People v. Ingram
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket5-24-0418
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 240418-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 11/19/26. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0418 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Macon County.
)
v. ) No. 14-CF-1529
)
UNDRA L. INGRAM, ) Honorable
) Phoebe S. Bowers,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the second-stage dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction petition
where the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was
brought before the circuit court, the State’s motion to dismiss sufficiently addressed
the entirety of the amended postconviction petition, and postconviction counsel did
not render unreasonable assistance of counsel.
¶2 On April 16, 2021, the defendant, Undra L. Ingram, filed a pro se petition in the circuit
court of Macon County seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The petition advanced to the second stage, where postconviction
counsel filed an amended petition and the State moved to dismiss the amended petition. On March
20, 2024, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The defendant now appeals,
arguing that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) by failing to amend the petition to allege ineffective assistance
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of appellate counsel. The defendant also argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing the
defendant’s right-to-counsel claim where the State did not specifically move to dismiss that claim
and postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to orally argue that claim. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State charged the defendant with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2010)), two counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-
1.20(a)(3)), and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 12-16(c)(1)(i)), all
involving his daughter, D.I. In April 2018, the case proceeded to a jury trial. Among other
evidence, Officer Robert Murray testified about D.I.’s initial report stating that on December 4,
2014, D.I. told a school counselor that the defendant had been sexually abusing her since
approximately 2009. An Illinois Department of Children and Family Services worker then
interviewed D.I. at the school, with Officer Murray present. Officer Murray testified that D.I. was
visibly shaking and crying during the interview and said that her father was going to be mad at
her. Afterward, D.I. and her sister, U.I., were both taken to the Child Advocacy Center for
interviews. U.I. testified at trial that D.I. had told her about the abuse months before D.I. reported
it to the school counselor. The State also played portions of U.I.’s recorded interview at the trial.
¶5 The defendant testified in his own defense. During his testimony, the circuit court took a
brief recess. After the circuit court suggested 10 minutes for the break, defense counsel asked the
court to admonish the defendant, and the circuit court instructed the defendant to stay in the
courtroom with his attorney, but not to talk to anyone. When the circuit court instructed the
defendant not to talk to anyone, defense counsel stated, “Including me. Okay?” The defendant
responded, “Okay.”
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¶6 The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to an aggregate
term of 105 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The Fourth District
affirmed the defendant’s convictions on direct appeal. People v. Ingram, 2020 IL App (4th)
180664-U, ¶ 54.
¶7 On April 16, 2021, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. He alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Officer Murray’s testimony regarding D.I.’s
statements; failing to request a limiting jury instruction regarding that testimony; failing to request
a hearing as required by section 115-10(b)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/115-10(b)(1) (West 2020)) regarding U.I.’s testimony and recorded interview setting forth
statements made by D.I. to U.I.; and, failing to object to the hearsay testimony of the Child
Advocacy Center interviewer. The defendant also alleged that the circuit court violated his right
to counsel by barring him from speaking with his attorney during the recess. In his conclusion, the
defendant further claimed that any forfeiture of the issues set forth in the petition stemmed from
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
¶8 The circuit court advanced the petition to the second stage and appointed counsel.
Postconviction counsel filed an amended petition on June 20, 2023, that incorporated the
defendant’s pro se petition, developed the hearsay claims, and added an additional claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call certain witnesses, with a memorandum in
support of the amended petition styled as an actual innocence claim. Postconviction counsel filed
a Rule 651(c) certificate at the same time that the amended petition was filed. The State moved to
dismiss the petition on February 22, 2024. It argued that the petition’s claims were forfeited
because they could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, and that the amended petition
did not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
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¶9 The circuit court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion on March 20, 2024. At the
hearing, postconviction counsel first noted that the issues raised in the petition could and should
have been raised on direct appeal, and that part of the defendant’s argument was that “appellate
counsel should have raised these particular issues on direct appeal as to the hearsay, so some of
those instances would be as raised in our petition.” In her discussion of the hearsay issues,
postconviction counsel further stated, “[I]t was also then ineffective assistance for appellate
counsel not to challenge these things on direct appeal.” She later reiterated for a third time that the
defendant was not given effective assistance of counsel at the appellate level. The parties primarily
argued the petition on its merits and the circuit court found that the defendant had not made a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation. It addressed the claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel regarding the hearsay and uncalled-witnesses issues on their merits, but it did not
specifically address the right-to-counsel claim when announcing its decision. The circuit court
granted the State’s motion and dismissed the amended petition at the second stage. This timely
appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 The defendant appeals the circuit court’s second-stage dismissal of his postconviction
petition arguing that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). He first contends that postconviction counsel
should have amended the pro se petition to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for
failing to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective. Postconviction counsel’s failure
to include this allegation, he claims, subjected the claims set forth in the petition to forfeiture. The
defendant also argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing the amended petition in its entirety,
because the State’s motion to dismiss did not address his claim that he had been denied access to
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counsel during a recess in his trial testimony. He contends that postconviction counsel should have
raised this omission with the circuit court, and failure to do so was unreasonable assistance. He
asks that this court remand this matter for new second-stage proceedings, with new postconviction
counsel.
