Manos v. White
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket1-25-1587
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
2026 IL App (1st) 251587-U
No. 1-25-1587
Order filed November 20, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not
precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
FIFTH DIVISION
GEORGE N. MANOS, as co-trustee of the CATHERINE N. MANOS DECLARATION OF
TRUST U/T/A DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1985, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
v.
EUSTATHIA M. WHITE, as co-trustee of the CATHERINE N. MANOS DECLARATION OF
TRUST U/T/A DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1985, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED, Defendant-
Appellee
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Honorable Patrick J. Sherlock, Judge, Presiding.
No. 24-L-10163
PRESIDING JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices C.A. Walker and Donnelly concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appeal is dismissed where this court lacks jurisdiction to consider a nonfinal order
granting defendant’s section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)) motion to
dismiss where plaintiff maintained the right to replead, the dismissal was without
prejudice, and the order did not include Rule 304 (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) language.
¶2 Plaintiff George N. Manos, as co-trustee of the Catherine N. Manos Declaration of Trust
u/t/a dated September 18, 1985, as amended and restated, appeals the circuit court’s grant of a
section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)) motion to dismiss in favor of defendant,
EUSTATHIA M. WHITE, as co-trustee of the Catherine N. Manos Declaration of Trust u/t/a dated
September 18, 1985, as amended and restated. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court
erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because: (1) plaintiff sufficiently alleged that
defendant’s conduct proximately caused injury to the Trust, and the fact that neither trustee invoked
the trustee voting rights clause was not a superseding cause; (2) the circuit court did not address
the many other reasons alleged as to why the trustee voting rights clause cannot insulate defendant
from liability for her breaches of fiduciary duty; (3) the circuit court erred by dismissing Count
VIII of plaintiff’s first amended complaint that sought an accounting; and (4) the circuit court erred
by dismissing plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The background factual information is taken from the circuit court’s orders granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s initial complaint on March 5, 2025, and the first amended
complaint on July 16, 2025.
¶5 Plaintiff and defendant are siblings and co-trustees of their mother’s trust, the Catherine N.
Manos Declaration of Trust u/t/a dated September 18, 1985, as amended and restated (the trust).
Their mother Catherine is 93 years old and was adjudicated as incapacitated in May of 2021, and
the parties became successor co-trustees at that time. The trust assets include various accounts at
Morgan Stanley valued at over $7 million; a Fidelity account valued at over $3.8 million; Thomas
White funds valued at an unknown amount, life insurance valued at $35,000; a 60% interest in the
family farm valued at over $2.7 million; a cooperative apartment located at 1448 North Lake Shore
Drive; and miscellaneous personal property.
¶6 Plaintiff alleged that when the parties became successor co-trustees of their mother’s trust,
defendant was presented with forms to allow the co-trustee to give direction to Morgan Stanley
-2-
regarding the investments in the accounts. Plaintiff alleged that defendant refused to execute the
forms and as a result, the value of the assets in the Morgan Stanley accounts decreased. Plaintiff
alleged malfeasance in connection with investments that were previously held in the Thomas
White Funds, which are investment funds operated by defendant’s husband, Thomas White.
Plaintiff sought an accounting related to those funds. On March 8, 2021, Catherine executed a
Fidelity power of attorney (POA) form granting defendant full control over the Fidelity account.
However, plaintiff contended that Catherine lacked capacity to execute the POA. Fidelity
subsequently froze the account in January 2023, and defendant made payments from the Fidelity
account to the attorney in connection with the POA, Peter Goschi. Plaintiff also alleged that
defendant did not perform duties relating to estate planning that would lower tax exposure,
specifically gifts and medical expenses incurred by both plaintiff’s and defendant’s families.
¶7 In November 2021, Goschi prepared a proposal to revise Catherine’s estate that plaintiff
concluded would divest him of his rights. Plaintiff alleged that when he refused to sign off on the
revision, defendant threatened to withhold his annual gift and then defendant unilaterally met with
representatives from Northern Trust and shared trust information. Plaintiff alleged defendant took
the position that Northern Trust should be made successor trustee which plaintiff opposed because
he believed the fees were exorbitant. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant improperly delayed in
selling the Lake Shore Drive condominium that had been empty since 2021.
