Durbin v. Crowley
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket4-25-0834
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
2026 IL App (4th) 250834-U
NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under November 20, 2026
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0834 Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
NANCY L. DURBIN, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Sangamon County
CHARLES CROWLEY and JANEEN CROWLEY, ) No. 23MR327
Defendants-Appellees. )
) Honorable
) Gail L. Noll,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the trial court did not err by dismissing
plaintiffâs third and fourth amended complaints because they failed to state any
claim upon which relief could be granted and (2) the courtâs denial of plaintiffâs
request for leave to file an amended complaint was not an abuse of discretion.
¶2 Pro se plaintiff, Nancy L. Durbin, sued defendants, Charles and Janeen Crowley,
seeking, among other things, (1) injunctive relief for the removal of defendantsâ dog from their
property, (2) the removal of several of defendantsâ trees, (3) the cleanup of rock that drifted onto
plaintiffâs property, and (4) the alteration of defendantsâ asphalt driveway. She also sought
punitive damages and compensatory damages relating to the loss in value of her home, legal fees,
and reimbursement for time and effort spent researching and litigating the instant matter. The trial
court granted defendantsâ motion to dismiss plaintiffâs third and fourth amended complaints, with
prejudice.
¶3 Plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by dismissing her third and
fourth amended complaints because she alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for private
nuisance and (2) the court abused its discretion by denying her leave to amend them. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. Plaintiffâs Initial Complaints
¶6 In September 2023, plaintiff, acting pro se, initiated this action against defendants
by filing a form complaint seeking an âAbatement of Nuisances.â In a single paragraph, plaintiff
complained (1) defendantsâ pine trees were compromised and could fall on her home, (2) their
privacy fence was hanging over plaintiffâs driveway, preventing her from parking there, (3) rocks
were encroaching onto her property, and (4) debris from trees on their property was falling onto
her property and damaging her vehicle.
¶7 In July 2024, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting that she resided at her
home in Leland Grove, Illinois, and advancing several claims of private nuisance in four âcountsâ
against defendants, her next-door neighbors. Each count consisted of a numbered heading, under
which appeared inconsistently numbered paragraphs providing narrative explanations of plaintiffâs
grievances.
¶8 Generally, plaintiff alleged defendantsâ dog repeatedly barked and its waste
smelled so foul that it interfered with her enjoyment of her property. She also alleged defendants
harassed her by letting their dog out of its kennel. In another âcount,â plaintiff reasserted her claims
that she feared some of defendantsâ trees could fall on her property, other trees deposited debris
on her driveway and vehicle, defendantsâ fence was leaning toward her driveway, preventing her
from parking on it, and rocks from defendantsâ property were drifting onto her property.
¶9 At an August 2024 status hearing, the trial court informed plaintiff her complaint
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failed to comply with section 2-603 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-603
(West 2024)) and gave her the opportunity to file a second amended complaint.
¶ 10 In September 2024, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. This pleading
largely advanced the same claims raised in her prior filing but separated her grievances into 12
âcountsâ and transposed the narrative allegations supporting each count into numbered paragraphs.
¶ 11 In October 2024, plaintiff filed two additional amended complaints that largely
reflected her prior amended complaint but addressed the defendants individually in separate
pleadings. These pleadings lacked verification.
¶ 12 In response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)), arguing the amended complaints stated no claim for which
relief could be granted.
¶ 13 B. The Verified Third and Fourth Amended Complaints
¶ 14 Despite defendantsâ motion to dismiss, plaintiff again filed two additional
complaints, which are the complaints at issue in this appealânamely, a verified third amended
complaint naming only Charles and a verified fourth amended complaint naming only Janeen.
Plaintiff intended to proceed on these pleadings together, which the trial court allowed.
