Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM GUAM WATERWORKS AUTHORITY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee, and JOEY A. TAITANO, Real Party in Interest-Appellant. Supreme Court Case No. CVA24-012 Superior Court Case No. SP0030-23 OPINION Cite as: 2026 Guam 3 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on August 11, 2025 Hagåtña, Guam Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 2 of 31 Appearing for Real Party in Interest-Appellant: Appearing for Petitioner-Appellee: Joshua D. Walsh, Esq. Jay Matthew Strader, Esq. (briefed & argued) Razzano Walsh & Torres, P.C. Assistant Attorney General 139 Murray Blvd., Ste. 100 Office of the Attorney General Hagåtña, GU 96910 Bank of Hawaii Bldg. 134 W. Soledad Ave., Ste. 302 Hagåtña, GU 96910 Theresa G. Rojas, Esq. (briefed) Legal Counsel Guam Waterworks Authority Gloria B. Nelson Public Service Bldg. 688 Route 15 Mangilao, GU 96913 Appearing for Respondent-Appellee: Katherine M. Nepton, Esq. (briefed) Civil Service Commission Bell Tower 710 W. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 201 Hagåtña, GU 96910 Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 3 of 31 BEFORE: F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Presiding Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice; and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Justice Pro Tempore.1 CARBULLIDO, P.J.: [1] The facts of this case are not disputed. The Guam Waterworks Authority (“GWA”) terminated Joey A. Taitano’s employment for refusing to retake a drug test under direct observation. GWA mailed Taitano two “adverse action forms” that provided notice of proposed adverse action (collectively the “NPAA”) on May 6, 2021. Taitano received the NPAA on May 13. GWA terminated Taitano on May 18. Under GWA’s Personnel Rules and Regulations (“GWA Rules”), an employee has ten days to answer “after receipt of the notice,” and the General Manager may not proceed with the adverse action until the notice period has expired. GWA Pers. R. & Regs. 11.200C, § 12.0 (approved by Guam Pub. L. 28-159:7 (Dec. 29, 2006)) (emphasis added). [2] Taitano appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission (“CSC”), arguing in part that he was not given adequate time to answer the NPAA. The CSC ultimately vacated the termination because an insufficient number of commissioners voted to uphold it. GWA then appealed to the Superior Court. The trial court concluded that the notice period began on May 6 because, under the GWA Rules, service is complete upon mailing, and thus Taitano’s termination was valid. Taitano appeals the trial court’s determination, claiming that the court had no jurisdiction to hear GWA’s petition for judicial review because it was filed late. He further argues that his termination was invalid because it occurred a mere four days after he received the NPAA. We conclude that the plain language of the GWA Rules mandates that an employee be given ten days to respond after receiving notice before adverse action is taken. We reverse. 1 The signatures in this opinion reflect the titles of the justices at the time this matter was argued and submitted. Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 4 of 31 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND [3] On March 30, 2021, Taitano underwent a random drug test which was later deemed invalid. Taitano then refused to retake the drug test under direct observation. GWA placed Taitano on administrative leave on April 20, 2021. [4] GWA sent two “Adverse Action Forms” to Taitano and the Civil Service Commission (“CSC”). The first form was marked as a “Notice of Proposed Adverse Action”; the second labeled the type of action as a “Notice of Proposed and Immediate Suspension During Notice Period (13.1).” Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 27 (Excerpts Admin. R., June 28, 2024), Ex. 1 (Notice Proposed Adverse Action, May 6, 2021); id., Ex. 2 (Notice Proposed & Immediate Suspension, May 6, 2021) (hereinafter, “Notice Proposed Suspension”). Although GWA dated both forms April 21, 2021, there is no record of either being sent before May 6.2 [5] The first form did not state the nature of the adverse action being proposed against Taitano beyond stating, “These are infractions in anticipation of a proposed action, and not a matter already decided. Be advised that a final adverse action will be initiated that may result in termination of your employment, demotion or suspension action.” Id., Ex. 1 at unnumbered p. 6 (Notice Proposed Adverse Action). The second form was for a “suspension during notice period,” from May 7 until June 4 (twenty working days). Id., Ex. 2 at unnumbered pp. 1, 3 (Notice Proposed Suspension) (emphasis omitted). Both forms provided in bold font that “Employee must answer orally or in writing within ten (10) calendar days after receipt of this notice.” Id., Ex. 1 at unnumbered p. 1 (Notice Proposed Adverse Action); id., Ex. 2 at unnumbered p. 1 (Notice Proposed Suspension) (emphasis omitted). 