Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 52388 SAMARI PRENTICE WINN, ) ) Filed: November 5, 2026 Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. ) ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Respondent. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. Judgment summarily dismissing successive petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed. Samari Prentice Winn, Eloy, Arizona, pro se appellant. Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ LORELLO, Judge Samari Prentice Winn appeals from a judgment summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2016, Winn was found guilty of two counts of aiding and abetting first degree murder and one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder. The district court imposed concurrent, unified sentences of life imprisonment, with minimum periods of confinement of forty years, for aiding and abetting first degree murder and a concurrent fifteen-year determinate sentence for aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder. Winn appealed his judgments of conviction and sentences, which were affirmed by this Court in an unpublished opinion, and a 1 remittitur was issued on December 5, 2017. See State v. Winn, Docket No. 44345 (Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2017). On June 10, 2019, Winn filed a motion to toll the statute of limitations to file a post-conviction petition but had not yet filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed the motion and issued a notice of intent to dismiss the post-conviction proceedings because no petition for post-conviction relief had been timely filed and because equitable tolling was not warranted. In September 2019, the district court dismissed the post-conviction case and Winn appealed the dismissal. On appeal, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to toll but reversed the dismissal of the post-conviction case because, as no petition had been filed, there was nothing to dismiss. See Winn v. State, Docket No. 47532 (Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2021) (unpublished). Winn filed a petition for post-conviction relief while the appeal in Docket No. 47532 was pending, and the district court subsequently issued a notice of lack of authority pursuant to I.A.R. 13(b) to consider the petition or the State’s motion to dismiss during the pendency of the appeal. In February 2021, after this Court issued its opinion vacating the judgment and dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the district court issued a scheduling order related to the State’s motion to dismiss Winn’s petition. Therein, the district court noted that the remittitur in Winn’s direct appeal was issued December 5, 2017, and that any post-conviction petition had to be filed no later than December 5, 2018. As a result, the petition filed on August 17, 2020, was untimely. The district court provided Winn twenty-one days from entry of the order to file responsive briefing or affidavits and explicitly stated that, if nothing was received from Winn by April 5, 2021, it would take the State’s motion to dismiss under advisement on April 6, 2021. No response was filed by April 5, and the district court summarily dismissed Winn’s petition for post-conviction relief. On April 20, 2021, Winn filed another petition for post-conviction relief, affidavit in support, and motion for appointment of counsel. The district court found the petition was not properly filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15 because the State had already filed a responsive pleading and Winn did not seek, and had not been granted, leave to amend his previous filing. However, under the circumstances, the district court found it appropriate to address the petition as a proposed amended petition. Even as a proposed amended petition, the district court found the petition failed 2 to allege factual support for the claims and, therefore, failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that Winn was entitled to post-conviction relief. The final judgment dismissing the petition was entered April 26, 2021. On October 25, 2021, Winn filed a motion for relief of judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(2). The district court denied the motion. Winn appealed, and this Court affirmed the district court’s order denying his I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. See Winn v. State, Docket No. 49490 (Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024) (unpublished). Shortly thereafter, Winn filed a successive post-conviction petition, in which he alleged actual innocence, numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct, district court trial error, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Winn also asserted that his claims were based on “newly discovered evidence,” which he identified as State v. Robins, 164 Idaho 425, 431 P.3d 260 (2018). In Robins, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgments of conviction of one of the other defendants involved in the underlying murders for which Winn was found guilty of aiding and abetting. Winn also filed a separate motion for equitable tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations, asserting he was unable to present the “newly discovered evidence” (the Robins opinion) earlier due to “[i]nstitutional limitations and restrictions pertaining to adequate access to research and possessing of the legal work of other inmates.” The State moved for summary dismissal. The district court denied Winn’s motion for equitable tolling and, after providing notice, summarily dismissed Winn’s successive petition. The district court concluded that the Robins opinion did not constitute sufficient grounds to justify the filing of a successive petition and that, in any event, Winn did not file his successive petition within a reasonable time of the issuance of that opinion. The district court also concluded that Winn’s prosecutorial misconduct and district court trial error claims were barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) because he could have raised them on direct appeal. Winn appeals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions 3 of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001). III. ANALYSIS Winn appeals, pro se, claiming error in the summary dismissal of his successive post-conviction petition. The State responds that Winn has failed to show error for three independent reasons: (1) he has failed to challenge the district court’s grounds for dismissal; (2) his successive petition is barred by I.C. § 19-4908; and (3) his successive petition is barred by I.C. § 19-4901. We hold that Winn has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his successive petition for post-conviction relief. Pro se appellants must meet the same standards as those represented by counsel. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009). Pro se litigants are not excused from abiding by procedural rules simply because they are appearing pro se and may not be aware of the applicable rules. Id. As the appellant, Winn has the burden of alleging and showing in the record an error by the district court in his post-conviction proceeding. See Almada v. State, 108 Idaho 221, 224, 697 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Ct. App. 1985). Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(a)(6), the argument in an appellant’s brief must “contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.” This Court will neither search the record for error nor presume error on appeal. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119, 937 P.2d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 1997). Additionally, assignments of error not asserted with particularity and supported with sufficient authority are too indefinite to be considered on appeal. Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010). Winn dedicated a large portion of his appellate brief to discussing caselaw, without providing context as to how that case law applies to the issues he argues on appeal. Winn’s appellate brief also lacks argument to support the issues presented. The brief does not specify the applicable standard of review on appeal, lacks citations to the record in this case, and fails to identify an alleged error by the district court in Winn’s successive post-conviction proceeding, including the district court’s determinations regarding the timeliness and successive nature of Winn’s post-conviction petition. Further, Winn does not address any basis the district court set 4 forth in summarily dismissing his claims of actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, district court trial error, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Because Winn has failed to adequately present an issue for this Court to review on appeal, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing his successive post-conviction petition. IV. CONCLUSION Winn has failed to articulate any specific error by the district court for this Court to review on appeal. Consequently, Winn has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of the claims alleged in his untimely, successive post-conviction petition. The judgment dismissing Winn’s successive petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed. Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge FLEMING, CONCUR. 5