In re Marriage of Niebrugge
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket5-25-0847
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 250847-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 11/18/26. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0847 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
FELICIA NILES-NIEBRUGGE, ) Coles County.
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
and ) No. 22-DC-11
)
MARK NIEBRUGGE, ) Honorable
) Mark E. Bovard,
Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Sholar concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s judgment where the court’s classification of property
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Petitioner, Felicia Niles-Niebrugge, appeals the May 22, 2025, judgment of the Coles
County circuit court that dissolved her marriage with respondent, Mark Niebrugge, and distributed
their real and personal property. On appeal, Felicia argues that the court erred when it determined
that the parties’ marital residence and various investment and retirement accounts were Mark’s
non-marital property. For the following reasons, we affirm.
1
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Felicia and Mark married in Okaloosa County, Florida, on May 27, 2007. Felicia filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage on February 9, 2022.
¶5 The matter proceeded to a two-day trial on November 13, 2024, and December 9, 2024. At
the time of the trial, Mark was 57 years old and Felicia was 42 years old. The undisputed trial
evidence demonstrated that during their marriage, Mark and Felicia lived in a modular home on
two acres of land in Mattoon, Illinois. Mark purchased the modular home in 2005, prior to the
parties’ marriage. Mark and Felicia began the process of purchasing land for the modular home in
April 2007 prior to the parties’ marriage. Mark finalized the purchase of the land on June 6, 2007,
shortly after the parties’ marriage. The land was purchased in Mark’s name alone, but the home
insurance on the marital residence was in both parties’ names. In the months after the parties
married, a basement was constructed on the land, and the modular home was placed on top of the
basement. During their marriage, Mark and Felicia made substantial improvements to the modular
home, including indoor renovations and the addition of a garage. An appraisal of the marital
residence from August 4, 2022, estimated the value of the home as $240,000. The undisputed
evidence also demonstrated that at the time of the trial, Mark had various investment and retirement
accounts, including a Prudential Roth IRA #8863 valued at $82,729, a Prudential IRA #0675
valued at $234,084.59, a Jackson Annuity #7873 valued at $386,832, a Prudential Annuity #8206
valued at $74,462, an individual Prudential account #0800 valued at $56,353, and an individual
Prudential account #1835 valued at $77,016.
¶6 Mark testified that his financial accounts were managed by Rich Hartke at Prudential. Mark
explained that Hartke “takes care of all my stuff and I don’t know much about it.” Mark had
multiple “inheritance” accounts at Prudential. Mark testified that he inherited money in 2004, after
2
his father died. Hartke initially managed the accounts with little involvement from Mark. Mark
explained that any Prudential accounts with dates from 2004 were his inheritance accounts. Mark
testified, “Because my Prudential stuff that was inherited was left alone, never touched any of it
until I built my—when I met Felicia and I went to get a loan for everything that I did for my house,
loan.” When Mark was unable to obtain a bank loan, he used money from his inheritance accounts
to pay for the construction and placement costs associated with the marital home.
¶7 When asked about the specific accounts, Mark testified that he had difficulty keeping the
account numbers straight. If Mark had his “cheat sheet” or “spreadsheet,” he could identify the
account numbers. Mark explained that in 2011, Prudential went through changes that resulted in
new account numbers for certain accounts, which caused him some confusion. After the account
number changes in 2011, Hartke reallocated some of Mark’s inheritance money into different
accounts, which added to Mark’s confusion. Mark claimed he “would have to look at the accounts
and see which ones got mixed after retiring and [Hartke and Mark] mixed accounts, we put money
in with other moneys that were already established, so that’s the part that’s confusing for me.”
¶8 Mark testified that he also had a Roth IRA. When Mark “started” the Roth account, he had
approximately $7,000 in the account. A financial document admitted as an exhibit at trial indicated
that the balance of the account was $7,597 prior to the parties’ marriage. When Mark retired from
General Electric (GE) in 2018, he rolled over his voluntary side pension of approximately $41,000
into his Roth account. Mark initially collected unemployment because GE closed in 2018;
however, he later testified that he began collecting his pension after GE closed.