¶8 Plaintiff filed a single count complaint for breach of fiduciary duty on September 13, 2024,
and defendant filed a section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)) motion to dismiss on
December 12, 2024. In its March 5, 2025, written order, the circuit court noted that the parties
owed a fiduciary duty to each other in administration of the trust as co-trustees. Plaintiff argued
that such duty was breached by defendant through several of her actions and inactions: (1)
-3-
defendant ignored repeated requests to execute administrative forms after they were made co-
trustees for Morgan Stanley to have proper direction for investments; (2) defendant refused to
provide information relating to the Thomas White Funds and an accounting; (3) defendant caused
their mother to execute a power of attorney relating to one fund when their mother was
incapacitated; (4) defendant refused to implement certain strategies to minimize taxes as the trust
allowed; (5) defendant hired Goschi to act on her behalf in conflict with the trust’s interests and
inappropriately paid him out of trust funds; (6) the trust and plaintiff sustained damages as a result
of the alleged breaches through a dissipation of the trust assets; (7) defendant’s failure to minimize
tax exposure; and (8) defendant’s failure to provide accounting of the various assets.
¶9 In response, defendant argued that the complaint was inadequately pled because plaintiff
had not alleged that he satisfied a condition precedent to the filing of a suit. The court noted that
performance was an element of a breach of contract claim and not an element of a breach of
fiduciary duty; however, it found that plaintiff was hard pressed to allege facts in support of
causation.
¶ 10 Defendant contended that courts frequently dismissed claims because certain conditions
were not met prior to filing suit and directed the court to cases where administrative remedies or
alternative dispute resolution avenues must be established prior to bringing suit. The circuit court
indicated that it would review the trust through that lens. In doing so, the circuit court restated
defendant’s argument as follows: plaintiff could have followed the trust provisions and avoided all
of the purported damages he claimed to have suffered. Defendant’s decisions not to execute the
Morgan Stanley documents, list the cooperative apartment for sale, etc. may have been well-
informed decisions or they may have been spiteful decisions. Either way, the trust allowed plaintiff
a means to avoid deadlock, and plaintiff did not follow the provisions of the trust.
-4-
¶ 11 The circuit court accordingly granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege
additional facts to support each of the elements of his cause of action, including specific causation
that “but for” the breach, he would not have suffered damages. The court noted that plaintiff must
plead facts and not merely legal conclusions that the breach was the proximate cause of the alleged
damages. The court granted defendant’s section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)) motion to
dismiss with leave to replead. Plaintiff was given until March 28, 2025, to file an amended
complaint and defendant had until April 21, 2025, to answer or otherwise plead.
¶ 12 Plaintiff subsequently filed his nine-count first amended complaint on March 28, 2025:
Count I- Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Morgan Stanley accounts; Count II- Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
Thomas White Fund accounts; Count III- Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fidelity POA; Count IV-
Refusing to attend to gifting for tax avoidance; Count V- Refusal to permit plaintiff to be
compensated for work managing the trust real estate; Count VI- Lake Shore Drive Condominium;
Count VII- Declaration of Invalidity of Article X(4); Count VIII- Demand for Accounting; and
Count IX- Attorneys’ Fees.
¶ 13 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint again alleged various failings on defendant’s part in
connect with the trust assets. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant repeatedly failed to
execute necessary forms relating to accounts so plaintiff and defendant could give directions to
Morgan Stanley and Fidelity. Plaintiff contended that because plaintiff and defendant were not
empowered to give direction to the fund managers, investment opportunities were lost and caused
depreciation in value. Plaintiff alleged that his mother executed a POA to defendant over the
Fidelity account and defendant and her husband moved funds from the Thomas White Funds
account to the Fidelity account in order for defendant to have full control. Plaintiff contended that
his mother lacked capacity to execute the POA. Fidelity froze the account in January 2023, and
-5-
defendant made payments from the Fidelity account to the attorney in connection with the POA,
Peter Goschi. Plaintiff alleged that defendant did not perform duties relating to estate planning that
would lower tax exposure, specifically gifts and medical expenses incurred by both plaintiff’s and
defendant’s families. Plaintiff further alleged that Goschi made proposals to revise the estate which
defendant would not sign off on. Plaintiff contended that defendant unilaterally met with
representatives from Northern Trust, shared trust information with them and suggested that
Northern Trust should be the sole successor trustee. Plaintiff alleged that he had not been
compensated for managing the family farm and that defendant improperly delayed selling the Lake
Shore Drive co-op for her personal benefit resulting in a loss of value.
