Full Opinion

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX 06-AUG-2026 09:24 AM Dkt. 46 OP IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI ---o0o--- RAMONA RICAPOR-HALL, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, vs. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP LLC; FOODLAND SUPER MARKET, LIMITED, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellees. SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX) AUGUST 6, 2026 DEVENS, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND GINOZA, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KIMURA, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J. I. Ramona Ricapor-Hall smoked for sixty-six years. *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** A jury found that Philip Morris helped keep her smoking through decades of fraud about the dangers of cigarettes. Those cigarettes, it concluded, caused her lung cancer. The jury awarded Ricapor-Hall $6 million in general damages and $8 million in punitive damages. The circuit court cut the general damages nearly in half. Because the jury found Ricapor-Hall partly at fault for her injuries, the court reduced her recovery by her share of negligence. Even on her claim that Philip Morris conspired to defraud. That was error. We hold that a plaintiff’s negligence does not reduce damages for an intentional tort. Ricapor-Hall’s cross-appeal on that issue succeeds. Philip Morris challenges the verdict on four grounds: the recall of discharged alternate jurors, the court’s inquiry into Juror 30’s alleged bias, two refused jury instructions, and the availability of punitive damages. Each fails. Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 47(b) did not bar the circuit court from recalling alternates it had earlier discharged. No further investigation of Juror 30 was required. Philip Morris never made the showing that would have compelled it. The court adequately investigated anyway. 2 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** The two proposed jury instructions were properly denied. Philip Morris’ preexisting injury instruction was unnecessary once the court limited damages to Ricapor-Hall’s lung cancer. And cigarettes are not an unavoidably unsafe product. Also nothing bars punitive damages. Ricapor-Hall’s claim was not covered by the tobacco industry’s past settlement with the states. Nor precluded by any earlier lawsuit. Longstanding precedent and sound policy foreclose using comparative negligence to shrink recovery against an intentional wrongdoer. We therefore vacate the portion of the final judgment reducing Ricapor-Hall’s damages and remand for entry of an amended judgment for the full amount. In all other respects, we affirm. II. A. The Master Settlement Agreement In 1997, the State of Hawaiʻi sued Philip Morris and other major cigarette manufacturers. The State sued through its attorney general, in a sovereign capacity. The complaint invoked the State’s “parens patriae responsibility to protect the health and safety of its citizens.” The suit sought three things. Recovery of public funds the State spent treating Hawaiʻi residents with smoking-related disease. Disclosure of the industry’s internal records. And 3 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** punitive damages. It did not seek relief for injuries suffered by individual smokers. In 1998, the State’s suit settled, along with parallel suits brought by the attorneys general of most other states. The settlement is known as the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). Among other things, the MSA restricted cigarette marketing, required the industry to make formerly confidential records public, and set up a system of annual payments to the states based on each manufacturer’s market share. One MSA provision matters to this appeal. The MSA defined “Releasing Parties” to identify whose claims the settlement released. That definition reaches persons acting in a “parens patriae, sovereign, quasi-sovereign, private attorney general, qui tam, taxpayer, or any other capacity,” but only “to the extent” they seek “relief on behalf of or generally applicable to the general public,” “as opposed solely to private or individual relief for separate and distinct injuries.” Private claims for individual injuries were not released. B. Ramona Ricapor-Hall Ramona Ricapor-Hall started smoking in 1953. She was twelve years old. Cigarette packages would carry no warning labels for another thirteen years. By 1953, the scientific evidence linking cigarettes to lung cancer was emerging into public view. The major cigarette 4 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** manufacturers responded not by warning the public, but by reassuring it that the science was unsettled. They conspired to deceive the public about the safety of smoking. Publicly, they peddled doubt. Privately, their own records acknowledged the deadly hazards. Ricapor-Hall kept smoking for sixty-six years. She relied on the manufacturers’ assurances when she decided to keep smoking. She tried many times to quit. Her nicotine addiction defeated those efforts. She relapsed again and again. In 2019, doctors diagnosed Ricapor-Hall with lung cancer. A second primary lung cancer followed. In 2021, she sued Philip Morris and other manufacturers and vendors for her lung cancer. C. The Trial Before trial, Ricapor-Hall settled with every defendant except Philip Morris. Her remaining claims against Philip Morris went to a bifurcated jury trial: negligence, strict products liability, and two conspiracy claims, conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to commit fraudulent misrepresentation. Phase one addressed liability, compensatory damages, and whether punitive damages could be awarded. Phase two would fix the amount of any punitive damages. 