Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 51546 KEITH THAETE, STEVE KING, and ) LANCE THAETE, ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Boise, June 2025 Term ) v. ) Opinion Filed: July 29, 2026 ) ST. LUKE’S MAGIC VALLEY MEDICAL ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk CENTER, and MICHAEL R. FRY, D.O., ) ) Defendants-Respondents. ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Michael P. Tribe, District Judge. The district court’s order granting summary judgment is reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Hepworth Holzer, LLP, Boise, for Appellants Keith Thaete, Steve King, and Lance Thaete. Andrew J. LaPorta argued. Quane McColl, PLLC, Boise, for Respondents, St. Luke’s Magic Valley Medical Center and Michael R. Fry. Alec T. Pechota argued. _____________________ MEYER, Justice. In this medical malpractice appeal, we review a district court’s grant of summary judgment to a hospital and an attending physician entered after the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony as untimely or lacking foundation. Sherry Thaete died in January 2021 at St. Luke’s Magic Valley Medical Center after hospital staff administered Paxil, a medication her psychiatrist had discontinued and was contraindicated with her current prescription, Nardil. Her husband and two sons (the Thaetes) sued Dr. Michael Fry and St. Luke’s (the Respondents) under Idaho’s Medical Malpractice Act. The district court concluded that without admissible expert testimony the Thaetes could not establish a prima facie case under Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. We hold that: (1) the Thaetes’ failure to serve their notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal; (2) the district court erred in striking Dr. McIlraith’s August 28 declaration, though it acted within its discretion in striking the Thaetes’ August 29 supplemental 1 response; (3) Dr. McIlraith possessed an adequate foundation under Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 to offer a standard-of-care opinion; and (4) the district court did not err in concluding that Nurse Chisum’s expert disclosure omitted an opinion that St. Luke’s nursing staff breached the applicable standard of care. We vacate the amended judgment, partially reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On January 15, 2021, Keith Thaete brought his wife, Sherry Thaete, to St. Luke’s Magic Valley Medical Center in Twin Falls, Idaho, because she was disoriented and unable to communicate. Mr. Thaete brought two of his wife’s prescription bottles—phenelzine (Nardil) and Ativan—with him to the hospital. Mr. Thaete recalls showing the bottles to an unidentified nurse in the emergency room and later to another female nurse after his wife was admitted and transferred to an upper floor. Mr. Thaete also believed, though he could not state definitively, that he showed the prescription bottles to Dr. Fry, the attending physician. An ER nurse, Nurse Brown, remembers Mr. Thaete providing two prescription bottles to him, and that he handed the bottles to Dr. Fry. Nurse Brown recalls Dr. Fry looking at the bottles before returning them to Mr. Thaete, but the doctor did not enter the medications into the computer system in Nurse Brown’s presence. During Mrs. Thaete’s hospitalization, Dr. Fry prescribed her paroxetine (Paxil), a medication her psychiatrist had discontinued months earlier when initiating Nardil, another medication. Paxil and Nardil are contraindicated drugs and pose a significant risk when taken concurrently. Despite conflicting testimony as to whether Dr. Fry was aware of Mrs. Thaete’s Nardil prescription, Paxil was administered. Mrs. Thaete died two days after being admitted to the hospital. In October 2021, the Thaetes filed a complaint and demand for jury trial against the Respondents. Although labeled as “negligence, negligence per se, and reckless conduct,” the Thaetes’ claim was brought under Idaho’s Medical Malpractice Act. The Respondents filed an answer on November 19, 2021, denying all material allegations. The district court’s original April 2022 scheduling and pretrial order required the Thaetes to disclose expert witnesses no later than 120 days before trial and the Respondents to do so no later than 75 days before trial. The order set a ten-day jury trial to begin on October 31, 2023. The scheduling order was amended twice before discovery concluded. The first amendment required the Thaetes to disclose expert witnesses 210 days before trial and the 2 Respondents to disclose their expert witnesses 120 days before trial. A second amendment extended the Respondents’ expert disclosure deadline by 35 days to August 7, 2023, while setting the Thaetes’ rebuttal deadline 21 days later, on August 28, 2023. The parties engaged in extensive discovery. The Thaetes served written discovery on January 26, 2022, and moved to compel twice. The Thaetes’ discovery requested documentation regarding the policies and practices for internists prescribing medications at St. Luke’s. The Respondents objected, arguing that the request was overly broad. In response, the Thaetes narrowed their request. The Thaetes’ first motion to compel was denied due to their failure to meet and confer with opposing