Accordingly, the court struck plaintiffâs previous amended complaints, dismissed defendantsâ
pending motion to dismiss as moot, and deemed plaintiffâs verified third and fourth amended
complaints the âoperative documents going forward.â
¶ 15 As with her previous filings, both pleadings organized plaintiffâs various claims of
private nuisance into 12 âcountsâ over approximately 50 pages. Although difficult to ascertain due
to repeated allegations, conclusory assertions, and fragmented contentions interspersed with
requests for relief throughout the meandering structure of the complaints, the pleadings appeared
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to allege the following.
¶ 16 In count I, plaintiff asserted defendantsâ dog barked âat any hour,â including at
night so as to wake her, and created dog waste in defendantsâ yard and dog kennel that smelled so
âoffensiveâ she could not open the windows of her home for fresh air. She alleged that because
defendants did not pick up their dogâs waste or sanitize their dog kennel, the air had become
âpolluted.â Additionally, because the dog typically defecated on a spot on defendantsâ property
that was near plaintiffâs driveway, the smell permeated the interior of her vehicle, prevented her
from maintaining her driveway, and forced her to stop parking on that portion of the driveway.
Plaintiff also claimed the waste introduced flies into her home. She further alleged her yard had
become âcontaminat[ed]â due to rainwater washing the dogâs waste onto her property, causing her
to fear for her health and the health of the public.
¶ 17 When describing these allegations, plaintiff noted defendantsâ kennel was illegal in
that Leland Grove had previously issued defendants a permit to build only a â âstorage shedâ â and
in any event, the structure did not adhere to âdog kennel regulationsâ regarding matters like
ventilation or drainage. Plaintiff also highlighted several Leland Grove ordinances, including one
prohibiting owners from allowing animal feces that constituted a health hazard to remain on their
premises. See Leland Grove Ordinance No. 425, § 4-1B-4 (eff. Mar. 25, 1985). She referenced
another ordinance declaring any dog or cat that disturbs â âthe peace and quiet of any personâ â to
be a public nuisance requiring impoundment. See Leland Grove Ordinance No. 297, § 5-1-3 (eff.
Apr. 25, 1995). She further cited an ordinance declaring as nuisances sounds that interfered with
the peace or disturbed the quiet enjoyment of any person and any filthy, foul, or offensive matter
or liquid discharged into a public place or adjacent lot. Leland Grove Ordinance No. 425, § 4-1B-
1 (eff. Mar. 25, 1985).
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¶ 18 According to plaintiff, defendants were âlazyâ and âstubbornâ and had âstolen
years of [plaintiffâs] time and enjoymentâ of her property by failing to clean up after their dog. As
relief, plaintiff requested the removal of the dog from defendantsâ property and a permanent ban
on dogs living in the kennel âeven if [defendants] sold their home.â She also requested unspecified
âactual damagesâ relating to defendantsâ âdisregard [for] respect[ing the] rights of another,â
damages for the loss in value of her property, and reimbursement for the time, effort, and materials
spent litigating the matter.
¶ 19 In count II, plaintiff alleged defendants harassed her by allowing their dog out of
its kennel âwhen the weather [was] niceâ such that, if she were also outside, she would be âforcedâ
to listen to the dog running, panting, and barking or forced âto smell [its] bowel movements.â As
a result, plaintiff claimed she âcan never go outsideâ or âenjoy any quiet time or *** peaceâ
because defendants âhave confined [her] to being houseboundâ to avoid the noise and odor of their
dog. Plaintiff noted some instances when defendantsâ dog barked at night, waking her. On other
occasions, when she wanted to enjoy time outdoors, she had to âretreat back into her homeâ
because the dog was making noise or defecating. She also complained of instances in which
defendants made â[a] racketâ by mowing their lawn or shoveling waste from the dog run while she
was outside. Plaintiff asserted she âwant[ed] no reminders the dog and [defendants were] even
livingâ next door and requested an order requiring defendants to cease the alleged harassment as
well as unspecified â[m]onetary compensationâ and â[r]estitution for years of suffering.â
¶ 20 In other âcountsâ alleging private nuisance, plaintiff claimed defendants were
encroaching on her property. In these counts, plaintiff asserted defendantsâ privacy fence was at
one point damaged, and while she acknowledged it had been repaired, she claimed it had âbeen
shoved over to [plaintiffâs] sideâ following additional damage and âlook[ed] terribleâ (count III).