2 The trial court did not distinguish between the two forms in its Decision and Order. As a handwritten note on the first form cross references a handwritten note on the second, and there is a single certified mail receipt, we take this to mean the trial court found both forms were mailed together. Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 5 of 31 [6] GWA sent the NPAA via certified mail to Taitano’s P.O. Box at the Hagåtña post office. On appeal, GWA does not dispute Taitano’s claim that he received the NPAA on May 13. GWA requested a return receipt3 for the NPAA, although no return receipts appear in the record before us. GWA’s Personnel Services Administrator testified at the CSC hearing and, on recross- examination by Taitano’s representative, appeared to admit that GWA had received a return receipt showing that Taitano received the NPAA on May 13: Q . . . . [C]ould you look at [Exhibit] M-106? That is a certified mail receipt; is that right? A Yes. Q And is there a box checked there, return receipt is requested or what does it say? “Hard copy.” Return receipt hard copy. Is that correct? .... A Yes. .... Q So, not only are they going to serve it personally on the employee but they also send you a receipt showing the employee received it. Is that right? A Yes. Q So, even though GWA received a receipt showing that he received the document on May 13, you proceeded with adverse action anyway; is that correct? A Yes. Q Yes. So, GWA knew that the Employee received the document on May 13. A (pauses) 3 “Certified Mail through the U.S. Postal Service provides written proof of mailing, and Return Receipt service provides written proof of delivery.” Pineda v. Pineda, 2005 Guam 10 ¶ 15. Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 6 of 31 [Taitano’s representative]: So, okay. I just want to make it clear that service . . . . [T]he Employee did not receive it till May 13th. The agency had knowledge of it, but they chose not to consider the Employee’s Answer. See RA, tab 22, CSC Tr. at 9, 60-61 (CSC Merits Hr’g, Dec. 7, 2022). However, in response to questions from the CSC Board Chairman, the Personnel Administrator clarified that although the NPAA was sent via certified mail return receipt requested, GWA never received the return receipt from the post office: Q So, can you just go back and try to track down the timeframe? Can you just clarify -- I need some clarification. . . . .... Q So, when exactly -- I’m trying to look at a date here, the post office, but I couldn’t figure the date. What date did they mail out the notice to the employee? A May 6. Q May 6. So, the employee received the notice of proposed adverse action; correct? On what date is that? A I don’t believe the receipt from the post office is in the exhibit. But according to the Employee’s Notice, he received it on the 13th of May. Q So, he received officially the [NPAA] on May 13? A Based on his response. Based on his response letter to the general manager, he claimed that he received the notice on May 13th. Q That’s the employee’s response. But this is a certified mail, right? A Yes. Q I’m trying to find exactly where the post office return it back by certifying that the -- the receiver or the employee received the mail. Do you know what date is this? A I don’t recall what date certified by the post office; because we didn’t have the receipt that is usually sent to us was not received from the post office. Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 7 of 31 Q So, management did not receive the -- A Yes. Q -- your office did not receive the -- A Yeah. Q -- notice that the employee did pick up the mail from the post office? A Yeah. . . . I believe at the time, because of the Covid situation -- Q Okay. A -- they were probably delayed or we never received the receipt that the employee actually signed received. Q But the employee -- A From the post office. Q So, since you did not receive that or Management did not receive the return notice from the post office saying that the employee did receive -- listening to the testimony of this case, the employee did notice Management that he did receive the [NPAA] on May 13, 2021. Right? A Yes. Q That’s from the Employee’s notice? A Yes. Q And not from the post office? A Not from the post office. Id. at 63-66. [7] GWA terminated Taitano’s employment on May 18, 2021. GWA sent a third adverse action form via certified mail to Taitano, this time giving notice of final adverse action (“NFAA”). GWA sent the NFAA to Taitano’s P.O. Box. Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 8 of 31 [8] The NFAA told Taitano: “You ignored the opportunity given to you to explain or respond to the NPAAs to the [General Manager]. You failed to answer during the given notice [sic].” RA, tab 27 (Excerpts Admin. R.), Ex. 3 at unnumbered p. 7 (Notice Final Adverse Action, May 18, 2021). The NFAA further stated that Taitano’s “failure to answer to the notice provided”—among other actions4—was a “conclusive” violation of GWA’s Drug and Alcohol-Free Workplace Policy and subjected him to immediate dismissal. Id. The NFAA concluded by stating: “GWA Management finds that the charge is substantiated, and that you have offered no answer in response to the charges, and you are therefore dismissed effective: May 18, 2021.” Id. at unnumbered p. 8. [9] On May 21, GWA received an answer from Taitano addressing the NPAA (but not the NFAA). Taitano’s answer stated that he received the NPAA “via certified mail on May 13, 2021.” Id., Ex. 4 at 1 (Employee’s Answer, May 21, 2021). His answer further stated that he was “very confused” by the drug-testing process and that direct observation was “a major invasion of [his] privacy rights.” Id. Taitano wrote that he had neither been provided with the testing policy, nor had he received any training explaining it. Id. at 1-2. Taitano further denied any drug use and expressed his willingness to perform another test, including “saliva, blood or even a urine sample collected in a professional and discreet manner.” Id. at 1. Because GWA had already mailed the NFAA terminating Taitano’s employment on May 18, it did not consider his answer to the NPAA. [10] Taitano appealed GWA’s decision to the CSC on June 7, 2021. The CSC held a hearing on the merits over four days. [11] Because one commissioner was absent during one of the days of the hearing, he recused himself, leaving a quorum of five commissioners to decide Taitano’s case. The remaining commissioners voted 3-1 to uphold Taitano’s termination, with one commissioner abstaining. 4 The NFAA also cited Taitano’s refusal to test and failure to utilize the drug-test appeal procedure. See RA, tab 27 (Excerpts Admin. R., June 28, 2024), Ex. 3 at unnumbered p. 7 (Notice Final Adverse Action, May 18, 2021). Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 9 of 31 However, the CSC’s enabling statute requires a vote of at least four members to uphold an adverse action. See 4 GCA § 4402 (2005). Thus, the CSC vacated the termination. Because the CSC’s enabling statute requires a vote of four members to issue findings of fact, see Guam Power Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Guerrero), 967 F.2d 586, 1992 WL 153005, at *2 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (“[N]o findings can be issued from the Commission without four concurring votes . . . .”), none were issued. However, the reason for the dissenting vote was the belief that Taitano received the NPAA on May 13—which meant GWA did not give Taitano the full ten days to respond under its Rules when it terminated him on May 18. See RA, tab 22, CSC Tr. at 78-85, 88-90 (CSC Merits Hr’g, Dec. 9, 2022). [12] GWA then petitioned the Superior Court for judicial review. GWA maintained that the CSC’s decision vacating the termination because it “did not meet its required vote of four” was “subject to de novo review since the ruling against [GWA] resulted from a question of law relative to an interpretation of [GWA]’s rules service [sic] for proposed and final adverse actions and the dates (or action) which trigger an Employee Response.” RA, tab 1 at 5 (Pet. Jud. Rev., Mar. 8, 2023) (citing Fagan v. Dell’Isola, 2006 Guam 11 ¶ 11). GWA argued that “[i]n effect, the Commissioner (whose vote was cast in favor of Taitano) determined that Taitano’s proposed adverse action was effectively ‘served’ on the date Taitano indicated the adverse action was ‘received’ (on May 13, 2021) in contravention with the law and applicable rules.” Id. GWA also argued that “the CSC further failed to state the basis on which the Commissioners reached their decision as the signed Judgment fails to provide this court the ability to understand the factual basis for its ultimate conclusion.” Id. at 6. GWA requested that the Superior Court vacate the CSC’s