5 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** 1. The Comparative Negligence Ruling Midway through trial, the circuit court asked the parties to brief a remedy question. How would damages be calculated if the jury found Ricapor-Hall comparatively negligent and also found Philip Morris liable for conspiracy, an intentional tort? The parties agreed on two points. For Ricapor-Hall’s negligence claim, Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-31’s (2016) modified comparative negligence framework would govern. For her strict products liability claim, pure comparative negligence would apply. See Hao v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 69 Haw. 231, 738 P.2d 416 (1987). The parties split on the conspiracy claims. Ricapor-Hall maintained that comparative negligence cannot reduce damages for an intentional tort, because “it is impossible to compare the fault of a plaintiff with the intentional conduct of a defendant.” Philip Morris argued the opposite, asserting that “Hawaiʻi law allows for application of pure comparative fault principles to intentional tort claims.” The circuit court adopted Philip Morris’ position. It instructed the jury that if it found for Ricapor-Hall on her “strict products liability or conspiracy claims,” the court would “reduce the amount of damages” by Ricapor-Hall’s percentage of negligence, “regardless of any percentage of responsibility” assigned to her. Ricapor-Hall objected. 6 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** 2. The Disputed Jury Instructions Four other jury instruction rulings matter to the issues on appeal. The court declined to give an instruction on apportioning damages among preexisting injuries. Both parties had proposed versions. The court declined them because no expert had offered an apportionment opinion, and “[a] jury cannot rely upon pure conjecture and speculation on a question of medical apportionment.” The court did instruct, at Philip Morris’ request, that Ricapor-Hall’s claims were limited to her lung cancer. The jury was told that although it had heard evidence of Ricapor-Hall’s “other diseases or conditions, including [COPD], peripheral vascular diseases, and heart disease,” she was “only asserting claims” for “her own lung cancer and the related treatment,” and there was “no claim” that Philip Morris caused “any other disease.” The jury was further told it could award “only” damages “legally caused by” Philip Morris’ cigarettes, negligence, or fraud, and not “speculative damages.” The court declined Philip Morris’ proposed instruction on unavoidably unsafe products. That instruction, drawn from comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), would have told the jury that “[u]nless the product unreasonably 7 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** exposes users to risk of injury, there is no liability for supplying an unavoidably unsafe product.” The court gave the parties’ agreed instruction on the scope of punitive damages. The jury was told it could “not seek to punish [Philip Morris] for any conduct except that conduct of [Philip Morris] that [Ricapor-Hall] has shown to have caused her injuries,” and that it could “not impose punitive damages on [Philip Morris] in order to punish it for[] harms suffered by other people.” 3. The Alternate Jurors The jury retired to deliberate on phase one on August 11, 2023. Three alternate jurors remained. The circuit court did not permanently release the alternates. It told them their “service may not be done,” that it was “done for today,” and that the court would contact them “if we need your service in the future.” It directed the alternates to keep following the instruction not to discuss the case, told them they remained “under the court’s supervision for jury service,” and promised day-to-day updates on their status. Philip Morris objected. It argued that HRCP Rule 47(b) required the court to permanently discharge the alternates once deliberations began, and that the alternates would therefore be unavailable if a juror were later lost. The court overruled the objection. Because the trial was bifurcated and phase two would 8 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** proceed before the same jury, the court reasoned, the alternates would “remain subject to call.” Replacing them with new alternates for phase two, the court explained, “would be disruptive and prejudicial to the parties.” 