Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 52401-2024 WAYNE MORRISON, ) ) Plaintiff-Counterdefendant- ) Boise, April 2026 Term Appellant, ) ) Opinion filed: June 30, 2026 and ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk TODD MORRISON, BRYANT MORRISON, ) and LYN DEESUE MORRISON, ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ) ) CHRISTINA K. THOMPSON, as Trustee of ) the Petra E. Morrison Trust, and as Trustee ) of the Frank L. Morrison Trust, ) ) Defendant-Counterclaimant- ) Respondent, ) ) and ) ) CHARLES THOMPSON and CHRISTINA ) THOMPSON, husband and wife, ) individually; CRAIG THOMPSON, ) CAROLYN HASTINGS, and CARL ) THOMPSON, ) ) Defendants-Respondents, ) ) and ) ) DOES INDIVIDUALS/ENTITIES 1-10, ) ) Defendants. ) _____________________________ ) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETRA ) MORRISON TRUST, uta May 14, 2007, and ) as AMENDED September 16, 2016; ) CHRISTINA K. THOMPSON, Successor ) Trustee, ) 1 ) Petitioner. ) _____________________________ ) IN THE MATTER OF THE FRANK ) MORRISON TRUST, uta February 13, 1986, ) CHRISTINA K. THOMPSON, Co-Trustee, ) ) Petitioner. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Blaine County. Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge. The decision of the district court is affirmed. Elam & Burke, P.A., Boise, for Appellants. Kirsten Hahn argued. Haemmerle Law, PLLC, Hailey, for Respondents Christina K. Thompson as Successor Trustee of the Petra Morrison Trust and the Co-Trustee of the Frank Morrison Trust; and Carolyn Hastings as Co-Trustee of the Frank Morrison Trust. Fritz Haemmerle argued. Stanek Law, PLLC, Hailey, for Respondents Christina Thompson, Charles Thompson, Craig Thompson, Carolyn Hastings, and Carl Thompson. Joshua Stanek argued. ZAHN, Justice. Wayne Morrison and his children (“the Morrisons”) appeal from several district court orders concerning the administration and distribution of two trusts established by Wayne’s parents: the Frank Morrison Trust (“FMT”) and the Petra Morrison Trust (“PMT”). Wayne’s sister, Christina K. Thompson, is a trustee of both trusts. Christina’s daughter, Carolyn, is a co-trustee of the FMT. The primary asset of each trust is a fractional ownership interest in a piece of real property known as the Farnlun property. Wayne filed a complaint against Christina in her individual and trustee capacities, asserting a variety of claims against Christina that concerned her alleged breaches of the trust and of fiduciary duty, and seeking an accounting. Wayne later amended the complaint twice to add Christina’s husband and his and Christina’s children as parties, to assert a variety of claims concerning Christina’s alleged fraud, and to seek partition of the Farnlun property by sale. 2 Christina commenced her own petitions in the district court, in her capacity as trustee, seeking to distribute the FMT and the PMT in-kind, which would allow the Farnlun property to remain in the family. The Morrisons opposed the petitions, requested that the Farnlun property be sold, and that the sale proceeds be distributed according to their respective interests in each trust. The parties stipulated to consolidate the Morrisons’ and Christina’s cases before the district court. The Morrisons filed a motion to remove Christina and Carolyn as trustees, which the district court denied. Christina and her family (“the Thompsons”) filed several motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the Thompsons’ motions and (1) dismissed the partition action; (2) determined that Wayne had violated a “no-contest” clause in the PMT and therefore was not entitled to any share of that trust; and (3) granted the petitions for distribution in kind, determined the value of the Farnlun property, awarded Christina the entirety of the PMT and determined the beneficiaries’ interests in the FMT. The Thompsons later filed a motion for attorney fees under Idaho Code sections 15-8-208 and 12-121. The district court granted the motion and assessed the attorney fee award against the Morrisons’ share of the FMT. The Morrisons appeal and argue that the district court erred in five respects. First, they argue that the district court erred by denying their petition to remove the trustees because there is evidence that the trustees breached their fiduciary duties in the administration of the trusts. Second, they argue the district court incorrectly concluded that they lacked standing to seek partition of the Farnlun property. Third, they assert that the district court erred in its application of the no-contest clause to disinherit Wayne from the PMT. Fourth, they claim the district court erred in its valuation of the Farnlun property and erroneously calculated the beneficiaries’ interests in the Farnlun property. Finally, they challenge the award of attorney fees. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Frank and Petra Morrison were married and had two children, Christina Thompson and Wayne Morrison. This appeal concerns the administration and distribution of their respective trusts. A. The Frank Morrison Trust Frank died in 1994. His will established the FMT. The trust corpus consisted of Frank’s 50% interest in a piece of real property known as the Farnlun property and funds in an Edward Jones account. The FMT designated Christina as a co-trustee. During the time period relevant to 3 this appeal, Christina’s daughter, Carolyn Hastings, was the other co-trustee. The FMT authorized the trustees to use trust funds to care for Petra for the remainder of her life, and directed that, after Petra’s death, the remainder of the FMT be distributed as follows: 25% to Christina; 25% to Christina’s children; 25% to Wayne’s children; and 25% to remain in trust for Wayne’s benefit. The FMT further stated that Frank made advances of money to Wayne during Frank’s life and directed that those advances were “to be included in determining the shares to be distributed and credited against the share to be received by” Wayne. B. The Petra Morrison Trust Petra created the PMT in 2007. At that time, the trust corpus consisted of Petra’s 50% interest in the Farnlun property. After Petra created the PMT, she conveyed 16.35% of her interest in the Farnlun property to Christina. As such, at the time of Petra’s death, the corpus of the PMT was Petra’s remaining 33.65% interest in the Farnlun property. Petra was the trustee of the PMT until her death in 2021. After Petra’s death, Christina became the successor trustee of the PMT. The PMT provides that, after Petra’s death, trust funds can be used to pay “all of Grantor’s or Trustee’s expenses of last illness, burial and debts . . . .” After those expenses are paid, the PMT indicates that the “remaining trust principal and accrued interest shall be distributed equally” between Wayne and Christina. The PMT also included a “no- contest” clause, which provided that all distributions were conditioned upon the beneficiary neither opposing any distributions, nor testing the validity of the trust agreement in any manner. In the event a beneficiary opposed any distributions or tested the validity of the agreement, Petra revoked all distributions to that beneficiary, and the beneficiary was to be treated as if the person had predeceased Petra. C. The Current Dispute Shortly after Petra’s death, Christina sent an email to Wayne proposing to buy his portion of the Farnlun property. Wayne’s attorney responded to Christina’s email and requested documentation and an accounting of the value of the trust before responding to Christina’s offer. Wayne asserts he never received the requested information and that Christina’s offer was for less than the property’s fair market value. Wayne later filed a complaint against Christina in her individual and trustee capacities and pleaded claims for declaratory judgment, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and sought an accounting. 4 Around the same time that Wayne filed his complaint, Christina, in her role as trustee of the FMT and PMT, executed a quitclaim deed conveying the Farnlun property to herself and her husband. Christina claimed she signed the deed because she believed it was required in connection with a loan she obtained to make repairs on the Farnlun property. When Wayne learned of the deed, he amended his complaint to include Christina’s husband as a defendant and to add claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, conspiracy, fraudulent transfer of property, and conversion. Christina and her husband conveyed the Farnlun property back to the trusts nearly a year later. Christina, as trustee of the FMT and PMT, filed petitions to distribute the trusts in-kind. Christina amended the petitions for distribution several times to update the proposed distributions. The parties stipulated to consolidate the petitions with Wayne’s lawsuit and the district court entered an order consolidating the actions. Chrisina filed an amended answer and counterclaim to Wayne’s amended complaint. In it, she alleged that Wayne violated the no-contest clause in the PMT and should be removed as a beneficiary of that trust. Wayne later amended his complaint a second time to include his three children as plaintiffs and Christina’s three children as defendants and to add a claim for partition by sale of the Farnlun property. The Thompsons filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Morrisons’ Second Amended Complaint. The Morrisons filed a petition to remove Christina and Carolyn as trustees, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-7-308. The district court denied the Morrisons’ petition to remove the trustees. It also granted the Thompsons’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed all but the Morrisons’ claim for declaratory judgment, which sought a declaration of their rights and legal obligations under the trusts. The Thompsons then filed (1) a motion for summary judgment on their third amended petition to distribute the FMT and (2) a motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim to have Wayne removed as a beneficiary of the PMT because he breached its no-contest clause. The district court granted both motions and entered a judgment distributing in kind the assets of the FMT and PMT. The Thompsons filed a motion for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code sections 15-8-208 and 12-121. They asserted that the Morrisons’ claims were brought and defended frivolously and without foundation because the claims lacked evidence and ignored the plain 5 language of the trusts. The Thompsons also requested that the attorney fees be awarded against the Morrisons’ shares of the FMT, pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-8-208. The district court granted the Thompsons’ motion and awarded $100,869.67 in attorney fees against the Morrisons and stated the award would be assessed against their shares of the FMT. The Morrisons timely appealed. II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 1. Whether the district court erred by denying the Morrisons’ motion to remove the trustees. 