In re Marriage of Oberweis

2026 IL App (2d) 240705 No. 2-24-0705 Order filed June 10, 2026 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT In re MARRIAGE OF JENNIFER L. OBERWEIS, n/k/a Jennifer L. Hartman, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and JOSEPH S. OBERWEIS, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable Bradley P. David, Judge, Presiding. No. 17-D-1337 PRESIDING JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Schostok concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶1 Held: The trial court properly interpreted and applied the relevant terms of the parties’ marital settlement agreement. The manifest weight of the evidence supports the court’s finding that petitioner was cohabiting and that the relationship demonstrated a de facto marriage. This conclusion renders moot respondent’s cross-appeal challenging a discovery ruling below. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied respondent’s motion to modify maintenance. We therefore affirm the court’s judgment. ¶2 In this postdecree proceeding, petitioner, Jennifer L. Oberweis, n/k/a Jennifer L. Hartman, appeals from the trial court’s declaratory judgment finding in favor of respondent, Joseph S. Oberweis, and against her. The court found that Jennifer was cohabiting and involved in a de facto marriage, which warranted a reduction of maintenance pursuant to the parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA). Jennifer argues on appeal that the court erred because it utilized an analysis to find cohabitation disparate from the terms in the MSA. On cross-appeal, Joseph argues that the court erred when it allowed Jennifer to redact certain text messages during discovery proceedings and denied his motion to modify maintenance based on a substantial change in his financial circumstances. ¶3 We affirm the trial court’s declaratory judgment finding in favor of Joseph and against Jennifer. Our decision renders moot Joseph’s claim of error regarding the redaction of Jennifer’s text messages. We affirm the court’s decision to deny Joseph’s motion to modify maintenance. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 Jennifer and Joseph were married on July 21, 2001, and divorced by entry of a judgment for dissolution of marriage incorporating the MSA on May 10, 2018. During the marriage, the parties had five children together. At the time of the divorce, Joseph served as the CEO of Oberweis Dairy, Inc., earning an annual gross income of $475,000. Jennifer was not working at the time of the divorce, but since then has completed a master’s degree in social work and is now employed as a hospice social worker, earning a salary of $70,000 per year. ¶6 Under the MSA, the parties had agreed to maintenance payments to Jennifer in the amount of $13,000 per month, in addition to 30% of any cash distributions or bonuses received by Joseph. Maintenance payments began on May 6, 2018, and are scheduled to cease on May 6, 2029, “unless terminated prior thereto or modified pursuant to Paragraph 2.9,” which states that maintenance “shall be modifiable” pursuant to section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2018)). Paragraph 2.6 of the MSA provides that, “[b]ased on the substantial amount of maintenance paid under this agreement, JOSEPH’S obligation to pay child -2- support to JENNIFER shall be reserved.” Paragraph 2.7 of the MSA states that any income earned by Jennifer “shall not serve as a basis to modify maintenance under Article II of this Agreement.” ¶7 Pertinent to this appeal, paragraph 2.11 of the MSA begins: “JENNIFER’S remarriage or cohabitation on a continuing conjugal basis (not a dating relationship but actual physical, residential cohabitation consisting of a combination of households, along with any other factors then existing at law) shall not serve as a terminating event.” ¶8 The same paragraph of the MSA then provides a formula for modifying the maintenance payments to Jennifer if she were found to cohabit with a new significant other, for example, reducing maintenance “by fifty percent (50%) of [the] cohabitant’s highest annual income (on a calendar year basis) during the period that begins on January 1 of the year that includes the date five (5) years prior to the marriage or commencement of cohabitation and including each year thereafter.” Paragraph 2.11 also lists a schedule of minimum maintenance payments to be calculated depending on the cohabitant’s income. ¶9 On October 20, 2021, Joseph filed a motion for declaratory judgment, arguing that Jennifer was cohabiting with her boyfriend, Shawn Hanke, thereby triggering the modification of maintenance in paragraph 2.11 of the MSA. He sought a declaration from the trial court that Jennifer was cohabiting with Hanke, a finding regarding Hanke’s income from the previous five years, and an appropriate calculation under the MSA for the modified maintenance payment amount. ¶ 10 On June 16, 2023, Joseph filed a motion to modify maintenance and for other relief. He asserted that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred, wherein his salary had been involuntarily reduced from $429,000 annually to $300,000 annually. He stated in his motion that -3- he was seeking alternative employment but noted that “there may be a lengthy period of unemployment before [he] is able to find and obtain