¶9 Mark testified that his retirement account from GE was managed by Fidelity. A financial
document admitted as an exhibit at trial indicated that there was a $479,390.58 distribution to
Mark’s IRA retirement account after GE closed. There was a subsequent distribution to the same
3
account in the amount of $3,932.58. Mark explained that Hartke used $300,000 from the
distribution to set up a Jackson Annuity account. The remaining balance of approximately
$179,000 was left in the original IRA retirement account. According to Mark, $115,391 of the IRA
retirement account was earned prior to his marriage. Mark calculated this amount by reviewing the
last account statement he received prior to the parties’ marriage.
¶ 10 When questioned about Prudential accounts #8206, #0800, and #1835, Mark was unable
to recall the exact date the accounts originated, but he believed the accounts were premarital. Mark
believed these accounts were premarital because some of the account numbers had changed. Mark
later clarified that the only account number that did not change was #8206. Mark also believed
these accounts were premarital based on his discussions with Hartke. Mark believed he had
documentation demonstrating that the accounts were premarital. A financial document admitted
as an exhibit at trial demonstrated that #8206 was created in 2004. Mark explained that these three
accounts were from the inheritance he received from his father. Mark used some of his inheritance
money during the parties’ marriage to build and improve the marital home. Mark also had to use
some of the money to pay bills and “live.” Mark testified that account #2768 changed to #0800
and a financial document admitted as an exhibit from an account #2768 included a handwritten
notation that #2768 changed to #0800. Mark acknowledged that he made notes on the documents
but noted that he was unsure of the accuracy of his notes. When asked if he had any documentation
to show that the account changed, Mark stated, “I think we do.” Mark knew the account changed
because he talked to “Prudential people.” Mark then testified, “You need some documentation
proving it I can get that from them if that’s what you’re asking because I’m still trying to get it.”
Additional financial documents admitted as exhibits at trial indicated that funds from #2768 were
transferred into account #1835.
4
¶ 11 Mark testified that he had two residences prior to the parties’ marriage. One of the homes
burned down and he collected approximately $70,000 in insurance proceeds prior to the parties’
marriage. He also sold some property for approximately $17,000. Mark testified that he used
premarital funds to purchase the two acres of land for the modular home. When asked what funds
he used for the foundation, Mark testified that he used funds from his inheritance. After some
initial confusion, Mark testified that he transferred money from his inheritance account into the
same checking account where he received his paychecks, so that he could write a check for the
land. Mark claimed he had the checking account before he married Felicia. Mark acknowledged
that checks from the insurance proceeds and his inheritance accounts were both deposited into his
checking account that he used to purchase the land and make improvements to the land. Mark
testified that he used either money from his inheritance or the insurance proceeds to pay for the
construction of the foundation and basement of the marital home. When asked about a $36,770
deposit into his checking account from March 2007 Mark agreed that he had made a handwritten
notation on a banking document that the check came “from insurance house in Hord or Rich Hartke
from inheritance.” Mark admitted that he could not specifically “remember where the money came
from.”
¶ 12 Felicia testified that she believed the land was in both parties’ names. Felicia contributed
to the property taxes on the marital residence. Felicia and her father also testified regarding the
substantial renovations they made to the marital home.
¶ 13 On May 22, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution and memorandum
opinion. Regarding the real and personal property relevant to this appeal, the court noted as
follows:
5
“In this case, characterization and allocation of the real and personal property is
extremely difficult. While the Respondent inherited and owned certain property before the
parties were married, it is difficult to discern and trace some of these accounts and monies
due to various factors including the passage of time, the changing of account numbers, as
well as lack of first-hand information from brokers and accountants. In addition, there has
been some commingling of monies and properties from before and after the marriage which
requires efforts to trace and value.”