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She further alleged defendants at one point had pine trees on their property that were struck by
lightning, and she had feared these âcompromisedâ trees would fall onto her property and injure
her, although she conceded these trees had since been cut down (count IV). She also alleged
another tree deposited âgumballsâ onto her driveway, which made it unsightly and âlowered the
value of her homeâ (count V). Several counts claimed other trees on defendantsâ property were
âunsightly,â too close to her property, or had branches hanging over her property, and she wanted
them trimmed or removed (counts VII-IX).
¶ 21 In other counts, plaintiff alleged rocks from defendantsâ driveway drifted onto her
property (count X), and asphalt from their driveway âcover[ed] part of [the] entrance to her
drivewayâ (count XI). As another basis for nuisance, plaintiff alleged that due to defendantsâ
encroachments and the dog waste on defendantsâ property, she had to park on the sidewalk in front
of her house, which resulted in her receiving a parking ticket (count VI). As relief for these counts,
plaintiff requested that defendants repair their fence, cut down their pine trees, remove or trim
other trees on their property, remove the rocks that drifted onto her property, repaint their dog
kennel, and remove the asphalt poured on her driveway.
¶ 22 Plaintiff also requested unspecified âOut-of-Pocket expensesâ and â[a]ll damagesâ
incurred (count XII). She further requested reimbursements for the parking ticket she received, her
time and effort spent contesting the ticket, and a doctorâs appointment she had to attend while she
was contesting the ticket.
¶ 23 C. Defendantsâ Motion To Dismiss
¶ 24 Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the third and fourth amended
complaints under section 2-615 of the Code. Therein, defendants asserted plaintiffâs complaints
were legally insufficient. Defendants further noted the complaints contained false, misleading, and
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contradictory statements. Defendants claimed they obtained an order of protection against plaintiff
because she was harassing them. They asserted plaintiff engaged in patterns of (1) yelling and
cursing at them, (2) making multiple police reports complaining of their dogâs barking and odor
that were deemed untrue, and (3) submitting reports to the Sangamon County Public Health
Department, resulting in inspections of defendantsâ home that did not substantiate her allegations.
In support of these claims, defendants attached to their motion copies of âbelligerent and
increasingly threatening text messagesâ from plaintiff, police reports, and public health inspection
reports.
¶ 25 Defendants argued that even taking plaintiffâs allegations as true, the complaints at
no point stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Defendants added plaintiff sought ârelief
the Court does not grant,â such as an order for the removal of their dog and a ban on all future
residents from possessing one; orders to remedy conditions on their property that had already been
remedied; the alteration of trees on their property; and unspecified reimbursements for her efforts
to contest a parking ticket, a doctorâs appointment, yard maintenance, legal fees, and time and
materials litigating the matter.
¶ 26 In February 2025, plaintiff filed a response to defendantsâ motion to dismiss and
attached several exhibits that were not included in the amended complaints, including a map of the
partiesâ properties and a police report. Plaintiff argued the case should not be dismissed because
her âallegations [were] substantiated in case law, ordinances, and statutes.â
¶ 27 In April 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendantsâ motion to dismiss.
The transcript of this hearing does not appear in the record on appeal. The courtâs docket sheet,
however, provides the following:
âArguments heard on Defendantsâ Motion to Dismiss Verified Third and Fourth
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Amended Complaints. Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal pursuant to 2-615. Court
may consider the allegations of the complaints, matters of which the Court may
take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record. Applying this standard,
the exhibits attached to motion to dismiss are stricken and the Court will not
consider them in ruling on the motion. Court also strikes Exhibits A and J to the
Plaintiffâs response and will not consider them in making ruling. Plaintiff notes that
a few issues have been resolved. Plaintiff withdraws Counts 4, 5 and 9. Defendantsâ
Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED. Even taking Plaintiffâs factual allegations as
true, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action that would entitle Plaintiff to recovery
under the law of the state of Illinois. The remaining counts fail to allege facts
sufficient to support any claim that a private individual can bring and upon which
this Court could grant relief. Plaintiff has had previous opportunity to amend.