comparable employment.” He sought to terminate the maintenance obligation owed to Jennifer as provided in the MSA and enter a child support obligation pursuant to statutory guidelines. The trial court took Joseph’s motion to modify maintenance under advisement pending trial on his motion for declaratory judgment. ¶ 11 This matter proceeded to a three-week intermittent trial on February 5, 2024, wherein Hanke testified regarding his relationship with Jennifer. He met Jennifer in 2017 while playing an online game application. At that time, he resided in Colorado. Hanke first met Jennifer in person in September 2017, when he surprised her in Las Vegas while she was on a trip with a girlfriend. He and Jennifer shared physical intimacy for the first time during that trip. ¶ 12 Hanke began to visit Jennifer in Illinois beginning in March 2018. During his visits with Jennifer, he stayed at her house. He met Jennifer’s children in July of 2018 on a camping trip. At that time, he texted and spoke to Jennifer on the phone daily. Hanke returned to visit Jennifer in November 2018, staying with her for about a week. Jennifer visited Hanke in Colorado on New Year’s Eve that year. He returned to Illinois to visit Jennifer in April 2019 and celebrated the birthday of one of the parties’ children. He stated that it was his custom and practice to celebrate birthdays with the children. ¶ 13 Hanke returned to Illinois in June or July 2019, and he traveled with Jennifer, the children, and Jennifer’s mother to Sanibel Island, Florida, for a two-week vacation. Jennifer paid for Hanke’s airfare, while Hanke paid for food and some transportation. Jennifer paid for the rental house. He visited Illinois in October 2019 to go trick-or-treating on Halloween with Jennifer and the children and returned for another visit in December 2019 for Christmas. He stayed with Jennifer for a week to 10 days during the Christmas holiday. -4- ¶ 14 Hanke testified that, beginning in 2019, on certain occasions, Jennifer would attend out- of-state dance competitions with one of her children while he would stay at her house and watch the other children. He had no knowledge as to why he stayed with the children instead of Joseph. He acknowledged that he would care for and feed the children when Jennifer was away from home. Jennifer and Hanke continued to visit each other in 2020. ¶ 15 Hanke moved to Illinois from Colorado in February 2021. He testified that he moved to Illinois to prove his commitment to Jennifer. At the time of his move, Jennifer had undergone surgery and he stayed at her home for three weeks to help her recuperate. Afterwards, he moved in with Jennifer’s mother, where he resided for about eight or nine months. He had signed a lease agreement with Jennifer’s mother, a copy of which was admitted into evidence without objection. Then, he rented a room at a communal house in Aurora but could not recall the names of roommates with whom he shared the room. Hanke stated he did not know who else lived there “[b]ecause we all keep different hours.” He renewed the six-month lease four times and a copy of the lease from the communal house was admitted into evidence without objection. He described the residence as “a room upstairs” with “multiple other rooms where other folks rent.” He had access to a shared laundry room, television, and bathroom. ¶ 16 In June 2021, Hanke traveled to Disney World with Jennifer, his son, her children, and Jennifer’s mother. Also during that summer, Hanke, Jennifer, her children, and Jennifer’s family members traveled to Branson, Missouri, and Pensacola, Florida. Jennifer paid for the airfare. ¶ 17 In November 2021, Jennifer’s mother passed away and Hanke attended the funeral with her. He stood in the family receiving line with Jennifer. Hanke’s name was listed in the funeral program in brackets after Jennifer’s name. -5- ¶ 18 Hanke traveled with Jennifer to Jamaica and Niagara Falls in 2022. She paid for the airfare and hotel. Hanke attended Jennifer’s graduation party in May 2022 and was also present for Mother’s Day. He testified that he celebrated holidays with Jennifer, including Easter, Labor Day, Halloween, Thanksgiving, and Christmas. He also attended a number of celebrations with the children, including a graduation party. ¶ 19 In January 2023, Hanke, Jennifer, and her children flew to Colorado for a celebration of Hanke’s father’s life. Hanke, Jennifer, and her children went on a cruise during the summer of 2023, for which Jennifer had paid. ¶ 20 Hanke testified that he spoke about his experiences as an Air Force veteran at the children’s school. He stated that he does his laundry at Jennifer’s house, but not on a regular basis. He keeps his cats at Jennifer’s house but pays the expenses to care for the cats. Hanke stated that he keeps his video game console at Jennifer’s house because the children enjoy using it. He stays at Jennifer’s house 30 to 40 percent of the time, including overnights, but most of the time, the children are not at the house when he stays there. ¶ 21 Hanke testified that he plays board games with the children, helps them with their homework, administers medicine to them with Jennifer’s authorization, and takes them to their activities when Jennifer is not present. He also volunteered for events at the children’s school and helped them with school projects. Counsel