In re C.B.
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket4-26-0803
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
2026 IL App (4th) 260803-U
NOS. 4-26-0803, 4-26-0804, 4-26-0805, 4-26-0806, 4-26-0849, 4-26-0850, 4-26-0851,
4-26-0852 cons.
NOTICE
This Order was filed under
FILED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT November 16, 2026
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed OF ILLINOIS 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re C.B., J.B., K.B., and Ja. B., Minors ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Peoria County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 23JA227
v. ) 23JA228
Joan B., ) 23JA229
Respondent-Appellant). ) 23JA230
)
) Honorable
) Daniel M. Cordis,
) Judge Presiding.
In re C.B., J.B., K.B., and Ja. B., Minors ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Peoria County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 23JA227
v. ) 23JA228
Jacquri B., ) 23JA229
Respondent-Appellant). ) 23JA230
)
) Honorable
) Daniel M. Cordis,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Grischow and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: In appellate court case Nos. 4-26-0803, 4-26-0804, 4-26-0805, and 4-26-0806, we
grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm, concluding no issue of
arguable merit could be raised on appeal. In appellate court case Nos. 4-26-0849,
4-26-0850, 4-26-0851, and 4-26-0852, we affirm the trial court, finding neither
the court’s unfitness finding nor its termination of parental rights was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In October 2023, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
respondents Joan B. (hereinafter the mother) and Jacquri B. (hereinafter the father) as to their
minor child, C.B. (born 2018). The mother’s and the father’s other minor children, J.B. (born
2016), K.B. (born 2013), and Ja. B. (born 2012), were joined in this action. (The minors’ two oldest
siblings, A.B. (born 2007) and N.B. (born 2011), who have different putative fathers, are not
involved in this appeal.) In July 2026, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both
respondents. Each filed a notice of appeal, and the court appointed each an attorney to represent
them. On our own motion, we consolidated the two appeals for review and decision.
¶3 Appointed appellate counsel for the mother filed a motion to withdraw, citing
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and arguing that the appeal presented no potentially
meritorious issues for review. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685 (2000) (holding Anders
applies in juvenile abuse and neglect cases). This court gave the mother the opportunity to respond
to the motion, but she filed no response. The father argues on appeal that the trial court’s unfitness
finding as to him and termination of his parental rights were against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶4 For the reasons that follow, we (1) grant the motion to withdraw filed by counsel
for the mother and (2) find the trial court’s unfitness finding as to the father and termination of his
parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the
court’s judgment.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
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¶6 On October 19, 2023, the State filed a petition to adjudicate C.B. neglected under
section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)
(West 2022)). The State alleged that C.B.’s environment was injurious to her welfare because
(1) the family’s residence was uninhabitable; (2) all the children were dirty and unkempt, (3) a
registered sex offender lived in the home with the children; (4) the children were not registered for
and had not attended school in 2023; (5) the father tested positive for heroin and
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC); (6) the mother tested positive for THC; and (7) the father had one
prior conviction for forgery, one prior conviction for theft, and two prior convictions for
aggravated battery. The children were subsequently adjudicated neglected, and the mother and the
father were ordered to complete various services and tasks in order to have the children returned
to their care.
¶7 The services and tasks the mother and the father were ordered to complete included
maintaining stable housing, undergoing drug treatment, and submitting to random drug testing.
The mother and the father failed to complete almost all of the services and tasks. Accordingly, the
State petitioned to terminate their parental rights, alleging that from January 17, 2025, to October
17, 2025, the mother and the father failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions
that resulted in the children being removed from their care. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2024).
¶8 At a subsequent fitness hearing, Stephanie Church, a caseworker from FamilyCore,
testified that, from January 17, 2025, to October 17, 2025, the mother and the father attended most
of the scheduled visits with the children. The mother brought coloring books and word puzzles
with her and played with the children. The father, who brought homemade baked goods with him
twice, sat at a nearby table and waited for the children to approach him before interacting with
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them. When he did engage with the children, he made promises about providing them with shoes
and toys that were never fulfilled. He also showed up for visits several times smelling of cannabis
and under what Church believed was the influence of drugs or alcohol. Visitation was not canceled
when he did so because he was not a safety threat. During that same period, the mother and the
father failed to obtain stable housing and provide proof that they had legal employment, although
the father had made attempts to complete these tasks by (1) signing up for subsidized housing and
(2) going on job interviews.