¶ 14 Regarding the marital residence, the trial court found that Mark purchased the modular
home prior to the parties’ marriage with premarital funds. The court also found that Mark
purchased the two acres of land shortly after the parties’ marriage with non-marital funds. The
court noted that the deed was in Mark’s name, unbeknownst to Felicia. The court found that the
parties made substantial improvements to the marital residence during their marriage, including
the addition of a basement and indoor renovations. The court noted that Felicia and her father
completed many of the renovations inside of the home. The court found that Mark used his non-
marital funds to construct the basement. Specifically, the court found that Mark used his
inheritance accounts and insurance loss proceeds to pay $18,978 for the land on June 6, 2007,
$29,139 for the basement on September 27, 2007, and $19,800 for materials in October 2007. The
court found it important that each of the transactions relating to the marital home occurred within
five months of the marriage. In light of the court’s determination that Mark used non-marital funds
for the transactions, the court found that the marital home was Mark’s non-marital property and
awarded the marital home to him.
¶ 15 The trial court further found that Felicia significantly contributed to the marital home and
was entitled to reimbursement for her efforts and the funds she used to improve the property;
6
however, the court found it difficult to quantify the value of Felicia’s efforts based on the evidence.
The court observed that $73,595 in marital tax refunds were used to fund home improvement
projects and ordered that the marital estate be “given reimbursement in this amount.” The court
found, based on the totality of the evidence, that the marital estate was entitled to $90,000 in
reimbursement for marital funds and labor expended in improving the house. The court ordered
Mark to pay Felicia $45,000 as her share of the reimbursement by the non-marital estate to the
marital estate.
¶ 16 Regarding Mark’s investment accounts and pensions, the trial court again noted that it was
difficult to trace the origin and path of some of the balances. The court noted that it “did not have
the benefit of hearing from any accountants or investment brokers so as to assist it in its fact-
finding.” The court observed Felicia’s acknowledgment that Mark had premarital investment
monies and accounts, but noted Felicia’s argument that those accounts should be considered
marital property and divided equally between the parties because Mark could not properly trace
and identify certain accounts. The court found it “apparent from the evidence that [Mark] inherited
a significant amount of monies which would be non-marital, and that he saved some monies
through his employment which would also be non-marital.” The court noted that there were “sums
that accumulated during the marriage which must be allocated between the parties.” The court
found that Prudential account #8206, valued at $74,462 at the time of trial and $55,477 as of April
5, 2007, was Mark’s non-marital inheritance and awarded the account to him. The court similarly
found that Prudential account #0800, valued at $56,353 at the time of trial and $148,635 in May
2007 was Mark’s non-marital inheritance and awarded that account to him as well. The court also
found that the Prudential account #1835 valued at $77,016 at the time of trial was Mark’s non-
marital inheritance account and, thus, awarded that account to Mark. The court noted that Felicia
7
listed #0800 and #1835 as Mark’s property in her financial affidavit. The court awarded Felicia
$193,416, or half, of Mark’s Jackson Annuity #7873 valued at $386,832. The court awarded
Felicia $59,346.50 of Mark’s Prudential IRA #6075, noting that Mark earned $115,391 prior to
the parties’ marriage and that the remaining balance of $118,693 was to be divided equally between
the parties. The court awarded Felicia $37,566 of Mark’s Prudential Roth IRA #8863, finding that
Mark contributed $7,597 prior to the parties’ marriage and that the remaining balance of $75,132
was to be divided equally between the parties.
¶ 17 On June 18, 2025, Felicia filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s judgment. In the
motion, Felicia argued that there was a presumption that the marital residence and investment
accounts were marital property and that Mark failed to overcome that presumption with clear and
convincing evidence. Felicia quoted Mark’s testimony, noting that he repeatedly stated that the
investment accounts and movement of money was confusing and that he had difficulty keeping
the account numbers straight. Due to Mark’s failure to distinguish the marital and non-marital
portions of the accounts and property, Felicia asserted that the property should be considered
transmuted into marital property. Felicia maintained that Mark’s testimony and the documentary
evidence at trial was insufficient to trace the funds and classify the funds as non-marital property.