for Joseph presented Hanke with a number of photographs depicting him with Jennifer’s children, some of which were admitted into evidence without objection and some admitted over objection. Some of the photographs depicted Hanke attending school events with the children, including prom. Hanke testified that he took the children to various appointments. In addition, he stated that he had instructed Jennifer to insult Joseph in front of the children “so much that his own kids hate him.” -6- ¶ 22 Hanke testified that he tells Jennifer that he loves her and he refers to her father as “dad.” He also described a necklace that he gave to Jennifer for Christmas that had a charm on it stating, “Forever and Always.” ¶ 23 Hanke stated that he paid his own rent and did not contribute to paying Jennifer’s mortgage. He testified at length regarding his separate finances from Jennifer’s. He stated that he does not plan to either propose to Jennifer or to reside with her. To his knowledge, he is not legally divorced from his current wife. He considers himself to be a Colorado resident. He clarified that while Jennifer had paid for flights, he had reimbursed her for other travel expenses. He stated that when he is invited to go on a trip with her, he pays for certain things, including food, but pays her in cash for his portion of the vacation “just to help pay because I don’t want her paying for me.” He stated that he always reimburses her for trips. He testified that he was unaware of the amounts of Jennifer’s expenses for her mortgage, her vehicle, or the children. ¶ 24 Jennifer testified that she resides in a home with her five children and is employed as a hospice social worker, earning $70,000 per year. She completed a master’s degree in social work in May 2022, following her divorce from Joseph. She pays for the mortgage, property taxes, groceries, pet care, and other bills every month. When Hanke joins her and the children on a vacation, he reimburses her for his portion of the trip. ¶ 25 Jennifer stated that Hanke is a good role model for her children and that if he were no longer in her children’s lives, they would miss him. She has been in an exclusive relationship with Hanke since 2018. Hanke did not physically move into Jennifer’s home and she does not plan to combine her household with Hanke. ¶ 26 Jennifer next testified regarding Hanke’s relationship with her children. She permitted Hanke to participate extensively in the children’s school events and activities. He served as an -7- emergency contact at the children’s school, but Jennifer explained that she used his name because her mother was too ill at that point to serve as an emergency contact. Jennifer stated that Hanke was listed on a website that allowed him to review her children’s artwork online. Hanke bought presents for the children and attended their birthday celebrations. Hanke attended all the holidays celebrated at Jennifer’s home since he moved to Illinois in 2021. He also attended out-of-state competition events involving the children and cared for the children who were not competing. ¶ 27 Hanke resided as a tenant at Jennifer’s mother’s house until she passed away in November 2021. Jennifer stated that Hanke stood in the receiving line with her at her mother’s funeral. She agreed that her mother’s obituary listed Hanke’s name next to hers in brackets and that she had personally approved Hanke’s name to be included next to hers in the obituary. An exhibit depicting a copy of the obituary was admitted into evidence over objection. Hanke was also listed as a “family mourner” on the funeral service’s brochure, although Jennifer stated that she “didn’t know his name was going to be on there.” Jennifer testified that she had attended the life celebration for Hanke’s father in Colorado in January 2023. ¶ 28 Jennifer testified that she had loaned money to Hanke to help him pay his bills. When Jennifer and Hanke travel together on vacation, he reimburses her in cash for his travel expenses. She stated that, sometimes when she was not present, Hanke used her credit card to purchase items for her children. She does not share bank accounts, investment accounts, or credit card accounts with Hanke. ¶ 29 Jennifer asked Hanke to move to Illinois to be with her. Hanke sold his house in Colorado to move to Illinois. Jennifer asked her neighbor if Hanke could park his truck in her driveway and on numerous occasions, he parked his truck there. Hanke has access to Jennifer’s home by using the code to the garage door. Hanke does not pay Jennifer to board his cats at her home. Hanke does -8- his laundry occasionally at her home. When Hanke stays at her house overnight, he brings his own clothes and a toiletry kit and takes it with him when he leaves. He would stay at Jennifer’s home when the children were not there. ¶ 30 Next, Jennifer testified about the inclusion of Hanke on her social media pages, which included various profile pictures of her and Hanke together, along with pictures of him and the children together at various events, birthdays, holidays, and vacations. A large number of exhibits depicting these pictures and social media posts were admitted into evidence without objection and over objection, and the trial court sustained some of the objections to preclude commentary or narratives appearing underneath the