In re: Arbitration Between University of Hawaii Professional Assembly and Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii
CourtHawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Date FiledSeptember 30, 2026
DocketCAAP-24-0000278
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
30-SEP-2026
08:02 AM
Dkt. 75 OP
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
โโโO0Oโโโ
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PROFESSIONAL ASSEMBLY,
Union/Petitioner-Appellee,
and
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII,
Employer/Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CSP-XX-XXXXXXX)
SEPTEMBER 30, 2026
NAKASONE, CHIEF JUDGE, AND WADSWORTH AND McCULLEN, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY WADSWORTH, J.
This appeal arises out of a dispute concerning an
arbitration award, which was issued in favor of Petitioner-
Appellee University of Hawai#i Professional Assembly (UHPA or
Union) and against Respondent-Appellant Board of Regents of the
University of Hawai#i (University). UHPA and the University are
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parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) under which
the University provides legal counsel to its faculty members
under certain conditions. UHPA filed grievances on behalf of a
faculty member, Sarita Rai, Ph.D (Dr. Rai), alleging that the
University breached the CBA by denying Dr. Rai's request for
legal representation in connection with an investigation and
later charges brought against her by the Hawai#i Ethics
Commission (HEC). The grievances went to binding arbitration
under the CBA. Following an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator
concluded that the University breached the CBA when it failed to
provide counsel for Dr. Rai, and awarded UHPA the attorney's fees
expended for representing her, in the HEC matters.
UHPA filed a motion to confirm the arbitrator's
decision and award (Motion to Confirm) in the Circuit Court of
the First Circuit (Circuit Court). The University filed a
counter motion to vacate the decision and award (Counter Motion
to Vacate). After briefing and a hearing, the Circuit Court
granted the Motion to Confirm and denied the Counter Motion to
Vacate.
The University appeals from the Judgment entered in
favor of UHPA on March 11, 2024, by the Circuit Court.1/ The
University also challenges the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order Granting [UHPA's] Motion to Confirm Arbitration
Decision Filed on October 16, 2023 (Order Granting Motion to
Confirm) and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying . . . the University['s] Counter Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award Filed on November 7, 2023 (Order Denying
Counter Motion to Vacate), both entered on January 16, 2024, by
the Circuit Court.
On appeal, the University contends that the Circuit
Court erred in granting the Motion to Confirm and denying the
Counter Motion to Vacate because: (1) "the arbitrator exceeded
his authority under the CBA"; and (2) "the award was
unenforceable under the public policy exception" to the general
1/
The Honorable Dean E. Ochiai presided.
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deference given to arbitration awards.2/
We hold that the Circuit Court did not err in
concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in
interpreting the CBA's legal representation clause.
Specifically, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority: (1)
in relying in part on extrinsic evidence such as dictionary
definitions to interpret ambiguous language in the clause; and
(2) in analyzing whether Dr. Rai's alleged acts were within the
course and scope of her employment with the University, as
prescribed in the clause.
We further hold that the Circuit Court did not err in
concluding that the University failed to establish: (1) an
explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy that prohibits
the use of public funds by a public employer such as the
University to defend a public employee in matters before the HEC
arising within the course and scope of their employment; and (2)
that the arbitrator's decision and award clearly violates such a
public policy. Therefore, the Circuit Court did not err in
determining that the limited public policy exception to the
general deference given to arbitration awards does not provide a
basis to vacate the arbitrator's decision and award.
Accordingly, we affirm the Judgment.
I. Background
The following facts and procedural history are drawn
from the undisputed findings of fact in the Order Denying Counter
Motion to Vacate, and the facts upon which the parties appear to
agree based on their briefs and the underlying documents they
cite, including the February 24, 2023 Decision and Award issued
by Arbitrator Michael Anthony Marr (Arbitrator) and the
November 17, 2021 Resolution of Charge 2021-02 (Resolution of
Charge) issued by the HEC.
2/
We have reordered the University's points of error for purposes of
analytical clarity.
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A. The CBA and Legal Representation
UHPA and the University are parties to the 2021-2025
Agreement, referred to in this opinion as the CBA. The CBA
contains a three-step grievance procedure. "A grievance is a
complaint by a Faculty Member or the Union concerning the
interpretation and application of the express terms of [the
CBA]." Under this procedure, a grievance may conclude at "Step
3. Arbitration." "No grievance may be arbitrated unless it
involves an alleged violation of a specific term or provision of
the [CBA]." The Arbitration provision further states, in
relevant part:
2) If the [University] disputes the arbitrability of any
grievance, the Arbitrator shall first determine
whether the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to act; and if
the Arbitrator finds no such power, the grievance
shall be referred back to the parties without decision
or recommendation on the merits. . . .