¶ 12 A. Rule of Law
¶ 13 The Act provides a statutory remedy to criminal defendants who claim substantial
violations of their constitutional rights occurred in the proceedings which resulted in their
convictions. People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 53; People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21.
A postconviction proceeding “is not a substitute for, or an addendum to, direct appeal.” People v.
Kokoraleis, 159 Ill. 2d 325, 328 (1994). “The purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to permit
inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that were not,
nor could have been, adjudicated previously upon direct appeal.” People v. Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d
480, 510 (2002). A postconviction petition must “clearly set forth the respects in which [the
defendant’s] constitutional rights were violated” and shall “have attached thereto affidavits,
records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.”
725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020).
¶ 14 “The Act provides a three-stage mechanism for a defendant to advance such a claim.”
People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 18. “At the first stage, the [circuit] court must independently
review the petition within 90 days of its filing and determine whether it is frivolous or patently
without merit.” Id. If the circuit court does not dismiss the petition, it must be further considered
at the second stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2020); Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 18.
¶ 15 The second stage of postconviction review tests the petition’s legal sufficiency. People v.
Dixon, 2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 12. At this stage, it is the defendant’s burden to make a
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substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Id. It is at this stage, also, that the State may move
to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2020). “If the State moves to dismiss, the [circuit]
court may hold a dismissal hearing, which is still part of the second stage.” People v. Wheeler, 392
Ill. App. 3d 303, 308 (2009). At this stage, the circuit court may dismiss a postconviction petition
if its allegations, taken as true and liberally construed in favor of the defendant, fail to warrant
relief under the Act. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31. “We review a [circuit] court’s
dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second stage de novo.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 17.
¶ 16 There exists no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in a postconviction
proceeding. People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007). Rather, the right to counsel under the Act
is a matter of “legislative grace.” People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 72 (1988). Accordingly, a
postconviction defendant is entitled only to a “reasonable” level of assistance. People v. Flores,
153 Ill. 2d 264, 276 (1992). To ensure that a postconviction defendant receives that level of
assistance, Rule 651(c) provides:
“The record filed in that court shall contain a showing, which may be
made by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that the attorney has consulted with
petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her
contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has examined the record of the
proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se
that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Ill. S.
Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 17 The purpose of this rule is to “ensure that counsel shapes the [defendant’s] claims into
proper legal form and presents those claims to the court.” People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 44
(2007). Proper presentation of claims includes making efforts to overcome procedural bars that
will result in dismissal of the petition if not rebutted. Id. When postconviction counsel files a Rule
651(c) certificate, a rebuttable presumption arises that counsel provided reasonable assistance.
Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21; People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 32.
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¶ 18 B. Unreasonable Assistance
¶ 19 The defendant’s first argument is that he received unreasonable assistance of
postconviction counsel because she failed to amend the postconviction petition to include a claim
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, exposing the defendant’s claims to forfeiture. This
failure runs afoul of Rule 651(c), the defendant argues, and states that remand is required
regardless of whether the circuit court considered these claims on their merits.
¶ 20 In support of this position, the defendant relies on Addison, 2023 IL 127119. In that case,
our supreme court held that a postconviction attorney’s failure to allege ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel was a failure to shape the defendant’s claims into their proper form in violation
of Rule 651(c). Id. ¶ 27. The Addison court further held that, because of this, remand was necessary
regardless of whether the underlying claims had merit. Id. ¶ 33. The State in this case counters that
the present case is distinguishable from Addison, because the circuit court dismissed the
defendant’s petition on its merits. In support of its position, the State relies on this court’s decision
in People v. Warnsley, 2025 IL App (5th) 230445-U.
¶ 21 Postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate in this case. It is therefore the
defendant’s burden to show that postconviction counsel failed to do what was necessary to
adequately present his claims. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21. In his attempt to carry this burden,
the defendant points to postconviction counsel’s supposed failure to amend the defendant’s pro se
petition to include a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and the consequent
exposure of his claims to forfeiture.
