Mays v. Pacific Permanente Group LLC
CourtHawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketCAAP-25-0000160
StatusPublished
๐ฐ News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
20-NOV-2026
08:41 AM
Dkt. 231 MO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
(Consolidated with No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX)
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
ADAM O. MAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v.
PACIFIC PERMANENTE GROUP LLC;
HAWAII PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants; et al.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CCV-XX-XXXXXXX(2))
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)
Adam O. Mays sued Pacific Permanente Group, LLC and
Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, Inc., claiming breach of his
employment contract and violation of the Hawai#i Whistleblowers'
Protection Act (HWPA), part of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
Chapter 378. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted
Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente's motion for summary
judgment, and awarded them costs but not attorney fees.1 Mays
appeals, and Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente cross-
appeal, from the Judgment and Amended Final Judgment.
We hold: (1) summary judgment on the breach of contract
claim was appropriate because Mays took an unauthorized leave of
absence, which breached his employment contract; (2) summary
judgment on the HWPA claim was appropriate because the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to Mays, was not reasonably
susceptible of an inference or conclusion that Mays was a
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The Honorable Peter T. Cahill presided.
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protected whistleblower; and (3) Pacific Permanente and Hawaii
Permanente were entitled to recover attorney fees. We affirm the
Amended Final Judgment and remand for the circuit court to
determine the amount of attorney fees to which Pacific Permanente
and Hawaii Permanente are entitled.
I. BACKGROUND
The evidence submitted on Pacific Permanente and Hawaii
Permanente's motion for summary judgment showed:
Mays had a Practitioner Employment Agreement with
Pacific Permanente. His job title was Physician Extender โ
Orthopedics. A physician extender is a physician's assistant or
a nurse practitioner. The Agreement stated:
This position is responsible for providing and supporting
the medical services of the Specialty Department; provides
professional Specialty Services assessment and care to all
inpatients and outpatients at MMMC [(Maui Memorial Medical
Center)] (and elsewhere as may be assigned from time to
time), participates in on-call duties as required and also
assists in development and clinical management of the
Specialty Department as needed and as may be requested or
directed by [Pacific Permanente], including, but not limited
to, training, treatment planning, program development and
strategic planning.
Mays agreed to "perform such duties at such times and
places and in such manner as [Pacific Permanente] may from time
to time determine." He testified in deposition he was employed
full-time, "which they made very clear was approximating
40 hours."
The Agreement was effective from August 5, 2020 until
August 4, 2021, "unless terminated earlier pursuant to the
section entitled 'TERMINATION'." The Termination section stated:
"This Agreement may be terminated by either party for any reason
by giving thirty (30) calendar days' written notice to the other
party."
In August 2020, Mays worked in MMMC's operating room
and its outpatient clinic. Assistant associate medical director
Ronald Christopher Martin was told by the surgeons for whom Mays
worked that they "did not find him to be useful in the" operating
room. Mays met with Martin and director of physician practice
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management Traci Nunokawa in early October 2020. Mays wanted to
work "four ten-hour days" in the clinic. Martin pointed out that
the clinic was only open eight hours a day. He told Mays, "I
can't have you only work 32 hours a week and pay you full-time."
Martin and Nunokawa decided that Mays "was going to
have a five-day-a-week schedule as he was a full-time employee.
Anything less than five days a week is not a full-time employee."
Nunokawa met with Mays in late November 2020 and told him he
will need to work five days a week in the clinic. Mays did not
agree. Nunokawa testified in deposition that she "tried to help
him understand that there was no negotiation or anything to think
about, that this was leadership's decision, but the conversation
was going in circles, so we ended the meeting."
Nunokawa and Martin met with Mays on December 9, 2020.
They told him their final decision was that he needed to work
five days a week in the clinic. He said he needed to think about
it. He did not get back to them.
Mays instead sent a lengthy email dated January 1,
2021, from his kp.org address to four persons with kp.org
addresses who he described as "high ranking in the leadership
that surrounds me at" Pacific Permanente. He explained: "With
recent leadership changes, and the delicate information involved,
I am uncertain who: Tracy [sic] Nunokawa and Dr. Ron Martin,
[sic] report to directly and who to trust." The email states
that "a disregard of my contributions to medicine has become
evident in the effective stripping of my hospital privileges,
along with a forced ultimatum to be a 5day [sic] clinic provider
only or leave my job!" It concludes:
My intention for your reading this in its entirety is to
seek your influence in any way, to stave off an abject
transgression Traci Nunokawa and Dr. Ron Martin are
mandating. As it is unethical. It is inconsistent with the
values told to me as expected and deserved within the MMMC
and Kaiser workplace, for everyone.