Plaintiffâs Third and Fourth Amended Complaints dismissed with prejudice.â
¶ 28 D. Plaintiffâs Motion To Reconsider
¶ 29 In May 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the grant of defendantsâ motion
to dismiss. Therein, plaintiff asserted the trial courtâs dismissal âwas based on a misunderstanding
or misapplication of relevant statutes or case law.â The motion then effectively repleaded the
entirety of plaintiffâs amended complaints and requested the opportunity to file another amended
complaint.
¶ 30 Defendants filed a response, arguing the motion to reconsider should be denied
because plaintiff neither (1) presented any new evidence or a change in law nor (2) showed any
error by the trial court that warranted reconsideration of the courtâs dismissal of the complaints.
¶ 31 In a subsequent response to defendantsâ filing, plaintiff clarified she sought
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reconsideration of the trial courtâs dismissal because the court erroneously concluded the law
provided no remedy for a private nuisance.
¶ 32 In July 2025, the trial court denied plaintiffâs motion to reconsider.
¶ 33 This appeal followed.
¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 35 Plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by dismissing her third and
fourth amended complaints because she alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for private
nuisance and (2) the court abused its discretion by denying her leave to amend them. We disagree
and affirm.
¶ 36 A. Defendantsâ Request To Strike Plaintiffâs Brief and Dismiss the Appeal
¶ 37 As an initial matter, we note defendants request plaintiffâs appellate brief be
stricken and the appeal dismissed on two bases. First, defendants contend plaintiff did not timely
file the appendix to her brief. After granting plaintiff several extensions of time in which to file
her appellate brief, this court issued an order granting a final extension of time to May 7, 2026.
Durbin v. Crowley, No. 4-25-0834 (Mar. 30, 2026). Plaintiff filed her initial brief on that date, but
the brief lacked an appendix, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
Plaintiff filed her appendix the following day. We decline defendantsâ request to strike the brief
on this basis. The striking of a brief or dismissal of an appeal is a particularly harsh sanction. Colon
v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 2024 IL App (1st) 221841, ¶ 22. Although plaintiff filed her appendix
one day outside the final deadline, the failure to timely file her appendix does not hinder or
preclude our review. Accordingly, striking her brief and dismissing the appeal is unwarranted. See
Gaston v. City of Danville, 393 Ill. App. 3d 591, 601 (2009).
¶ 38 Second, defendants contend that after this court granted plaintiff leave to file a
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âcorrected brief with corrected citations and paginationâ (see Durbin, No. 4-25-0834 (June 3,
2026)), plaintiff acted â[i]n defiance of this *** orderâ by submitting a corrected brief containing
âsubstantive changesâ from her prior brief. Defendants, however, make no effort to identify the
offending portions of plaintiffâs corrected brief or make any claim they were prejudiced by the
purported changes. Moreover, our review of plaintiffâs initial and corrected briefs shows she raised
the same essential arguments in both submissions. Accordingly, we also decline defendantsâ
request to strike plaintiffâs brief and dismiss the appeal on this basis.
¶ 39 B. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Dismissing Plaintiffâs
Third and Fourth Amended Complaints
¶ 40 Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting defendantsâ motion to dismiss
because her third and fourth amended complaints alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for private
nuisance. We disagree.