counsel. In March, the district court partially granted the Thaetes’ second motion to compel and imposed a temporal limitation on the internal policy request. Both parties timely disclosed expert witnesses. The Thaetes deposed Dr. Fry and Nurses Victor and Brown. The Respondents produced relevant hospital policies on March 28 and April 10, 2023. The Respondents deposed the Thaetes’ experts, Dr. Dodson and Dr. McIlraith. In June, the Thaetes filed a supplemental witness disclosure identifying Nurse Tripp. On August 1, 2023, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the Thaetes could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against Dr. Fry or St. Luke’s. They argued that Dr. McIlraith’s opinions lacked foundation for a standard of care opinion against Dr. Fry; that Dr. Dodson’s opinions lacked foundation for a standard of care opinion against St. Luke’s; that Nurse Chisum’s disclosure did not contain a breach opinion; and that Nurse Tripp’s disclosure was untimely. A hearing on the Respondents’ motion for summary judgment was initially scheduled for September 5, 2023. The Thaetes filed a motion to extend their August 15 response deadline, and on August 17 the district court granted the motion, ordered the Thaetes’ response be filed no later than August 22, and because of its calendar, rescheduled the hearing for September 19. The Thaetes filed a timely opposition brief on August 15. They then filed rebuttal expert declarations on August 28 and a supplemental response on August 29—six and seven days after the August 22 deadline. The Respondents moved to strike the Thaetes’ August 28 and 29 filings. The district court granted both the Respondents’ motion to strike and motion for summary judgment. The court gave three reasons for striking the filings: untimeliness, improper rebuttal designation for a dispositive motion addressing the Thaetes’ case-in-chief, and new standard-of-care opinions that would 3 prejudice the Respondents. The court then concluded that Dr. McIlraith’s opinions were inadmissible because he failed to show actual knowledge of the community standard of care, Nurse Chisum’s disclosure did address the element of breach, and Nurse Tripp’s disclosure was untimely. Without admissible expert testimony, the court concluded that the Thaetes could not establish a prima facie medical malpractice case and entered judgment in favor of Dr. Fry and St. Luke’s. The Thaetes moved for reconsideration, challenging the court’s exclusion of all three expert witnesses. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration. Regarding Nurse Chisum, the court determined that the Thaetes had not disclosed any breach of the standard of care opinion from Nurse Chisum in their initial or rebuttal expert disclosures, nor had they submitted a timely declaration to supplement the record indicating that she would testify to a breach of the standard of care by nursing staff. The court also cited representations by the Thaetes’ counsel that Chisum was unwilling to testify, which contradicted their later position on reconsideration. Regarding Nurse Tripp, the court reiterated that her disclosure was untimely, as it violated the amended scheduling order. With regard to Dr. McIlraith, the district court maintained that he lacked the necessary foundational basis to provide opinions concerning Dr. Fry’s actions. Despite recognizing that shared board certification might support familiarity with the standard of care, the court ultimately concluded that the lack of precision in Dr. Fry’s deposition and the insufficient evidence regarding Dr. McIlraith’s preparation did not meet the requirements under Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. The district court entered final judgment for the Respondents. The Thaetes timely filed a notice of appeal but did not serve the notice on the Respondents. Twelve days later, the Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Thaetes’ appeal, arguing that both filing and service are jurisdictional requirements. This Court denied the motion without prejudice and ordered the parties to address the issue in their substantive briefing and at oral argument. II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 1. Does the Thaetes’ failure to serve the notice of appeal require automatic dismissal? 2. Did the district court err in granting the Respondents’ motion to strike the Thaetes’ expert witness’ declaration and supplemental response? 3. Did the district court err in determining that Dr. McIlraith lacked foundation to offer a standard of care opinion? 4. Did the district court err in determining that Nurse Chisum’s disclosure omitted a breach opinion? 4 5. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment? 6. Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal? III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW This Court reviews summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard the trial court employed in its rulings on the motion for summary judgment. Summerfield v. St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd., 169 Idaho 221, 228, 494 P.3d 769, 776 (2021). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Owen v. Smith, 168 Idaho 633, 640, 485 P.3d 129, 136 (2021) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(a)). “Summary judgment is improper ‘if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented.’” Id. at 641, 485 P.3d at 137 (citation omitted). “This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and draws any reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party’s favor.” Summerfield, 169 Idaho at 228, 494 P.3d at 776 (citation omitted). The admissibility of expert testimony is a threshold question, separate from whether the testimony creates a “genuine issue[] of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.” Id. at 228, 494 P.3d at 776 (quoting Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012)). In determining admissibility, the standard of liberal construction does not apply. Id. at 228–29, 494 P.3d at 776–77 (citing Mattox v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 473, 337 P.3d 627, 632 (2014)). The trial court must instead examine the expert’s affidavit or deposition to determine whether it alleges facts which, if true, would make the testimony admissible. Fisk v. McDonald, 167 Idaho 870, 879, 477 P.3d 924, 933 (2020). Evidentiary rulings, including the grant of a motion to strike, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See id. at 879, 891, 477 P.3d at 933, 945. This Court applies the four-part Lunneborg test to evaluate discretionary decisions: whether the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) acted within the bounds of its discretion; (3) applied the correct legal standards; and (4) reached its decision through reasoned analysis. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). IV. ANALYSIS The Thaetes ask this Court to reverse the district court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondents and denying their motion for reconsideration. Six issues frame our analysis, and we address them in the order that their resolution requires. We first address a 5 threshold question raised by the Respondents: whether the Thaetes’ failure to serve their notice of appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction and requires dismissal. We then turn to three evidentiary and substantive rulings challenged by the Thaetes: (a) the district court’s order striking Dr. McIlraith’s August 28 declaration and the Thaetes’ August 29 supplemental response; (b) the court’s determination that Dr. McIlraith lacked foundation under Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 to offer a standard-of-care opinion; and (b) the court’s determination that Nurse Chisum’s expert disclosure omitted an opinion that St. Luke’s nursing staff breached the standard of care. We next address the grant of summary judgment to the Respondents, which rested entirely on the evidentiary rulings analyzed above and therefore follows from our resolution of them. Finally, we address the parties’ requests for attorney fees and costs on appeal. A. Service of a notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional requirement, and the Thaetes’ failure to serve does not require automatic dismissal. The first issue is whether the Thaetes’ failure to serve a notice of appeal on the Respondents constitutes a jurisdictional defect that requires automatic dismissal of the Thaetes’ appeal. On January 29, 2024, the Thaetes timely filed their notice of appeal but did not serve it on the Respondents. It is unclear from the record whether the Thaetes ever served the Respondents. Despite the Thaetes’ service defect, the Respondents filed a motion to dismiss two weeks later on February 12, 2024. The Respondents do not dispute that the Thaetes timely filed their notice of appeal. However, they argue that the failure to timely file and serve the notice deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. They rely on Rules 14 and 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. The former requires an appellant to file a notice of appeal within 42 days after a district court’s final judgment or order. See I.A.R. 14(a). The latter requires the appellant to serve that notice “upon all persons who were parties and who appeared in the proceedings below[.]” I.A.R. 20. The Thaetes respond that only compliance with the deadline for filing the notice of appeal is jurisdictional. They maintain that while service is mandatory, it is not jurisdictional; therefore, it does not require dismissal of their appeal. The Thaetes acknowledge that Rule 21 of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that defects in service are subject to sanctions but emphasize that their service defect did not prejudice the Respondents. Failure to serve a notice of appeal is not jurisdictional and does not require automatic dismissal. Under Idaho Appellate Rule 21, “[t]he failure to physically file a notice of appeal . . . within the time limits prescribed by these rules, shall be jurisdictional and shall cause automatic 6 dismissal of such appeal or petition, upon the motion of any party, or upon the initiative of the Supreme Court.” I.A.R. 21. However, the “[f]ailure of a party to timely take any other step in the appellate process shall not be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such action or sanction as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.” Id. Idaho Appellate Rule 20 more specifically