drinking or had alcohol in the house. ¶ 21 As Ms. Knight stated in her notes, E.H. was always appropriate during those visits; she had appropriate toys for K.W., played with him, and cooked food for him. Ms. Knight recorded that on March 12, 2024, they ate chicken and beans, played with building blocks, painted a jewelry box, and made an Easter basket. Ms. Knight noted, “the youth and his mother appeared to have a great relationship and loving bond. The youth was extremely sad when it was time to leave.” On March 26, 2024, they created a poster board together, played a catching game, and made a snack. On March 29, 2024, they practiced tracing letters and numbers, played games, sang songs, watched a program about dinosaurs, and colored Easter eggs. On April 7, 2024, they worked on a numbers game and coloring sheets, sang Happy Birthday and had cake (it was E.H.’s birthday), completed an alphabet maze, practiced learning K.W.’s address, and danced together. ¶ 22 Ms. Knight reported that K.W. often refused to eat at E.H.’s house, saying he would eat when he got home. K.W. called A.S. “Mommy” and E.W. “Mommy Ebby,” and on at least one of those occasions, he told Ms. Knight that “his mama [told] him not to eat Mama Ebby’s food.” ¶ 23 Ms. Knight also reported that when she drove K.W. back to A.S.’s house after visits with his mother: “He has sometimes refused. He’ll want to get out the car. He has teared up. And he 6 No. 1-25-1913 always says I don’t want to go.” When driving him back to A.S.’s home on March 12, 2024, she asked him whether he wanted to live with his mother or grandmother, and he said “Mommy,” and on March 26, 2024, she wrote in her notes: “KW cries or is always sad when the worker brings him back to the caregiver’s home.” ¶ 24 Ms. Knight testified that E.H. was subject to random urine drops every week, sometimes twice a week, and had complied with all of them. Ms. Knight was asked about the positive test result on January 23, 2024. E.H. consistently represented to Ms. Knight and to Ms. Knight’s supervisor at DCFS that the test came back positive not because she had drunk alcohol but because she had taken NyQuil for a cold. Ms. Knight reached out to the provider that did the test, and they confirmed that taking a medication like Nyquil or ZzzQuil could cause a positive result. ¶ 25 Ms. Knight acknowledged that E.H. gave different explanations for the positive result to her various service providers and agreed that this was concerning. The documentary evidence in the record indicates that E.H. told her therapist that she had trouble refilling her prescription medication and took ZzzQuil to help her sleep. At a telehealth visit with her prescriber, she said that she had not had alcohol in two-and-a-half years. She told workers at Bobby Wright, however, that she drank alcohol after losing an aunt she was close to. And when she was trying to preemptively get enrolled into the intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment program at Healthcare Alternative Systems (HAS) that the court would later order her to attend as a result of the positive urine test, E.H. gave a detailed account of a purportedly severe relapse, indicating that she had not been sober for more than two weeks at a time at any point in the past year. ¶ 26 Having reviewed all of this, however, Ms. Knight said that she and her supervisor at DCFS nevertheless believed what E.H. had told them. “[S]he knew she wasn’t going to get into treatment if she told them she just took Nyquil,” Ms. Knight explained, and “she felt like she needed to get 7 No. 1-25-1913 herself into treatment because of the positive drop.” “[W]e were not there,” Ms. Knight, continued, “so we don’t know if this mother had a drink or not.” “We only can go by her drops,” and “[a]ll of them were negative except for the one.” ¶ 27 An individual named Michael at HAS reported to Ms. Knight that E.H. was doing well in their program, which met for three hours a day, three times a week. She had missed only one session and was on track to complete the program by the end of April. ¶ 28 Ms. Knight acknowledged that E.H. had at first resisted attending meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), saying she did not think that was necessary. They had not discussed that recommendation further while E.H. was attending HAS, but Ms. Knight had raised it again recently, recommending that E.H. obtain a sponsor, and E.H. had agreed that it “wouldn’t hurt” for her to do that. ¶ 29 Ms. Knight reported that, in addition to participation in the intensive outpatient treatment at HAS, E.H. had attended her latest psychiatric appointment and was taking her prescribed medication. Ms. Knight testified that there were no other services that E.H. was referred to that she was not participating in. E.H. had also complied in a timely manner with every request for a urine test since the positive test result in January. ¶ 30 Ms. Knight agreed that she had occasionally expressed her personal opinion about the case in a group text message with E.H. and A.S., including her frustration that A.S. “manipulate[d] things” and had “disrupted the visits.” This was a concern Ms. Knight and her supervisor had discussed with A.S. on five or six occasions. At one point, Ms. Knight texted, “[E.H.], I