¶ 41 1. Section 2-615 Motions and the Standard of Review
¶ 42 A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code tests the legal sufficiency
of a complaint based on particular defects or defenses apparent on its face. Walworth Investments-
LG, LLC v. Mu Sigma, Inc., 2022 IL 127177, ¶ 39. When ruling on a motion pursuant to section
2-615, âa court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom,
to determine whether the complaintâs allegationsâconstrued in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffâare sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.â Id.
Illinois is a âfact-pleadingâ state, meaning that although pleadings are to be liberally construed and
formal or technical allegations are not necessary, a complaint must nevertheless contain facts
stating a cause of action. Borcia v. Hatyina, 2015 IL App (2d) 140559, ¶ 21.
¶ 43 A plaintiff need not set out his or her evidence in the complaint; however, the
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plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to bring a claim within a legally recognized cause of action.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp, 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429-30 (2006). âThe degree of specificity required
to sufficiently plead a cause of action in any case is difficult to determine and is dependent upon
the individual circumstances of each case.â Borcia, 2015 IL App (2d) 140559, ¶ 38.
¶ 44 In any event, a pleading that simply paraphrases the elements of a cause of action
in conclusory terms is insufficient. Paul v. County of Ogle, 2018 IL App (2d) 170696, ¶ 34. âA
fact is well pleaded if a plaintiff has clearly set out the ultimate fact he or she intends to prove.â
(Emphasis in original) Id. If a complaint offers conclusions unsupported by allegations of fact, we
will not accept those conclusions as true. Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 429-30.
¶ 45 Appellate courts review a dismissal under section 2-615 de novo. OâConnell v.
County of Cook, 2022 IL 127527, ¶ 19. We may affirm a trial courtâs grant of a motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-615 on any basis supported by the record. Law Offices of Charles Chejfec,
LLC v. Franz, 2023 IL App (3d) 230083, ¶ 37.
¶ 46 2. Private Nuisance Claims
¶ 47 âA private nuisance is a substantial invasion of anotherâs interest in the use and
enjoyment of his or her land. The invasion must be: substantial, either intentional or negligent, and
unreasonable.â In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 204 (1997). Private nuisance is âa
civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City of
Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (2004). Although interference with the
individualâs possession of land is not required, to state a cause of action for private nuisance, it is
nevertheless necessary to allege a physical invasion of the plaintiffâs property. Chicago Flood
Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 204-05; Schiller v. Mitchell, 357 Ill. App. 3d. 435, 442 (2005).
¶ 48 âAn invasion constituting a nuisance can include noise, smoke, vibration, dust
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fumes, and odors produced on the defendantâs land and impairing the use and enjoyment of
neighboring land.â Dobbs v. Wiggins, 401 Ill. App. 3d 367 (2010). However, the invasion
complained of must be more than âa question of mere delicacy or fastidiousness arising from
elegant and dainty habits of life.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co.
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Commân, 34 Ill. 2d 544, 547 (1966). Effectively, the nuisance must
be so physically offensive to the senses as to make life uncomfortable. Chicago Flood Litigation,
176 Ill. 2d at 205.
¶ 49 Whether particular conduct constitutes a nuisance is determined by the effect of the
conduct on a reasonable person without accounting for any special sensitivity the affected
landowner may have. Id.; see Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co., 34 Ill. 2d at 548 (noting a private
nuisance claim cannot afford relief to hypersensitive individuals).
¶ 50 3. This Case
¶ 51 Plaintiff argues that her third and fourth amended complaints properly stated claims
for private nuisance because she sufficiently alleged substantial and unreasonable interferences
with her use and enjoyment of her property considering the assertions of defendantsâ conduct
contained in each âcount.â She contends the dismissal of her complaints was premised upon a
misapplication of the law stemming from the trial courtâs âconfusion between public and private
nuisance.â
¶ 52 Defendants respond that the dismissal of the complaints was appropriate because
plaintiff stated no cause of action that would entitle her to relief. We agree with defendants.