4. Juror 30 On the morning of August 17, 2023, the fourth full day of phase one deliberations, Juror 30 told the court, through the bailiff, that she “may feel” she “cannot be a fair and impartial juror.” The court suspended deliberations and recessed the jury. Philip Morris moved for a mistrial. It argued that the jury was now short a member, that HRCP Rule 47(b) barred substituting an alternate, and that the court’s questioning of Juror 30 had to be confined to confirming what she told the bailiff. Any further inquiry, Philip Morris said, would “trespass into the area of the thought processes of a sitting juror.” The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding it had too little information to rule. The court brought Juror 30 into the courtroom alone. She explained that she had encountered “some of the details” of the MSA while researching disaster-relief funds, and that the information had “colored” her view of “this whole case.” What Juror 30 said about the other jurors was equivocal. She said she “tried not to tell them anything about it,” but 9 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** that they “kind of got wind of the MSA” when she explained her vote. She also said she “held that information back,” that the others “don’t know,” and that she did not know whether anything “slipped out” during her explanation. Asked directly whether she recalled saying anything about the MSA during deliberations, she answered, “No.” The court offered both sides the chance to question Juror 30. Neither did. With the agreement of counsel, the court excused her. 5. The Investigation and the Substitutions With Juror 30 excused, Ricapor-Hall asked the court to proceed with eleven jurors. Philip Morris again moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury was tainted and that HRCP Rule 47(b) forbade substituting an alternate. The court decided to question each remaining juror, individually, about whether Juror 30 had exposed them to outside information. It recessed and asked both parties to propose questions. Ricapor-Hall proposed a sequence: first ask whether the juror received outside information, and only if so, ask how it influenced them. Philip Morris proposed nothing. It said juror questioning was “a fruitless act” and that it had not had the chance to brief the issue. The court made three rulings. It denied the renewed mistrial motion. It ruled that substituting an alternate was 10 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** proper, because in a bifurcated trial “all deliberations have not yet begun” until phase two deliberations begin. And it decided to call each juror in alone and ask a single question. The court worked through several drafts of that question with counsel. As it did, Philip Morris objected that the question would not capture “what information [the jury] received.” The court again asked Philip Morris what question it would pose. Philip Morris again declined to say. The court explained its concern: pressing jurors for the specifics of the extraneous information could “attract[] more attention than less” and invite the very mistrial Philip Morris sought. The court then questioned the eleven remaining jurors one at a time. Each was questioned “in the presence of” that person alone “and the absence of all other jurors.” The court asked the same questions of each: whether, if the juror “heard any comments or statements made by [Juror 30] during the jury’s deliberations about information that was not evidence in this case,” the juror could “still be a fair and impartial juror in this case.” One juror first answered “No.” But it was unclear which question he was answering. Had he heard nothing? Or could he no longer be impartial? The court did not let the uncertainty stand. It brought the juror back and asked him directly whether he had heard Juror 11 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** 30 “say anything about something that was not evidence in the case.” He answered: “No, Your Honor. I never heard anything from them.” Asked then whether he could be fair and impartial, he said he could. Every one of the eleven jurors confirmed that they could remain fair and impartial. Philip Morris asked no follow-up questions. The court seated the first alternate in Juror 30’s place. It instructed the reconstituted jury to “begin your deliberations all over,” to “express your positions and then revote on everything,” and to proceed “as if we were just starting now.” A second substitution followed. On August 22, 2023, the court excused Juror 33 to accommodate travel plans the juror had disclosed during jury selection, reasoning that keeping the juror would delay deliberations by three days. Philip Morris renewed its mistrial motion. The court denied it. The court seated the second alternate. It instructed the jury to “begin jury deliberations all over again,” to consider the evidence and law “as if previous deliberations have not occurred,” to select a new foreperson, and to vote anew on a new verdict form. The court asked any juror who could not follow those instructions to raise a hand. None did. The reconstituted jury then deliberated for over eight hours before reaching its phase one verdict. At no point did 12 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** the jury report a deadlock. 