There are other related violations I could mention, but
presently, if I am complicit to either direction of the
given ultimatum, a certain detriment to my professional and
respective personal well-being will result. With no
authority for recourse.
These offensive actions deconstruct my professional capacity
and undermines [sic] my integrity and honor, with nothing to
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replace it. I now find it unfathomable that Tracy [sic] and
Dr. Martin are in leadership roles of such importance. With
such little regard to my being an asset to the community. I
will only hope other PA-C's are not experiencing this
mal-treatment, and my situation is unique, for the sake of
my colleague's [sic] well-being.
*** As such, I am removing myself from Tracy's [sic] and
Dr. Martins [sic] hostile environment, influence and chain
of command. Based on the entirety of these circumstances, I
am taking an unofficial "leave of absence," out of fear that
submitting to it will serve an additional course of
detriment as the ultimatum engages to the next working day.
"I have not quit my job." As I do not choose either
direction of the ultimatum, nor do I peacefully accept the
unwarranted reduction, removal, or effectively similar,
logistically complicated to impair utilize them. [sic]
I have coordinated with [Maui Health System] to adjust the
clinic schedule to accommodate my absence in anticipation of
this growing crisis for me.
We are at the pinnacle of my uncertainty, attempting to
remain valued within Kaiser and MMMC circles. I am hopeful
you will see my concerns as legitimate, and my intended
temporary absence justified as a shout to you for justice.
I believe the issues are deserving of senior and executive
leadership commitment to mitigate the circumstances, without
me being the sacrifice, for the ease of muting these medical
practice circumstances, and possibly for support of
orthopedic privilege expansion.
Therefore, I mentioned previously your skills of empathy,
for my complete understanding.
I believe it undeserving, but a contrary choice would advise
for my termination, as a simple solution that disposes of
what I've said coldly. If so, it will accept the
disappointment confirming to me the complicit implications
to wrong doings. Of course, I wish for everyone to get what
they want. However, the manner and in which things played
out, to bring me to such various measures of [sic]
This ongoing situation is generating despair and compromise
to me. It has created a loss of faith and trust in those
meant to advocate for my success. Honestly, I am concerned
about their tangents of influence and friendships throughout
the remaining spectrum of my chain of command and committees
they are involved.
I am heavily invested and committed to remaining with
Kaiser, and being part of MMMC, practicing hospital
orthopedics, and living the rest of my life on Maui.
Without your support, I am left defenseless to this
perceived tyranny.
It must be stated, these consequential actions against my
prosperity was [sic] not generated in response to poor
conduct. I might accept the loss of privileges, or even a
restrictive function if surrounded by inappropriate behavior
or moral turpitude as a reason. There is an active example
of this in our community with another orthopedic provider
who lost their privileges. I suspect the result may be the
same for me, but the major difference is I'm innocent of
error leading to my similar circumstances, other than
seeking help from my leaders.
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On a final topic, being that hospital privileging is and was
a specifically required contingency in my contract hiring,
along with my high experience to fulfill the orthopedic
specialty service line needs, I find the dubious reduction
of my privileges, restrictions in my schedule, and blockade
to work in the hospital facility to provide patient care is
more than a compromise to the spirit of my contract. These
questionable actions undoubtedly represent a complete
contrast to all prior established expectational norms when I
hired on.
After today, depending on what will fully transpire, I may
only have access to personal email and cell phone, as listed
below. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for
carefully reading and taking the time out of your busy and
important lives.
I now await fate.
(bold italics added).
When he was asked in deposition if he agreed his leave
of absence was unauthorized, he answered:
I would -- I would have to qualify it differently in --
because, black or white, saying yes is not accurate to me.
I would say that it was a justified tactic to alert
authority that could help the situation.
Otherwise, it's almost like when one or two or two or
more people strike or some -- some sort, right? It's --
it's -- it's -- you know, I'm not in a union. I'm not in
any protected entity obviously. It's a void in the health
care system, my profession, and I'm unprotected.
And so it was -- it was a response to the environment
I was being subjected to. And --
Q. Did you have preapproval before taking a leave
of absence?
A. Not in the usual process, but it was under
duress because all of my direct leadership I felt like were
undermining me and doing it in dubious ways, duplicitous
ways, and -- and smiling to me, you know, when I -- when I
would see them.