¶ 53 We reject plaintiffâs argument the trial court misapplied the law by confusing public
and private nuisance. The court is presumed to know the law and to apply it properly unless an
affirmative showing to the contrary is demonstrated in the record. Vance v. Joyner, 2019 IL App
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(4th) 190136, ¶ 91. No such showing of any misunderstanding of the law when dismissing
plaintiffâs complaints is apparent in the record here. Indeed, plaintiff did not include a transcript
of the hearing on defendantsâ motion to dismissâor, for that matter, any transcript beyond the one
for the hearing on plaintiffâs motion to reconsider the order dismissing her complaints. Therefore,
â[a]ny doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the
appellant.â Foutch v. OâBryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). Accordingly, we decline to attribute
the dismissal of plaintiffâs complaints to a purported misunderstanding of the law by the court.
¶ 54 Instead, upon our review of plaintiffâs third and fourth amended complaints, we
conclude that the trial court appropriately dismissed plaintiffâs third and fourth amended
complaints because plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action for which
relief could be granted. Although plaintiffâs complaints described a litany of conduct by defendants
and their dog that clearly annoyed her, her subjective annoyance by the alleged conduct is
insufficient to establish any substantial or unreasonable invasion of her property as is necessary to
raise an actionable claim of private nuisance.
¶ 55 For example, although excessive noise and odors can certainly be so physically
offensive to the senses as to constitute a nuisance, plaintiffâs allegations that defendantsâ dog was
frequently noisy and created foul-smelling waste failed to plead specific facts to show the noise
and odors here were so substantial as to be offensive to a normal person of ordinary habits and
sensibilities. See Dobbs, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 377. The facts alleged here are a far cry, for example,
from the circumstances in Dobbs, in which the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging the defendant,
their neighbor, was operating a dog kennel and that barking dogs on their property, sometimes
numbering 100, were a nuisance. Id. at 368, 374. The appellate court determined the barking noise
was âsubstantialâ because it involved large numbers of dogs that barked at wildlife at all hours of
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the day and night, which invaded the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffsâ land. Id. at 377.
¶ 56 In the present case, by contrast, plaintiffâs complaints identified the barking and
odor of a single dog as being so unreasonable as to invade her interest in her use and enjoyment of
her property. However, nothing in plaintiffâs complaints distinguished the behavior and activities
of defendantsâ dog from the normal, everyday experience of living next door to dog-owning
neighbors. It is an accepted part of everyday life that a dog owner may allow a pet outside to relieve
itself in his or her yard and that the dog may sometimes bark while outside, including at
inconvenient times such as at night or in the early morning hours. See Ayo v. Quintero, 2024 IL
App (4th) 230607-U, ¶¶ 59-60 (concluding that because nothing in the plaintiffâs complaint
suggested the defendantsâ fence was in any way unusual, its construction, although annoying to
the plaintiffs, was not a substantial invasion of their property that would support a claim for private
nuisance).
¶ 57 In essence, although plaintiff may have been irritated by noise and odor from
defendantsâ dog, she alleged nothing in her complaint to establish the noise and odor complained
of constituted the sort of invasion that is substantially offensive to the sensibilities of a reasonable
person.
¶ 58 The same can be said of the circumstances complained of in plaintiffâs remaining
âcounts.â In several such counts, plaintiff complained of some aspect of defendantsâ property,
including (1) defendantsâ leaning fence, (2) rocks that encroached on her property, and (3) trees
that she considered to be unsightly, with limbs overhanging her property or being closer to her
yard than she preferred. However, in none of these counts did plaintiff plead specific facts to show
how these conditions were a substantial or unreasonable invasion of her interest in the use and
enjoyment of her land. For example, although she alleged she had been unable to park at a
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particular spot on her driveway because it abutted defendantsâ leaning fence and their
âcompromisedâ pine trees, her own complaints acknowledged that the fence had been repaired and
the offending pine trees were cut down.