photographs or in posts. ¶ 31 Finally, Jennifer testified regarding a text message exchanged between herself and Joseph from November 20, 2018, in which she stated, “even when [Hanke] moves out here he and I won’t be [‘]Living Together[’] for 11 years, sorry Charlie.” Jennifer stated that she sent Joseph that text in response to him saying “he wished that [Hanke] and I would move in together with a dollar sign behind it.” Counsel for Joseph moved to admit the exhibit containing the text message into evidence, which was admitted without objection. ¶ 32 Jacob Osojnak, a private detective, testified that Joseph retained him to conduct a cohabitation investigation, which involved physical surveillance to determine whether a person is staying at another party’s residence. He completed four investigative reports beginning in October 2021 through February 2022 and testified regarding the number of times he observed Hanke’s truck parked in Jennifer’s driveway during his surveillance. Osojnak testified that his investigation required surveilling whether the subject vehicle was located at Jennifer’s residence. He was not specifically surveilling Hanke and could not provide a description of him. Osojnak also was unaware if Jennifer was at home during any of the drive-by surveillance he conducted for the -9- investigation. Osojnak had no independent information regarding who was at the home during any of the periods of his surveillance. He had no evidence as to whether Hanke resided at Jennifer’s residence other than observing Hanke’s vehicle parked there. ¶ 33 Joseph testified that Hanke was “always there,” referring to the children’s events or activities. Joseph described other events involving his children where Hanke attended but Jennifer did not. He stated that he observed Hanke’s truck “regularly parked in [Jennifer’s] driveway.” ¶ 34 Joseph testified that he was no longer employed, but that his current source of income was derived from investments. His financial affidavit, which was admitted into evidence without objection, reflected that, despite his unemployment, he received a dividend income of $3,500 per month and investment income of $8,000 per month. He formerly served as the CEO of Oberweis Dairy but resigned from his position on June 7, 2023. He owned a 30% to 35% share of the company in 2019. At the end of 2022, he sold his shares of stock in Oberweis Dairy to his siblings for a little less than $2 million, which provides the source of his dividend and interest income. He still owns approximately a 20% share of stock in the family’s parent company. Joseph began to look for employment immediately after resigning from the family business. He stated that he has not rejected any positions since leaving Oberweis Dairy and has not received any offers for employment. He described in detail his attempts to secure employment. ¶ 35 According to Joseph’s financial affidavit, he estimated his total monthly living expenses to be $26,180 per month, not including the maintenance he pays monthly to Jennifer. When he resigned from his CEO position at Oberweis Dairy in July 2023, he was aware that he could be unemployed for about two years. He testified that, despite his unemployment, he had scheduled a vacation to Mexico, booking airfare totaling $8,000 and renting a house for $14,000, including an on-site chef. He stated that he did not reduce his spending on vacations “to take advantage of the - 10 - opportunity with my kids. But on other expenses I think we are.” He also planned upcoming trips to Washington, D.C. and Hawaii. He continued to pay his credit card bills in their entirety every month, including more than $30,000 in August 2023. In addition, he pays his legal representation $20,000 per month. He provides a monthly stipend of $3,500 to his current wife for personal use. ¶ 36 Joseph testified that, since his unemployment, he has not missed any mortgage payments, maintenance payments, or credit card payments. He stated that if a financial opportunity arose to purchase some assets of Oberweis Dairy in a distress sale, he would work with an investor group to buy the assets. For example, he had considered investing between $500,000 and $1 million of his own money to purchase some of the Oberweis Ice Cream and Dairy stores with his father. Joseph stated that, ultimately, he could rely on his assets to support himself and his family until he could find employment. ¶ 37 On July 24, 2024, the trial court granted a declaratory judgment in favor of Joseph and against Jennifer. The court entered a detailed, written order finding that Jennifer and Hanke were cohabiting under section 510(c) of the Act and had been involved in a de facto marriage since November 2021, when Jennifer had approved the inclusion of Hanke’s name in her mother’s obituary. 