Viktoria v. Devai v. John M. Burk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 53351 VIKTORIA V. DEVAI, ) ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) Boise, April 2026 Term ) v. ) Opinion Filed: July 15, 2026 ) JOHN M. BURK, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk ) Respondent. ) Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Clark A. Peterson, Magistrate Judge. The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. Viktoria V. Devai, Appellant pro se, submitted argument on the briefs. John M. Burk, Respondent pro se, submitted argument on the briefs. _____________________ MEYER, Justice. This is an expedited, permissive appeal from a high-conflict custody modification dispute concerning the parties’ minor child. Appellant Viktoria V. Devai and Respondent John M. Burk are the parents of a six-year-old child. After an eight-day trial, the magistrate court granted Burk’s petition to modify custody in part, maintaining joint legal and physical custody and adopting a week-on, week-off schedule that increased Burk’s parenting time. We affirm the magistrate court’s judgment because substantial and competent evidence supports its findings that no domestic violence, as defined by Idaho Code section 39-6303(1), occurred and that Burk did not abuse the child. In addition, the court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the best-interest factors under Idaho Code section 32-717(1), in delegating limited school-selection authority, or in relying on the court-ordered parenting time evaluation. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We note at the outset that the facts and record in this case are extensive. The 2025 memorandum decision and order is 223 pages and was issued following an eight-day court trial. Since the initiation of the modification proceedings, the parties have filed nine motions for 1 temporary custody orders, five of which were filed within the past year. The record contains numerous audio and video exhibits. Most of the parties’ appellate briefing is devoted to recounting the disputed facts in the record, much of which reiterates positions previously advanced before the magistrate court. While we recognize the extensive background and intense emotion underlying this case, our opinion will address only the facts most relevant to the present appeal. A. The parties, their child, and the stipulated custody orders. Devai and Burk are the parents of one child, born January 13, 2020 (the child). The parties met in 2017 in Bellingham, Washington. Devai moved in with Burk in the spring of 2018 and the two moved to Texas in October 2018. Conflict arose, and the couple separated and reunited several times. Devai became pregnant with the child in the summer of 2019. During the pregnancy, Burk discovered that Devai was still married to another man and was in the United States on a marriage visa. Devai described Burk as verbally, physically, and emotionally abusive and controlling early on in their relationship. After the child’s birth, Burk engaged in conduct he later acknowledged as inappropriate, including damaging property and making demeaning comments to Devai. While in Texas, Devai obtained a temporary civil protection order against Burk based on allegations of domestic violence. At the first contested hearing, the case was dismissed at her request, and no finding of domestic violence was made. The parties then moved to Post Falls, Idaho, for a fresh start in May 2020. In early October 2020, Devai filed a petition for a civil protection order in Kootenai County, seeking protection from Burk for herself and the child. Devai alleged spousal rape and other domestic violence. The court entered an ex parte temporary civil protection order the same day, protecting Devai but not the child. That order resulted in Burk leaving the parties’ shared apartment. At the same time, Devai filed a petition for a decree establishing paternity and an order regarding child custody, visitation, and child support. She sought sole legal and physical custody of the child and an ex parte temporary order to the same effect. The court issued an ex parte order awarding Devai temporary sole physical custody of the child until a full hearing on the merits of the case could be heard. Devai and Burk reached a settlement agreement regarding temporary custody before the scheduled hearing on the merits. Devai was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child, who was ten months old, and Burk received one hour once a week supervised visitation, subject 2 to an increase based on supervisor feedback and “agreements reached between the parties through their attorneys.” Pursuant to a term in the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that they would not modify the parenting plan before the child turned three years old. In addition, the court dismissed the civil protection order. However, in the temporary custody order, Burk was still ordered not to contact or come within 300 feet of Devai, her residence, or her employment. Burk was ordered to complete a domestic violence intervention program and a nurturing fathers parenting class. Sometime after the temporary custody order was entered, Burk moved into the same apartment complex where Devai and the child resided. Devai’s apartment unit was 101, and