3) The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and
binding upon the Union, its members, the Faculty
Member(s) involved in the grievance, and the
[University]. There shall be no appeal from the
Arbitrator's decision by either party, if such
decision is within the scope of the Arbitrator's
authority as described below.
a) The Arbitrator shall not have the power to add
to, subtract from, disregard, alter, or modify
any of the terms of this Agreement. The
Arbitrator's award must be consistent with the
terms of this Agreement.
The CBA contains a legal representation clause
(Representation Clause or Clause) that provides legal counsel to
faculty members under certain conditions. The Clause provides:
D. LEGAL REPRESENTATION
1. The [University] shall provide legal counsel for
a Faculty Member upon request to the Office of
the Vice President for Legal Affairs and
University General Counsel when:
a. The Faculty Member is sued for actions
taken by the Faculty Member in the course
of the Faculty Member's employment and
within the scope of the Faculty Member's
duties and responsibilities;
b. The Faculty Member must appear as a
defendant or is subpoenaed to appear in
court when sued for actions taken in the
course of employment and within the scope
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of the Faculty Member's duties and
responsibilities;
c. The Faculty Member must appear as a
witness or is subpoenaed to appear in
court on a matter arising in the course of
employment and within the scope of the
Faculty Member's duties and
responsibilities; and
d. The Faculty Member is required to give
deposition or answer interrogatories on a
matter arising in the course of employment
and within the scope of the Faculty
Member's duties and responsibilities.
2. If a judgment or court approved settlement is
made against a Faculty Member in a civil suit
for actions taken by the Faculty Member in the
course of the Faculty Member's employment and
within the scope of the Faculty Member's duties
and responsibilities, the [University] agrees to
no more than submit to the Legislature any
judgment (or court approved settlement) against
the Faculty Member, with the [University]
retaining the discretion of recommending or not
recommending legislative approval.
The parties' dispute concerns the interpretation of the
Clause and whether it applies to Dr. Rai's grievance.
B. Dr. Rai's Grievance
Dr. Rai was at all relevant times employed by the
University as the Director of the Study Abroad Center (SAC). Her
primary duties and responsibilities concern the development,
administration, and evaluation of academic programs at the
University and evaluating programs offered at approximately
thirty locations across Asia, Australia, Central and South
America, Europe, and the Pacific. As part of her
responsibilities, Dr. Rai directs fundraising and scholarships,
negotiates bilateral agreements with overseas institutions, and
manages a budget of approximately $1.5 million, generated from
students participating in the study abroad program.
Prior to Dr. Rai becoming the SAC Director and
continuing until late 2018, the SAC offered an "International
Student Identity Card" (ISIC) for purchase by students
participating in the study abroad program. The ISIC was produced
and distributed by the ISIC Association, a private non-profit
organization, such that students could prove their official
student status and access student discounts and offers worldwide.
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Proceeds from the sale of the ISICs were deposited into an SAC
bank account maintained at First Hawaiian Bank (the FHB-ISIC
account),3/ which existed prior to Dr. Rai becoming the SAC
Director. Dr. Rai was informed and understood that the funds
generated from the sale of ISICs to participants were neither SAC
funds nor University funds. The FHB-ISIC Account was a non-
interest-bearing account to support SAC activities.
From 2015 to 2018, Dr. Rai and SAC Staff used FHB-ISIC
account funds for about two dozen expenditures on food and
beverages, including alcohol, totaling $4,305.15. According to
Dr. Rai, these expenditures were connected to SAC business, i.e.,
each expenditure supported an SAC-related event or a relationship
with an individual at another university with which SAC
interacts. Dr. Rai mistakenly believed that FHB-ISIC account
funds were private funds that could be used for these purchases.
In 2018, following a complaint by an anonymous
employee, the University began an investigation of the SAC
expenditures. By letter dated December 13, 2019, Dean Nicholas
B. Comerford, the investigator, found that Dr. Rai committed
"numerous fiscal violations" and recommended a one-day
suspension. By letter dated December 14, 2020, Provost Michael
Bruno, the final decision-maker, agreed that Dr. Rai violated
University policies in administering the FHB-ISIC account.