¶9 Church indicated that the mother was not honest about the things she needed to do
to obtain custody of the children and failed to cooperate with her and/or FamilyCore. Church
explained that the mother did not attend counseling; attain sobriety, which was a prerequisite to
undergoing counseling; and submit to random drug testing. Church elaborated that the mother was
ordered to complete 27 drug drops, but she only submitted to 3. According to evidence admitted
at the hearing, the mother tested positive for cocaine twice and THC and methamphetamine three
times on the three occasions where she completed random drug testing.
¶ 10 Concerning the father, Church stated that although he was polite most of the time,
he, too, failed to complete services. The father, like the mother, was untruthful about whether he
had completed services or was working toward doing so. He frequently changed his phone number
but notified Church or FamilyCore as required only 10% of the time. He also, like the mother, was
ordered to submit to 27 random drug drops. The record reflected he underwent testing only twice,
and on those two occasions, he tested positive for THC.
¶ 11 In her testimony, the mother claimed that she had, in fact, completed two
assessments for substance abuse and mental health. She did not provide any of the paperwork from
the assessments to her caseworker because she was told the facility would send it over. She also
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said she was unable to complete many of the services because she either did not get the proper
referral or lacked transportation. She claimed she told Church about this problem.
¶ 12 The father testified that, in contrast to what Church had stated, he completed two
substance abuse assessments. He also denied showing up for visitations while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol. He asserted that although he may have committed crimes in the past, he had
not been arrested for any offenses between January 17, 2025, and October 17, 2025.
¶ 13 On a later date, the trial court found Church credible and the mother, who was not
in court, untruthful. It determined that the mother, from January 17, 2025, to October 17, 2025,
failed to (1) communicate adequately with Church and/or FamilyCore; (2) undergo a drug
assessment; (3) test negative for illicit drugs; (4) complete a mental health assessment; (5) go to
drug counseling; (6) obtain stable housing; and (7) become legally employed. The court found that
the father, who was in court, failed to do the following during the same time period: (1) undergo
regular drug testing; (2) test negative for illicit drugs; (3) complete a mental health assessment;
(4) engage in counseling; (5) obtain stable housing; (6) provide proof of lawful employment; and
(7) update Church and/or FamilyCore regularly when he changed his phone number. Accordingly,
the court found the mother and the father unfit because they failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of their children to their care.
¶ 14 At the best interest hearing, Jacob Razo, a caseworker for C.B., Ja. B., and J.B.,
testified that the children had attained stability in their foster homes. Razo intimated that he reached
this conclusion based in part on seeing the children in their foster homes four times in 30- to 45-
minute increments. From those visits, which were scheduled in advance, Razo learned Ja. B. and
J.B., who resided in the same foster home for 16 weeks, were healthy and had adequate food,
shelter, and clothing. Ja. B. and J.B. identified with their foster family, loved them, wanted to
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remain with them, and felt safe and secure in their house. They also hugged their foster parents,
called them mom and dad, and sat close to them. Ja. B. and J.B. went to school in the foster family’s
district; did well in school; had friends; and were involved in the community, attending camps and
playing sports in the area. The foster parents allowed Ja. B. and J.B. to maintain a relationship with
their siblings, provided the least disruptive placement available, and wanted to adopt Ja. B. and
J.B.
¶ 15 Razo testified similarly to his testimony with respect to C.B., who was placed with
another foster family and has lived with them for 31 months. C.B. went to school in her foster
family’s district, did well in school, and had friends. She was comfortable in her foster family’s
home, was affectionate with her foster family, called her foster parents mom and dad, talked freely
with them about any issues she had, hugged them, and sat close to them. Razo asserted C.B.’s
foster parents let her maintain a relationship with her siblings and wished to adopt her.
¶ 16 Razo stated the mother and the father were unhoused, having couch surfed from
home to home. When they were unable to stay with friends or family, they stayed at Dream Center,
a homeless shelter. Razo indicated that the father’s one visit with the children he observed went
well, and during that visit, the children called their father “dad.” Although Razo, who spoke to the
father the day before the best interest hearing, believed the father had been employed for several
months, Razo asserted the father did not provide him with proof of that employment. The father
also never told Razo that he had a place to live.