Burk’s unit was 205. Burk maintained that the only available affordable housing option after months of waiting was in the same complex, but it was over 300 feet away from Devai’s apartment, and he took “great steps” to avoid Devai. When the child was one year and four months old, Devai and Burk entered a stipulated decree of paternity, custody, visitation, and support on May 18, 2021. That decree awarded joint legal and physical custody to both parties and gave Burk unsupervised visitation on alternate weekends, with no overnights. Because Burk had not completed a domestic violence intervention program or a nurturing fathers parenting class yet, those requirements remained in the decree. Burk completed a 52-week domestic violence intervention program in November 2021. He also subsequently completed the iCare Nurturing Father’s program. In the summer of 2022, Devai moved to a new apartment complex in Spokane Valley, Washington. In July, Burk filed a contempt action alleging Devai engaged in conduct at exchanges that violated the decree. Burk alleged that Devai would argue with him in front of the child, direct which activities were allowed during his visits, and demand explanations for what he planned to do during those visits. The parties resolved the contempt action by stipulation, which resulted in the entry of an amended final judgment and decree on September 14, 2022. The child was two years and eight months old. The amended decree continued joint legal and physical custody, did not change the parenting time, but included provisions governing conduct at exchanges. The exchange provisions included: The parties shall not speak to one another at the parenting exchanges, except only as necessary to effectuate the exchange itself, and regarding no other parenting or non-parenting related matters. All other communication shall occur only through a 3  parenting app ([Our] Family Wizard, etc.) and the parenting app communication shall be related only to matters pertaining to the minor child. . . . The parties may record during their parenting exchanges, but their phones or recording devices must be discrete [sic] and not held in front of the minor child or be obvious to the child, e.g. not holding the phone in front of the minor child’s face. B. The modification petitions and the pre-trial proceedings. On January 20, 2023, immediately after the child turned three years old, Burk filed an amended petition to modify, which is the focus of this appeal. Burk alleged that a permanent, material, and substantial change in circumstance occurred, and he requested, among other things, that: (1) the court appoint a parenting time evaluator, (2) Devai submit to a mental health evaluation, (3) the court modify physical custody to “every Monday from 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. and every other Friday from 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 6:00 p.m.[,]” and annual alternating holidays. Devai also filed a counterclaim alleging a change in circumstance, but she requested that “the current order remain in place with no changes” except that Burk’s Wednesday visit be removed from the current parenting plan because he no longer visited the child on Wednesdays. While the modification case was pending, Burk filed a motion for a parenting time evaluator, which the court granted. In addition, the court ordered an Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) investigation in response to Devai’s allegation that the child claimed that Burk had hit the child. To defend himself against Devai’s allegations of child abuse, Burk installed “Blink” home surveillance cameras throughout his home and recorded when the child was in his care. The system was motion-activated, recording whenever a motion sensor detected a person in a room. The cameras covered multiple areas of the home, including the child’s bedroom, the kitchen, and other common areas. Burk also wore a body camera during custody exchanges. The IDHW filed a report concerning Devai’s report that Burk hit the child, concluding “[t]he department has no concerns for the safety of” the child. The court entered a temporary order in June 2023 that provided Burk one overnight visit “every other Tuesday from 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 6:00 p.m.” Devai subsequently filed an emergency motion for temporary custody based on her earlier allegation that Burk hit the child on the head. She also asserted new allegations against Burk for physical abuse of the child, and further claimed that he was “coaching, alienating, and causing 4 emotional and mental harm” to the child. To support her allegations that Burk was coaching the child and alienating their relationship, Devai described disparaging remarks from the child toward Devai, such as calling her “a fucking piece of shit,” “disgusting,” and “crazy.” Devai claimed that the IDHW report contained false statements, that the caseworker lied in her report, and that the caseworker “disregarded” the court’s order to investigate because she “never asked any questions to [the child] about . . . [Burk] hitting” the child. The court denied Devai’s motion after the parenting time evaluator filed a report concluding that, although evidence of verbal and emotional abuse existed, primarily from Burk toward Devai, there was