And so I -- I just needed to shine a light on it
somehow. And I would say leave of absence without the
conflict of interest letter cannot -- it can't be supported,
it can't be justified.
But with it preceding it and trying to assure that at
least for the period of time -- because I would have gone
back to work the next day if I would have had some kind of
support or show of response that what they're doing is wrong
-- because I know what they're doing is wrong -- and if they
would have resolved it immediately, and said, You [sic] know
what, we're in the wrong, come on back, I would have come
back the next day, and all this would have been a much
smaller issue. And I made that clear when I was talking to
Bell and HR folks.
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Q. So you were attempting to take this leave of
absence and use it as leverage in order to get your way in
negotiations?
A. I had no other avenue at that point. I tried.
The several meetings exemplified that, the attempt to have
support discussions from my sponsoring physicians. I wasn't
-- with the leadership changes that had happened, I didn't
even know where to go next.
So I captured -- I think it was seven when I sent the
letter. And part of that was to account for Traci's
director or VP or whatever role that is for MHS, hospital
CEO, medical staff chief, my -- the orthopedic chief. And
in some ways, I felt like that -- if there was legitimate
support of ethical policy, that it wouldn't have gone right
to Martin and Traci as an FYI.
Laura T. Katase, Hawaii Permanente's executive director
for human resources, emailed Mays on January 4, 2021. She
acknowledged his January 1 email, and being "aware that you are
not reporting in to work this week." She told Mays he had been
placed on an unpaid leave of absence.
By letter dated January 19, 2021, Pacific Permanente
offered Mays a release and separation agreement, with a
separation date of February 18, 2021. Mays did not sign it. It
appears his employment with Pacific was terminated effective
February 18, 2021.
Mays sued Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente on
July 19, 2021. Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente moved
for summary judgment. The motion was granted. The Judgment was
entered on February 25, 2025. Mays appealed, creating
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX.
Meanwhile, Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente
moved for attorney fees and costs. The circuit court awarded
them taxable costs, but denied attorney fees. The Amended Final
Judgment, which included the cost award, was entered on April 4,
2025. Mays appealed, creating CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. Permanente
cross-appealed. We consolidated the appeals.
II. POINTS OF ERROR
Mays contends the circuit court erred by granting
summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material
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fact about whether Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente
violated the HWPA.
Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente contend the
circuit court erred by denying their request for attorney fees.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Summary Judgment
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Bellamy
v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 158 Hawai#i 227, 233, 590 P.3d 871,
877 (2026). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence
shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
The evidence must be viewed, and all inferences must be drawn, in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 233โ34,
590 P.3d at 877โ78.
B. Attorney Fees and Costs
We review an order granting or denying attorney fees
for abuse of discretion. Knowles v. Haw. Pac. Univ., 158 Hawai#i
311, 315, 591 P.3d 984, 988 (App. 2026). "A court abuses its
discretion if it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or
disregards rules or principles of law or practice." Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
When (as here) the summary judgment movant does not
bear the burden of proof at trial, it has the burden to show
(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact on the essential
elements of the claim or defense addressed by the motion, and
(2) the uncontroverted facts entitle it to judgment as a matter
of law. Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai#i 46, 56, 292 P.3d 1276, 1286
(2013). Once the movant satisfies its burden, the non-moving
party must "demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to general
allegations, that present a genuine issue worthy of trial." Id.
at 56-57, 292 P.3d at 1286-87.
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A. Summary judgment on the breach of contract
claim was appropriate because Mays breached
the Agreement.
A plaintiff claiming breach of contract must prove
"either that he has performed the contract or that during the
term of the contract he was ready, willing and able to perform."
Low v. Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 50 Haw. 582, 585, 445 P.2d
372, 376 (1968). Although he tried to justify it, Mays admitted
taking an unauthorized leave of absence. Having breached the
Agreement himself, he cannot maintain a claim for breach of
contract against Pacific Permanente.
We need not address Hawaii Permanente's argument that
it was not a party to the Agreement, or Mays's argument that a
parent company can be liable for the actions of a subsidiary when
it actively participates in wrongdoing, because Mays could not
maintain a claim for breach of contract against Hawaii
Permanente, either.
B. Summary judgment on the HWPA claim was
appropriate because the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to Mays, was not
reasonably susceptible of an inference or
conclusion he was a protected whistleblower.