¶ 22 The defendant’s argument overlooks the conclusion of his own pro se petition. There, the
defendant stated, “Furthermore, any potential forfeiture, waiver, or procedural default stem from
the ineffectiveness of trial or appellate counsel.” In support, the defendant cited People v. Mauro,
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362 Ill. App. 3d 440, 444 (2005), in which the Second District advised postconviction defendants
to include such a statement in their petitions. Postconviction counsel later filed an amended petition
that incorporated the defendant’s pro se petition in its entirety. The amended petition therefore
included the defendant’s statement that any forfeiture of his claims stemmed from the
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Thus, the amendment the defendant faults postconviction
counsel for excluding was unnecessary, because the claim was already part of the petition before
the circuit court.
¶ 23 We acknowledge that, in Addison, our supreme court found that a similar statement was
not an “adequate presentation” of the defendant’s claim. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 24 n.1. In
that case, the amended petition’s conclusion stated that the defendant “ ‘received ineffective
assistance of counsel during pre-trial proceedings, during post-trial proceedings, and at the
appellate level.’ ” Id. The Addison court explained that this was not a substantive claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, because the petition nowhere explained how appellate
counsel was ineffective. Thus, even if the statement were to be treated as a claim, the court
reasoned, it was not an adequate presentation of that claim under Rule 651(c). Id. In reaching this
conclusion, the court examined five circumstances: (1) the claim was raised in such an obscure
way that no one recognized it as being in the petition, (2) the petition failed to set forth any way in
which appellate counsel was ineffective, (3) the State moved to dismiss the petition on the basis
that it contained no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, (4) postconviction counsel
never challenged the State’s claim that the allegation was not included, and (5) the circuit court
ruled on the petition with the understanding that it contained no claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
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¶ 24 Of these five circumstances, only the third is fully present here. As to the first, we
acknowledge that the statement in the defendant’s pro se petition was easy to miss, and neither
party has mentioned it on appeal. However, the record shows that postconviction counsel was
aware of it in the circuit court. In responding to the State’s motion to dismiss, she stated three
separate times that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise various claims, and on the
first mention told the court:
“In addressing the State’s Motion to Dismiss, part of the argument, walking through
this would, be res judicata and waiver, indicating that these are issues that could
and should have been raised on direct appeal. Absolutely. That’s part of our
argument is that appellate counsel should have raised these particular issues on
direct appeal as to the hearsay, so some of those instances would be as raised in our
petition.”
¶ 25 Postconviction counsel thus recognized that the defendant’s claims faced forfeiture, and
she understood the petition to answer that problem with an allegation that appellate counsel should
have raised the issues on direct appeal. She stated three times at the hearing on the motion to
dismiss that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to include the claims.
¶ 26 As to the second circumstance, the statement in the defendant’s pro se petition attributes
any forfeiture of the petition’s claims to appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. This is precisely the
type of allegation that the Addison court noted was absent in the petition before it. See id. (noting
that the petition nowhere alleged that “appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
claims asserted in the petition”).
¶ 27 The third circumstance is present here, as it was in Addison. The State moved to dismiss
on the basis that the petition did not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The fourth
and fifth circumstances, however, are absent. Counsel in Addison never countered the State’s
forfeiture argument, while postconviction counsel here met that argument directly. Id. ¶ 25.
Likewise, the trial court in Addison ruled with the understanding that the petition contained no
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claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id. ¶¶ 24 n.1, 40. The circuit court here, by
contrast, decided the defendant’s claims on their merits alone.
¶ 28 Accordingly, we find that the circumstances that led the Addison court to find an inadequate
presentation of the defendant’s claims are largely absent here. The allegation of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel in the defendant’s pro se petition was incorporated by reference
into the amended petition, and postconviction counsel addressed the relevant argument at the
hearing. Further, unlike Addison, the circuit court did not dismiss the petition based on a procedural
default, but rather dismissed the petition because it determined that the defendant’s claims lacked
merit, and the petition therefore failed to allege a constitutional violation. Where ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel was alleged and argued, and the circuit court did not dismiss the
petition based on a procedural default, but rather considered the petition on its merits, we cannot
conclude that postconviction counsel made an inadequate presentation of the defendant’s claims
in violation of Rule 651(c) as alleged in this appeal.
