Hallums v. Alston

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 02-JUL-2026 07:59 AM Dkt. 81 OP IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I ---oOo--- DAVID LEONARD K. HALLUMS, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. PAUL ALSTON, in his individual capacity; GALEN KÎKAHA CHEE, in his individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, and DOE PERSONS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS and PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; ROE "NON-PROFIT" CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE UNINCORPORATED ORGANIZATIONS 1-10; ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX) July 2, 2026 HIRAOKA AND GUIDRY, JJ., WITH LEONARD, PRESIDING JUDGE, CONCURRING AND DISSENTING SEPARATELY OPINION OF THE COURT BY HIRAOKA, J. This appeal involves the Hawaii Public Expression Protection Act (HPEPA), Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 634G. David Leonard K. Hallums (a police officer and vice-president of the labor union representing police officers) sued Paul Alston  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER and Galen Kîkaha Chee (attorneys defending parties Hallums sued in another lawsuit) over three letters Chee had written to the Honolulu Police Department and its chief. Alston and Chee filed a special motion to dismiss under HPEPA. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted the motion and awarded Alston and Chee attorney fees, but denied Alston and Chee's motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP).1 Hallums appeals, and Alston and Chee cross-appeal, from the Final Judgment. We hold that the circuit court did not err by granting Alston and Chee's special motion to dismiss and awarding them attorney fees. We also hold that the circuit court acted outside its discretion by denying the Rule 11 motion without sufficiently explaining its reasons. We affirm the Final Judgment, but vacate the order denying the motion for Rule 11 sanctions and remand for post-judgment proceedings on the motion. I. BACKGROUND In a letter dated May 4, 2022 to Robert Cavaco, then president of the State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers (SHOPO), Honolulu Police Department (HPD) interim chief Rade K. Vanic wrote: There is an understanding between the HPD and the previous SHOPO administration that union officials who are performing union-related work may be placed on special assignment and remain on leave with pay status. However, this special assignment does not extend to union-related business for travel to conferences on the outer islands and the continental United States. Sergeant Hallums will be sent a notification letter informing him that he was incorrectly placed on special assignment and should have been deducted leave while away from his work assignment to attend the two conferences. 1 The Honorable Dean E. Ochiai presided. 2  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Four weeks later, Hallums sued SHOPO and its board members, officers (including Cavaco), employees, and others.2 He was represented by attorney Bosko Petricevic. His complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to illegally remove him from his position as SHOPO's vice-president. Alston and Chee defended SHOPO and most of the other defendants against Hallums's lawsuit. By letter to HPD's Professional Standards Office (PSO) dated July 15, 2022, Chee wrote: I represent the State of Hawai#i Organization of Police Officers ("SHOPO") and am writing to inform you about possible violations of Honolulu Police Department (the "Department") policy and falsification or tampering with government documents by David L. K. Hallums ("Hallums"). I am hereby requesting that the department initiate a criminal and/or administrative investigation into Hallums' request and receipt of authorized release time off, also known as, Special Assignment ("SA") leave to attend Mainland conferences on behalf of SHOPO, once in 2018, and twice in 2019. In a letter to PSO dated July 28, 2022, Chee wrote: This letter is a follow up to our Complaint Regarding David L. K. Hallums, dated July 15, 2022 (the "Complaint") and is based on discussions with Detective Brandon Nakasone ("Nakasone") and Acting Lieutenant Micah Putnam ("Putnam") regarding the Honolulu Police Department's ("HPD") refusal to investigate in a criminal or administrative manner, criminal misconduct by David L. K. Hallums ("Hallums"). . . . . After submitting the Complaint, Nakasone (on behalf of the Criminal Investigation Section) and later, Putnam (on behalf of the Administrative Investigation Section) informed me that the Professional Standards Office ("PSO") is unable to pursue the matter because the one year statute of limitations prescribed in HPD Policy 5.01 has lapsed. That position is clearly wrong. Because the reported misconduct 2 We take judicial notice of the documents filed in Hallums v. State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers, JIMS Case ID 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX. See Rule 201, Hawaii Rules of Evidence, Chapter 626, Hawaii Revised Statutes (2016). 