6. The Verdicts and the Judgment The phase one verdict went against Philip Morris on every claim. The jury found for Ricapor-Hall on strict products liability, negligence, and both conspiracy counts. It found Philip Morris’ cigarettes defectively designed and its conduct negligent. And it concluded that Philip Morris conspired to conceal and misrepresent cigarettes’ harms — a deception Ricapor-Hall reasonably believed. The jury awarded Ricapor-Hall $6 million in general damages. It assigned fault to both sides. Fifty-four percent to Philip Morris. Forty-six percent to Ricapor-Hall. And it found that Philip Morris’ conduct was intentional, willful, wanton, oppressive, or grossly negligent, exposing Philip Morris to punitive damages. Phase two turned to the amount. Both parties reminded the jury that punitive damages could only punish Philip Morris for the harm it caused Ricapor-Hall, not for harm to anyone else. The jury awarded $8 million in punitive damages. On October 10, 2023, the circuit court entered final judgment. Applying its comparative negligence ruling, the court reduced Ricapor-Hall’s $6,000,000 in general damages by her forty-six percent share of fault, to $3,240,000, citing HRS § 663-31, Hao, and Ozaki v. Assʼn of Apartment Owners of 13 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Discovery Bay, 87 Hawaiʻi 265, 954 P.2d 644 (1998). After crediting Philip Morris for prior settlement with the co- defendants, the final judgment totaled $11,095,000. D. The Appeals Philip Morris appealed. It raised four claims of error. First, that HRCP Rule 47(b) barred recalling discharged alternates and substituting them mid-deliberation. Second, that the court failed to adequately investigate whether Juror 30 exposed the jury to outside information. Third, that the court should have instructed the jury on apportioning preexisting injuries and on unavoidably unsafe products. And fourth, that the MSA precluded any award of punitive damages. Ricapor-Hall cross-appealed. She argued that the circuit court was wrong to reduce her damages on the conspiracy claims, because a plaintiff’s negligence does not reduce damages for an intentional tort. We accepted transfer of the case from the Intermediate Court of Appeals. III. A. The Circuit Court’s Juror Substitutions Do Not Warrant a New Trial Philip Morris raises two challenges to the jury that decided phase one. It says the circuit court violated HRCP Rule 47(b) by recalling discharged alternates and substituting them 14 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** in during deliberations. And it says the court failed to adequately investigate whether Juror 30 exposed the jury to outside information. Neither challenge warrants a new trial. 1. HRCP Rule 47(b) Does Not Bar Recalling Discharged Alternates HRCP Rule 47(b) provides that “[a]n alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.” Philip Morris reads this to mean that alternate jurors “must be discharged after deliberations begin, and may not replace a regular juror after that time.” The rule does not say that. HRCP Rule 47(b) makes discharge mandatory. See Malahoff v. Saito, 111 Hawaiʻi 168, 191, 140 P.3d 401, 424 (2006) (“shall” is “construed as mandatory”). But the rule does not define “discharge.” And nothing in its text compels the conclusion that discharge must be permanent. We construe the Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure under the same principles that govern statutory interpretation. Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawaiʻi 325, 331, 104 P.3d 912, 918 (2004). We give the rule’s words their ordinary meaning, and when a term is undefined, we may consult dictionaries to 15 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** determine that meaning. Rodriguez v. Mauna Kea Resort LLC, 156 Hawaiʻi 289, 293, 574 P.3d 309, 313 (2025). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “discharge of juror” as “[t]he relieving of a . . . juror, . . . from further responsibilities in a case.” Discharge, Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (12th ed. 2024). The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “discharge” as to “tell (someone) officially that they can or must leave.” Discharge, New Oxford American Dictionary 485 (2001). Neither definition compels permanence. Black’s speaks of relief from responsibilities in a case. But here the alternates were told the case was not over for them, that their “service may not be done,” and that they remained “under the court’s supervision for jury service.” New Oxford is broader still. Telling a juror they “can” leave is not telling them they must never return. Nothing in either forecloses recall. In the context of alternate jurors, “discharge” means temporarily relieving alternates of their responsibilities for the time being. Alternates serve provisionally by design. Throughout trial, alternates sit next to the regular jurors as the evidence comes in. See HRCP Rule 47(b). When the twelve jurors retire to deliberate, the alternates do not go with them. Their responsibilities pause. The court “discharges” them. It tells them they may leave. 