Felicia requested that the investment accounts all be divided equally between the parties and that
Mark be ordered to sell the marital residence and split the proceeds with her or pay her $125,000.
¶ 18 On September 17, 2025, the trial court entered a comprehensive order on all posttrial
motions. 1 The court noted that much of Felicia’s motion merely restated her closing arguments.
Regarding Felicia’s arguments pertaining to the investment accounts, the court found “its
1
Mark also filed posttrial motions; however, the issues raised in those motions are irrelevant to our
disposition of the instant appeal.
8
allocation and division as set forth in the [judgment] was fair and equitable, and was properly
supported by documentation of pre-marital balances.” The court also found as follows:
“In sum, the court finds that it properly applied the law to its factual findings. While
[Mark] could [ ] not match pre-marital account balances to an exact amount, he showed by
clear and convincing evidence that he owned significant accounts before the marriage, and,
that while certain accounts were transferred or opened after the marriage, that was merely
a transactional process and generally did not result in a commingling that suddenly made
the funds marital in nature. For those accounts where there was a mix of non-marital and
marital funds, the court properly identified said funds and allocated them accordingly.”
¶ 19 Regarding Felicia’s arguments pertaining to the marital home, the trial court found that its
ruling was “supported by its factual findings and applicable law.” The court found that Mark
“presented adequate evidence that he owned the modular home before the marriage, and that non-
marital funds were used to buy the land and pay for the foundation for placement of the modular
home.” The court noted that “the ‘marital aspect’ of the residence comes from the marital funds
and contributions made to remodel and fix-up this home over the course of the marriage.” The
court found that its finding in the judgment regarding Felicia’s contribution to the marital home
was equitable. Thus, the court denied Felicia’s motion. Felicia filed a timely appeal.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, Felicia argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the parties’
marital residence and various investment and retirement accounts were the non-marital property
of Mark. Specifically, Felicia argues that the court applied the incorrect legal standards in ruling
on the distribution of the real and personal property. Mark argues that the court properly classified
the property as his non-marital property.
9
¶ 22 A. Standard of Review
¶ 23 The parties initially dispute the applicable standard of review. Felicia argues that the trial
court applied the incorrect legal standards and, thus, the matter is subject to de novo review. Mark
argues that the court’s classification of marital property is subject to the manifest-weight-of-the-
evidence standard of review. We agree with Mark.
¶ 24 It is well settled that on review of a trial court’s findings on the existence of marital and
non-marital property, a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard is applied. In re Marriage of
Berger, 357 Ill. App. 3d 651, 659-60 (2005). “A judgment is against the manifest weight of the
evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent, or when the findings appear to be
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago,
168 Ill. 2d 83, 106 (1995). A reviewing court applies this deferential standard because the trial
court, having directly observed the witnesses and reviewed all exhibits, was in the best position to
evaluate credibility, weigh the financial documentation, and assess whether the evidence satisfied
the tracing requirements. Although Felicia urges de novo review based on the court’s alleged
misapplication of evidentiary standards, the record demonstrates that the court made fact-based
determinations regarding the origins of property, commingling, and financial tracing. Such
determinations are quintessential questions of fact that warrant a deferential standard of review.
Moreover, Felicia argued in her motion to reconsider that there was a presumption that the marital
residence and investment and retirement accounts were marital property and that Mark failed to
overcome that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. The court rejected Felicia’s
argument when it denied her motion. The court expressly stated in its comprehensive order on all
posttrial motions that it applied the clear and convincing standard and that its ruling was “supported
by its factual findings and applicable law.” Accordingly, we reject Felicia’s argument that the court
10
applied the incorrect legal standard, and we apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard
of review.