governs service of documents on appeal. It requires the appellant, “[a]t the time of the filing of a notice of appeal . . . , [to] serve copies thereof upon all persons who were parties and who appeared in the proceedings below, whether or not they are parties to the appeal[.]” I.A.R. 20. Although Rule 20 mandates service of the notice of appeal, it contains no language indicating that failure to serve is jurisdictional. The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement under Rule 21, whereas service is not a jurisdictional requirement under Rule 20. The Respondents cite Moe v. Harger, 10 Idaho 194, 195, 77 P. 645, 645 (1904), and Harris v. Bechtel Corp., 74 Idaho 308, 310, 261 P.2d 818, 819–20 (1953), cases in which this Court stated that the failure to file and serve a notice of appeal was a jurisdictional issue. Their reliance on these cases is misplaced for three reasons. First, both cases predate the current Idaho Appellate Rules, which superseded all conflicting prior precedent. See I.A.R. 1 (“These rules shall take effect on July 1, 1977, and thereafter all laws and rules of appellate procedure in the Supreme Court in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.”). Second, both were decided on statutory grounds that the current rules have since replaced. Moe, 10 Idaho at 195, 77 P. at 645 (decided under Rev. Stat. §§ 4807(3), 4808 (Idaho 1887)); Harris, 74 Idaho at 310, 261 P.2d at 819 (decided under former I.C. § 72-609). Third, neither case turned on a service defect. The appellant in Moe served the respondent but filed untimely, and the cross-appellant in Harris never filed. See Moe, 10 Idaho at 195, 77 P. at 645; Harris, 74 Idaho at 310, 261 P.2d at 819. The Respondents’ remaining authorities, Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957 (1934), Finlayson v. Humphreys, 67 Idaho 193, 174 P.2d 210 (1946), Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 840 P.2d 383 (1992), and Campbell v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 126 Idaho 222, 880 P.2d 252 (1994), are also unpersuasive. In Campell, the Court did not dismiss the appeal because the unserved respondent did “not have an interest in the outcome such that its presence [was] essential . . . .” 126 Idaho at 225, 880 P.2d at 255. In Helgeson, the Court dismissed the appeal against one unserved respondent, but proceeded to the merits against all other properly served respondents. 54 Idaho at 673, 34 P.2d at 959. In Finlayson, the Court 7 dismissed the appeal “for want of jurisdiction” because the unserved respondent “might be prejudicially affected by” its outcome. 67 Idaho at 195, 174 P.2d at 211 (decided under former I.C. § 11-202). Finally, in Mortimer, the Court dismissed the appeal because the unserved respondent “was not given notice or an opportunity to defend” and had a “direct interest in the outcome of the appeal,” which could cause “potentially significant financial consequences . . . .” 122 Idaho at 846, 840 P.2d at 390. Thus, as we explained in Campbell, when “[r]ead together,” Helgeson, Finlayson, and Mortimer “demonstrate that the essential question before the Court in this case is whether or not the [unserved respondent] would be adversely affected by this Court’s ruling on the merits of the appeal . . . .” 126 Idaho at 225, 880 P.2d at 255. In this case the Respondents, who fully participated in this appeal, would not be adversely affected by this Court reaching the merits of the Thaetes’ appeal. The Thaetes filed their notice of appeal nineteen days after the district court entered the final judgment. Filing was therefore timely, and this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The defect in serving the notice of appeal on the Respondents, in this case, does not require automatic dismissal. See I.A.R. 21. Instead, this Court has the discretion to determine whether the untimely service of or failure to serve a notice of appeal on the Respondents warrants sanctions, which may include dismissal of the appeal. See id. The Respondents did not advocate for an alternative sanction. They are only seeking dismissal of the appeal by this Court. Dismissal is not an appropriate sanction, considering that “[i]t has long been judicial policy in Idaho that controversies be determined and disposed of each on its own particular facts and as substantial justice may require.” Hollis v. State, 174 Idaho 168, 177, 551 P.3d 1262, 1271 (2024) (quoting Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 711, 587 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1978)). “The exercise of judicial discretion should tend to bring about a judgment on the merits.” Id. (citation modified). Moreover, unlike the respondents in Helgeson, Finlayson, Mortimer, and Campbell, who were not given notice or an opportunity to defend against the appeal, the Respondents in this case have fully participated in the appeal, including filing their motion to dismiss within 12 days of the filing of the notice of appeal and submitting briefs on the merits. In summary, because service is not jurisdictional under Idaho Appellate Rule 21 and dismissal is not a warranted discretionary sanction under these circumstances, we will proceed to evaluate the merits of the issues raised on appeal. 