3  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER involves multiple crimes, PSO has the power to initiate administrative investigations at any time within the applicable limitations period prescribed in the penal code. See HPD Policy 5.01. (Footnote omitted.) And in a letter to HPD's chief dated July 29, 2022, Chee wrote: We represent the State of Hawai#i Organization of Police Officers ("SHOPO") in a litigation matter involving Officer David L. K. Hallums. The purpose of this letter is to urge the Honolulu Police Department ("HPD") to investigate possible criminal violations by Officer David L. K. Hallums ("Hallums"). Hallums filed a second amended complaint on March 22, 2023. SHOPO answered and counterclaimed against Hallums for breach of fiduciary duty. The counterclaim alleged that Hallums violated SHOPO's and HPD's longstanding understanding and practice of requiring SHOPO leaders who traveled to the mainland to attend conferences for union business to do so "on their own time" by improperly seeking and obtaining authorized excused/release time off (with on-duty pay) from the Honolulu Police department to attend mainland conferences for SHOPO[.] Within three weeks, Hallums moved for leave to file a third amended complaint. He sought to add claims against Alston and Chee. The motion was heard on August 29, 2023. The trial court stated: With respect to the allegations specific to Mr. Alston and Mr. Chee . . . it's too late to be adding new defendants and new facts. [Hallums] can make those allegations in a separate lawsuit if he truly wants to do so. Hallums filed the lawsuit giving rise to this appeal the same day. His amended complaint — factually based entirely on Chee's letters to HPD and its chief — alleged causes of action titled: (1) "Civil Conspiracy to Retaliate, Make False Criminal 4  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Allegations and Reports, Commmit [sic] Fraud and Defame"; (2) "Racketeering"; (3) "Defamation"; (4) "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress"; (5) "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress"; (6) "False Light"; and (7) "Malicious Defense and Defense of Improper Purpose and Bad Faith Tort." Alston and Chee filed a special motion to dismiss under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 634G-3(a). They also moved for sanctions against Hallums and Petricevic under HRCP Rule 11. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss but denied the motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Alston and Chee moved for an award of attorney fees. The circuit court granted the motion. The Final Judgment was entered on April 16, 2024. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. II. POINTS OF ERROR Hallums contends the circuit court erred by granting Alston and Chee's special motion to dismiss and motion for attorney fees. Alston and Chee contend the circuit court erred by denying their motion for Rule 11 sanctions. III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW HPEPA Special Motion to Dismiss We review an order granting an HPEPA special motion to dismiss de novo. "In ruling on a [special motion to dismiss] under section 634G-3(a), the court shall consider the parties' pleadings, the motion, any replies and responses to the motion, 5  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under the applicable Hawaii rules of civil procedure." HRS § 634G-5 (Supp. 2022). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, 142 Hawai#i 331, 338, 418 P.3d 1187, 1194 (2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that the material facts are uncontroverted and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 342, 418 P.3d at 1198. Once the movant has satisfied its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must "demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to general allegations, that present a genuine issue worthy of trial." Id. Attorney Fees We review an order granting attorney fees under the abuse of discretion standard. Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC, 156 Hawai#i 268, 272, 574 P.3d 288, 292 (2025). A court abuses its discretion if it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Id. HRCP Rule 11 Sanctions We review a ruling on a Rule 11 motion under the abuse of discretion standard. Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai#i 325, 331, 104 P.3d 912, 918 (2004). IV. DISCUSSION Effective June 17, 2022, HPEPA replaced the Citizen Participation in Government Act, former HRS Chapter 634F. See 6  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 2022 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 96, §§ 1, 3, 5, at 215, 218. The legislature found: to protect public participation at all levels of government, the State should adopt the provisions of the model act recommended by the Uniform Law Commission. By adopting the Uniform Act provisions, the State will have an anti–SLAPP [(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation)] law that is among the best in the nation, with procedural protections for all parties, and clearer instructions for the courts on how to fairly and expeditiously dispose of SLAPP claims to ensure citizens are