¶ 29 C. Dismissal of Right-to-Counsel Claim
¶ 30 The defendant next argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition in its
entirety. His pro se petition alleged that the circuit court violated his right to counsel by barring
him from speaking with his attorney during a recess in his testimony. Postconviction counsel
incorporated that claim into the amended petition, but did not argue that claim at the hearing on
the motion to dismiss. The State’s motion to dismiss also did not address that specific claim.
Without a motion specifically directed at this claim, the defendant’s argument runs, the circuit
court could have only dismissed it sua sponte, which the Act does not permit at the second stage.
Additionally, the defendant contends that postconviction counsel was unreasonable for failing to
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bring this omission to the circuit court’s attention and for failing to present the right-to-counsel
claim at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
¶ 31 The defendant is correct about the governing law. At the second stage, the State may either
answer the petition or move to dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2020). Once a petition has
advanced to the second stage, the circuit court may no longer dismiss it on its own motion. People
v. Starks, 2012 IL App (2d) 110324, ¶ 23; People v. Greer, 341 Ill. App. 3d 906, 910 (2003).
However, the State is free to seek dismissal of some claims, all claims, or none. See, e.g., People
v. Miller, 2017 IL App (3d) 140977, ¶ 30 (the State conceded one claim but challenged the
remainder). The first question, therefore, is whether the State’s motion sought to dismiss the right-
to-counsel claim. We find that it did.
¶ 32 While the State’s motion addressed most of the defendant’s claims individually, it did not
limit itself to those claims. Indeed, the motion closes by requesting the circuit court to dismiss the
petition in its entirety. By requesting the circuit court to dismiss the defendant’s petition in its
entirety, the State necessarily requested the circuit court to dismiss every claim within it, including
the right-to-counsel claim.
¶ 33 The defendant’s reliance on People v. Ressa, 2024 IL App (3d) 220259-U, does not change
our analysis. In that case, the State’s motion to dismiss discussed only three specified claims. Id.
¶ 18. The petition itself was so poorly organized in that case that the parties disputed, both in the
circuit court and on appeal, which claims it raised. Id. ¶ 44. Under those circumstances, the Third
District remanded to allow the State to respond to the claims its motion had not addressed. Id. ¶ 52.
Here, the right-to-counsel claim was set out plainly in the pro se petition and adopted by the
amended petition. The State’s motion sought to dismiss the amended petition as a whole, and
neither party disputes that the right-to-counsel claim forms part of the petition.
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¶ 34 The defendant argues that allowing general language of this kind would deprive defendants
of notice of the arguments they must answer. We are not persuaded that the defendant lacked notice
here. The State’s motion asked the circuit court to dismiss the amended petition, in its entirety,
without an evidentiary hearing. It did so on the grounds that the petition, the affidavits, and the
trial record, taken together, did not demonstrate the need for such a hearing. The defendant was
therefore on notice that the State sought the dismissal of every claim in the petition, including the
right-to-counsel claim.
¶ 35 The defendant points to two rules that, in his view, show that a motion to dismiss must
argue each claim with specificity; namely, that the State may amend its motion to dismiss at the
second stage, and that it may waive a timeliness defense. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 102
(2002); People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 49 (2007). There would be no need to clarify or
supplement a motion to dismiss, the defendant argues, if a general request for dismissal were
sufficient. We disagree. At the second stage, the question is whether the defendant has made a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Dixon, 2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 12. It is the
defendant’s burden to convince the court that the answer to that question is “yes.” Id. A motion
that asks the court to dismiss the entire petition is, in effect, stating that the defendant has not met
that burden. To be sure, the State may choose to strengthen its position with arguments directed at
particular claims, and it forgoes the right to do so at its own risk. Foregoing that right, however,
affects merely the strength of the State’s motion on a particular claim. It does not convert the
court’s ruling on that claim into a sua sponte dismissal. Where the law does not mandate that each
claim in the petition be specifically addressed in the State’s motion to dismiss the petition, we will
not add such a requirement. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2020); but see People v. Cowart, 2015 IL
App (1st) 131073, ¶ 11 (the State forfeits nonjurisdictional procedural challenges to
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postconviction petitions when it fails to raise any such challenge in a motion to dismiss).
Accordingly, by granting the State’s request to dismiss the amended petition in its entirety in this
case, the circuit court did not engage in an improper sua sponte dismissal of the defendant’s claim.
¶ 36 Couched within his argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing the right-to-counsel
claim without a proper motion from the State, the defendant sets forth two additional claims that
postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance. He asserts that he received unreasonable
assistance where postconviction counsel failed to highlight the lack of specificity in the State’s
motion regarding the right-to-counsel claim, and failed to present argument on that issue at the
hearing.