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 2018). The court considered at length whether Jennifer and Hanke were involved in a de facto marriage rather than an intimate dating relationship based on the totality of the circumstances of their relationship. ¶ 38 The trial court found “a 6-year monogamous relationship to be more akin to a de facto marriage than an intimate dating relationship,” but placed little weight on this factor alone. Instead, the gravamen of the court’s conclusion focused upon Hanke’s relationship with Jennifer’s children, finding that, although he could “easily be financially segregated [from Jennifer], it is abundantly clear that [the] children cannot be emotionally segregated without drastic consequences to - 11 - everyone involved.” The court stated that Jennifer significantly downplayed Hanke’s importance to her children when she testified that “ ‘they might miss him but they would move on’ ” when asked if it would be harmful to the children if Hanke was not in their lives. The court then listed 21 different examples of Hanke’s involvement with the children, along with a discussion of text messages replete with communications rendering the “obvious” conclusion that she had vested Hanke with a caretaking role for her children. The court stated that “Jennifer, by way of allowing [Hanke] to participate so frequently and intimately in the lives of her children, has demonstrated that she is fully committed to her relationship with [Hanke] and intends it to be permanent, regardless of whether she actually intends on being married to him.” Hanke’s caretaking role of Jennifer’s children weighed strongly in favor of the court’s finding of a de facto marriage. ¶ 39 In addition, the trial court found that Jennifer’s listing of Hanke’s name in her mother’s obituary weighed strongly in favor of a de facto marriage and further supported Jennifer’s belief in the permanence of the relationship. The court also considered communications between Jennifer and Hanke that demonstrated the permanence of, and mutual commitment to, their relationship. The court noted how the parties frequently texted and expressed their love back and forth, including a message that Hanke sent to Jennifer stating, “I just wanted to tell you that I am so thankful you are in my life.” Jennifer responded, “If you were not in my life then [sic] I wouldn’t want to exist anymore.” ¶ 40 The trial court found that November 2021 was the appropriate date reflecting the beginning of Jennifer and Hanke’s de facto marriage because it was “the first time that Jennifer publicly published her relationship with [Hanke] to the outside world in such a manner for the Court to be able to find her in a de facto marriage.” Based on the finding of cohabitation, the court implemented the maintenance modification formula provided in paragraph 2.11 of the MSA. - 12 - ¶ 41 The trial court considered evidence of Hanke’s and Joseph’s income when calculating the modified amount of maintenance. After recounting in great detail Joseph’s financial history, the court concluded that he had “not modified his lifestyle since the reduction or the elimination of his salary from the corporation” and had “not reduced any of his monthly expenditures since resigning from his position.” The court noted that Joseph remained able to pay all his credit cards on a monthly basis, “even with the significant amounts of attorneys’ fees that have been incurred in the present litigation.” In addition, Joseph “continued to take lavish vacations and his new wife, who plans the family vacations, has not been given any constraints or restrictions on her planning activities.” The court also noted that Joseph “still provides his new wife with $3,500 per month to cover her personal expenses and there was no evidence that he asked her to reduce those.” The court concluded that Joseph had “substantial assets and is well-able to continue paying his maintenance obligation to Jennifer and to contribute to the child-related expenses as previously ordered, in spite of the loss of income.” As a result, the court denied Joseph’s motion to modify maintenance and for other relief. ¶ 42 The trial court reduced Joseph’s maintenance obligation to $98,700 per year, or $8,225 per month, effective November 1, 2021. The court found that, because Joseph had paid $13,000 per month in maintenance until the date of its finding, Joseph’s reduced obligation had resulted in an overpayment of $157,575. To offset the overpayment, the court ordered a reduction of Joseph’s monthly maintenance payments to Jennifer by $2,764.47 per month for the next 57 months. In sum, the court ordered Joseph to pay Jennifer $5,460.53 per month for the remainder of the maintenance period. ¶ 43 On August 23, 2024, Jennifer moved to reconsider the trial court’s decision, arguing that the court improperly interpreted the MSA when it modified maintenance by using a totality of the - 13 - circumstances analysis without making an actual finding that she was cohabiting with Hanke as provided in paragraph 2.11 of the MSA. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court denied Jennifer’s motion. Initially, the court acknowledged that paragraph 2.11 of the MSA contains “various clauses, definitions, [and] modifications.” The court stated that paragraph 2.11 of the MSA was not a simple provision to interpret and required consideration of certain factors to determine whether a de facto marriage existed. The court also specifically found that paragraph 2.11 was not vague. The court concluded that “if the factors for a de facto marriage don’t exist in this case, I’m not sure when they ever would, quite frankly.” ¶ 44 On November 19, 2024, the trial court entered an agreed order containing a special finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Jennifer timely appealed the court’s declaratory judgment finding of cohabitation. Joseph filed