no evidence that Burk abused the child. C. The parenting time evaluation. The parenting time evaluator, Mary H. Hoffman, conducted intake and follow-up interviews with each parent, observed parent-child-family interactions, contacted third parties, and reviewed records. The evaluation stated that the methods and procedures conform to the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) Model Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation and the 2022 AFCC Guidelines for Parenting Plan Evaluations. The evaluator noted that Devai and Burk maintained a contentious relationship characterized by allegations of domestic violence, child maltreatment, and persistent high conflict. Devai alleged that Burk had abused both her and the child, whereas Burk asserted that Devai was alienating the child from him and making false accusations of abuse. The evaluator acknowledged that both parents demonstrated loving and attentive behavior toward the child, who appeared comfortable, happy, and engaged with each parent. Both households were assessed as safe and appropriate environments. Although Devai reported multiple instances of abuse and neglect by Burk, none were substantiated by investigating authorities, and Burk did not face criminal charges related to abuse. The parenting time evaluator noted that although Burk “has taken extreme measures to ensure his time with [the child] is documented and he can provide evidence of [the child’s] safety in his home and with him, [Devai] continues to allege his abusive and dangerous behavior toward [the child].” The parenting time evaluator characterized the ongoing conflict between Devai and Burk as marked by poor communication and limited cooperation. Both parents engaged in behaviors that perpetuated this conflict, including disputes over medical decisions, parenting styles, and childcare payments, all of which adversely affected the child. Both parents recorded custody 5 exchanges and there were mutual accusations of parental alienation and coaching the child. The child appeared well-adjusted in both homes but exhibited behavioral changes likely associated with parental conflict. The parenting time evaluator noted that continued exposure to the parents’ conflict presented significant risks to the child’s emotional well-being. As mentioned above, the parenting time evaluator concluded that, while evidence of verbal and emotional abuse existed, primarily from Burk toward Devai, there was no substantiated evidence of child abuse by Burk. The parenting time evaluator recommended that the child primarily reside with Devai while maintaining substantial time with Burk under a shared physical custody arrangement. She recommended that exchanges should occur without direct parental contact, preferably at daycare or facilitated by a third party. The parenting time evaluator advised the court that both parents should complete co-parenting and communication programs and consider individual counseling. To facilitate communication, the evaluator recommended that the parties download a co-parenting app to communicate, such as OurFamilyWizard. Finally, the evaluator advised the court to appoint a parenting coordinator and order both parents to complete psychological evaluations. Shortly after the parenting time evaluator’s report was filed, the court ordered the parties to submit to psychological evaluations. Devai’s evaluation concluded that she “presents in generally unremarkable terms, psychologically and emotionally.” However, it noted that she has tendencies toward denial, tension, conformity, and defensiveness, with “Obsessive-Compulsive, histrionic, and mild narcissistic personality features or traits.” Burk’s evaluation noted that he did not have major psychiatric or personality disorders. He was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, which was considered situational and likely to resolve when current stressors decrease, specifically “his custody situation[.]” D. IDHW investigations. Three IDHW investigation reports were admitted as evidence at trial. The first IDHW investigation followed Devai’s allegation that the child told her that Burk “hit the minor child” in the summer of 2023. That investigation report concluded: [T]here have been no injuries that were not consistent with normal bumps and bruises for a child [that] age. There have been no injuries that indicated that [the child] has been abused. Even when [Devai] is provided a reasonable explanation for an injury on [the child], she will allege abuse. [Devai] believes that anyone who disagrees with her is an unreasonable person. [IDHW] does not have any concerns for [Burk’s] ability to care for [the child]. 