HRS ยง 378-62 (2015) provides, in relevant part:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of
employment because:
(1) The employee . . . reports or is about to report to
the employer, . . . verbally or in writing, a
violation or a suspected violation of:
(A) A law, rule, ordinance, or regulation, adopted
pursuant to law of this State, a political
subdivision of this State, or the United
States[ ]
. . . .
unless the employee knows that the report is false[.]
HRS ยง 378-62 "provides protection to employees who
report suspected violations of law from any form of retaliation
by their employers." Crosby v. Dep't of Budget & Fin., 76
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Hawai#i 332, 341, 876 P.2d 1300, 1309 (1994) (quotation marks and
italics omitted). "[T]he legislature intended that the required
burden of proof be similar to that utilized in traditional labor
management relations discharge cases." Id. at 342, 876 P.2d at
1310.
To prevail on an HWPA claim, the "employee has the
burden of showing that his or her protected conduct was a
'substantial or motivating factor' in the decision to terminate
the employee." Id. at 342, 876 P.2d at 1310. If the employee
sustains that burden, "the employer can defend affirmatively by
showing that the termination would have occurred regardless of
the protected activity." Id. (brackets omitted). "[I]f the
employer rebuts the prima facie case, the burden reverts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's proffered reasons
were 'pretextual.'" Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135 Hawai#i 1,
14, 346 P.3d 70, 83 (2015) (age discrimination).
Mays argues his sending the January 1, 2021 email was
conduct protected under HRS ยง 378-62. He contends the email
raised "concerns about his hospital privileges, hostile work
environment, and ethical issues[.]" His email did not name,
cite, or describe any law, rule, ordinance, or regulation Hawaii
Permanente or Pacific Permanente was violating, or was suspected
of violating.
Mays's memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment argued his email reported violations of the
Affordable Care Act, Clayton Act, Sherman Act, and something
called a "340B drug program." But it didn't provide citations to
those laws, rules, or regulations. It didn't explain what those
laws, rules, or regulations covered, regulated, or prohibited.
And it didn't point to any content in the email that supposedly
described violations or suspected violations of those laws,
rules, or regulations by Pacific Permanente or Hawaii Permanente.
Mays's opening brief contains the same deficiencies.
On a motion for summary judgment, "[a]lthough the court
must draw all inferences and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, significantly, the court is
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permitted to draw only those inferences of which the evidence is
reasonably susceptible." Bellamy, 158 Hawai#i at 233โ34, 590
P.3d at 877โ78 (quotation marks omitted). Mays's January 1, 2021
email can reasonably be read only as a complaint about being
assigned to work five days a week in MMMC's clinic; a plea to
those he thought were "high ranking in the leadership" to change
his supervisors' decision; and a threat that "a contrary choice
would advise for my termination, as a simple solution that
disposes of what I've said coldly."
No reasonable jury could interpret the email as a
"report" of "a violation or a suspected violation of . . . [a]
law, rule, ordinance, or regulation, adopted pursuant to law of
this State, a political subdivision of this State, or the United
States[.]" HRS ยง 378-62(1)(A).
Because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable
to Mays was not reasonably susceptible of an inference or
conclusion that would support Mays's claim of an HWPA violation,
Mays failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient
to defeat summary judgment. See Bellamy, 158 Hawai#i at 235, 590
P.3d at 879 ("Because the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to Bellamy was not 'reasonably susceptible' of an
inference or conclusion that would support Bellamy's allegations,
Bellamy failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
sufficient to defeat summary judgment."). The circuit court did
not err by granting Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente's
motion for summary judgment on Mays's HWPA claim.
C. Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente were
entitled to recover attorney fees.
The circuit court denied Pacific Permanente and Hawaii
Permanente's request for attorney fees because "the essential
nature of plaintiff's claims sounded as a Whistleblower claims
[sic] and . . . the relief he sought constituted damages more in
the nature of tort actions and not for breach of contract." The
order was entered on March 28, 2025.
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On May 27, 2026, we decided Knowles. There, Knowles
sued Hawaii Pacific University (HPU) for breach of employment
contract and violation of the HWPA. After a bench trial, the
trial court entered judgment in favor of HPU on all claims. HPU
moved for attorney fees under HRS ยง 607-14 (2016) ("Attorneys'
fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit, etc."). The circuit
court awarded HPU attorney fees. Knowles appealed.