2. Whether the district court erred by dismissing the Morrisons’ claim for partition. 3. Whether the district court erred in its decision disinheriting Wayne from the PMT for violating its no-contest clause and distributing the assets of the PMT to Christina. 4. Whether the district court erred in its distribution of the FMT. 5. Whether the district court erred in granting the Thompsons attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 and assessing the attorney fee award against the Morrisons’ share of the FMT. 6. Whether the Thompsons are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW When reviewing a decision on a petition to remove a trustee, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Edwards v. Lane, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 578 P.3d 525, 529 (2025). When reviewing a district court’s summary judgment decision, this Court applies the same standard used by the district court. DeKlotz v. NS Supp., LLC, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 574 P.3d 328, 331 (2025). “Summary judgment is proper if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Owen v. Smith, 168 Idaho 633, 640, 485 P.3d 129, 136 (2021) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(a)). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must “liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012). We review an award of attorney fees under an abuse of discretion standard. Gilbert v. Radnovich, 171 Idaho 566, 572, 524 P.3d 397, 403 (2023). IV. ANALYSIS A. The district court did not err by denying the Morrisons’ petition to remove the trustees. The Morrisons petitioned the district court to remove Christina and Carolyn as trustees and appoint TreSCo of Idaho as trustee of the FMT and the PMT. The Morrisons claimed that the trustees breached their fiduciary duties, failed to provide accurate accountings, engaged in self- 6 dealing, conspired to increase their families’ shares in the trust, and fraudulently transferred the Farnlun property. Following a hearing, the district court denied the petition to remove. The Morrisons argue that the district court erred by denying the petition because its findings of fact were not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and it misapplied Idaho Code section 15-7-308. The Thompsons argue that the Morrisons failed to articulate the proper standard of review and that the arguments raised in the petition to remove are moot. 1. The applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion and the Morrisons have done enough to support their argument and allow their appeal to proceed. The Morrisons assert that the district court’s denial of their petition to remove should be reversed due to clear error in the district court’s factual findings. The Thompsons contend that the district court’s decision on the petition should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. They claim that the Morrisons’ appeal on this issue is “fatally deficient” because they failed to cite or apply the abuse of discretion standard. While we agree that the district court’s decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, we conclude that the Morrisons sufficiently supported their challenge on appeal. After the parties submitted their briefing on this issue, we issued our opinion in Edwards v. Lane, holding that a decision on a petition to remove a trustee is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ___ Idaho ___, ___, 578 P.3d 525, 529 (2025). When reviewing a district court decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court considers whether the district court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). “[T]his Court does not impose a ‘formalistic requirement that the standard of review be recited and the party claiming error attack a particular prong of that standard of review.’ ” Midtown Ventures, LLC v. Capone, 173 Idaho 172, 180, 539 P.3d 992, 1000 (2023) (quoting State v. Diaz, 170 Idaho 79, 92, 507 P.3d 1109, 1122 (2022)). While the Morrisons did not recite the abuse of discretion standard in connection with their arguments that the district court erred in denying their motion to remove the trustees, they argued that the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous and therefore it did not correctly apply the legal standards applicable to their motion. We have stated that a district court abuses its discretion when its findings of fact are clearly erroneous. See Hayes v. Medioli (In Re Doe), 168 Idaho 511, 515–16, 484 P.3d 195, 199–200 (2021). Because making clearly erroneous findings of 7 fact and acting inconsistently with the appropriate legal standards would each establish an abuse of discretion, we hold that the Morrisons have done enough to preserve their argument on this issue. 