a timely cross-appeal challenging the denial of his motion to modify maintenance and seeking reversal of the court’s entry of a protective order allowing Jennifer to redact text messages. ¶ 45 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 46 On appeal, Jennifer argues that the trial court erred when it found cohabitation based on a totality of the circumstances without also finding that she was cohabiting with Hanke specifically based on having “actual, physical, residential cohabitation consisting of a combination of households,” as provided in paragraph 2.11 of the MSA. Jennifer contends that the parties contracted such that cohabitation must have a physical residential component and, because she and Hanke did not reside together, the cohabitation finding under paragraph 2.11 of the MSA was incorrect. She maintains that the parties explicitly defined cohabitation to consist of a combination of households, meaning, joining her home and household with Hanke. Jennifer argues that without - 14 - a finding consistent with the definition of cohabitation in the parties’ MSA, a modification cannot be triggered. ¶ 47 Joseph responds that the evidence presented at trial supported the ultimate finding that a de facto marriage existed between Jennifer and Hanke. He argues that, if paragraph 2.11 of the MSA precluded him from seeking relief unless he could prove a single residence consisting of Jennifer and Hanke, it would have completely undermined his ability to do so considering Jennifer’s efforts to obscure the seriousness of their relationship. He contends that the trial court made its ruling under the proper standard, including paragraph 2.11 of the MSA and other factors it considered when determining whether a de facto marriage existed. In his cross-appeal, he maintains that the court improperly entered protective orders limiting his ability to review certain text messages between Jennifer and Hanke. In addition, he argues that the court erred when it failed to find that there had been a substantial change in Joseph’s financial circumstances warranting a modification of his obligations under the MSA. ¶ 48 Before addressing the merits of this appeal, Joseph submitted in his response brief that Jennifer’s statement of facts was incomplete and self-serving in that it excluded facts important to the understanding of the trial court’s ultimate conclusion as well as the case generally, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(6) requires a statement of facts “necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate references to the pages of the record on appeal.” Id. We agree that Jennifer’s opening brief violates Rule 341(h)(6) because it was woefully inadequate in providing this court with facts necessary to an understanding of the case when considering the sheer volume of evidence presented during a three-week intermittent trial and a necessary de novo review of that evidence on appeal. We can only surmise that Jennifer provided such a short statement of facts - 15 - because presenting less evidence perhaps would support her argument that she did not have a de facto marital relationship with Hanke. ¶ 49 Compounding Jennifer’s paltry statement of facts, she also failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rules 342(a)(1) and (3) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019), which require an appellant’s brief to include “an appendix [and] a complete table of contents, with page references, of the record on appeal.” Jennifer’s table of contents to the record on appeal in her appendix is merely a copy of the table of contents from the trial court’s records, which in no way provides this court with a means to navigate the more than 3,000-page record in a complex postdecree proceeding. Jennifer was required to include a table of contents to the record that stated the nature of each document, order, or exhibit, and the dates of filing or entry of orders. Here, Jennifer’s table of contents to the record on appeal following an intermittent three-week trial, consisting of more than 1,000 pages of the common law record, 1,363 pages of trial testimony, more than 500 pages of an impounded record, and more than 500 pages of exhibits, provided no detail whatsoever as to the nature of testimony, each document, order, or exhibit. ¶ 50 Supreme court rules are not merely suggestions but are necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the courts. In re Marriage of Kiferbaum, 2014 IL App (1st) 130736, ¶ 20. When a brief fails to follow the requirements set forth in the supreme court rules, we may dismiss the appeal. Lamb-Rosenfeldt v. Burke Medical Group, Ltd., 2012 IL App (1st) 101558, ¶ 21; Fender v. Town of Cicero, 347 Ill. App. 3d 46, 51 (2004). Indeed, our supreme court’s rules are not simply hortatory but are mandatory and are to be scrupulously followed. In re Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38. We recognize, however, that striking a brief or dismissing an appeal is a particularly harsh sanction. People v. Thomas, 364 Ill. App. 3d 91, 97 (2006) (citing In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 132 (2005)). Although Jennifer’s deficient brief - 16 - frustrates our review, we will consider the merits of the appeal. We admonish Jennifer’s counsel to adhere to the requirements of the supreme court rules in future appeals. ¶ 51 A. Standard of Review ¶ 52 Under the Act, when a marriage is dissolved, a trial court “may grant a maintenance award for either spouse” or the spouses can agree on maintenance payments pursuant to an MSA. 750 ILCS 5/502(a), 504(a) (West 2018). The terms of an MSA are binding on the parties and the courts. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 32 (2009); see 750 ILCS 5/502(b) (West 2018). In an MSA, “[t]he parties may provide that maintenance is non-modifiable in amount, duration, or both.” 750 ILCS 5/502(f) (West 2018). If the parties do not so specify, a spouse’s maintenance obligations are modifiable “upon a substantial change of circumstances.” Id. Here, the parties agreed to and executed an MSA with specific provisions for the allocation of maintenance. ¶ 53 An MSA is a contract, subject to the usual rules of contract interpretation. Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 33. When interpreting a contract, the reviewing court’s objective is to give effect to the parties’ intent, determined from the language of the contract given its ordinary meaning. In re Marriage of Scarp, 2022 IL App (1st) 210711, ¶ 11. “As a general rule, the parties’ intentions are determined from their final agreement.” Kehoe v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 584, 590 (1998). Illinois follows the “four corners rule for contract interpretation in that, ‘[a]n agreement, when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it. It speaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from the language used.’ ” Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (1999) (quoting Western Illinois Oil Co. v. Thompson, 26 Ill. 2d 287, 291 (1962)). “If the language of the contract is facially unambiguous, then the contract is interpreted by the trial court as a matter of - 17 - law without the use of parol evidence.” Id. We review contract interpretation de novo. Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 33. ¶ 54 B. Interpretation of the MSA ¶ 55 Jennifer argues that the parties’ MSA defines cohabitation to include essential terms for a modification to occur and that the MSA was clear and unambiguous as to the definition of cohabitation. She contends that the parties specifically contracted around the statutory requirement that maintenance be terminated upon cohabitation, as provided in section 510(c) of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 2018). Jennifer asserts that the trial court erred when it utilized a totality of the circumstances analysis and bypassed the operational terms of the MSA that defined cohabitation, thereby making those terms superfluous. She insists that the definition of cohabitation in the MSA is not subsumed by the other factors in law but should be considered on its own terms. She argues that, in effect, she and Joseph specifically contracted for and enumerated in their MSA what specific factors would hold the most import to a determination of cohabitation. Jennifer contends the court failed to consider the contractual terms the parties had agreed to when it found that she was cohabiting with Hanke. ¶ 56 Jennifer maintains that “cohabitation” under the terms of the MSA here requires a physical, residential component, meaning that the alleged paramour must be residing in the party’s home. According to Jennifer, “under a traditional totality of the circumstances analysis, whether the couple resides together is just one circumstance of determining cohabitation,” whereas in this case, “the parties’ agreement requires co-residency for [her] to be cohabiting.” In short, Jennifer argues that the plain language of the MSA requires actual, physical residency. She contends that the court made no finding that she and Hanke resided together or shared a home together. - 18 - ¶ 57 Further, Jennifer argues that the parties explicitly defined cohabitation to consist of a combination of households, meaning that she would have had to join her home and household with Hanke. Jennifer contends that the trial court made no such finding that she and Hanke had combined their homes or households. She points out that the court found no financial intermingling between her and Hanke. Thus, she maintains that without a finding of “actual, physical, residential cohabitation consisting of a combination of households, cohabitation cannot be determined, and a maintenance modification cannot be triggered in accordance with the [MSA].” We disagree. ¶ 58 Section 510(c) of the Act provides, “[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated by the death of either party, or the remarriage of the party receiving the maintenance, or if the party receiving maintenance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.” 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 2018). The rationale for this rule is that it would be inequitable for a person to receive maintenance while he or she is involved in a husband- and-wife relationship with a new paramour but does not legally formalize it. In re Marriage of Herrin, 262 Ill. App. 3d 573, 577 (1994). ¶ 59 Here, when the parties executed the MSA, which was incorporated into the judgment for dissolution of marriage, they agreed in paragraph 2.11 that Jennifer’s “cohabitation on a continuing conjugal basis (not a dating relationship but actual physical, residential coha