8 B. The district court acted within its discretion in granting the motion to strike the Thaetes’ supplemental response but abused its discretion in granting the Respondents’ motion to strike Dr. McIlraith’s declaration. The Thaetes challenge the district court’s decision granting the Respondents’ motion to strike Dr. McIlraith’s August 28 declaration and their August 29 supplemental response to the Respondents’ motion for summary judgment. The court rested its decision on three grounds: (1) the filings violated the August 22 deadline set by the court’s August 17 order; (2) the declaration was designated as rebuttal and therefore procedurally improper to oppose a dispositive motion addressing the Thaetes’ case-in-chief; and (3) the declaration introduced new standard-of-care opinions that would prejudice the Respondents. The Thaetes do not challenge the exclusion of the declarations of Nurse Tripp and Dr. Dodson; they appeal only the exclusion of Dr. McIlraith’s August 28 declaration and their August 29 supplemental response. We hold that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding the supplemental response but exceeded its discretion in excluding Dr. McIlraith’s declaration in its entirety. Before we address each of the district court’s three grounds in turn, it is important to understand the progression of the case and the manner in which the parties conducted discovery. The Thaetes served the Respondents with their first set of interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission on January 26, 2022. In Request for Production No. 9, the Thaetes requested, “[A]ll standards, memorandums, letters, by-laws, or other such documentation which relates [sic] to the policies, procedures and practices for an internist working with or at St. Luke’s.” St. Luke’s objected to the request, arguing that it was overly broad. In response to the objection, the Thaetes acknowledged the breadth of the request and proposed that St. Luke’s provide those documents “for internists at St. Luke’s when prescribing prescriptions.” On April 8, 2022, the district court issued the first scheduling order, notice of trial setting, and pretrial order, which scheduled a ten-day jury trial to begin on October 31, 2023. The parties were only required to disclose expert witnesses in response to discovery requests. If requested, the Thaetes were required to disclose their expert witnesses at least 120 days before the trial, and the Respondents at least 75 days before the trial. For any motion for summary judgment, the scheduling order required the moving party to file the motion at least 35 days before the hearing, with opposing briefs and affidavits due at least 21 days before the hearing. The scheduling order further explained that the district court would not entertain discovery motions unless accompanied by a written, signed certification by counsel confirming an effort to 9 resolve disputes voluntarily. The order explained, “A party’s obligation to fully and timely respond to discovery requests is distinct from any obligation imposed by this order, and no party may rely upon the [o]rder or any deadline it imposes as justification for failing to timely respond to discovery requests or to supplement prior responses.” The parties were required to offer and serve all discovery on the opposing party, with responses due at least 30 days before trial. In addition, any supplemental responses under Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure must have been served at least 30 days before trial, and any required discovery supplementation must have been made “in a timely manner.” In the following months, the Respondents engaged in extensive motion practice, including filing motions to amend the scheduling order, to change venue, for a protective order and to seal, and to compel. The Thaetes contested every motion. On June 6, 2022, the district court granted the Respondents’ motion to modify the scheduling order, providing an earlier timeframe than previously required for the Thaetes and the Respondents to disclose expert witnesses. This amended scheduling order also added a requirement for both parties to disclose all information regarding expert witnesses under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Thaetes’ and the Respondents’ deadlines were as follows: (Plaintiffs’ experts—retained or non-retained) 1. 210 days before trial, Plaintiffs shall disclose each person Plaintiffs intend to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the witness is expected to testify. 2. 210 days before trial, Plaintiffs shall disclose all information required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses. 3. 70 days before trial, Defendants shall complete any depositions of Plaintiffs’ initial retained expert witnesses. (Defendants’ expert—retained or non-retained) 4. 120 days before trial, Defendants shall disclose each person Defendants intend to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the witness is expected to testify. 5. 120 days before trial, Defendants shall disclose all information required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses. 6. 70 days before trial, Plaintiffs shall complete any depositions of Defendants’ retained expert witnesses. (Plaintiffs’ rebuttal experts—retained or non-retained) 10 7. 