2. The issues raised in the petition to remove are not moot. The Thompsons maintain that the arguments in the petition to remove are moot because the district court denied the same arguments in its decision granting the Thompsons’ motion for summary judgment on the Second Amended Complaint. The Thompsons further argue that, even if Christina were removed as trustee, Carolyn Hastings would remain a trustee of the FMT, and Carl Thompson, Christina’s son, would be the successor trustee of the PMT. As a result, the Morrisons’ requested replacement trustee would not be appointed and the granting of the petition to remove would not change the outcome of the case. “A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Smith v. Smith, 160 Idaho 778, 784, 379 P.3d 1048, 1054 (2016) (quoting Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 610, 200 P.3d 1153, 1159 (2009)). The mere fact that there is overlap between the Morrisons’ arguments to remove the trustees and the allegations made in their Second Amended Complaint does not moot the arguments they raised in their petition to remove. The remedy sought in the two pleadings is distinct and the Morrisons had a legally cognizable interest in replacing the trustees. Further, we disagree with the Thompsons’ assertion that, if the motion had been granted, Carolyn and Carl would have been the successor trustees to Christina. It is true that the Morrisons’ petition to remove relied on similar allegations to those made in their Second Amended Complaint. Their petition claimed the trustees should be removed for breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty, failure to provide accurate accountings, self-dealing and unjust enrichment, conspiracy to increase their shares in the trust, and fraud. The Morrisons’ Second Amended Complaint raised issues including breach of trust and fiduciary duty, accountings, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and fraudulent transfer. However, seeking removal of the trustees for misconduct is a different and distinct remedy than seeking to deny the petitions for distribution and force the sale of the Farnlun property. If the district court had removed Christina and Carolyn as trustees, a successor trustee may have taken different actions to resolve the claims, including not seeking to distribute the assets in kind, not seeking to invoke the no-contest clause 8 of the PMT, or conducting a new valuation of the Farnlun property. As such, the Morrisons possessed a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the petition to remove. We also disagree with the Thompsons’ suggestion that, if Christina were removed, Carolyn and Carl would succeed her. This argument ignores the fact that the Morrisons also sought to remove Carolyn as co-trustee of the FMT. If their petition was successful, Carolyn would not succeed Christina because Carolyn would also be removed. The Thompsons’ argument regarding Carl requires us to interpret the relevant provision of the PMT. The PMT provides that, “[i]n the event the Trustee shall for any reason resign or cease to act, CHRISTINA K. THOMPSON shall be successor Trustee of any Trust established herein. In the event CHRISTINA K. THOMPSON for any reason fails to act, CARL W. THOMPSON shall be alternate successor Trustee.” (Capitalization in original; emphasis added.) While the Thompsons have interpreted this to mean that Carl would automatically succeed Christina if she were removed, the Morrisons disagree. They argue that the provision only means that Carl will succeed Christina if she declines to act as trustee. We agree with the Morrisons on this point. When interpreting a trust, our objective is to discover the grantor’s intent by viewing the document as a whole. See Salfeety v. Seideman (In re Est. of Kirk), 127 Idaho 817, 827, 907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995). The PMT provides that Christina will become the successor trustee when Petra “resign[s] or cease[s] to act.” (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, Carl only becomes the successor trustee if Christina “fails to act.” (Emphasis added.) The use of “fail” rather than “cease,” indicates that different circumstances govern whether Christina and Carl will be designated as trustees. To “cease” means to stop something that one is already doing. See Cease, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/cease (last visited Jun. 26, 2026) (“[T]o come to an end[.]”). On the other hand, “fail” means to not act at all. See Fail, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/fail (last visited Jun. 26, 2026) (“[T]o leave undone[.]”). Given the different words used in the PMT concerning Christina and Carl, the plain language of the PMT provides that Carl would become the successor trustee only if Christina never acted as trustee. Because Christina did act as trustee, Carl would not assume the role of