6 The caseworker who completed the investigation stated that Devai “appears to make allegations that have no context and expects others to take her allegations as fact without any evidence,” and recommended Devai obtain a psychological evaluation based on “concern that she may be struggling with mental health issues that impairs her ability to view the reality of the situation.” Furthermore, the caseworker cautioned that “[t]he contentious coparenting relationship” negatively affects the child “and could potentially be hindering the parental bond” with Burk. The second IDHW investigation report, filed in January 2024, noted that out of fourteen reports of abuse concerning the family since 2021, none had been substantiated. The caseworker who completed the investigation interviewed the child and Devai in the caseworker’s office. She also interviewed the child and Burk in Burk’s home on two occasions. The caseworker noted that Devai failed to follow up with law enforcement and to report abuse allegations in a timely manner. The investigation concluded that “[t]here have been no substantiated claims of abuse or neglect” and that “[t]he child appears to be safe and having her needs met.” The second report further noted that Devai “appears to lack insight into how her thoughts about [Burk] and the ongoing custodial dispute impacts [the child].” The third IDHW report was ordered after the fifth day of trial in response to Devai’s introduction to the “Hotdog” video, discussed in more detail below. Devai did not cooperate with the investigation and did not bring the child in for an interview. Burk was prevented from bringing the child in after Devai obtained a temporary protection order in Washington. The report, completed without interviewing the child, stated that “there has been no evidence of abuse occurring at the hands of the father” and that the child appeared “clearly emotionally distraught” in a video provided to the IDHW. The caseworker recommended a parental fitness evaluation of both parents, counseling for both parents and the child, parenting classes, and psychoeducation regarding the impact of parental conflict on a young child. E. Other motions throughout the case. Both parties filed motions for contempt against the other while their modification case was pending. Devai filed her motion against Burk over unpaid childcare costs. Burk responded with 42 counts of contempt against Devai for her conduct at exchanges and missed visits with the child. The court found Burk in contempt on two counts and Devai on 36 counts. At times, both parties represented themselves, though Devai later had a public defender represent her in the contempt 7 proceedings. Based on a request from both parties, the court did not impose sanctions against either Devai or Burk. Devai repeatedly filed motions to disqualify Judge Clark Peterson before and during the trial. She alleged judicial misconduct, bias, and improper appointment of Kacey Wall as Guardian ad Litem (GAL) for the child based on Judge Peterson and Wall’s “relationship as former business partners and colleagues.” The court denied all Devai’s motions for disqualification. On all motions, the court explained that Devai’s allegations did not evidence bias or procedural error, and the court consistently reaffirmed its impartiality. The court also addressed Devai’s concerns about the GAL appointment, explaining that any prior professional overlap with the GAL lasted approximately one to one and a half years, that they had no personal or social relationship outside of work, and that the appointment was appropriate given the limited number of qualified individuals. F. The eight-day trial and the related GAL appointment. A bench trial began on February 2, 2025, and continued over eight nonconsecutive days, with the final day occurring in July 2025. On the fifth day of trial, Devai testified that on December 18, 2024, and January 6, 2025, the child disclosed that Burk had hit her. Devai introduced Exhibit 291, the “Hotdog” video, filmed on January 6, 2025. The video shows the child striking Devai and stating that Burk had instructed the child to harm the child’s stuffed animal. To address concerns raised by the video, the court ordered the third IDHW investigation, appointed the GAL, and ordered Burk to preserve all surveillance videos from his home recording system covering the dates leading up to the disclosures. Devai also introduced Exhibit 303, the “name calling” video that recorded the child using profanity directed at Devai and stating that the child wanted to “kill” and “shoot” Devai. While the trial was pending and the third IDHW investigation was ongoing, Devai obtained a temporary ex parte domestic violence protection order for her and the child in Washington. In her petition, Devai alleged that the child disclosed that during visits at Burk’s house he “has pulled a gun on [the child] when [the child] ‘cries for mommy.’” Following a UCCJEA 1 conference between Judge Marla L. Polin of the Superior Court of the State of Washington, County of Spokane, and Judge Peterson, the Washington court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Burk, but it was appropriate to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction for three weeks to 1 UCCJEA is an acronym for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. It is codified at Idaho Code sections 32-11-101 to -405. 