Knowles did not dispute that his breach of employment
contract claim was in the nature of assumpsit. Id. at 315, 591
P.3d at 988. We held that Knowles's HWPA claim was statutory,
did not sound in assumpsit, and noted that the HWPA allowed a
prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney fees but did not contain
a reciprocal provision for a prevailing defendant. Id. at 315-
16, 591 P.3d at 988-89. We noted that "[i]n awarding attorneys'
fees in a case involving both assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims,
a court must base its award of fees, if practicable, on an
apportionment of the fees claimed between assumpsit and
non-assumpsit claims." Id. at 316, 591 P.3d at 989 (quoting
Blair v. Ing, 96 Hawai#i 327, 332, 31 P.3d 184, 189 (2001)
(Blair II)).
Blair II arose from a lawsuit for accounting
malpractice and breach of implied contract. The circuit court
granted the accountant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The
plaintiffs appealed. The supreme court affirmed. Blair v. Ing,
95 Hawai#i 247, 21 P.3d 452 (2001). The accountant then moved
for an award of attorney fees incurred in the appeal. The
supreme court concluded:
Because the negligence claim in this case was derived from
the alleged implied contract and was inextricably linked to
the implied contract claim by virtue of the malpractice
suit, we hold that it is impracticable, if not impossible,
to apportion the fees between the assumpsit and
non-assumpsit claims.
Blair II, 96 Hawai#i at 333, 31 P.3d at 190.
Similarly, in Knowles we stated: "The same factual
allegations underlie both of Knowles's claims and the defense to
both claims. . . . Thus, it appears that this is not a case that
we can divide into discrete slivers neatly matching each claim
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advanced." 158 Hawai#i at 316, 591 P.3d at 989 (quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Mays's breach-of-contract and HWPA claims were
inextricably intertwined; the same factual allegations underlay
both of Mays's claims and Pacific Permanente and Hawaii
Permanente's defenses. Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente
were thus entitled to recover attorney fees under HRS ยง 607-14.
HRS ยง 607-14 (2016) imposes a limit on the amount of
attorney fees to be paid by the losing party: twenty-five percent
of the amount of the judgment obtained by the plaintiff, or
twenty-five percent of "the amount sued for if the defendant
obtains judgment." We held in Knowles:
Here, notwithstanding that Knowles's assumpsit and
non-assumpsit claims are inextricably intertwined, there is
a determinable maximum that should limit the amount of
attorneys' fees recoverable under HRS ยง 607-14. . . .
Knowles's contract ran from August 16, 2014, to August 15,
2019. Thus, for his claim sounding in assumpsit, Knowles
was only potentially entitled to "future pay" on his
employment contract from the date of his termination on
June 19, 2015, until the employment contract expired on
August 15, 2019. Therefore, we conclude that the maximum
possible damages Knowles could have received based on the
breach of contract claim is determinable.
. . . .
Finally, we note that, to the extent that it did so,
the Circuit Court clearly erred in determining the amount
sued for in this case โ and in turn determining the
allowable amount of attorneys' fees โ based on Knowles's
interrogatory response in the USDC suit, rather than, for
example, Knowles's requested damages in his proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case. Upon
remand, the proper inquiry involves the amount of damages
sought in this case based on Knowles's breach of contract
claim against HPU, without regard to any additional relief
that might have [been] provided under the HWPA.
158 Hawai#i at 317, 318, 591 P.3d at 990, 991 (cleaned up)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Under these circumstances, we hold that the circuit
court acted outside its discretion by denying Pacific Permanente
and Hawaii Permanente's request for attorney fees. We remand
this case for the circuit court to determine the amount of
attorney fees to which Pacific Permanente and Hawaii Permanente
are entitled from Mays.
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To determine whether the HRS ยง 607-14 twenty-five
percent limit applies, the circuit court should calculate the
amount of damages Mays could have recovered had he prevailed on
his breach of contract claim โ that is, the pay and any other
benefits to which Mays would have been entitled from January 4,
2021 (when he was placed on unpaid leave of absence) to August 4,
2021 (the Agreement's ending date).
V. CONCLUSION
The April 4, 2025 Amended Final Judgment is affirmed.
This case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion.
Mays's motion for retention of oral argument is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, November 20, 2026.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Shawn A. Luiz, Chief Judge
on opening brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant/ /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Cross-Appellee. Associate Judge
Adam O. Mays, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Self-represented on Associate Judge
reply and answering briefs.
Kristi K. O'Heron,
Andrea Lux Miyashita,
Nicolette Winter,
for Defendants-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants.
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