However, Provost Bruno concluded:
I understand why Dean Comerford recommended the one-day
suspension given that you do serve as a Program Head and you
are responsible for ensuring compliance with policies and
procedures. However, I also recognize that you are a
faculty member and you may not have received sufficient
training on the specific budget and fiscal policies. You
also indicated that no one has informed you that the
[FHB-]ISIC account was not in compliance with UH fiscal
policies. This could be, in part, due to the fact that SAC
has successfully operated without the need for significant
oversight, and management was not aware that such an account
existed.
I also acknowledge that the collection of ISIC fees, fees
for photos, etc. are done for the benefit and convenience of
3/
The per-card cost to the SAC, which purchased the ISICs in bulk,
was $21.25. Students were charged $25.00 for the ISIC, leaving the SAC with
excess funds in the amount of $3.75 for each card sold. About 200 to 250
students participated in SAC programs each year, and most purchased an ISIC
through the SAC.
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students participating in the Study Abroad Programs.
Additionally, in reviewing the expenditures made from the
[FHB-]ISIC account, the surplus funds were for gifts to
partner institutions, to host lunches/dinners when partner
institutions visited, end of year parties, etc. These were,
as you indicated, for SAC events and activities. There
clearly was no personal gain in collecting such fees.
Finally, in considering the appropriate discipline for you,
I did review your past record. This is the first time that
you have been investigated for violating budget and fiscal
policies. . . [.]
With the notion that discipline should be corrective rather
than punitive, I am reducing your discipline from the
recommended one-day suspension to a written reprimand. It
is imperative that you know exactly why it is inappropriate
to continue to utilize an external account. As an employee
of the University of Hawaii, you are expected to reflect the
values and standards of the University. We have a
responsibility to our community to comply with all budget
and fiscal policies so that they can be assured that the
funds are being used only for official University business.
Dr. Rai later testified that while she did not agree
with everything Provost Bruno said, she elected not to appeal his
decision.
On June 25, 2021, Dr. Rai was contacted by Daniel
Gluck, then the Executive Director of the HEC (Director). Dr.
Rai was informed by the Director that he had received an ethics
complaint against her, he wished to schedule a meeting, and she
was "entitled to have an attorney and/or union representative
present at your own expense." Dr. Rai was also provided with a
"Notice of Rights and Responsibilities in Hawaii State Ethics
Commission Investigation" form that advised her that "[a]t your
own expense, you may have an attorney of your choosing with you
during the investigative interview." The form further advised
Dr. Rai that if she did not cooperate with the HEC, her
employment could be terminated.
On June 30, 2021, Dr. Rai submitted a legal service
request to the University's Office of General Counsel. The
request was denied on the basis that the CBA limited legal
representation to court proceedings and litigation and not HEC
investigations. The denial also indicated that the FHB-ISIC
account, which was the subject of the alleged ethics violation,
was not a University account and the University had already
determined that Dr. Rai had violated University policies
regarding controlling and utilizing the FHB-ISIC account.
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On July 20, 2021, UHPA filed a grievance under the CBA
on behalf of Dr. Rai.
On September 3, 2021, the HEC charged Dr. Rai with
violating the fair treatment law, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
ยง 84-13, by using the FHB-ISIC account to provide herself and/or
others with unwarranted benefits identified as holiday parties,
alcohol purchases, and gifts. Dr. Rai submitted a second legal
service request to respond to the HEC charges. Dr. Rai did not
receive a response to the second request, and UHPA filed an
amended Step 1 grievance under the CBA on September 10, 2021.
The University later denied the amended grievance at Step 1 and
Step 2, and the matter was taken to Step 3 arbitration.
Meanwhile, on November 17, 2021, the HEC issued the
Resolution of Charge. The HEC determined, in relevant part:
[Dr.] Rai admits that she violated the Fair Treatment
law, HRS ยง 84-13(a), by using, and/or authorizing the use
of, FHB-ISIC account funds on approximately two dozen
occasions between 2015 and 2018 to purchase food and
alcohol, totaling $4,305.14, for herself and others. In
short, the [FHB-ISIC] account funds belonged to the
University, and โ as a general rule โ state officials may
not use state funds on parties, holiday events, and/or
social gatherings for themselves. Indeed, the University's
own policies are clear on this point. Of course, nothing
prohibits the SAC staff from using personal funds for social
gatherings or to purchase alcohol to accompany a meal.