trustee if Christina was removed. As a consequence, the Morrisons have a live interest in removing Christina so they can propose a new trustee. For these reasons, their arguments related to the district court’s denial of the petition to remove are not moot. 9 3. The district court did not err by denying the Morrisons’ petition to remove the trustees. The Morrisons’ petition alleged five grounds for removal: (1) breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty; (2) failure to provide accurate accountings; (3) self-dealing and unjust enrichment; (4) conspiracy to increase trust shares to the detriment of the beneficiaries; and (5) fraud and fraudulent transfer. The district court addressed these five grounds for removal and denied the petition to remove. The Morrisons argue that the district court erred because its factual findings were not supported by substantial and competent evidence and it misapplied the relevant law. The removal of a trustee is addressed by Idaho Code section 15-7-308, which identifies six grounds for removing a trustee: (a) If the trustee has committed a material breach of trust; (b) If the trustee is unfit or unable to administer the trust; (c) If lack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially impairs the administration of the trust; (d) If the investment decisions of the trustee, although not constituting a breach of trust, have resulted in investment performance persistently and substantially below those of comparable trusts; (e) If, because of changed circumstances, removal of the trustee would substantially further the trustor’s purpose in creating the trust; or (f) For other good cause shown. I.C. § 15-7-308(2)(a) to (f). The Morrisons claim the district court erred in not removing the trustees because their petition established that the trustees had committed a material breach of the trust, and that other good cause existed to remove the trustees. See I.C. § 15-7-308(2)(a), (f). When reviewing a district court’s factual findings, this Court does not reweigh the evidence or analyze whether it would have reached a different conclusion. Barr v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc. USA, 161 Idaho 136, 137, 384 P.3d 383, 384 (2016). Rather, it reviews the decision to ensure it is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. The record demonstrates that the district court addressed each ground raised by the Morrisons, that its findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that it properly exercised its discretion in denying their motion. The Morrisons’ argument that the trustees breached the trust agreement was premised on Christina’s failure to provide notice prior to transferring the property, emails between the Thompson family about purchasing the Farnlun property, Petra conveying a portion of the Farnlun 10 property to Christina, and disputes over Christina’s claims for reimbursement of loans made to Petra and for Christina’s time spent providing care to Petra. The district court addressed each of these allegations and found that the trustees were not required to give the beneficiaries notice when they transferred the property and that the email conversations took place while Petra was still alive and thus before Christina became trustee of the PMT. It additionally found that the emails exhibited a clear concern for following the law. It also found that Petra’s conveyance of a portion of the property to Christina was solely attributable to Petra, and that disputes over the loan and caregiving fees were factual matters related to the beneficiaries’ respective interests in the trusts rather than a breach of the trust agreement. The district court’s findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the form of the emails between the Thompsons, the deed conveying a portion of the Farnlun property to Christina, and the trust documents. Finally, the Morrisons’ petition to remove alleged that good cause existed to remove the trustees because the trustees failed to perform accurate accountings, engaged in self-dealing and unjust enrichment by transferring the Farnlun property to Christina and her husband, conspired to increase their shares in the trust, and committed fraud. The district court found that the Morrisons were provided with multiple accountings. That finding is supported by declarations from the parties’ attorneys describing the accountings the Morrisons had been provided. The district court also found that Christina’s conveyance of the Farnlun property to herself and her husband had been rectified. This is supported by a deed conveying the property back to the trusts. Finally, the district court found that, based on its summary judgment decision dismissing the Morrisons’ conspiracy and fraud claims, the Morrisons had not established that the trustees had conspired or committed fraud. The Morrisons claim that the district court’s decision was erroneous because it failed to address each factual allegation made in support of their petition to remove. They argue that, when all their factual allegations are taken together, they establish that Christina materially breached the terms of the trust. To the extent the Morrisons ask