protected from punitive SLAPP suits. Id. § 1 at 216. HRS § 634G-2 (Supp. 2022) establishes HPEPA's scope: (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this chapter shall apply to a cause of action asserted against a person based on the person's: (1) Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; (2) Communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; or (3) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Hawaii State Constitution, on a matter of public concern. (b) This chapter shall not apply to a cause of action asserted: (1) Against a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting or purporting to act in an official capacity; (2) By a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a law to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety; or (3) Against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the person's sale or lease of the goods or services. (c) As used in this section: "Goods or services" does not include a dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic work. 7  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "Governmental unit" means a public corporation or government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality. "Person" means an individual, estate, trust, partnership, business or nonprofit entity, governmental unit, or other legal entity. Hawai#i courts may use the official comments to the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (Unif. L. Comm'n 2020) (UPEPA) to aid in interpreting HPEPA. See Mikelson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 122 Hawai#i 393, 399, 227 P.3d 559, 565 (App. 2010) (using Uniform Arbitration Act official comments to interpret Hawai#i Uniform Arbitration Act, HRS Chapter 658A). A. The circuit court did not err by granting the special motion to dismiss. UPEPA recognizes that a SLAPP plaintiff's "purpose is to ensnare their targets in costly litigation that chills society from engaging in constitutionally protected activity." UPEPA prefatory note at 1. HRS § 634G-3(a) (Supp. 2022) allows filing "a special motion to dismiss the cause of action or part of the cause of action" within sixty days after a party is served with a pleading to which HPEPA applies. HRS § 634G-4 (Supp. 2022) provides for an expedited hearing. The timely filing of a special motion to dismiss stays all other proceedings in the action. HRS § 634G-3(b)(1). HRS § 634G-6 (Supp. 2022) establishes the procedure for a special motion to dismiss: (a) In ruling on a motion under section 634G-3(a), the court shall dismiss with prejudice a cause of action or part of a cause of action if: (1) The moving party establishes under section 634G-2(a) that this chapter applies; 8  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (2) The responding party fails to establish under section 634G-2(b) that this chapter does not apply; and (3) Either: (A) The responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action; or (B) The moving party establishes that: (i) The responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted; or (ii) There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action or part of the cause of action. 1. Alston and Chee established that HPEPA applied. Under HRS § 634G-6(a)(1) the moving party — the SLAPP defendant — has the burden to establish that HPEPA applies for a reason identified in HRS § 634G-2(a). See UPEPA § 7 cmt. 2.3 HPEPA applies to a cause of action asserted against a person based on the person's exercise of the right to "petition, . . . guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Hawaii State Constitution, on a matter of public concern." HRS § 634G-2(a)(3). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Article I, section 4 of the Hawai#i Constitution similarly preserves the right "to petition the government for a redress of grievances." 3 UPEPA § 7, comment 2 states, in part: Section 7(a)(1) establishes "Phase One" of the motion's procedure — applicability. In this phase, the party filing the motion has the burden to establish the Act applies for one of the reasons identified in Section 2(b). 9  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Hallums's causes of action against Alston and Chee were based on Chee's letters to HPD and its chief. Each letter was written on Chee's law firm's letterhead. The July 15, 2022 and July 29, 2022 letters stated Chee represented SHOPO; the July 28, 2022 letter was "a follow up to" the July 15 letter. The letters were thus written on SHOPO's behalf. Interim chief Vanic's May 4, 2022 letter told SHOPO its vice-president, Hallums, was not entitled to special assignment leave with pay and "should have been deducted leave while away from his work assignment to attend the two conferences." Through Chee's July 15, 2022 letter, SHOPO asked HPD to initiate an investigation into Hallums receiving special assignment leave with pay to attend three Mainland conferences on its behalf (once in 2018, twice in 2019). Chee's July 28, 2022 letter was a follow-up after HPD indicated an inability to pursue the matter. Chee's July 29, 2022 letter to HPD's chief asked HPD to investigate possible criminal violations by Hallums. HPD