However, [Dr.] Rai violated the Fair Treatment law by using
FHB-ISIC account funds โ that is, money that came directly
from University students โ to pay for SAC holiday luncheons
and alcohol.
The HEC resolved the charge by issuing the Resolution
of Charge and requiring Dr. Rai to pay an administrative penalty
of $5,500 to the State. Dr. Rai paid this amount to the State.
C. The Arbitration
The University and UHPA selected the Arbitrator to
render a final and binding decision on Dr. Rai's grievance. The
parties stipulated, as follows:
The parties agreed that the first issue to be
determined by the Arbitrator is whether the Rai Grievance
was timely filed? If the grievance was timely filed, the
second issue for the Arbitrator to decide is whether the
University violated the CBA by failing to provide legal
representation to the Grievant, and if so, what is the
appropriate remedy? In addition, the parties agreed that if
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the Rai Grievance was granted, the issue of the appropriate
remedy would be set on a day after the arbitration hearing.
The arbitration hearing was held before the Arbitrator
on November 16 and 17, 2022. UHPA called two witnesses,
including Dr. Rai, and the University called one witness.
Following the submission of closing briefs, the Arbitrator issued
the Decision and Award on February 24, 2023.
As to the first stipulated issue, the Arbitrator
concluded that the grievance was timely and denied the
University's motion to dismiss based on timeliness with
prejudice. The timeliness issue is not part of the University's
appeal.
As to the second stipulated issue, the Arbitrator
concluded that Dr. Rai was entitled to legal representation in
the HEC matters under Article III.D.1. of the CBA, and the
University violated the CBA by denying Dr. Rai's requests for
such representation.
The Arbitrator addressed the appropriate remedy in his
Remedy and Final Decision and Award (Final Decision and Award)
issued on September 5, 2023. The Final Decision and Award
granted UHPA the attorneys' fees expended for representing Dr.
Rai in the HEC matters.
In determining that Dr. Rai was entitled to legal
representation in the HEC matters, the Arbitrator reasoned in
part: The Representation Clause provides legal representation to
faculty members in four scenarios, provided the faculty member's
actions were in the course of employment and within the scope of
their duties and responsibilities. The first issue to be
determined is whether the Clause, which refers in part to a
faculty member who must appear in "court," applies only to court
proceedings or other litigation matters, as the University urged,
or also to HEC matters, as UHPA contended. In this circumstance,
"legal dictionaries and well accepted dictionaries" may be used
to determine the ordinary meaning of the term. Black's Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (Black's) defines "court" to include
"a tribunal constituted to administer justice; esp., a
governmental body organized for public administration of justice
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at the time and place prescribed by law, usu. consisting of one
or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes . . . ." Black's
definition of "court," which recognizes that a governmental body
organized for public administration of justice might have a
presiding official who is not a judge, "clearly includes the
HEC[.]" This conclusion is also consistent with the definitions
of "court" in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2022 ed.)
(Merriam's) and Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary
(1993 ed.) (Webster's). The Clause therefore applies to HEC
matters when one of the four scenarios is met.
The Arbitrator then concluded that all four scenarios
were met, as follows: (1) under Article III.D.1.a, and based on
Merriam's definition of "sue,"4/ Dr. Rai "was sued by the HEC when
it filed a formal charge against her on September 3, 2021"; (2)
under Article III.D.1.b, Dr. Rai "was a defendant once the HEC
filed a formal charge against her"; (3) under Article III.D.1.c,
Dr. Rai "was coerced to appear before the HEC[,]" i.e, the court,
"as a witness against herself under threat of termination from
her position"; and (4) under Article III.D.1.d, and based on
Black's definition of "deposition,"5/ Dr. Rai was required to give
a deposition when she was sworn in as a witness and asked
questions by HEC staff during the "interview" or "meeting" held
on July 13, 2021, and her testimony was later reduced to a formal
transcript.
Lastly, the Arbitrator found that Dr. Rai's acts were
"within the course of her employment and within the scope of her
duties and responsibilities as a Faculty Member and Director of
the SAC[.]" The Arbitrator reached this conclusion guided by the
"course and scope" test in Henderson v. Prof. Coatings Corp., 72
Haw. 387, 392, 819 P.2d 84, 88 (1991), discussed below, and based
on the following "totality of circumstances":
4/
The Arbitrator noted that "Merriam's definition of 'sue' is '2. To
seek justice or right by bringing legal action <sued by the company>.'"