decision, adopt GWA’s position that the notice period begins running on the day notice is Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 10 of 31 mailed, and remand to the CSC for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming termination. Id. at 6-7. [13] After ordering briefing from the parties and holding a hearing on the merits, the Superior Court granted GWA’s petition. RA, tab 33 at 7 (Dec. & Order, Oct. 23, 2024). Although the CSC did not issue factual findings, the Superior Court appears to have accepted the reasoning for the dissenting vote as the basis for vacating the termination. See id. at 6-7. The Superior Court found that Taitano had ten days to reply to GWA’s NPAA, starting on the date it was mailed rather than the date it was received. See id. The trial court acknowledged that the GWA Rules state that an employee has ten days “after receipt of the notice” to answer but emphasized that “service by mail is complete upon mailing.” Id. at 4. The trial court determined that the “service by mail rule” controlled: In this case, service by mail is the specific method of delivery. This method was allowed under the circumstances as GWA had made multiple attempts to serve Taitano at his home to no avail. On this issue, the Court finds that “service upon mailing” is a more specific descriptor than “upon receipt,” and is therefore the standard that should be applied. The legal definition of “receipt” is not provided in GWA’s Personnel Rules and Regulations, and could be interpreted to encompass the meaning of service upon mailing. If Taitano had been reachable at his home, he would have received the Notice in hand immediately, without any mailing delay. However, because Taitano was unreachable, the Rules provide an alternative method of service, which specifies that service is complete upon mailing. It does not make sense for the law to recognize a difference between these methods. Id. at 5. The trial court further stated that “the principle of the mailbox rule in Guam law is clear. There is a rebuttable presumption in the law that properly mailing a document is sufficient for service and the law assumes that document was timely received by the addressee, barring evidence to the contrary.” Id. (citing Melwani v. Arnold, 2010 Guam 7 ¶ 20). The trial court determined that “Taitano’s claims that he did not receive the Notice until May 13 are insufficient to rebut the presumption that the Notice was timely received.” Id. Despite finding that Taitano failed to rebut Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 11 of 31 the presumption, the court confusingly stated that, under the deferential standard of review for factual issues, it did not “dispute any of the questions of fact asserted by the parties prior to the petition for judicial review, and particularly accepts the fact that Taitano did not receive the Notice until May 13, giving him only a few days to reply to the Notice.” Id. at 6. Ultimately, the trial court’s decision was rooted in policy considerations: [W]hen mail is the method of service, the only way to have a concrete legal standard is to use the date of mailing as a baseline. While it is true that mail can be delayed and not everyone checks their mail every day, allowing a party to push back a legal deadline based on when they decided to check their mail is poor legal policy. Such a standard would allow legal deadlines to be controlled by parties rather than by the reviewing institution, and would place too high of a burden on reviewing institutions like the CSC to know when a deadline has passed. Id. The court vacated the CSC’s decision and remanded to the CSC for further proceedings. Id. at 7. Taitano timely appealed. II. JURISDICTION [14] “Decisions of the Civil Service Commission are subject to judicial review.” Charfauros v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Guam Police Dep’t), 2022 Guam 19 ¶ 15 (citing Guam Police Dep’t v. Guam Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Charfauros), 2020 Guam 12 ¶ 6; Carlson v. Perez, 2007 Guam 6 ¶ 65). “The vehicle for obtaining this review is a petition for judicial review filed in the Superior Court of Guam.” Id. (quoting Charfauros, 2020 Guam 12 ¶ 6). We have jurisdiction over appeals from a final order of the Superior Court. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 119-84 (2026)); 7 GCA §§ 3107, 3108(a) (2005). [15] Before turning to the merits of Taitano’s arguments, we must address his contention that GWA’s petition for judicial review was untimely, depriving this court of jurisdiction. 