this Court to reweigh the evidence before the district court, we decline to do so. See Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, 167 Idaho 214, 227, 469 P.3d 1, 14 (2020) (holding that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence). However, it appears their argument is more that the district court failed to address each and every factual allegation argued 11 in support of their petition to remove. They argue that “[t]hese omissions alone render the court’s findings clearly erroneous.” The district court was under no obligation “to recite every piece of evidence and either adopt it or reject it . . . .” Browning v. Ringel, 134 Idaho 6, 14, 995 P.2d 351, 359 (2000) (quoting 9 Moore’s Federal Practice § 52.15[2][b] (3d ed. 1997)). The fact that counsel for a party sincerely contended for a position does not mean that findings must be made on that position. A decision between the positions of two litigants necessarily rejects contentions made by one or the other. The trial court’s failure to discuss each party’s contentions does not make the findings inadequate or suggest that the court failed to understand the propositions. Id. (9 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, at § 52.15[2][b]). Each of the district court’s findings was supported by substantial and competent evidence. The district court’s failure to address each and every factual contention raised by the Morrisons or to expressly weigh each piece of the Morrisons’ evidence against the Thompsons’ evidence did not eliminate the substantial and competent evidence that supported its factual findings. Moreover, the decision whether to grant a petition to remove a trustee is a discretionary one. I.C. § 15-7-308(1) (“A trustee may be removed . . . .” (emphasis added)). The district court’s findings supported its discretionary decision to deny the Morrisons’ motion to remove the trustees. While the Morrisons essentially argue the district court should have spent more time in its written decision grappling with the factual contentions that formed the basis for their motion, the fact that it did not address each and every factual contention they raised does not, standing alone, establish an abuse of discretion. The Morrisons also argue that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard. They argue that the district court failed to analyze their conspiracy and fraud/fraudulent transfer allegations under section 15-7-308(2)(a) to (f). However, the district court had already concluded in its summary judgment decision that the Morrisons failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support their conspiracy and fraud claims. The Morrisons did not submit any additional evidence in support of their petition to remove. In the absence of any additional evidence, the district court did not err when it relied on its prior summary judgment decision to conclude that the Morrisons had failed to establish that the trustees engaged in a conspiracy or committed fraud. In sum, for the reasons discussed above, the district court did not err by denying the Morrisons’ petition to remove the trustees. 12 B. The district court did not err by dismissing the Morrisons’ partition claim because they lacked standing to seek partition of the Farnlun property. The Second Amended Complaint sought a partition by sale of the Farnlun property. The Thompsons moved for summary judgment on the claim, arguing that the Morrisons did not have standing to seek partition. The district court granted the Thompsons’ motion after determining that, because the Morrisons were not cotenants, joint tenants, or tenants in common, they could not seek partition under Idaho law. On appeal, the Morrisons argue that, as trust beneficiaries, they have an equitable property interest in the Farnlun property, which permits them to seek partition under Idaho Code sections 6-502 and 15-3-911. We disagree and hold that neither statute granted the Morrisons authority to seek partition of the property. “Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law which this Court reviews de novo.” Genho v. Riverdale Hot Springs, LLC, 174 Idaho 894, 901, 560 P.3d 1041, 1048 (2024) (citing Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2022-32) (In re Doe), 171 Idaho 677, 680, 525 P.3d 715, 718 (2023)). “Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.” Hess v. Hess, 174 Idaho 524, 535–36, 558 P.3d 254, 265–66 (2024) (quoting Nelson v. Evans, 166 Idaho 815, 820, 464 P.3d 301, 306 (2020)). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction.” Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014) (citation modified) (quoting St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). We begin with Idaho Code section 6-501, which discusses when a partition action “may be had”: When several cotenants hold and are in possession of real property as parceners, joint tenants or tenants in common, in which one (1) or more of them have an estate of inheritance, or for life or lives, or for years, an action may be brought by one (1) or more of such persons for a partition thereof, according to the respective rights of the persons interested therein, and for a sale of such property, or a part thereof, if it appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners. I.C. § 6-501 (emphasis added). The Morrisons neither held nor had possession of the Farnlun property when they filed their partition action. As beneficiaries of the trusts, the Morrisons certainly possessed an interest in the trust assets. Est. of Cornell v. Johnson, 159 Idaho 778, 782– 13 83, 367 P.3d 173, 177–78 (2016). However, because those assets had not yet been distributed, they did not have a possessory interest in the Farnlun property. Our opinion in McKay v. Walker explained that a possessory interest in real property is “[t]he present right to control property, including the right to exclude others, by a person who is not necessarily the owner.” 160 Idaho 148, 152, 369 P.3d 926, 930 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Possessory interest, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). “[A] possessory interest in land exists where a person has: ‘(a) a physical relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain degree of physical control over the land, and an intent so to exercise such control as to exclude other members of society in general from any present occupation of the land . . . .’ ” Id. (last alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (First) of Property § 7 (1936)). McKay establishes that parties have a possessory interest in real property when they have a present right to control the property. See id. The Morrisons failed to establish that they possessed this present right. The extent of the Morrisons’ rights to the Farnlun property are defined by the trust documents. Neither trust provides the Morrisons with a present right to control the Farnlun property. Under the FMT, Wayne is entitled to 25% of the trust, to be retained in trust for his benefit. As such, Wayne had no possessory interest in the assets of the FMT. Instead, the trustee was directed to hold Wayne’s share of the assets for Wayne’s benefit. For Wayne’s children, the FMT grants the trustee absolute discretion on how to distribute the property. They would not have a present possessory interest until the trustee distributed the property in kind. Because the trust property had not been distributed in kind, they did not have a present possessory interest in the Farnlun property at the time they filed the partition action. Under the PMT, Wayne had an interest in half of the remaining assets of the PMT, but it was not a present possessory interest. The PMT granted the trustee sole authority “to partition, allot, and distribute the Trust Estate in undivided interests or in kind, or partly in money and partly in kind at valuations determined by the Trustee and to sell such property as the Trustee may deem necessary to make division or distribution.” Wayne would only obtain a present possessory interest after the trustee distributes the property to him in kind. Because the PMT had not been distributed in kind, he did not hold a present possessory interest in the Farnlun property when the partition claim was filed. Nor did Idaho Code section 15-3-911 permit the Morrisons to seek partition. That section provides: 14 When two (2) or more heirs or devisees are entitled to distribution of undivided interests in any real or personal property of the estate, the personal representative or one (1) or more of the heirs or devisees may petition the court prior to the formal or informal closing of the estate, to make partition. I.C. § 15-3-911 (emphasis added). “Legislative definitions of terms included within a statute control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the statute.” Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 226, 370 P.3d 738, 741 (2016) (quoting State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 477, 163 P.3d 1183, 1189 (2007)). The Morrisons do not meet the definitions of personal representatives, heirs, or devisees in Title 15 of the Idaho Code. The term “ ‘personal representative’ includes executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law governing their status.” I.C. § 15-1-201(35). The Morrisons are not executors or administrators of the trusts and therefore do not fall within the definition of “personal representative.” An heir includes “those persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a decedent.” I.C. § 15-1-201(22). The Farnlun property is being distributed via trust, not through intestate succession. Thus, the Morrisons do not fall within the definition of “heirs.” A “devisee” is “any person designated in a will to receive a devise. In the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trustee or trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee and the beneficiaries are not devisees.” I.C. § 15-1-201(12). In the case of a trust, “beneficiaries are not devisees.” Id. As such, the Morrisons do not fall within the definition of a “devisee.” For these reasons, neither section 6-501 nor section 15-3-911 permitted the Morrisons to bring a partition claim concerning the Farnlun property. The district court did not err when it granted summary judgment on the basis of standing and dismissed their partition claim. C. The distric