100 days before trial, Plaintiffs shall disclose each person Plaintiffs intend to call as an expert witness at trial to rebut new information or issues disclosed or raised by Defendants. 8. 100 days before trial, Plaintiffs shall disclose all information required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses. 9. 40 days before trial, Defendants shall complete any depositions of Plaintiffs’ rebuttal expert witnesses. The Thaetes filed their first motion to compel discovery in early November 2022, which the district court denied because the court was uncertain whether the meet-and-confer standards had been met. Email correspondence between the parties’ attorneys from December 2022 to February 2023 reflects that the efforts to resolve the discovery dispute quickly devolved. On December 2, the day after the motion to compel hearing, the Thaetes’ counsel invited the Respondents’ counsel to discuss the discovery disputes at his office: I am following up on the Court’s oral ruling yesterday on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. . . . Regarding the substance of the motion to compel, I believe at the hearing St. Luke’s argued it was not responsible for providing any additional information, supplemental answers, or evidence. Please let me know if my understanding is correct. If St. Luke’s wants to provide additional information or evidence, please let me know what it expects that will be, and we can confer about reasonable solutions. If you would like to meet, I invite you to discuss at my office on Monday or Tuesday, December 5 or 6. The Respondents replied, “Please let us know which of our discovery responses you may have contention with, and we will respond.” After the Thaetes identified seven interrogatories and two requests for production they previously requested, the Thaetes asked, “Please let me know if you need more than a couple of days to respond to these requests for information. I will calendar it to follow up on Friday, 12/29, if I don’t receive a response.” To which, the Respondents’ emailed: I received your email at the very end of the business day yesterday, in which you gave us less than two days in which to provide a response to your request for information and documents. This deadline is highly unrealistic considering some of the types of information you seek, including information that may not be in our firm’s possession but will need to be obtained from our clients, then reviewed by us, before potential production to you. As such, your deadline does not comport with a good faith attempt to meet and confer. We will thoroughly respond to your email as soon as possible. 11 The Thaetes clarified: I am not filing a motion to compel on Friday. I’m giving you until Friday to respond to my email and tell me whether or not you are going to provide new information. All of these issues have been identified before, briefed, and argued at a motion to compel. St. Luke’s has previously refused to produce new information. I believe this is a reasonable time frame [sic] to tell me whether it intends to do the same thing it has been doing. So, by Friday, tell me whether you will provide new information, and please be specific. That Friday morning, the Thaetes followed up with a request for an update, again offering to meet in person that afternoon, and the Respondents replied, in part: Your attempts at meeting and conferring are unfair and do not comply with the Rule and do not reflect the scope of the requests you have made or the position in which my clients have been placed relative to your clients’ intransigence with Rogg 26 and RFP 40 and 44. That being said, please see the responses [bolded], below. .... Interrogatory No. 8 asks St. Luke’s to identify people “with knowledge” and specifically ask [sic], for each person, St. Luke’s to set forth “the subject matter about which they possess information or knowledge.” We are particularly concerned with people who received information relating to the medication Sherry was to be administered. You have not identified the “subject matter” known by any of the witnesses you identified. Please do so. Your characterization ignores the medical records which have been produced. Your continued refinement of the question also, flips on its head, the process we have now brought up to the [c]ourt serially and that is, what medications did Keith Thaete bring to [St. Luke’s Magic Valley Medical Center] on 1/15/21? That being said, St. Luke’s will review its response and provide a supplementation as appropriate. Interrogatory No. 21 asks St. Luke’s to identify each and every “staff member who interacted with either Keith or Sherry Thaetea [sic], and Interrogatory No. 22 asks for each of those individuals identified, “please set forth in detail all communications they had with either Keith or Sherry Thaete.” St. Luke’s and Dr. Fry have not disclosed a single communication. Please provide this information. I can’t track what you are asking, as you are not clear as to which defendant you are asking information from. Your clients elected to file a lawsuit against St. Luke’s and Dr. Fry and then served discovery on each. We have raised before that you are not being clear who you want what from. Further, your characterization ignores the medical records which have been produced. That being said, St. Luke’s will review its response and provide a supplementation as appropriate. 