¶ 14 Defendant again filed a section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)) motion to dismiss,
attacking the legal sufficiency of the complaint, on April 25, 2025.
¶ 15 In its July 16, 2025, written order, as an initial matter, the circuit court determined that
Counts IV through VI were not, as labeled, independent causes of action. Rather, each of those
counts asserted claims for mismanagement of trust assets by defendant and sounded in breach of
fiduciary duty, which is the theory applied by the circuit court to determine their adequacy. The
court noted that there was no dispute that the parties owed a fiduciary duty to each other, and
plaintiff adequately alleged that defendant’s actions and non-actions amounted to a breach of that
fiduciary duty. The court further noted that in its prior order dismissing plaintiff’s original single-
count complaint for breach of fiduciary duty, it advised plaintiff that to survive a motion to dismiss,
he would need to allege additional facts to support the causation element of his claim by pleading
that “but for” the breach, plaintiff would not have suffered harm. Despite additional facts and
counts that broke each action and inaction into individual counts, plaintiff did not clear the hurdle
of pleading proximate causation of his alleged damages.
-6-
¶ 16 The circuit court determined that the trust explicitly provided the mechanism for resolving
conflicts related to the trust. It found that Counts I through VI of the first amended complaint were
governed by the terms of the trust, which plainly and unambiguously provided the mechanism for
resolution of a conflict or deadlock. Article X of the trust provides:
“(4) Trustee Voting Rights. If there is more than one Trustee serving, then the vote of the
Trustees for any action hereunder must be by unanimous vote of the Trustees. In the event
the Trustees cannot reach a unanimous decision on any action, then the Trustees shall seek
the vote of the next named successor trustee as provided hereinabove, and a majority vote
of the three Trustees shall control; provided, however, any dissenting Trustee shall not be
held accountable for any action taken hereunder he or she did not vote in favor of.
(Emphasis added by the Court).”
¶ 17 The circuit court examined each count of plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
¶ 18 Count I, Morgan Stanley Accounts, alleged that defendant ignored requests to execute
administrative forms after they were made co-trustees for Morgan Stanley to have proper direction
for investments and that they lost value as a result. The court found that defendant’s failure to
execute the documents, for whatever reasons, was an action that could be and can be challenged
using the mechanism provided for in the trust.
¶ 19 Count II, Thomas White Funds, alleged that in December 2020, defendant caused her
mother’s investment in the Thomas White Funds to be sold and the proceeds deposited in a Fidelity
account owned by the trust. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant divested herself personally from
the Thomas White Funds prior to divesting the trust funds yet failed to provide any explanation
for the timing of the divestment, opining that the delay in divesting the trust from the Thomas
White Funds resulted in a loss in excess of $600,000. The court found that since the parties were
-7-
not trustees until Catherine was adjudicated to be incapacitated in May of 2021, no breach of
fiduciary duty could be sustained for either of those actions.
¶ 20 Count III, Fidelity Power of Attorney (POA), alleged that defendant caused Catherine to
execute a POA relating to the Fidelity accounts when she was incapacitated on March 8, 2021.
Despite Catherine’s adjudication on May 3, 2021, plaintiff alleged that it was plain that Catherine
was not competent the prior year. The court found that plaintiff might have grounds for a different
cause of action, but that he could not prevail on a fiduciary duty claim. With respect to plaintiff’s
request for an accounting for all transactions within the Fidelity accounts, plaintiff claimed
damages as a result of the fraudulently acquired POA resulting in investment opportunity costs,
increased costs of administration and unnecessary attorneys’ fees. The court found once again that
those actions and inactions could have been compelled had the parties come to an impasse using
the mechanism provided in the trust.
¶ 21 Count IV, Refusing to attend to gifting for tax avoidance, alleged that defendant refused to
implement certain strategies to minimize taxes as the trust allowed and defendant hired Goschi to
act on her behalf in conflict with the trust’s interests and inappropriately paid him out of trust
funds. Plaintiff further alleged that the parties had conflicting proposals for administration of the
trust funds and who would or should be trustee. The court found that it was clear from the
allegations and the emails of the ongoing dispute relating to those payments that the parties were
at odds and should have availed themselves of the conflict resolution provision in the trust.