is a "governmental unit" within the meaning of HRS § 634G-2(c). Hallums's complaint and amended complaint asserted claims against Alston and Chee based on their exercise, as SHOPO's attorneys, of SHOPO's constitutional right to petition HPD on a matter of public concern. HRS § 634G-2(a)(3). The supreme court has recognized "the compelling public interest in instances of police misconduct given the importance of public oversight of law enforcement." Peer News LLC v. City & County of Honolulu, 138 Hawai#i 53, 74, 376 P.3d 1, 22 (2016). The public also has an interest "to gauge the police department's responsiveness to specific instances of misconduct 10  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER and assess whether the agency is accountable to itself internally[.]" State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers v. City & County of Honolulu, 149 Hawai#i 492, 516, 494 P.3d 1225, 1249 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). "The public's interest extends to those investigating misconduct and those accused of misconduct: the public should be assured that both the activity of public employees suspected of wrongdoing and the conduct of those public employees who investigate the suspects is open to public scrutiny." Id. (cleaned up). Hallums argues that "writing letters to [Hallums]'s employer to get him falsely prosecuted and fired is not covered by the SLAPP suit statute. There was no public participation before a governmental body since such proceeding did not exist here." Alston and Chee didn't have to show there was a "governmental proceeding" under HRS § 634G-2(a)(1) or (2), because they established that HRS § 634G-2(a)(3) applied — that Hallums's claims against them were based on Chee's exercise, as SHOPO's attorney, of SHOPO's right to petition the government on a matter of public concern — and the subsections are alternative, not cumulative. Hallums relies on Perry v. Perez-Wendt, 129 Hawai#i 95, 294 P.3d 1081 (App. 2013). That case was decided under former HRS Chapter 634F, based on the dictionary definition of "testimony" — not "communication," which appears in HRS § 634G-2(a)(1) and (2). Id. at 100–01, 294 P.3d at 1086–87. When the legislature repealed HRS Chapter 634F in 2022, it stated that "courts have often declined to apply its procedural protections due to its narrow and confusing provisions." 2022 11  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Haw. Sess. Laws Act 96, § 1 at 215. Perry does not apply here because the statutory language on which that case was decided was materially different from HRS § 634G-2. Alston and Chee established that HPEPA applied. 2. Hallums did not establish that HPEPA did not apply. Even if the SLAPP defendant establishes HPEPA applies, the plaintiff can still defeat a special motion to dismiss by establishing one of the three exemptions under HRS § 634G-2(b). See UPEPA § 7 cmt. 3.4 Hallums did not argue to the circuit court that any HRS § 634G-2(b) exemption applied, nor does he make the argument on appeal. 3. Hallums failed to establish prima facie viability for any of his stated causes of action. If the SLAPP plaintiff doesn't argue, or cannot establish, that an HRS § 634G-2(b) exception to HPEPA applies, it must show under HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(A) that the challenged causes of action have "prima-facie viability." The plaintiff "has the burden to show its case has merit by establishing a prima-facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action being challenged by the motion." UPEPA § 7 cmt. 4. 4 UPEPA § 7, comment 3 states, in part: Section 7(a)(2) is also part of "Phase One" of the motion's procedure. Even if the Act applies for one of the reasons identified in Section 2(b), the Act may nevertheless not apply if the party against whom the motion is filed can establish the applicability of an exemption identified in Section 2(c). A party seeking to establish the applicability of an exemption bears the burden of proof on that exemption. 12  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER [A]ll a responding party must do to satisfy its burden under Phase Two is produce evidence that, if believed, would satisfy each element of the challenged cause of action. A court may not weigh that evidence, but rather must take it as true and determine whether it meets the elements of the moved-upon cause of action. If the responding party cannot establish a prima-facie case, then the motion must be granted and the cause of action (or portion of the cause of action) must be stricken or dismissed. If the responding party does establish a prima-facie case, then (and only then) the court moves to "Phase Three" of the motion's procedure. Id. (citation omitted). HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(A) shows that HPEPA is not a substantive defense; it provides an expedited procedure for determining whether a SLAPP lawsuit has factual and legal merit without requiring the defendant to expend time and resources litigating — the objective of a SLAPP plaintiff. See UPEPA § 7 cmt. 4.5 If the SLAPP plaintiff's opposition memorandum and evidence establish a prima facie case, the SLAPP defendant's reply memorandum must show, under HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(B), that (1) the challenged claim fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted;6 or (2) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a 5 UPEPA § 7, comment 4 states, in part: Anti-SLAPP laws do not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from protected rights of petition or speech. They only provide a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. (Cleaned up.) 6 Cf. HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) (dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"). 