hate that you as a mother can’t see your child on a regular basis” and “I’ve never seen anything like this.” She also confronted A.S. when E.H. told her A.S. had offered her alcoholic drinks, saying she should know better than to do that when E.H. was trying to maintain her sobriety, and A.S. had 8 No. 1-25-1913 said “yeah, I know” and “I won’t do that anymore.” Ms. Knight felt A.S. was not only trying to sabotage E.H. but was making it more difficult for Ms. Knight as a caseworker to provide reunification services, in an effort to force her off the case. Requiring someone new to learn the case would, in Ms. Knight’s view, only turn back the progress that had been made. ¶ 31 In response to the State’s concerns, and over the objection of defense counsel and the attorney for DCFS, Ms. Knight was removed from active management of the case. ¶ 32 Andrea Brown, E.H.’s therapist from the Catholic Charities agency since May 2020, testified at the permanency hearing that E.H. had made progress and responded positively to her recommendations. E.H. had told Ms. Brown that she tested positive for alcohol in early 2024 because she took cold medicine. Ms. Brown understood that E.H. had told her treatment provider at HAS a different story, but had explained to her, as she had to DCFS, that she made up the story about relapsing so that she could get into treatment more easily, because she was eager to show the court that she was motivated to achieve a return home. ¶ 33 Jose Thomas, Ms. Knight’s DCFS supervisor, took the stand to confirm that he too was recommending a permanency goal of return home within 12 months. He believed the explanation E.H. gave to DCFS about the positive test result in early 2024—that she had said what she felt was necessary to “get into services quickly.” He told the court: “I think this mom is doing everything possible to correct the conditions. So I stick with the goal of return home.” Mr. Thomas testified that K.W.’s CIPP report had come back, and he was being transferred to a specialized agency. ¶ 34 On the last day of testimony, September 6, 2024, the court heard from K.W.’s new caseworker, Shelby Foster. Ms. Foster testified that was employed by UCP Seguin and had been assigned to the case for approximately one month. She last saw K.W. the day before, on a visit to his preschool, and had observed him within the past month at A.S.’s home, which she found to be 9 No. 1-25-1913 safe and appropriate. She had also met with E.H., who was engaged in all recommended services. She participated in individual therapy; was compliant with her prescribed medication, as monitored by her psychiatrist; was attending AA; and had a sponsor whom she met with weekly. On cross- examination by the State, Ms. Foster agreed that she had no documentation confirming E.H.’s AA attendance but stated that she would obtain it. ¶ 35 Ms. Foster had sent E.H. for two urine tests. She missed the first one because she was out of town helping a relative, and the second test was scheduled for later that day. Ms. Foster agreed that a missed test was considered a positive drop but explained that this was a “missed communication on both ends,” because she had scheduled the test with the mistaken belief that E.H. was coming back a day earlier than she actually was. ¶ 36 Ms. Foster reported that K.W. had been evaluated and was developmentally on target. E.H. visited with him every Friday for three hours. The visits were supervised by the transportation company that brought him, and it had reported no concerns. Ms. Foster had personally observed one visit and also had no concerns. K.W. appeared to be bonded to E.H. She cooked for him and they spent the visit playing games and watching TV. Ms. Foster, in consultation with her supervisor, recommended a permanency goal of return home within 12 months. ¶ 37 Counsel for DCFS supported the recommendation of the new agency. They were newly assigned and had a fresh perspective, but they were still getting to know the family. The court should enter a goal of return home and allow the agency to work with the family. ¶ 38 The GAL stood by its recommendation that the permanency goal should be changed to guardianship. “This is a 2019 case that came into care due to [E.H.]’s alcohol use during her pregnancy,” counsel stated, “[a]nd it’s an issue that may still be of concern.” The GAL pointed out that the court had “heard conflicting testimony” regarding E.H.’s “use or potential use of alcohol.” 10 No. 1-25-1913 Changing the goal would “allow [E.H.] to continue to work on herself while allowing her parental rights to remain intact,” but would give K.W. “some semblance of stability” and “the permanence that he need[ed].” ¶ 39 The State likewise asked the court to “rule out return home” and enter a goal of guardianship. The new agency and caseworker assigned to this case had no new information to report except what E.H. had told them, the ASA pointed out, and E.H.’s statements “[had] been suspect in the past.” She had also missed a drop for reasons that could not be confirmed, and it “seem[ed] like a convenient excuse.” ¶ 40 Counsel for E.H. reminded the court that the only recommendation from any of the caseworkers was that the goal should remain return home. ¶ 41 Stating that she wanted to get