12 .... Interrogatory No. 15 asks St. Luke’s and Dr. Fry to “describe with particularity what you recall, independently of your medical records, of Sherry Thaete’s hospital stay from January 15-January 17, 2021. Please specifically set forth each and every conversation, everything you did, and what you found. For this Interrogatory, “you” refers to everyone at the hospital who participated in Sherry’s care, or communicated with Keith Thaete.” Interrogatory No. 16 asks St. Luke’s to “describe with particularity what you believe happened on January 15- January 16, 2021, during Sherry’ Thaete’s hospital stay, and specifically describe all conversations, what you did, and what findings you made.” Defendants have not described what a single witness says they remember, or the contents of a single communication among its staff regarding the prescription error. Please respond to this request. You have been cautioned by the [c]ourt relative to your declaratives about having heard nothing about what anybody said and continue to ignore the medical record. Your characterization continues to ignore the medical record. Your continued refinement of the questions also flip on its head the process we have now brought up to the [c]ourt serially and that is, what medications did Keith Thaete bring to [St. Luke’s Magic Valley Medical Center] on 1/15/21. That being said, my clients will review their responses and provide a supplementation as appropriate. .... Request for Production No. 9 asks for St. Luke’s to produce any standards or protocols in its possession which related to the policies and procedures for internists at its hospital. We later asked that you provide/produce information relating to the polices or procedures when an internist prescribes medication. I believe this is a reasonable request. What was Dr. Fry supposed to do to confirm this was the proper medication? St. Luke’s has not produced a single document. Please produce this information. .... First, you don’t get to ask additional questions through a meet and confer. If you want to serve additional discovery as permitted by the rules, you may certainly consider doing so. Second, I disagree with your characterizations, which leads me to: Third, please read the statutes, case law and my clients’ responses. The parties did not resolve the discovery dispute and ended the communications after the Respondents’ counsel threatened to seek sanctions if the Thaetes filed a motion to compel before December 16, 2022. The Thaetes filed their second motion to compel on February 23, 2023, seeking an order requiring the Respondents to supplement their responses to five interrogatories and one request for 13 production from their first and second sets of interrogatories and requests for production. The Thaetes asserted that after the court denied their first motion to compel, counsel continued efforts to resolve discovery disputes before depositions and disclosure deadlines. The Respondents’ opposition maintained that St. Luke’s already supplemented its answers to two disputed interrogatories; however, the three remaining interrogatories sought privileged information. In addition, the Respondents contended that the Thaetes’ request for production regarding policies and procedures for internists at St. Luke’s when prescribing prescriptions was overly broad and not “described with reasonable particularity.” The Respondents argued that the request for production was not limited to any relevant time frame [sic] or setting and could be read to include a myriad of irrelevant records having nothing to do with the subject matter of this case. The rules of discovery do not require St. Luke’s to incur the time and expense to identify responsive information that is not relevant to the issues at stake in the action or to resolving matters at issue in this case. On March 7, 2023, the hearing on the Thaetes’ motion to compel evolved into an informal hearing to resolve the discovery disputes. The court granted the Thaetes’ motion to compel supplemental responses to three interrogatories, along with the Thaetes’ request for production with an added temporal limitation “between January 1, 2018 and January 15, 2021.” Shortly after the hearing, several events occurred in rapid succession. First, the Thaetes submitted a proposed order to formalize the outcome of the motion hearing. Second, the Respondents contacted opposing counsel, stating: “Your proposed order is wrong. Please revise it immediately.” Third, the Respondents filed an objection to the Thaetes’ proposed order. Fourth, the district court issued the proposed order granting in part and denying in part the motion to compel the following day. The court, however, revised the proposed order. Fifth, the Respondents contacted opposing counsel again, explaining the discrepancies between the court’s oral ruling and the signed order, and asserting, “Obviously [the court] made some edits to your proposed [o]rder, but I believe more are due.” Sixth, the Respondents filed a motion to amend the order. They also requested a hearing on their motion.