13  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER matter of law on the challenged cause of action or part of the cause of action.7 See UPEPA § 7 cmt. 5.8 Hallums's amended complaint alleged seven causes of action. His opposition memorandum did not cite legal authority for, or list the essential elements of, any of them. He failed to establish the legal viability for any of his causes of action. Hallums's opposition was supported by his declaration, and those of HPD corporal Don Faumuina, former SHOPO executive director Tenari Maafala, and former SHOPO president Malcolm Lutu. They described facts relevant to Hallums's lawsuit against SHOPO for removing him from office. None mentioned Alston or Chee. Nor did the memorandum explain how those facts established elements of his claims against Alston and Chee. 4. The circuit court did not need to conduct an HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(B) analysis. Hallums's opposition memorandum discussed Alston and Chee's assertion of the litigation privilege and the Noerr- 7 Cf. HRCP Rule 56 (summary judgment). 8 UPEPA § 7, comment 5 states, in part: Even if a responding party makes a prima-facie showing under Section 7(a)(3)(A), the moving party may still prevail if it shows that the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted or that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law — in other words, that the cause of action is not legally sound. . . . . . . . . . . [B]y employing a legal-viability standard, the Act recognizes that a SLAPP plaintiff can just as easily harass a defendant with a legally nonviable claim as it can with a factually nonviable one. 14  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Pennington doctrine.9 Those affirmative defenses only become relevant if Hallums established, by evidence that could be considered under HRCP Rule 56, prima facie cases for his stated causes of action. Because he didn't, the circuit court did not need to analyze whether Alston and Chee established that Hallums's amended complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, or if there was no genuine issue of material fact and Alston and Chee were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those affirmative defenses. B. The circuit court did not err by awarding attorney fees. HRS § 634G-9 (Supp. 2022) provides: On a motion under section 634G-3(a) the court shall[10] award costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion: (1) To the moving party if the moving party prevails on the motion; or 9 "In certain circumstances, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides counsel general immunity from statutory liability for their litigation activity based on the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances." Greenspon v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 158 Hawai #i 39, 45 n.4, 583 P.3d 812, 818 n.4 (2026) (citing Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006)). 10 UPEPA § 10, comment 1 explains: The mandatory nature of the relief provided for by this section is integral to the uniformity of the Act. States that do not impose a mandatory award upon dismissal of a cause of action will become safe havens for abusive litigants. Without the prospect of having to financially reimburse a successful moving party, SLAPP plaintiffs will be able to file their frivolous suits in such states with impunity, knowing that, at worst, their claims will only be dismissed. But because moving parties would be financially responsible for the expense of obtaining that dismissal, the effect of the abusive cause of action is nevertheless achieved. The only way to assure a truly uniform application of the Act is to require the award of attorney's fees to successful moving parties. 15  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (2) To the responding party if the responding party prevails on the motion and the court finds that the motion was frivolous or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding. Because the circuit court correctly granted Alston and Chee's special motion to dismiss, it did not abuse its discretion by awarding them attorney fees under HRS § 634-9(1). Hallums does not challenge the amount of the award. C. The circuit court acted outside its discretion by not sufficiently explaining why it denied the motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Petricevic signed Hallums's amended complaint. Under HRCP Rule 11(b) (eff. Oct. 28, 2019), he certified that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. The amended complaint alleged: 29. SHOPO's counsel Kikaha Chee made a notarized and false complaint against [Hallums] in [sic] July 15, 2022, thereby making himself and his law firm witnesses — at the very least — in this case. . . . . 