K.W. permanency, “as quickly as possible so we get him out of the system,” the judge entered a goal of private guardianship. The judge explained to E.H. that she knew there were “some issues” between her and A.S., and that, for instance, A.S. had offered E.H. wine, knowing that she was working to maintain her sobriety. The judge believed that it was in K.W.’s best interest to have a relationship with E.H. but that, “more importantly, he ha[d] to have a permanent situation.” The judge concluded by stating: “I understand that [A.S.] will make sure that it is more than the once a month visit that you have with your son. That you two will work together to ensure that we raise a happy, healthy young man. So, that’s my ruling.” ¶ 42 E.H. moved to reconsider the changed permanency goal, arguing that K.W.’s former caseworker, that caseworker’s supervisor, and the newly assigned caseworker and her supervisor had all recommended a goal of return home within 12 months. Counsel also pointed out—attaching a HAS discharge summary and AA meeting logs to the motion—that since the last hearing, E.H. had completed substance abuse treatment and was participating in AA meetings with a sponsor. 11 No. 1-25-1913 The court denied the motion to reconsider on December 13, 2024. Another permanency hearing was held on April 30, 2025, and the court again entered the goal of private guardianship. The court gave as its reasons: “Considering the best interest factors and since 2021 NM has not been found fit willining [sic] and able. Minor needs permanency now.” ¶ 43 D. Closure of the Case to Private Guardianship ¶ 44 Given the new permanency goal, DCFS petitioned the court on August 14, 2025, to appoint A.S. as K.W.’s private guardian and to close the case. At the hearing on that motion, held on August 22, 2025, Ms. Foster testified that she had last visited A.S.’s home a week ago and it appeared safe and appropriate, a background check revealed that A.S. had no felony convictions, and she and K.W. appeared to have a good relationship and were well-bonded. A.S. had indicated that she would allow E.H. to visit K.W. even if the case was closed. ¶ 45 K.W. had not said anything to Ms. Foster that led her to believe he was unhappy or unsafe living with A.S., though she acknowledged he “didn’t really understand due to his age” what guardianship was. When she had asked him how he would feel living with A.S., he simply said, “I already live with [A.S.]” ¶ 46 Ms. Foster reported that K.W. was in kindergarten. He had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) but did not have an individualized education program (IEP) yet because the school needed to reevaluate him. Ms. Foster believed that as his guardian, A.S. would be able to advocate for all of his educational needs if the case were closed, and there was no further need for the court to continue monitoring his case. Ms. Foster and her supervisor agreed, given the new permanency goal, that it was in K.W.’s best interest for A.S. to be appointed as his private guardian. ¶ 47 Ms. Foster emphasized, however, that it was important for K.W. to continue to have a 12 No. 1-25-1913 relationship with E.H. Although reunification services were no longer being provided, E.H. had continued to attend therapy and AA meetings on her own. ¶ 48 A.S. then took the stand and confirmed that she wished to become K.W.’s private guardian. She understood what this would entail and believed she could adequately care for him without outside assistance. She agreed that E.H. would be allowed to visit K.W. at least once a month, supervised or unsupervised, at her discretion. ¶ 49 Counsel for E.H. again argued that private guardianship was not proper where E.H. continued “to demonstrate that she ha[d] resolved those issues” that brought this case in and had maintained a close relationship with K.W. ¶ 50 The circuit court judge stated that she appreciated the objection and understood substance abuse was a daily challenge. “[B]ut this is a 2019 case,” she said, “and we never got to the point where she had unsupervised visits for a consistent period of time with her son, which would allow for the Court to reunify her with her son.” The judge agreed that it was “paramount” for K.W. to continue to maintain a relationship with E.H. She was also aware that there had been “friction” between E.H. and A.S., but A.S. had repeatedly assured the court that she would facilitate a relationship between K.W. and E.H., and the judge explained that she needed to do what was in K.W.’s best interest based on the factors set out in the Act. The court did not elaborate further in its order, stating simply that closing the case to private guardianship was “in [the] minor’s best interest.” ¶ 51 E.H. now appeals. ¶ 52 II. JURISDICTION ¶ 53 An order terminating wardship and closing juvenile proceedings pursuant to section 2-31(2) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2024)) is a final and appealable judgment. In re 13 No. 1-25-1913 M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d 764, 777 (2003). The circuit court here entered such an order on August 22, 2025, and E.H. filed a timely notice of appeal from that order on September 19, 2025. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final judgments in civil cases, and Rule 660 (eff. Oct. 1, 2001), governing appeals in cases arising under the Act. ¶ 54 III. ANALYSIS ¶ 55 E.H. argues on appeal that the evidence did not support the circuit court’s decision to close this case to private guardianship. The GAL, whose brief and arguments the State adopts, and whose points are echoed by DCFS in its own brief on appeal, urges us to conclude the opposite. Having reviewed the record and the case law, it is clear to us that closing this case to guardianship was not in K.W.’s best interest. ¶ 56 A. The Legal Framework ¶ 57 Underlying every provision of the Act is the understanding that “parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children.” In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 26. Because no minor may be taken, even temporarily, from a fit, able, and willing parent, wardship is only granted when the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence at a dispositional hearing that the parents of an abused or neglected minor are “unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so.” 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2024); In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 238 (2001) (preponderance standard applies). ¶ 58 The court then hears evidence regarding what disposition will best serve “the health, safety and interests of the minor and the public.” 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2024). DCFS is commonly given the authority, as it was here, to place the minor in foster care. Id. §§ 2-23(1)(a)(2), 2-27(1)(d). 14 No. 1-25-1913 The dispositional order is not a final determination of either the parent’s abilities or the proper permanent situation for the child. It is a snapshot in time memorializing the reasons the child was made a ward of the state that is intended to give the parent “fair notice of what they must do to retain their rights to their child.” In re G.F.H., 315 Ill. App. 3d 711, 715 (2000). ¶ 59 Permanency review hearings, held at least every six months thereafter (705 ILCS 405/2- 28(2) (West 2024)), serve as a continuation of the dispositional hearing (In re M.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 210288, ¶ 72). The court sets a permanency goal, determines the appropriateness of the services offered in support of that goal, establishes whether those services have been provided, and considers what progress has been made. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(11.2) (West 2024). Section 2-28 of the Act establishes a hierarchical structure of permanency goals. Id. § 2-28. The court must first consider whether the child can return home within five months, then within one year, and only after ruling out those goals may it consider alternative permanency options like private guardianship or termination of parental rights leading to adoption. Id. ¶ 60 Where, as in this case, the court has closed the case to private guardianship, the court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that that result is in the child’s best interest. In re Kam B., 2024 IL App (1st) 240599, ¶ 50 (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366 (2004)). We will not disturb that decision on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence—i.e., where “review of the record demonstrates the proper result is the one opposite that reached by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re D.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 467, 472 (2000). ¶ 61 Whenever any determination is made regarding what is in the best interest of a child, the court must consider, “in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs,” the following factors set out in section 1-3(4.05) of the Act: “(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, 15 No. 1-25-1913 and clothing; (b) the development of the child’s identity; (c) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child’s sense of attachments, including: (i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and a sense of being valued); (ii) the child’s sense of security; (iii) the child’s sense of familiarity; (iv) continuity of affection for the child; (v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child; (e) the child’s wishes and long-term goals, including the child’s wishes regarding available permanency options and the child’s wishes regarding maintaining connections with parents, siblings, and other relatives; (f) the child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends; (g) the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other relatives; (h) the uniqueness of every family and child; (i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child, including willingness to provide permanency to the child, either through subsidized guardianship or through adoption.