Moreover, the court found that plaintiff could not have suffered any damages as a result of that
purported impropriety because Catherine is still alive and no estate or gift tax can be due.
¶ 22 Count V, Refusal to permit plaintiff to be compensated for work managing the trust real
estate, alleged that plaintiff had managed the farm without compensation since 2006. The court
-8-
found this to be an issue that involves administration of the assets of the trust and could have been
brought to a vote of the trustees and named successor trustee in the event the parties could not
agree. The court determined that plaintiff’s allegation that defendant unjustly profited from his
labor through her receipt of 20% of the farm’s profits and as beneficiary of the trust potentially
sounded in something other than a fiduciary duty claim.
¶ 23 Count VI, Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Apartment, alleged that the trust sustained a loss
due to the prolonged delay in the sale of the condominium, and plaintiff took issue with defendant
listing the unit for $1.65 million without a broker. Plaintiff ultimately obtained an appraisal for
$900,000, and the unit sold for $800,000. Plaintiff alleged malfeasance by defendant with the delay
of the sale. The court concluded, once again, that this was a trust asset and any disagreement on
how to market and sell the unit could have been set to a vote; thus, plaintiff could not allege the
causal connection to any damages.
¶ 24 Count VII, Declaration of Invalidity of Article X(4), sought a declaration that the trustee
voting rights provision of the trust was invalid. However, the circuit court found that it had already
determined that there was a mechanism in place in the event of deadlock, thus there was no actual
controversy at issue, which was required to seek a declaratory judgment. The court concluded that
a declaratory judgment action was improper when plaintiff had already initiated a suit, and even if
plaintiff had adequately pled claims for breach of fiduciary duty, he alleged actions that have
already happened in contravention of the rust agreement resulting in the instant litigation and thus,
a declaration would not help to end the earlier controversy.
¶ 25 Count VIII, Demand for Accounting, sought an accounting in equity. The court reiterated
that plaintiff failed to adequately allege proximate causation of damages to sustain a breach of
fiduciary duty claim. Therefore, an accounting claim similarly failed. However, pursuant to the
-9-
trust, as defendant conceded, plaintiff as co-trustee was entitled to an annual accounting. The court
noted that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law by making a demand and triggering the
impasse/deadlock provision of the trust. Plaintiff argued that he requested an accounting, but the
sole allegation in the complaint on this issue vague requested an accounting of the Thomas White
Funds based on actions that were prior to the parties becoming co-trustees and triggering the
accounting requirement.
¶ 26 With respect to Count IX, Attorneys’ Fees, the circuit court found that a demand for
attorneys’ fees was a remedy and not an independent cause of action and dismissed the count
outright.
¶ 27 The circuit court subsequently granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)). The order further stated that “[u]nless
plaintiff can allege that he complied with the terms of the Trust, the Court will not allow further
amendments.” Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was later filed on August 14, 2025.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss his breach of fiduciary complaint because: (1) plaintiff sufficiently alleged that defendant’s
conduct proximately caused injury to the Trust, and the fact that neither trustee invoked the trustee
voting rights clause was not a superseding cause; (2) the circuit court did not address the many
other reasons alleged as to why the trustee voting rights clause cannot insulate defendant from
liability for her breaches of fiduciary duty; (3) the circuit court erred by dismissing Count VIII of
plaintiff’s first amended complaint that sought an accounting; and (4) the circuit court erred by
dismissing plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees.
- 10 -
¶ 30 Before considering the merits of an appeal, it is the duty of this court to consider whether
it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal even though this issue was not raised by the parties. O’Hara
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 137 Ill. App. 3d 131, 133 (1985). Jurisdiction of
this court to hear an appeal is confined to reviewing appeals from final judgments unless it comes
within one of the exceptions for interlocutory orders specified by our Supreme Court Rules. Id. A
judgment or decree is final and reviewable if it either terminates the litigation between the parties,
either on the entire controversy or some definite part thereof, so that, if affirmed, the trial court has
only to proceed with execution. Id. Where an order of the court leaves a cause still pending and
undecided, it is not a final order. Id.