31. On July 28, 2022, SHOPO's counsels AGAIN sent a letter to HPD's PSO office making knowingly false criminal 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER allegations against [Hallums] and demanding that [Hallums] be criminally investigated. 32. Then, amazingly enough, since they realized that HPD's PSO's [sic] office will not take action against [Hallums] and ONE DAY LATER, SHOPO's counsels AGAIN retaliated against [Hallums]. On July 29, 2022, SHOPO's counsels — presumably attempting to use Mr. Alston's considerable political influence 1, AGAIN sent a letter to HPD — this time to newly appointed HPD Chief Logan 2 — and AGAIN making knowingly false criminal allegations against [Hallums] and demanding that [Hallums] be criminally investigated. . . . . 37. Upon information and belief, being hesitant to put his name on this attempt, [Alston] conspired with and instructed his young associate Defendant Chee to write 3 separate letters to HPD (2 letters to HPD PSO office and one letter to HPD Chief Logan) all in July of 2022 where Defendant Chee would defame [Hallums] to HPD by making false criminal allegations about [Hallums] by way of Defendant Chee submitting notarized complaint about [Hallums] to the HPD making criminal allegations that both Defendant Alston and Chee knew to be false and/or for which they had no evidence. . . . . 42. All of the above-described conspiracy and misconduct executed by Defendants Alston and Chee were committed completely outside the scope of their employment from their employer and outside the scope of their employment from their clients that they represent in this case since all of their actions were completely, intentionally and outside of any and all applicable law, ethical and professional standards. (Emphasis in original.) Alston and Chee's Rule 11 motion argued those allegations were "utterly baseless," "barred under controlling Hawai#i law," and "transparently a bad faith tactical maneuver to unnecessarily delay and increase the costs of litigation and deprive the SHOPO defendants of their choice of counsel in Hallums v. SHOPO." Attached to the motion were copies of emails from Petricevic that Alston and Chee claimed "threatened litigation against" them. Petricevic argued the Rule 11 motion was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because the court presiding over 17  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Hallums's lawsuit against SHOPO had denied an HRCP Rule 11 motion; Hallums "did not do anything worthy of sanctions"; and Alston and Chee "are misrepresenting facts regarding [Petricevic's] threatening to sue" them.11 The motion was heard on December 5, 2023. The circuit court stated: Okay. Just so counsel knows, my inclination is I've dismissed this case, right? So my inclination is not to impose sanctions based on Rule 11 at this point. After hearing brief arguments from counsel, the court stated: All right. I'll tell you this, Mr. Petricevic. It was a very thin line. But I give you the benefit of the doubt on this one. But at the appellate level, they treat Rule 11 much more seriously. So all I can say is do what you feel you gotta do, but I came close. I don't know what the next level will do. Okay? The order summarily denying the motion was entered on December 20, 2023. The determination of an HRCP Rule 11 motion "is fact intensive, requiring specific findings regarding the nature of the potentially sanctionable conduct and surrounding circumstances." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Greenspon, 143 Hawai#i 237, 244, 428 P.3d 749, 756 (2018) (reviewing order denying motion under Hawai#i District Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11). "In considering whether a complaint was supported by fact and law 'to the best of the signer's knowledge, 11 Petricevic also argued, in circuit court, that the motion was untimely because the circuit court had previously granted Alston and Chee's HRS § 634G-6 motion to dismiss. He doesn't make the argument in his answering brief on the cross-appeal. We note that the argument lacked merit because Alston and Chee timely served the motion then filed it in compliance with HRCP Rule 11(c)(1)(A). 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER information, and belief,' a court must make some assessment of the signer's credibility." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2459, 110 L. Ed. 2d. 359 (1990) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11).12 "Familiar with the issues and litigants, the [trial] court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by [federal] Rule 11." Id.; In re Hawaiian Flour Mills, 76 Hawai#i 1, 15, 868 P.2d 419, 433 (1994) (agreeing that "the trial court 'is best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 11's goal of specific and general deterrence.'" (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404, 110 S. Ct. at 2460, 110 L. Ed. 2d. 35