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024). ¶ 62 Although E.H. suggests we should also look to the best-interest factors found in section 16 No. 1-25-1913 2-28(2.4) of the Act (id. § 2-28(2.4)), as the GAL points out, those factors are only relevant to the court’s determination that a permanency goal is in the child’s best interest. E.H.’s appeal is not from the circuit court’s decision to change K.W.’s permanency goal to private guardianship but rather from its final judgment granting private guardianship on a permanent basis and closing the case. We agree with the GAL that the factors specifically applicable to the court’s decision to close this case to guardianship are the ones set out in section 1-3(4.05) of the Act. ¶ 63 Those are the same best-interest factors that apply where the State has successfully petitioned for a termination of parental rights so that a minor may be adopted. In re M.W., 2019 IL App (1st) 191002, ¶ 59. When that has occurred, application of the factors is usually quite straight forward. The court will have already found by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “an unfit person” due to abandonment, desertion, substantial neglect, extreme or repeated cruelty, or “[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare.” 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024); 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024). In such cases, the bond between the parent and the child has been severed, practically and legally, and the only decision to be made is if the child will be happy and well-cared for in a particular adoptive placement. ¶ 64 Closing a child protection case to private guardianship, as the circuit court did here, is a different thing altogether. It does not require a finding of parental unfitness and does not extinguish a parent’s rights to their child. Under section 1-3(13) of the Act, certain residual rights and responsibilities remain with the parent—including the right to reasonable visitation, the right to consent to adoption, the right to determine the minor’s religious affiliation, and responsibility for the minor’s support. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(13) (West 2024). The guardian’s authority is expressly exercised subject to those residual rights (id.), and the parent may seek to enforce visitation or 17 No. 1-25-1913 reopen the case and reinstate wardship if it is in the minor’s best interest (id. § 2-33). ¶ 65 The best interest analysis a court conducts when parental rights are intact and there is a demonstrated parent-child bond will look far different from the one it conducts when there has been a termination of parental rights. The factors themselves, which require the court to consider the development of the child’s identity; his background and ties; his sense of attachment, including where he feels love; his sense of familiarity; his need for continuity of affection; his desire to maintain connections with parents, siblings, and other relatives; and the wishes of those available to care for him, all inherently require the court to consider the importance to the child of maintaining and strengthening the parent-child relationship. ¶1 With these considerations in mind, we address the parties’ arguments and explain why we agree with E.H. that the circuit court’s conclusion that closure of this case to private guardianship was in K.W.’s best interest was against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶2 B. The Physical Safety and Welfare of the Child ¶3 E.H’s primary argument on appeal is that one positive urine test in January 2024 does not negate her years of sobriety and near perfect compliance with services nor provide a basis upon which to question whether K.W. would be safe and cared for with her. She emphasizes that there was a gap of over a year following her only other positive test result in this case, in April 2022, and that she has had no subsequent positive tests since, even after services in support of K.W.’s return home ceased and she has submitted to routine urine tests on her own. ¶4 E.H. persuasively argues that both prior to and following the January 2024 positive urine test, she made substantial progress in addressing any issue that caused concern about K.W.’s safety and welfare. She consistently took her prescription medication and met with her therapist, was engaged in substance abuse recovery services, and regularly and consistently submitted for urine 18 No. 1-25-1913 tests. ¶5 This one positive test appears to be the motivating force in changing the goal from a prompt return home to closing the case to private guardianship. Just before that test, in mid-2023, the circuit court had changed the permanency goal to return home within five months, and a hearing was scheduled for early 2024 for a permanency review hearing and “motion to return home.” ¶6 The GAL tries to justify the court’s reliance on this single positive result by focusing on the conflicting stories E.H. gave to explain it. E.H. told both the caseworker and her longtime therapist that she took ZzzQuil, an over-the-counter cold medicine, to help her sleep. She explained to the caseworker that she only told HAS that she had had a full relapse because she was desperate to get into a treatment program, something she anticipated the court would require of her, and which it in fact did require of her at the next hearing. The GAL questions why it was necessary for E.H. to support her claimed relapse with so many apparently fabricated, and exaggerated, details— that she had not been able to remain sober for more than two weeks at a time during the whole past year, for example. This suggests, the GAL argues, that what she told HAS was in fact the truth. But that is simply not plausible. Ms. Knight