8 allow Devai the opportunity to seek the same relief in Idaho. At this time, Devai enrolled the child, who was five years old, at Liberty Creek Elementary in the Central Valley School District in Washington for the upcoming Fall 2025 school year. The GAL filed an interim report in the middle of the trial explaining that after reviewing materials submitted by both parties, she was unable to provide the court with more assistance without further investigation. However, the GAL provided six recommendations pending her investigation. She recommended that first, exchanges should occur with an intermediary, such as a court-approved parenting time supervisor where one parent drops off the child and leaves, and the other parent picks up the child. Second, both parents must immediately message the off-duty parent about any incident causing a mark or injury to the child, including a description and photograph. The GAL should be emailed the same information. Third, the parents must not use corporal punishment to discipline the child. Fourth, they should avoid adult jokes or sarcasm the child may take literally, as the child may be sensitive to these statements and unable to distinguish them from genuine sentiment. Fifth, both must follow all advice from the child’s medical providers, including for a skin condition. Finally, Devai must provide a list of the child’s favorite foods, and Burk should try to keep the child’s diet consistent with that list. Burk should temporarily document what the child eats to build trust. On April 9, 2025, the court reinstated the previous temporary order regarding custody, denied competing motions for temporary custody, and adopted the GAL’s recommendations one through five with minor modifications. It also ordered that while arrangements were made for an exchange supervisor, Devai’s mother would handle the child’s exchanges on Devai’s behalf. However, in August, Devai’s mother filed an affidavit criticizing Judge Peterson’s continued assignment on the case and stating, among other concerns, that she would “not participate in the court-ordered sanctioned abuse of a child . . . .” After conducting further investigation, the GAL filed her report on June 10, 2025. The GAL stated that Devai did not fully cooperate, whereas Burk was cooperative and provided extensive video and audio evidence of his time with the child. The GAL reviewed all relevant documents, recordings, and allegations, including claims that Burk hit the child with a Christmas star, failed to care for the child’s eczema, and did not provide enough food. The evidence, including numerous videos of daily life, meals, and holiday activities, showed the child was comfortable, well cared for, and enjoyed a positive relationship with Burk. The GAL investigated allegations of 9 weight loss after visits with Burk, but after reviewing a log of what the child ate and watching videos of the child eating meals at Burk’s home, concluded that the child’s meals were appropriate, and the child appeared happy and healthy. The GAL stated that the child felt safe with both parents and did not exhibit fear or withdrawal toward Burk. The GAL stated that she was “unable to recommend a specific parenting schedule.” However, she recommended joint legal and physical custody, meaningful time with both parents, shared decision-making, supervised exchanges, coordinated communication, and consistent monitoring of the child’s weight. The bench trial concluded on July 9, 2025, and the court took the matter under advisement. G. The magistrate court’s memorandum decision, decree of modification, and other orders. On August 12, 2025, the magistrate court issued a memorandum decision and order. The court identified a substantial, material, and permanent change of circumstances based on the child’s increased age (then five and a half years old), the child would soon begin attending school, the escalation of conflict, and the child’s distress. The court found that Devai’s allegations of abuse of the child by Burk were not supported by the evidence. The IDHW investigations, the parenting time evaluation, and the GAL all concluded that the child was safe in Burk’s care. The court found that Devai was the instigator of the conflict between the parties and that her conduct had caused the child distress. The court further found that the child’s behavior showed turmoil and dysregulation in Devai’s care that did not occur in Burk’s care. After analyzing each factor under Idaho Code section 32-717(1) and the presumption in favor of joint custody under Idaho Code section 32-717B, the magistrate court granted in part and denied in part Burk’s amended petition to modify. The court continued the award of joint legal and physical custody and ordered a week-on, week-off custody schedule. The court appointed a parenting coordinator and an exchange supervisor and ordered counseling for the child and for both parents. The court further declared that Devai’s enrollment of the child in school during the pendency of a temporary protection order was not binding, and the court provided a process for school selection. Devai filed a motion for permissive appeal, which this Court granted on an expedited timeline. II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion by failing to give sufficient weight to the domestic violence and child abuse factors under Idaho Code sections 32-717 and 39- 6303. 10  2. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion by authorizing Burk to select a school within his or Devai’s home district if the parties could not agree on a school by a specified date. 3. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion by relying on the parenting time evaluation. III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW Child custody determinations fall within the sound discretion of the magistrate court. Raber v. Raber, 175 Idaho 365, ___, 565 P.3d 808, 811 (2025). Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court asks whether the magistrate court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). This Court will not overturn child custody determinations by the trial court absent an abuse of discretion. Raber, 175 Idaho at ___, 565 P.3d at 811. In child custody matters, “abuse of the trial court’s discretion occurs only when the evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that the interests and welfare of the minor children would be best served by a particular custody award or modification.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Biggers v. Biggers, 103 Idaho 550, 555, 650 P.2d 692, 697 (1982)). IV. ANALYSIS Devai appeals from the magistrate court’s memorandum decision and order and the decree of modification. She requests reversal of the magistrate court’s judgment, protective orders for the child, a remand of the case, and removal of the assigned magistrate judge. A. Devai waived the issue of judicial bias on appeal. As a preliminary matter, Devai’s appellate brief contains numerous allegations of bias, evidence tampering, and retaliation by the magistrate judge against her. Burk responded to these claims as a distinct issue raised on appeal. Rule 35 of the Idaho Appellate Rules requires “[a] list of the issues presented on appeal, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of the issues should be short and concise, and should not be repetitious.” I.A.R. 35(a)(4). In addition, even when “an issue is explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.” Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 11 1146, 1152 (2010); see also I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (“The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.”). “Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by [this] Court.” Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152 (citing Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975)). A “general attack” on the trial court’s findings and conclusions “without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.” Id. “This Court will not search the record on appeal for error.” Id. “Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in compliance with the [Idaho Appellate Rules], it is deemed to be waived.” Id. “This Court has repeatedly held that pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those litigants represented by an attorney.” Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Butcher, 157 Idaho 577, 580, 338 P.3d 556, 556 (2014) (quoting Clark v. Cry Baby Foods, LLC, 155 Idaho 182, 185, 307 P.3d 1208, 1211 (2013)). “Pro se litigants, like all other litigants, must comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules and standards of appellate practice.” Id. Devai’s statement of issues presented does not identify judicial bias, retaliation, evidence tampering, or refusal to disqualify as issues presented on appeal. Nevertheless, her brief contains multiple allegations of bias. In the statement of the case, she asserts that her “appeal arises from conduct that shocks the conscience, including abuses of judicial authority, obstruction of justice, and the deliberate tampering and doctoring of facts to manufacture an outcome through retaliatory harm and malicious injury after an intolerable appearance of bias was raised to produce a favorabl[e] outcome for [Burk].” She further alleges that she “testified before the Idaho State Legislature regarding the abuses in this case and has gathered additional victims of the same magistrate, resulting in the Idaho Supreme Court granting investigation into the conduct of the presiding judge . . . .” In her recitation of the procedural history, Devai contends that the magistrate judge engaged in “obstructing justice, tampering and doctoring of the evidence and the record to produce favorable outcome for [Burk] in a continuum patter [sic] of retaliatory harm and appearance of bias . . . .” These allegations are not supported by citations to the record, cogent argument, or legal authority. Rather, they are unsupported ad hominem attacks based solely on the magistrate court’s 12 rulings that are adverse to Devai. In addition to failing to identify specific conduct as grounds for judicial bias, retaliation, evidence tampering, or failure to disqualify as a discrete issue on appeal, Devai failed to provide a legal analysis section of her brief to the issue from which we could divine that this was an issue Devai intended to present on appeal. See Beebe v. N. Idaho Day Surgery, LLC, 171 Idaho 779, 789, 526 P.3d 650, 660 (2023) (holding that I.A.R. 35(a)(4) “might be relaxed where the issue was addressed by authorities cited or arguments contained in the briefs”). The magistrate court addressed Devai’s bias claims on several occasions and disclaimed having any bias toward either party. For example, at the January 16, 2025, hearing on Devai’s motion to disqualify, the magistrate judge explained that he did not have a bias or prejudice for or against either party, that rulings are “simply incident to the [c]ourt’s job of making rulings” and do not constitute bias, and that citizen complaints to judicial offices do not mandate disqualification. The magistrate court addressed similar contentions at the January 30, 