¶ 37 The defendant asks us not to engage in a prejudice analysis of these claims, arguing that
postconviction counsel’s failure to comply with her duty to present the claim at the hearing is a
Rule 651(c) violation requiring remand for new second-stage proceedings. This request
misapprehends the rule; once counsel has shaped the claims “into the proper legal form” and
presented them, “Rule 651(c)’s purpose has been satisfied,” and the duties at later hearings “turn[ ]
on the requirement to provide reasonable representation—not on Rule 651(c)’s mandates.” People
v. Smith, 2022 IL 126940, ¶¶ 28-29. Because the pro se petition, incorporated into the amended
petition, adequately presented the right-to-counsel claim, we review postconviction counsel’s
assistance at the motion to dismiss hearing under the reasonable representation standard.
¶ 38 Courts have recognized that we may apply the Strickland test 1 for ineffective assistance of
counsel to measure “reasonable” performance under the Act, as “it stands to reason that, if
postconviction counsel’s assistance cannot be deemed ineffective under Strickland, it cannot be
1
The United States Supreme Court set forth the two-prong test to evaluate claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984), adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984).
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deemed unreasonable under the Act.” People v. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶ 36. Under
the Strickland test, the defendant must prove both that: (1) his attorney’s errors were so serious as
to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that these errors prejudiced the
defendant to the point that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A
“reasonable probability” of a different result is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the proceeding’s outcome. Id. To be successful on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
the defendant must satisfy both prongs. Id. at 697. While the failure to establish either prong
precludes the finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, we may dispose of a claim by examining
either the performance or the prejudice prong alone. See People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476
(2003). For the following reasons, we find that both of the defendant’s claims of unreasonable
assistance regarding the right-to-counsel issue fail the Strickland test.
¶ 39 We first note that while the circuit court did not specifically address the right-to-counsel
claim when it granted the State’s motion to dismiss, it was only required to determine whether the
defendant had made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, and a claim-by-claim
evaluation was not required to be set forth when it announced its decision. See People v. Maclin,
2014 IL App (1st) 110342, ¶ 27; see also People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 139 (2007) (when a
petition is summarily dismissed, the trial court impliedly denies all requests in the defendant’s
prayer for relief). Further, our review of the ultimate issue as to whether the circuit court erred in
dismissing the claim is de novo; under de novo review, we evaluate the circuit court’s judgment,
not its reasoning, and we may affirm on any basis in the record. People v. Munz, 2021 IL App (2d)
180873, ¶ 27.
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¶ 40 The defendant claimed in his petition that he was denied his right to counsel when he was
directed not to speak to his trial attorney during a brief, approximately 10-minute recess that
occurred in the middle of his testimony. Postconviction counsel’s failure to discuss the issue at the
hearing does not limit our review. Failure to argue a claim that is included in the petition does not
result in its waiver. See 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2020) (waiver occurs when a claim is not included
in the original or amended petition). The record makes clear that when the recess was taken, the
defendant did not ask to be permitted to speak to his attorney at that time, and his attorney did not
make any such request. Under these facts, where the mid-testimony recess was brief and the
defendant never indicated a desire to confer with trial counsel, we cannot say that a defendant was
denied their right to counsel. See People v. Brooks, 115 Ill. 2d 510, 521 (1987) (defendant was not
denied right to counsel where recess was brief and no desire to confer with attorney was expressed)
(abrogated on other grounds). We therefore find that the defendant’s petition failed to demonstrate
a constitutional violation as to this issue.
¶ 41 As such, even if postconviction counsel had argued the right-to-counsel issue at the
hearing, and even if the circuit court had stated a basis for its dismissal of the claim, neither would
have impacted our decision. Illinois law does not support a constitutional violation under these
facts. Any contrary argument by postconviction counsel would have been futile, and
postconviction counsel cannot be deemed unreasonable for failing to make a futile argument. See
People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 438 (2005). Thus, postconviction counsel’s performance did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and the defendant has failed to establish
the first prong of Strickland. Accordingly, we find that postconviction counsel did not render
unreasonable assistant of counsel with regard to the defendant’s right-to-counsel claim.
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¶ 42 Based on the foregoing, we find that an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel was brought before the circuit court, that the State’s motion to dismiss sufficiently
challenged whether the petition made a substantial showing of a claim of a constitutional violation,
and that postconviction counsel did not render unreasonable assistance of counsel. Accordingly,
we find no error in the circuit court’s dismissal of the defendant’s amended postconviction petition
at the second stage.
¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Macon County.
¶ 45 Affirmed.
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