5/
The Arbitrator stated that "Black's defines 'deposition' as: '1.
A witness's out-of-court testimony that is reduced to writing, (usu. by a
court-reporter) for later use in court o[r] for discovery purposes.'"
(Formatting altered.)
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1. As acknowledged by Provost Bruno, [Dr. Rai] inherited
the [FHB-]ISIC account and there was little oversight
of her department, and she may not have gotten proper
fiscal training (while operating the account for the
benefit of the SAC).
2. The beneficiaries of ISIC expenditures in the form of
omiyage,6/ meals, and alcohol were University and SAC
guests and visitors.
3. The beneficiaries of the ISIC expenditures during the
year-end holiday party included faculty and were made
as a gesture by [Dr. Rai] as a "thank you" for
supporting the SAC.
4. Many of the events, particularly the year-end holiday
party[,] were on the campus of the University. It
appears that SAC partners were invited, but the party
was open to the entire University.
5. As stated by [Dr. Rai] and acknowledged by Provost
Bruno, all ISIC expenditures were for the benefit of
the University and the SAC.
6. The University's standing with institutions of higher
learning, particularly universities, were most
certainly enhanced [by Dr. Rai's] use of the
[FHB-]ISIC account by providing meals, sometimes with
alcohol.
7. While not part of the record, more likely than not,
reasonable inferences from the testimony and numerous
exhibits indicates [sic] that lunches, with or without
alcohol, were provided during working hours, and if
dinner, gratis time by [Dr. Rai] and/or SAC employees
entertaining them on behalf of the SAC.
8. SAC partners and guests were accompanied by [Dr. Rai]
and/or SAC staff during meals and other forms of
omiyage. The Rai Grievance has nothing to do with
omiyage being offered in the form of a bribe or other
serious misconduct.
9. The University was most certainly a beneficiary of
ISIC expenditures.
10. As acknowledged by Provost Bruno, [Dr. Rai] received
no personal gain from the [FHB-]ISIC account
expenditures.
11. [Dr. Rai's] actions were based upon negligence and
lack of training regarding fiscal policies. She did
not have any wrongful, fraudulent, or deceitful intent
to harm the University or violate University policy.
6/
In Japanese culture, "omiyage" refers to a gift or local
specialty, often edible, that a traveler brings back from a trip to give to
family, friends and coworkers. See Grace Maeda, Ono Omiyage: Hawai #i's Sweet
Gift-Giving Tradition, Hawai#i Magazine, Apr. 8, 2026. This tradition,
brought to Hawai#i in the mid-1800s by Japanese immigrants, has evolved into a
distinct local practice, in which omiyage is a way of showing appreciation,
expressing aloha, and strengthening connections with family, friends, and
colleagues, typically by giving and sharing local treats and delicacies. See
id.
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(Footnote added.)
D. Circuit Court Proceedings
On October 16, 2023, UHPA filed the Motion to Confirm
in the Circuit Court. On November 7, 2023, the University filed
the Counter Motion to Vacate, contending that: (1) the Arbitrator
exceeded his authority as granted in the CBA in interpreting the
Clause; and (2) the Decision and Award violates public policy on
state ethics under the Hawai#i Constitution and HRS Chapter 84.
On December 1, 2023, UHPA filed a memorandum in opposition to the
Counter Motion to Vacate, and on December 6, 2023, the University
filed a reply.
Following a hearing on December 11, 2023, the Circuit
Court entered its Order Granting Motion to Confirm and Order
Denying Counter Motion to Vacate on January 16, 2024. The court
concluded, first, the Decision and Award "could have rested on an
interpretation and application of the agreement[,]" i.e., the CBA
(quoting In re Haw. State Tchrs. Ass'n (HSTA), 140 Hawai#i 381,
401, 400 P.3d 582, 601 (2017)) and, therefore, the Arbitrator did
not exceed his authority in interpreting the Clause. The court
concluded, second, the University "fails to establish an
explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy that prohibits
the use of public funds by a public employer to
defend a public employee in matters before the State Ethics
Commission"; the University "fails to establish that the
Arbitrator's Decision and Award clearly violates [such a] public
policy"; and, therefore, "the limited public policy exception to
the general deference given to arbitration awards does not
provide a basis to vacate the Arbitrator's Decision and Award."