¶ 17 Monica Kilpatrick, the caseworker for K.B., testified K.B. felt safe in his foster
home, which Kilpatrick classified as stable. K.B. was healthy and had adequate food, shelter, and
clothing. He identified with his foster family, with whom he had lived for 16 months. He also was
happy, felt loved, and was safe and secure in the family’s home. K.B., who went to school in his
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foster family’s district and did very well, wanted to stay with his foster family, a placement that
would be the least disruptive. K.B. also had ties to the community, attending church with his foster
family and playing with his friends in the neighborhood. His foster parents, whom K.B. called
mom and dad, allowed K.B. to maintain a relationship with his siblings and wanted to adopt him.
Kilpatrick stated that when she talked to K.B. about the mother and the father, he shut down.
Kilpatrick asserted she has had no contact with the mother and/or the father.
¶ 18 The mother testified she had been sober for five weeks. She said she would start
work at Dunkin’ Donuts and undergo counseling and drug treatment in one week. With her first
paycheck and with help from a nonprofit financial assistance organization, she hoped to get an
apartment for herself and her children.
¶ 19 Although the father indicated he had recently missed three months of one time per
month visitation with the children because of miscommunications, the visits he has had have
generally gone well. He brings snacks and gifts to the visits, Ja. B. and K.B. call him dad, K.B.
kisses him, C.B. clings to him, and all four children have expressed a desire to live with him. The
father also asserted that, for the last month, he has lived in a one bedroom efficiency apartment
that can house up to seven people. He said that he had not provided Razo with his address or phone
numbers, but he did give that information to the front desk at FamilyCore. The father said he had
not used drugs in the last year or two, and he failed to complete random drug drops in the past
because he could not make it to the testing facility during the times they were open. After he
completed his two drug assessments, which he testified to during the fitness hearing, drug
counseling was not recommended. He also indicated he had participated in counseling up until he
got sick and/or fell on hard times and had to live in a homeless shelter. The father testified he loves
his children and believes he is able to care for them.
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¶ 20 The trial court found it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the
mother’s and the father’s parental rights. In so finding, the court noted the case had been pending
for two years and eight months. During that time, the mother and the father struggled with housing
instability, missed drug testing, and tested positive for illicit drug use. They also had extended
periods of time where they did not cooperate or communicate with FamilyCore and missed many
scheduled visits with the children. Further, during that time, the children bonded with their foster
families. They attended school in their foster families’ district, made friends in that community,
and participated in sports and camps. In weighing the best interest factors, some of which favored
not terminating the mother’s and the father’s parental rights, the court found the mother’s and the
father’s parental rights should be terminated.
¶ 21 These appeals followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 The mother’s appellate counsel moves to withdraw. Counsel supports her motion
with a memorandum of law providing a statement of facts, a discussion of potential claims, and
arguments why those issues lack arguable merit. Notice of counsel’s request to withdraw was sent
to the mother’s last known address, and the mother was notified of her right to respond. No
response was filed. Counsel for the mother submits it would be frivolous to argue that the trial
court erred in finding (1) the mother unfit and (2) it was in the best interest of the children to
terminate the mother’s parental rights. The father argues on appeal that the court’s unfitness
finding as to him and the termination of his parental rights were against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 24 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2024)), the involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must
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prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as defined in section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). If
the State proves unfitness, it then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363-66 (2004).
¶ 25 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility
determinations the trial court is in the best position to make. See In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21
(“[T]he trial court’s opportunity to view and evaluate the parties *** is superior.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)). A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.
Id.
¶ 26 Here, the trial court found the mother and the father unfit because they failed to
make reasonable progress toward the return of their children during the nine-month period at issue,
i.e., January 17, 2025, to October 17, 2025. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024).
“Reasonable progress” has been defined as “demonstrable movement toward the goal of
reunification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1046
(2007). Reasonable progress exists when the trial court
“can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child
returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to
parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully
complied with the directives previously given to the parent in order to regain
custody of the child.” (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461
(1991).