2025, hearing on Devai’s motion to continue trial; the March 14, 2025, UCCJEA conference; the March 28, 2025, hearing on Devai’s third motion to disqualify; the May 22, 2025, hearing on her motion for reconsideration; and the September 12, 2025, hearing on her motion for stay and recusal. Devai’s opening brief does not reference these rulings in the clerk’s record, cite the relevant portions of the reporter’s transcript, or analyze how the magistrate court abused its discretion in making those decisions. In addition, Devai does not cite the Idaho Code, Rule 109 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure governing disqualification, or any authority on the standard of review for judicial recusal or disqualification. As a result, Devai has waived the issue on appeal, and her unsupported allegations of bias, evidence tampering, and retaliation by the magistrate court will not be addressed further. B. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody to increase Burk’s parenting time. Devai asserts that the magistrate court abused its discretion by determining that no domestic violence or child abuse by Burk occurred, which, according to her, led the court to bypass the statutory factors outlined in Idaho Code sections 32-717(1) and 39-6303. She references Exhibit 36, a video recording of Burk’s conduct toward her around the time of the child’s birth, as well as photographs of bruising, property damage to a coffee table and door, and a temporary civil protection order obtained in Texas. Devai further argues that Burk’s completion of a 52-week domestic violence intervention program and the conditions imposed by the November 2020 temporary order corroborate the occurrence of domestic violence. In addition, she maintains that 13 the child’s therapist contacted IDHW’s Division of Child and Family Services (CFS) on five occasions, as documented in Exhibit 228, and contends that the court relied on unfounded IDHW investigations, failed to consider the child’s disclosures, weight loss data, and testimony regarding starvation, and that the finding identifying her as the instigator of conflict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Burk responds that the magistrate court’s findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence and that no abuse of discretion occurred. He asserts that the court considered the statutory factors and the evidence of domestic violence under Idaho Code section 32-717 but concluded that the evidence did not meet the statutory definition of domestic violence under Idaho Code section 39-6303. He further emphasizes that the magistrate court distinguished between historical intimate partner violence, reactive aggression, and statutory domestic violence; that three IDHW investigations concluded that the abuse claims were unfounded; that both the parenting time evaluator and the GAL reviewed in-home camera footage and reported no evidence of abuse; that both parties stipulated to joint legal and physical custody in 2021 and 2022; and that the presumption under Idaho Code section 32-717B remained unrebutted. A party seeking to modify an existing custody order must first demonstrate that a material and substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the prior order. Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 359, 347 P.3d 645, 651 (2015) (quoting Suter v. Biggers, 157 Idaho 542, 546, 337 P.3d 1271, 1275 (2014)). Upon such a showing, the court determines custody and residence based on the best interests of the child standard set forth in Idaho Code section 32-717. Id. The court must consider not only material, permanent, and substantial changes in conditions or circumstances, but must also thoroughly examine the implications of any evident change with respect to the best interests of the child. Woods v. Woods, 163 Idaho 904, 907, 422 P.3d 1110, 1113 (2018) (citation omitted). Even minor or seemingly insignificant changes in circumstances may significantly affect children. Id. (citation omitted). The best interests of the child remain “the controlling consideration in all custody proceedings.” Id. Idaho Code section 32-717(1) directs the court to consider all relevant factors, including the wishes of the parents and the child, the interaction between the child and the parents, the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community, the character and circumstances of the parties, the need to promote continuity and stability, and domestic violence as defined in Idaho Code section 14 39-6303. I.C. § 32-717(1). This list is neither exhaustive nor mandatory, as the court may consider other relevant factors. Lamont, 158 Idaho at 359, 347 P.3d at 651 (citation omitted). Idaho Code section 32-717B establishes “a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child[,]” unless a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates otherwise. I.C. § 32-717B(4). The statute also provides for a presumption that joint custody is not in the best interest of the child if one parent is found “to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303.” I.C. § 32-717B(5); see Lamont, 158 Idaho at 360, 347 P.3d at 652. Idaho Code section 39-6303 defines “domestic violence” as “the physical injury, sexual abuse or forced imprisonment or threat thereof of a family or household member, or of