The Circuit Court subsequently granted UHPA's motion
for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to HRS ยง 658A-25 in the
amount of $13,426.06, and entered the Judgment.
II. Standards of Review
We review the Circuit Court's ruling on an arbitration
award de novo. Tatibouet v. Ellsworth, 99 Hawai#i 226, 233, 54
P.3d 397, 404 (2002).
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"Judicial review of an arbitration award is confined to
'the strictest possible limits,' and a court may only vacate an
award on the grounds specified in HRS ยง 658A-23 and modify or
correct on the grounds specified in HRS ยง 658A-24." HSTA, 140
Hawai#i at 391, 400 P.3d at 592 (brackets omitted) (quoting State
of Haw. Org. of Police Officers (SHOPO) v. Cnty. of Kaua#i, 135
Hawai#i 456, 461, 353 P.3d 998, 1003 (2015)). "[C]ourts have no
business weighing the merits of the award." Id. at 392, 400 P.3d
at 593 (quoting Schmidt v. Pac. Benefit Servs., Inc., 113 Hawai#i
161, 165-66, 150 P.3d 810, 814-15 (2006)). Parties who agree to
arbitrate assume all hazards of the process, including the risk
the arbitrator "may make mistakes in the application of law and
in their findings of fact." Tatibouet, 99 Hawai#i at 233, 54
P.3d at 404 (quoting Wayland Lum Constr., Inc. v. Kaneshige, 90
Hawai#i 417, 422, 978 P.2d 855, 860 (1999)).
III. Discussion
With these principles in mind, we first address the
University's contention that the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority under the CBA, followed by its contention that
enforcing the award violates public policy.
A. The Arbitrator's Authority
The University contends that the Circuit Court erred in
denying the Counter Motion to Vacate pursuant to HRS ยง 658A-23-
(a)(4), "as the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the CBA."
More specifically, the University contends that the Arbitrator
exceed his authority "by relying on extrinsic evidence to give
meaning to unambiguous language in the [CBA]" and "by considering
irrelevant factors in whether Dr. Rai's acts were within the
course and scope of her employment." (Capitalization altered.)
Although "[j]udicial review of an arbitration award is
confined to the 'strictest possible limits,'" HSTA, 140 Hawai#i
at 396, 400 P.3d at 597 (quoting SHOPO, 135 Hawai#i at 461, 353
P.3d at 1003), an arbitration award must be vacated where "[a]n
arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers." HRS ยง 658A-
23(a)(4) (2016). "In determining whether an arbitrator has
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exceeded his or her authority under the agreement, 'there should
be no second guessing by the court of the arbitrator's
interpretation of his or her authority so long as the
arbitrator's interpretation 'could have rested on an
interpretation and application of the agreement.'" HSTA, 140
Hawai#i at 396, 400 P.3d at 597 (quoting SHOPO, 135 Hawai#i at
463, 353 P.3d at 1005).
1. Reliance Upon "Dictionary Definitions"
The University first argues that the Arbitrator
exceeded his authority "when he relied upon dictionary
definitions for unambiguous language in the [L]egal
[R]epresentation [C]lause." To recap, the Clause states that the
University shall provide legal counsel, provided that the faculty
member's actions were in the course of employment and within the
scope of their duties and responsibilities, when (a) "[t]he
Faculty Member is sued[,]" (b) "[t]he Faculty Member must appear
as a defendant or is subpoenaed to appear in court[,]" (c) "[t]he
Faculty Member must appear as a witness or is subpoenaed to
appear in court[,]" and (d) "[t]he Faculty Member is required to
give deposition or answer interrogatories[.]" The University
contends that the Clause unambiguously applies only to "court"
proceedings, not matters before the HEC, and the Arbitrator
therefore could not resort to "dictionary definitions" to
construe the Clause's terms. In this regard, the University
argues that the Arbitrator improperly relied on: (a) Black's to
determine that the word "court" can mean "a governmental body
organized for public administration of justice," such that
"court" includes the HEC; (b) Merriam's to determine that the
word "sue" can mean "[t]o seek justice or right by bringing legal
action[,]" such that "sue" includes the HEC's filing of a formal
charge against Dr. Rai; and (c) Black's to determine that the
word "deposition" can mean "[a] witness's out-of-court testimony
that is reduced to writing . . . for later use in court o[r] for
discovery purposes[,]" such that "deposition" includes the
interview or meeting before the HEC held on July 13, 2021. The
University argues that "the arbitrator deviated from the CBA by
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finding that the terms had the opposite meaning of what was
written" and the arbitration award "effectively modifies the
contractual terms agreed upon by the parties . . . ."