16 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** But “discharge” does not mean “permanently sever.” A discharged alternate may be called back. HRCP Rule 47(b) doesn’t forbid it. Other courts have read identical language the same way. Before Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) was amended in 1999 to expressly authorize mid-deliberation substitutions, the Fourth Circuit construed the unamended rule to permit them. The rule then provided, as HRCP Rule 47(b) provides now, that an alternate “shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.” United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1127 (4th Cir. 1980). The rule, the court explained, “does not purport[] . . . to deny power to the trial court to reconstitute someone as a juror who previously has been discharged.” Id.; see also Cork v. State, 433 So.2d 959, 963 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (same). Our rule tracks the federal rule Evans construed, word for word. It carries the same meaning. HRCP Rule 47(b) does not strip a trial court of the power to recall a discharged alternate. The defendant in Evans favored the substitution. Philip Morris didn’t. No matter. The Fourth Circuit’s construction turned on the rule’s text, not the parties’ consent. The power to recall a discharged alternate belongs to the court, and it does not appear and disappear with the litigants’ preferences. 17 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Reading HRCP Rule 47(b) Philip Morris’ way would frustrate the purpose the rules serve. The HRCP “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” HRCP Rule 1(a). A rule that forced a court to toss a month of trial whenever a juror became unavailable during deliberations, even with vetted alternates standing ready, would serve none of those ends. It would defeat all three. The concern is not abstract. This trial lasted over a month. It consumed substantial judicial resources. And Ricapor-Hall is eighty-five years old, in declining health. A construction of HRCP Rule 47(b) that required this case to be tried twice is not one the text commands, and not one HRCP Rule 1(a) tolerates. The Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure are liberally construed to promote justice. Struzik v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 50 Haw. 241, 246, 437 P.2d 880, 884 (1968). The circuit court here proceeded with care. When the jury retired on phase one, the court excused the alternates only “for today,” held them to the instruction not to discuss the case, and told them they might be recalled. When a juror was later lost, the court recalled an alternate and had the jury start its deliberations over. That’s what careful use of HRCP Rule 47(b) looks like. 18 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** The circuit court did not violate HRCP Rule 47(b). The parties also dispute when, in a bifurcated trial, the jury “retires to consider its verdict.” Because our reading of “discharge” permits recall regardless, we do not decide it. 2. Any Violation of HRCP Rule 47(b) Was Harmless Even if the substitutions skirted HRCP Rule 47(b), the violation would not warrant a new trial. Any error was harmless. Faulty trial rulings are subject to harmless error review. See HRCP Rule 61; Bank of Hawaii v. Shinn, 120 Hawaiʻi 1, 12, 200 P.3d 370, 381 (2008). HRCP Rule 61 is written broadly and admits no exception. “[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court” is ground for a new trial “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” HRCP Rule 61. Philip Morris’ contention that juror-substitution errors escape this rule rests on out-of-state authority. But our own rule and our own precedent control. HRCP Rule 61 allows no exception, and we applied harmless error analysis to the analogous criminal rule in State v. Wideman, 69 Haw. 268, 269, 739 P.2d 931, 932 (1987). The cases Philip Morris gathers from other jurisdictions give us no reason to read an exception into a rule that contains none. 19 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Philip Morris itself acknowledges that “replacing a deliberating juror with an alternate is not per se harmful.” Philip Morris points to one risk in particular. A juror substituted after deliberations have begun “is subject to potential undue pressure from the original jury members to reach a conclusion they may have agreed upon during their prior deliberations.” Wideman, 69 Haw. at 269, 739 P.2d at 932. That risk, though, is one a trial court can manage through its instructions. The circuit court did. After each substitution, it instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew. The instructions were specific. Select a new foreperson. Use a new verdict form. Weigh the evidence and the law “as if previous deliberations had not occurred.” Re-state positions and revote on every question. The court invited any juror who could not follow those directions to speak up. None did. The start-over instruction’s absence troubled the court in Wideman. See 69 Haw. at 269, 739 P.2d at 932 (faulting “the lack of an instruction to the new jury to begin its deliberations anew”). Here it was given. And given in detail. Juries are “presumed to be reasonable and follow all of the trial court’s instructions.” Myers v. South Seas Corp., 76 Hawaiʻi 161, 165, 871 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1994). 