¶ 25 B. Classification of Property
¶ 26 Felicia also argues that the trial court erred by classifying the marital residence and certain
investment and retirement accounts, or portions thereof, as Mark’s non-marital property. Felicia
argues that the evidence Mark presented at trial was insufficient to rebut the presumption that the
marital home and various accounts were marital property. Mark argues that the court’s
classification of property was supported by his testimony and relevant exhibits entered into
evidence at trial.
¶ 27 The disposition of property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is governed by section
503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2022)).
Before a court may dispose of property upon the dissolution of marriage, it must determine whether
the property is marital or non-marital. In re Marriage of Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d 159, 166 (2000).
“All the property of the parties to a marriage belongs to one of three estates, namely, the estate of
the husband, the estate of the wife, or the marital estate.” In re Marriage of Foster, 2014 IL App
(1st) 123078, ¶ 68 (citing In re Marriage of Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d 639, 641-42 (1993)). Marital
property includes all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage unless the property is
non-marital property. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2022). Non-marital property includes, inter alia,
“property acquired by gift, legacy or descent or property acquired in exchange for such property;”
“property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage;” “property acquired
before the marriage, except as it relates to retirement plans that may have both marital and non-
marital characteristics;” and “the increase in value of non-marital property, irrespective of whether
the increase results from a contribution of marital property, non-marital property, the personal
11
effort of a spouse, or otherwise, subject to the right of reimbursement provided in subsection (c)
of this Section[.]” Id. §§ 503 (a)(1), (2), (6), (7). “Property acquired prior to a marriage that would
otherwise be non-marital property shall not be deemed to be marital property solely because the
property was acquired in contemplation of marriage.” Id. § 503 (a). “The court shall make specific
factual findings as to its classification of assets as marital or non-marital property, values, and
other factual findings supporting its property award.” Id.
¶ 28 Under the Act, there is a rebuttable presumption that all property acquired by either spouse
after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage is marital property. Id.
§ 503(b)(1)); In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 45. “This presumption
includes non-marital property transferred into some form of co-ownership between the spouses,
regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership
such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property.” 750
ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2022). The presumption “is overcome by showing through clear and
convincing evidence that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this
Section or was done for estate or tax planning purposes or for other reasons that establish that a
transfer between spouses was not intended to be a gift.” Id. After the trial court classifies the
property as marital or non-marital, it awards each spouse his or her non-marital property and
divides the marital property into just proportions. Id. § 503(d). The distribution by the court need
not be equal so long as it is equitable. Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 649.
¶ 29 Here, we cannot say that the trial court’s classification of the marital residence and certain
investment and retirement accounts, or portions thereof, as Mark’s non-marital property was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. With regard to the marital residence, it was undisputed
that Mark owned the modular home prior to the parties’ marriage and that the land was acquired
12
shortly after the parties’ marriage. It was also undisputed that the construction of the basement,
construction of the garage, placement of the modular home, and substantial indoor renovations of
the modular home occurred after the parties’ marriage. Because the modular home was
permanently affixed to the land that was acquired after the parties’ marriage for the purpose of
becoming the parties’ marital residence, it is our view that the marital residence, including the
modular home, was presumptively marital property. Thus, in order to establish that the marital
residence was his non-marital property, it was Mark’s burden at trial to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the funds used to purchase the land and construct the home were obtained
exclusively by one of the methods set forth in the Act. In re Marriage of Didier, 318 Ill. App. 3d
253, 261-62 (2000).
¶ 30 The trial court found that Mark presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he used
non-marital funds, specifically money from insurance proceeds and inheritance accounts he
received or owned prior to the parties’ marriage, to purchase the land and pay for the construction
of the basement and placement of the modular home. Specifically, the court found that Mark used
the following non-marital funds: $18,978 to purchase the two acres of land on June 6, 2007,
$29,139 for the basement concrete on September 27, 2007, and $19,800 for materials in October
2007. The court found it significant that each transaction occurred within five months of the
parties’ marriage, which indicated to the court that Mark utilized non-marital funds. After carefully
reviewing the record and applying the deferential standard applicable to our review, we cannot say
that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 31 The trial court’s findings were supported by Mark’s testimony and the documentary
evidence presented at trial. Mark testified that he received approximately $70,000 from an
insurance company prior to the parties’ marriage, and he presented documentation from the
13
insurance company that supported his testimony in this regard. Mark also testified that he had
several premarital investment accounts that he inherited after his father passed away in 2004. 2
Mark testified that he used money from these two sources to pay for the land and to construct and
place the marital residence. Mark testified that he used the money from these two sources because
he needed money and was unable to obtain a bank loan.