¶ 59 Overall, the complaints alleged little more than plaintiffâs displeasure with the
manner in which defendants maintained their property, which she claimed contributed to
âunattractiveâ conditions and debris, such as rocks and âgumballs,â naturally migrating onto her
property. Although plaintiff may have alleged facts that conveyed her displeasure with the way
defendants maintained their property, conclusory allegations of displeasure alone are insufficient
to state a claim of private nuisance. See Carroll v. Hurst, 103 Ill. App. 3d 984, 990 (1982) (stating
âa landowner does not have a right to a pleasing view of his neighborâs landâ); Merriam v.
McConnell, 31 Ill. App. 2d 241, 248 (1961) (stating private nuisance could not encompass the
âcontrol or abatement of natural forces as though they were nuisancesâ and concluding that the
plaintiffâs complaint alleging the defendantsâ trees, which annually hosted bugs that migrated to
plaintiffâs property, were a nuisance stated no cause of action); Bandy v. Bosie, 132 Ill. App. 3d
832, 834 (1985) (explaining that trees that drop leaves or send out roots that migrate to neighboring
lands are relatively minor matters that do not ânecessarily constitute a nuisanceâ).
¶ 60 Accordingly, we agree with the trial courtâs determination that, even taking all of
plaintiffâs allegations as true, her complaints failed to state a claim under which relief could be
granted.
¶ 61 In short, plaintiff failed to establish the trial court committed any error when
determining that dismissal of her complaints was appropriate. In fact, the record establishes the
court took care to apply the proper analysis in assessing defendantsâ motion to dismiss.
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¶ 62 C. Whether the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying
Leave To Amend the Third and Fourth Amended Complaints
¶ 63 In the alternative, plaintiff argues that even assuming the third and fourth amended
complaints were deficient, the trial court abused its discretion by denying her leave to amend her
pleadings. We disagree.
¶ 64 1. The Applicable Law
¶ 65 The decision of whether to grant a party leave to amend its pleadings lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial courtâs
decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 2011 IL 110166,
¶ 69. An abuse of discretion occurs when the courtâs ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable,
or when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. Pister v. Matrix Service
Industrial Contractors, Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 120781, ¶ 55.
¶ 66 When determining whether the trial court properly denied a partyâs request to
amend the pleadings, a reviewing court considers whether: â(1) the proposed amendment would
cure the defective pleading; (2) the proposed amendment would surprise or prejudice the opposing
party; (3) the proposed amendment was timely filed; and (4) the moving party had previous
opportunities to amend.â Sheffler, 2011 IL 110166, ¶ 69. The paramount consideration, however,
is âwhether the amendment furthers the ends of justice.â Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown, 185 Ill.
App. 3d 173, 187 (1989).
¶ 67 2. This Case
¶ 68 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff leave
to amend her third and fourth amended complaints. Plaintiffâs request for an opportunity to file an
amended complaint was raised as a single sentence in her approximately 50-page motion to
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reconsider, which was filed one month after her third and fourth amended complaints had already
been dismissed. When making that request, plaintiff provided no indication of what amendments
she would have made to the complaints, virtually ensuring surprise to defendants upon the filing
of an amended pleading. In turn, because she did not indicate what the substance of her
amendments would have entailed or provide any such insight in her argument on appeal, neither
the trial court nor this court can determine whether her planned amendments would have cured her
defective pleadings.
¶ 69 Beyond that, the record is clear that the trial court was very accommodating to
plaintiff by allowing her to file several amended complaints and giving her multiple opportunities
to file a viable pleading. Despite these multiple opportunities, the court ultimately determined the
operative pleadings nevertheless failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.
Allowing plaintiff to make unspecified amendments to her complaints one month after they had
already been dismissed would not have furthered the ends of justice. We conclude that the trial
court appropriately exercised its discretion by determining that plaintiff had already been given
several opportunities to correct the deficiencies in her pleadings and failed to do so, making yet
another opportunity to do so unwarranted.
¶ 70 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
¶ 71 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 72 For the reasons stated, we affirm.
¶ 73 Affirmed.
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