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¶ 27 We have emphasized “ ‘reasonable progress’ is an ‘objective standard.’ ” In re
F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461). A trial court may
only consider evidence from the relevant time period in determining a parent’s fitness based on
reasonable progress. Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046 (citing In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 237-38
(2003)).
¶ 28 In this case, the children were removed from the mother’s and the father’s care in
October 2023. This happened because the family home was uninhabitable, a registered sex
offender lived in the home with the children, the children were unkempt and did not attend school,
and both the mother and the father tested positive for illicit drug use. To correct these issues, the
mother and the father were ordered to complete various services and tasks directly related to the
conditions that caused the children’s removal. This included obtaining stable housing, passing
random drug testing, and completing various forms of counseling. The credible evidence revealed
the mother and the father failed to successfully complete these services and tasks. Moreover,
nothing in the record sufficiently established that the mother or the father will complete these
services and tasks and have the children returned to them in the near future. Thus, we find the trial
court’s determination that the mother and the father were unfit was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
¶ 29 The father argues that his adequate visitation with the children between January 17,
2025, and October 17, 2025, and disputed evidence concerning whether he completed drug
assessments show he made reasonable progress toward reunification. We disagree. Even putting
aside the question of drug assessments, the facts above show that the father failed to make
reasonable progress toward having the children returned to his care. The trial court found, on
balance, the evidence favored finding the father unfit. We cannot conclude an opposite conclusion
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is clearly apparent. We further conclude that the mother’s appointed counsel had no nonfrivolous
basis to argue otherwise as to her.
¶ 30 Counsel for the mother next submits it would be frivolous to argue it was not in the
children’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. The father argues the trial court’s order
terminating his parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 31 When a trial court finds a parent unfit, “the court then determines whether it is in
the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352. “[A]t a
best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield
to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id. at 364. The State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interest. Id. at
366. In making the best interest determination, the court must consider the factors set forth in
section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024)). These factors
include:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s
identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and
religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity,
and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the
child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence,
including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures
and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to
substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the
child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071(2009) (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-
3(4.05) (West 2008)).
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“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these
factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming
its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19.
¶ 32 On review, “[w]e will not disturb a court’s finding that termination is in the [child’s]
best interest unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d
953, 961 (2005). “A [best interest determination] is against the manifest weight of the evidence
only if the facts clearly demonstrate that the trial court should have reached the opposite result.”
Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1071.
¶ 33 Here, the evidence demonstrated the children had a strong bond with their foster
families. The foster families provided for the children’s needs, including sending them to school,
where they all have thrived. The children feel secure and happy with their foster families and have
obtained stability with them. The trial court considered the evidence presented at the best interest
hearing in relation to the statutory best interest factors and found they weighed in favor of
terminating the mother’s and the father’s parental rights. We cannot conclude the evidence in the
record clearly demonstrates the court should have reached the opposite result, i.e., not terminating
the mother’s and the father’s parental rights. Accordingly, the court’s best interest determination
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We also conclude that it would be frivolous
for the mother’s appointed counsel to argue otherwise.
¶ 34 The father suggests that despite the “substantial evidence supporting the children’s
current foster placements,” his parental rights should not have been terminated because the
children’s ties to him remained intact, they expressed their love for him, and they were not residing
in the same foster home. Moreover, in support of not terminating his parental rights, the father
notes he obtained employment and housing. Putting aside the veracity of the facts which the father
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cites and the fact all the foster parents wanted the children to maintain a relationship with each
other, there was ample evidence supporting the termination of the father’s parental rights, most
notably all the favorable evidence establishing the children were thriving in their foster homes for
over a year. See D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364 (noting a biological parent’s interest in maintaining a
parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in having a stable, loving home life).
¶ 35 In sum, regarding the mother’s appeal, we agree with counsel after examining the
record, the motion to withdraw, and the memorandum of law that this appeal presents no issue of
arguable merit. Accordingly, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial
court’s judgment. Concerning the father’s appeal, we conclude that neither the unfitness finding
as to him nor the termination of his parental rights were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Therefore, like with the mother’s appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we grant the mother’s appellate counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment in both the mother’s and the father’s appeals.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
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