¶ 32 Mark testified that he began the process of purchasing the land before he married Felicia.
A bank statement submitted into evidence indicated that Mark deposited $36,770.01 into his
checking account on March 30, 2007, prior to the parties’ marriage. Although Mark’s testimony
lacked clarity regarding the source of the funds, a handwritten notation on the statement indicated
that the deposit was from the insurance proceeds or his inheritance account. Because the deposit
was made prior to the parties’ marriage, however, it clearly came from a non-marital source.
Another document submitted into evidence demonstrated that Mark began the process of
purchasing the land on April 4, 2007, shortly after he deposited the $36,770.01 into his bank
account and before the parties married. The settlement statement relating to the land purchase
indicated that Mark paid $18,978 for the land on June 6, 2007, shortly after the parties married. In
our view, this evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Mark used non-marital funds to
purchase the land.
¶ 33 Mark also testified that he used money from the insurance proceeds or his inheritance
accounts to construct the basement of the home and to place the modular home on the foundation.
Mark submitted into evidence a document indicating that he wrote a check in the amount of
$19,800.04 from account #2768, one of his inheritance accounts, on October 10, 2007. A
2
Felicia also challenges the trial court’s classification of these accounts as Mark’s non-marital
property; however, as will be fully discussed below, we conclude that the court’s classification of the
investment accounts was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
14
handwritten notation on the document indicated that those funds were used for materials to build
onto the modular home and to construct a garage. Mark also submitted into evidence a bank
statement that showed Mark deposited $29,139 into his checking account on September 27, 2007.
A handwritten notation on the statement indicated that the money deposited was used to construct
the basement. In our view, this evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Mark used non-
marital funds to construct the basement.
¶ 34 Although Mark paid for the land, construction, and placement with some funds from a
checking account, he explained that he moved money from the insurance payout or his inheritance
accounts into the checking account to write checks for the land and construction expenses. See
Foster, 2014 IL App (1st) 123078, ¶ 79 (noting that funds are not transmuted into marital property
when they merely pass through an account as a conduit to transfer money). The evidence
demonstrated that Mark had the checking account prior to the parties’ marriage and that he
deposited the money used to purchase the land prior to the parties’ marriage. Mark wrote the check
for building materials from his premarital inheritance account, not his checking account.
Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that Mark moved money into his checking account from
a premarital source to pay for the construction of the basement after the parties’ marriage.
Accordingly, there was evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Mark utilized non-marital
funds to purchase and construct the marital residence. Thus, in applying the deferential standard
applicable to our review, we hold that the court’s classification of the marital residence as Mark’s
non-marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 35 Despite this, we note that even if the marital residence was classified as marital property,
it would be subject to Mark’s substantial non-marital reimbursement credit—a result that, given
any modest marital contribution relative to Mark’s traced non-marital inputs, would distribute most
15
of the value of the marital residence to Mark. See Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 167 (“Notwithstanding
any transmutation, however, section 503(c)(2) of the Act provides that the contributing estate shall
be reimbursed from the estate receiving the contribution, unless the contribution cannot be retraced
by clear and convincing evidence or was a gift.”). The evidence demonstrated that the marital
residence was valued at $240,000. 3 The trial court accounted for Felicia’s contributions to the
marital residence by ordering Mark to pay her $45,000. It was undisputed that Mark owned the
modular home prior to the parties’ marriage. The evidence additionally demonstrated that Mark
used approximately $70,000 of his non-marital funds for the land and the construction and
placement of the marital residence. Accordingly, even if the court had improperly classified the
residence as Mark’s non-marital property, it is our view that the outcome would have been the
same and that the court’s distribution of property was equitable.