UHPA, on the other hand, contends that the Clause
applies to matters before the HEC. UHPA points out that the
words "court," "sued," and "deposition" are not defined in the
CBA, thereby leaving the meaning of these terms subject to more
than one interpretation โ a matter that was within the authority
of the Arbitrator to resolve. UHPA also points out that the
University itself urged the Arbitrator to define certain terms in
the Clause based on their "legal definition[s]" as stated in
Black's.
The CBA is a contract. "The construction and legal
effect to be given a contract is a question of law . . . ."
Hawaiian Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Wong, 130 Hawai#i 36,
45, 305 P.3d 452, 461 (2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting Brown v.
KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 82 Hawai#i 226, 239, 921 P.2d 146, 159
(1996)). The Hawai#i Supreme Court has set out the relevant
rules of interpretation as follows:
Contract terms are interpreted according to their
plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common speech. Cho
Mark Oriental Food v. K & K Intern., 73 Haw. 509, 520, 836
P.2d 1057, 1064 (1992). The court's objective is "to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the parties as
manifested by the contract in its entirety." Brown, 82
Hawai#i at 240, 921 P.2d at 160 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
A contract is ambiguous when its terms are reasonably
susceptible to more than one meaning. Airgo v. Horizon
Cargo Transp., 66 Haw. 590, 594, 670 P.2d 1277, 1280 (1983).
As a general rule, the court will look no further than the
four corners of the contract to determine whether an
ambiguity exists. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pac.
RentโAll, 90 Hawai#i 315, 324, 978 P.2d 753, 762 (1999)
(noting that the parties' disagreement as to the meaning of
a contract does not render it ambiguous). The parol
evidence rule "precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to
vary or contradict the terms of an unambiguous and
integrated contract." Pancakes of Hawai#i v. Pomare Props.
Corp., 85 Hawai#i 300, 310, 944 P.2d 97, 107 (App. 1997)
(citation omitted). This rule, however, is subject to
exceptions that permit the court to consider extrinsic
evidence when the writing in question is ambiguous or
incomplete. Id. Where there is any doubt or controversy as
to the meaning of the language, the court is permitted to
consider parol evidence to explain the intent of the parties
and the circumstances under which the agreement was
executed. Hokama v. Relinc Corp., 57 Haw. 470, 476, 559
P.2d 279, 283 (1977).
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Id. at 45-46, 305 P.3d at 461-62; see also Moloaa Farms LLC v.
Green Energy Team LLC, 157 Hawai#i 175, 189, 575 P.3d 808, 822
(2025) ("[W]hen an ambiguity exists so that there is some doubt
as to the intent of the parties, intent is a question for the
trier of fact." (quoting Found. Int'l, Inc. v. E.T. Ige Constr.,
Inc., 102 Hawai#i 487, 497, 78 P.3d 23, 33 (2003))).
The terms "court," "sued," and "deposition" are not
defined in the CBA. Although the University asserts that each of
these terms has just one meaning, it does not persuasively argue
that their context in the Clause necessarily excludes the meaning
advanced by UHPA. In short, the terms are reasonably susceptible
to more than one meaning and the Arbitrator did not exceed his
authority in making that determination or in using the referenced
dictionaries to determine the meaning. Indeed, the CBA expressly
provides for the arbitration of a faculty member's complaint
about the interpretation and application of the CBA's terms. And
there was no dispute that the Arbitrator was within his authority
to interpret the terms of the Clause โ so as to determine whether
Dr. Rai was entitled to legal representation in the HEC matters โ
until after the decision was made and the University concluded
the Arbitrator's interpretation was mistaken. Even if wrong, the
Arbitrator's interpretation was one of the "hazards of the
arbitration process" that the University assumed, "including the
risk that the arbitrator[] may make mistakes in the application
of law . . . ." Tatibouet, 99 Hawai#i at 233, 54 P.3d at 404
(quoting Wayland Lum Constr., 90 Hawai#i at 422, 978 P.2d at
860). "A misinterpretation of law does not amount to exceeding
enumerated powers . . . ." Id. at 235, 54 P.3d at 406.
In sum, the Arbitrator's interpretation of his
authority to construe the terms of the Clause "could have rested
on an interpretation an