¶ 31 In this case, plaintiff’s jurisdictional statement included in his brief indicates that this
appeal was brought pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301. Rule 301 provides that:
“Every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right. The appeal
is initiated by filing a notice of appeal. No other step is jurisdictional. An appeal is a
continuation of the proceeding.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 32 However, the specific issue we must address here is the effect on appealability of the
following wording in the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss:
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615 is granted.
Unless plaintiff can allege that he complied with the terms of the Trust, the Court will not
allow further amendments.”
The order does not specify that the dismissal was with or without prejudice, nor was Rule 304(b)
(eff. Mar. 8, 2016) language used in the order. Rather, the disposition left the option open for
plaintiff to file another amended complaint if he alleged that he complied with the terms of the
trust.
- 11 -
¶ 33 Rule 304(b) applies to judgements and orders appealable without special finding. Those
judgments and orders covered by this section of the rule are: (1) a judgment or order entered in the
administration of an estate, guardianship, or similar proceeding which finally determines a right
or status of a party; (2) a judgment or order entered in the administration of a receivership,
rehabilitation, liquidation, or other similar proceeding which finally determines a right or status of
a party and which is not appealable under Rule 307(a) 1; (3) a judgment or order granting or denying
any of the relief prayed in a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (4) a
final judgment or order entered in a proceeding under section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; (5) an order finding a person or entity in contempt of court which imposes a monetary
or other penalty; and (6) a custody or allocation of parental responsibilities judgment or
modification of such judgment entered pursuant to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.) or Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (750 ILCS 46/101 et seq.).
Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 34 It is clear that none of those types of judgments or orders were entered in this case, so Rule
304 is not an appropriate basis for jurisdiction. Here the circuit court simply entered an order
granting defendant’s section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Generally, an order striking a complaint or
granting a motion to dismiss is not final and appealable unless it indicates it is “with prejudice.”
O’Hara, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 133. While this language is not essential to a determination of what
1
Rule 307(a) governs interlocutory appeals as of right from orders (1) granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving or
refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction; (2) appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver or sequestrator;
(3)giving or refusing to give other or further powers or property to a receiver or sequestrator already appointed; (4)
placing or refusing to place a mortgagee in possession of mortgaged premises; (5) appointing or refusing to appoint
a receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator, or other similar officer for a bank, savings and loan association, currency
exchange, insurance company, or other financial institution, or granting or refusing to grant custody of the institution
or requiring turnover of any of its assets; (6) terminating parental rights or granting, denying or revoking temporary
commitment in adoption proceedings commenced pursuant to section 5 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/5); and
(7) determining issues raised in proceedings to exercise the right of eminent domain under section 20-5-10 of the
Eminent Domain Act, but the procedure for appeal. Ill. S. Ct. 307(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
- 12 -
constitutes a final and appealable order, the terms are indicative of the fact that plaintiff will not
be allowed to plead over and that the litigation is terminated. Id.
¶ 35 The record reveals that defendant ’s motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to section 2-615
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)). Motions under section 2-615 attack only the legal sufficiency of
the complaint, and when the motion is granted, a plaintiff is permitted to amend his complaint or
plead over. Id. at 134.
¶ 36 In this case, the circuit court’s order is not ambiguous; it specifically indicated that plaintiff
could file another amended complaint as long as he alleged that he complied with the terms of the
trust. The dismissal was not entered with prejudice nor was Rule 304 language included. However,
rather than amend his complaint, plaintiff instead filed his notice of appeal on August 14, 2025.
The record reveals that plaintiff did not seek Rule 304(a) language from the circuit court prior to
filing his appeal, and his notice of appeal, like his opening brief, indicate that his appeal is filed
pursuant to Rule 301 based on a final judgment entered on July 16, 2025. That was improper as
the July 16, 2025, order was not a final judgment. Thus, plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 301 for this
court’s jurisdiction is misplaced.
¶ 37 As such, we must conclude that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal as there was no
final judgment entered by the circuit court and the order appealed from did not include language
that dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice or Rule 304 language. Accordingly, the appeal
is dismissed.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 40 Appeal dismissed.
- 13 -