20 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Philip Morris invokes the dissent from this court’s denial of certiorari in State v. Baldado, No. SCWC-29623, 2011 WL 6144302 (Haw. Dec. 1, 2011). A dissent from a cert denial decides nothing and binds no one. Even on its own terms, it does not help Philip Morris. The dissent reasoned that the presumption was “reasonably called into question” where a jury deliberated for days, reported that it was deadlocked, and then returned a verdict less than six hours after an alternate was seated. Id. at *2 (Acoba, J., dissenting). This case bears no resemblance to that one. This jury never deadlocked. And the reconstituted jury deliberated over eight hours before reaching its verdict, longer than the under- six-hour verdict that troubled the Baldado dissenters. Nothing in this record rebuts the presumption that the jury followed the circuit court’s instructions. Any violation of HRCP Rule 47(b) was harmless. The substitutions do not warrant a new trial. B. The Circuit Court’s Investigation of Juror 30 Does Not Warrant a New Trial During phase one deliberations, Juror 30 told the court she had come across outside information about a settlement between tobacco companies and the states. The circuit court questioned her, excused her, and then questioned each remaining juror individually, outside the 21 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** presence of the other jurors. Philip Morris maintains that this investigation was inadequate. The argument fails at the threshold. Philip Morris never made the showing that would have triggered a duty to investigate at all. And even if it had, the investigation was sufficient and any misconduct was harmless. 1. Philip Morris Did Not Make a Prima Facie Showing “[T]rial courts have wide latitude to assess the nature of alleged juror misconduct and its prejudicial impact on a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Grewer, 157 Hawaiʻi 104, 111, 575 P.3d 737, 744 (2025). When a party claims it was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury, the trial court first determines “whether the nature of the alleged deprivation rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial.” State v. Chin, 135 Hawaiʻi 437, 445, 353 P.3d 979, 987 (2015). “If it does not rise to such a level, the trial court is under no duty to interrogate the jury.” Id. The burden rests on the complaining party. It must make “a prima facie showing of a deprivation that could substantially prejudice [its] right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.” Id. at 443, 353 P.3d at 985. That requires “‘some specific, substantial evidence’ showing the occurrence of the outside influence that may have possibly biased the juror.” Id. at 443 n.10, 353 P.3d at 985 n.10. 22 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** When the alleged deprivation rests on statements made during deliberations, the showing is more demanding still. See State v. Gabalis, 83 Hawaiʻi 40, 47, 924 P.2d 534, 541 (1996); see also State v. Kim, 103 Hawaiʻi 285, 292, 81 P.3d 1200, 1207 (2003). Our cases setting out this framework arose in criminal appeals. Neither party identifies a Hawaiʻi civil decision applying a different rule, and both litigate this appeal under the same standard. We hold that the Chin framework applies in civil cases as well. The right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is not the criminal law’s alone. Philip Morris does not carry its burden. It falls short for two reasons. First, the record contains no specific, substantial evidence that an outside influence reached the other jurors. At the prima facie stage, Philip Morris need not prove prejudice. But it must show “the occurrence” of an outside influence that “may have possibly” prejudiced the jury, and it must do so with “specific, substantial evidence.” Chin, 135 Hawaiʻi at 443 n.10, 353 P.3d at 985 n.10. Evidence that is “pure conjecture,” or merely “equivocal,” isn’t good enough. State v. Amorin, 58 Haw. 623, 631, 574 P.2d 895, 900 (1978); State v. Okumura, 78 Hawaiʻi 383, 396, 894 P.2d 80, 93 (1995). 