¶ 36 With regard to the investment and retirement accounts, the trial court carefully considered
each account in its judgment. 4 The court determined that the Prudential accounts #8206, #0800,
and #1835 were Mark’s non-marital accounts that he received as an inheritance after his father
passed away in 2004. Mark’s testimony and the documentary evidence presented at trial supported
the court’s determination in this regard. Mark testified, and Felicia acknowledged, that he had
various investment and retirement accounts prior to the parties’ marriage. Mark testified that he
received inheritance accounts after his father passed away in 2004, which were managed by Hartke
at Prudential. The documentary evidence indicated that account #8206 originated in 2004—well
before the parties’ marriage—thereby corroborating Mark’s testimony in this regard. The evidence
demonstrated that account #8206 was the only account that did not change account numbers when
We note that prior to obtaining an appraisal, Felicia valued the marital residence at $195,000.
3
The trial court found that Mark’s Jackson Annuity #7873 was marital property and divided that
4
account equally between the parties, and neither party disputes the court’s classification of this account.
16
Prudential underwent changes in 2011. Accordingly, the court’s determination that account #8206
was Mark’s non-marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 37 Mark testified that he had difficulty keeping the account numbers straight and that several
of the account numbers changed when Prudential underwent changes in 2011. The documentary
evidence indicated that account #2768 had a previous value of $144,299.40 as of April 30, 2007,
before the parties’ marriage, and a value of $148,635.97 as of May 31, 2007, shortly after the
parties’ marriage. Mark testified that account #2768 changed to #0800 in 2011, and a financial
document admitted as an exhibit from an account #2768 included a handwritten notation that
#2768 changed to #0800. Financial documents admitted at trial also indicated that funds were
transferred from #2768 to #1835. While Mark’s testimony lacked specificity regarding the account
numbers, Mark consistently testified that he had premarital inheritance accounts at Prudential and
that some of those accounts switched numbers in 2011. The documentary evidence supported
Mark’s testimony in this regard. We reject Felicia’s assertion that the change of account numbers,
through no fault of Mark, created new accounts during the parties’ marriage that transmuted
Mark’s non-marital property into marital property. Moreover, as the court correctly noted, Felicia
listed Mark as the owner of accounts #0800 and #1835 on her financial affidavits. Accordingly,
the court’s determination that accounts #0800 and #1835 were Mark’s non-marital property was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 38 The trial court also found that Mark’s Roth IRA #8863 was both non-marital and marital.
The court noted that the account had a balance of $7,597 in April 2007 prior to the parties’
marriage. The court awarded Mark $7,597 as his non-marital property and ordered that the
remaining balance of $75,132 be divided equally between the parties as marital property. Mark’s
testimony and the financial documents presented at trial supported the court’s determination in this
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regard. Thus, the court’s classification of this account was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 39 The trial court found that Mark’s IRA #0675 was both non-marital and marital. The court
found that Mark earned $115,391 prior to the parties’ marriage and awarded that amount to Mark
as his non-marital property. The court ordered that the remaining balance of $118,693 be divided
equally between the parties as marital property. Mark’s testimony and the financial documents
presented at trial supported the court’s determination in this regard. Thus, the court’s classification
of this account was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 40 In sum, we conclude that the trial court’s classification of the property was supported by
the evidence. We note that the court carefully reviewed the evidence in this case and issued a
detailed order that included findings supported by the specific evidence the court relied on in
making each finding. Because this court cannot say that the court’s findings were against the
manifest weight of the evidence, we hold that the court’s classification of the marital residence
and certain investment and retirement accounts, or portions thereof, as Mark’s non-marital
property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Coles County circuit court.
¶ 43 Affirmed.
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