23 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Juror 30’s account was equivocal. See supra II.C.4. She said she “held that information back,” that the others “don’t know,” and that she “tried not to tell [the jurors] anything about it.” But she also said the jurors “kind of got wind of the MSA” when she explained her vote and that she did not know whether anything “slipped out.” Asked directly whether she recalled saying anything about the MSA during deliberations, she answered, “No.” Equivocation doesn’t meet that standard. Juror 30 herself did not know whether she had conveyed anything to anyone. To infer that she did, and that what she conveyed could have biased the jury, would be conjecture. See State v. Blanding, 69 Haw. 583, 587, 752 P.2d 99, 101 (1988) (rejecting a prejudice claim where it was “unclear what statements were overheard”). Philip Morris now says the record is too thin to tell what happened. But Philip Morris made it that way. Before the court questioned Juror 30, Philip Morris insisted that the court could “only . . . confirm what she said to [the] bailiff” and could go no further. After the court questioned Juror 30, it offered Philip Morris the chance to question her. Philip Morris passed. After the court excused Juror 30, it asked both parties to propose questions for the remaining jurors. Philip Morris proposed none. When the court revised its proposed question and 24 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** again asked for input, Philip Morris offered none. And when the court questioned the remaining jurors one by one, it afforded Philip Morris the opportunity to question each in turn. Philip Morris declined every time. Four opportunities. Four refusals. Philip Morris’ only explanation was that it did not have time to review the caselaw. Instead of helping develop a record, it pressed for a mistrial. But a litigant cannot refuse to take part in the court’s inquiry, plead lack of time to prepare, and then assign error to the gaps that refusal left behind. See Leyson v. Steuermann, 5 Haw. App. 504, 520, 705 P.2d 37, 48 (App. 1985). Whether Juror 30 herself was influenced does not matter. The court excused her. What matters is whether a potentially biasing influence reached the jurors who decided the case. On that question, the record is silent. Second, even assuming an outside influence reached the jury, Philip Morris has not shown that it was used as a circumstance against it. Because Philip Morris alleges a deprivation based on statements made during deliberations, it must show “that improper juror comments during deliberations have been used as a circumstance against” it. Gabalis, 83 Hawaiʻi at 47, 924 P.2d at 541. Absent that showing, the alleged deprivation does not 25 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** “rise to the level of being substantially prejudicial.” Id. at 46, 924 P.2d at 540. Philip Morris makes no such showing. The record does not reveal what Juror 30 said, how it shaped her own view, how she voted when she said it, or whether her remarks cut for Philip Morris or against it. The record is blank on each point. That uncertainty sinks the claim, because information about the settlement agreement could favor either side. A juror might take the agreement as proof of Philip Morris’ wrongdoing. Or a juror might take it the other way, as a sign that Philip Morris had already paid billions under the settlement and therefore the company had been punished enough. That inference would favor Philip Morris, not Ricapor-Hall. Rather than show how Juror 30’s remarks were used against it, Philip Morris simply assumes they were. But see Kim, 103 Hawaiʻi at 292, 81 P.3d at 1207 (requiring the complaining party to “show how” a juror’s statements were “used as a circumstance against” them). An assumption is not a prima facie showing. To presume that unidentified remarks, of unknown content, biased the jury against Philip Morris would be to rest a new trial on a hunch. Philip Morris’ allegations do not raise a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. See Gabalis, 83 Hawaiʻi at 46, 924 26 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** P.2d at 540. The circuit court therefore had no duty to investigate at all. 2. The Circuit Court’s Decision to Investigate Does Not Mean Philip Morris Met its Burden Philip Morris argues that because the circuit court chose to question the jurors, the court must have found a prima facie showing. A trial court may question jurors “as a precautionary measure,” even without finding substantial prejudice. State v. Keohokapu, 127 Hawaiʻi 91, 102 n.18, 276 P.3d 660, 671 n.18 (2012). “Absent a ruling from the court on the question of prejudice, it would seem incorrect . . . to infer that the court implicitly determined that there was substantial prejudice.” Id. The circuit court’s decision to question the remaining jurors reflects caution, not a finding that Philip Morris had carried a burden it never tried to carry. 3. Even if Philip Morris Made a Prima Facie Showing, a New Trial Is Not Warranted Were we to assume a prima facie showing, the result would not change. The circuit court’s investigation was sufficient, and any misconduct was harmless. a. The Investigation Was Adequate Once a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises, “the