5 See 5 Although we are sympathetic to the CSC’s request for clarification on a jurisdictional issue, see Appellee CSC’s Br. at 7-10 (Apr. 30, 2025), we must decline to “address issues unnecessary to the resolution of the case before [us],” Unpingco v. Derry, 2021 Guam 1 ¶ 21 (quoting Hemlani v. Hemlani, 2015 Guam 16 ¶ 33). Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 12 of 31 Appellant’s Br. at 10-11 (Mar. 31, 2025). If we conclude that jurisdiction never attached to the original underlying action, then the CSC’s decision becomes final and binding over the parties. See San Nicolas v. Birn, 2022 Guam 8 ¶ 30; 4 GCA § 4406 (as amended by Guam Pub. L. 34- 145:1 (Dec. 13, 2018)). [16] “[J]urisdictional issues are a threshold matter, to be addressed prior to a review on the merits.” Agana Beach Condo. Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Mafnas, 2013 Guam 9 ¶ 37 (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007)). “[J]urisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Port Auth. of Guam v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Susuico), 2015 Guam 14 ¶ 11 (quoting Guam Fed’n of Tchrs. v. Gov’t of Guam, 2013 Guam 14 ¶ 24). [17] The CSC’s enabling legislation states that its decisions are “subject to judicial review.” 4 GCA § 4406. But “because the statute is silent on the procedures for obtaining [judicial] review,” this court imposed “a judicially-created limitations period requiring a CSC decision to be appealed within 30 days.” In re Dep’t of Agric. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Rojas), 2009 Guam 19 ¶ 13. “The CSC later adopted the 30-day rule through the rule-making process of the Administrative Adjudications Law.” Id. ¶ 14. Under CSC Rules of Procedure for Adverse Action Appeals (“CSC AA Rules”), a party seeking judicial review of a CSC judgment must file appropriate pleadings with the Superior Court “within thirty (30) days after judgment is entered.” CSC AA R. 11.7.8. [18] Applying the 30-day deadline to the CSC’s February 2, 2023, written decision, the filing deadline for GWA’s petition was March 7, 2023.6 GWA submitted its Petition for Judicial Review on March 7, 2023, using the Superior Court’s email filing. The Superior Court Clerk’s office informed GWA that court documents received after 5:00 p.m. on a weekday will be reviewed and 6 Taitano acknowledged at oral argument that he applied the incorrect computation of time in his brief, Digital Recording at 10:05:19–10:08:51 (Oral Arg., Aug. 11, 2025), as he did not take weekends and holidays into consideration and incorrectly claimed that “GWA submitted its Petition for Judicial Review 33 days later,” see Appellant’s Br. at 11 (Mar. 31, 2025). Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 13 of 31 processed the next business day. GWA paid the filing fee on March 8, 2023, after the petition was processed by the Superior Court Clerk’s office. The Superior Court Clerk relied on this court’s administrative order to determine the filing date. Supreme Court Administrative Order No. ADM22-007 states that “[a] document is not considered ‘filed’ until the filer receives a response from the Clerk’s office stating the document has been filed,” and “[a] document is not filed until the filing fee is paid.” Re: Relative to the Filing of Documents via Email in the Supreme Court of Guam and the Superior Court of Guam, ADM22-007 at 4 (Admin. Order No. ADM22-007, Oct. 14, 2022) (emphasis omitted). The Superior Court Clerk ultimately stamped the filing date as March 8, 2023, meaning GWA’s petition was stamped filed one day late. [19] Taitano argues that “jurisdiction never attached to the original underlying action, and the Superior Court was without the jurisdiction to confer the relief that it did to GWA.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. But this is incorrect, as “not all filing deadlines are ‘jurisdictional.’” People v. Pinaula, 2023 Guam 2 ¶ 18. A time limit prescribed only in a court- or agency-made rule is not jurisdictional; it is a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture or waiver if not properly raised. See id. ¶¶ 18-20; Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 158 (2023) (treating administrative filing deadline as claim-processing rule, observing “most time bars are nonjurisdictional”). We conclude that Taitano relies upon non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules that he has waived. [20] The 30-day time limit to file a petition for judicial review from a CSC decision was first created by this court and then adopted by CSC rule; it was not created by the Legislature and is therefore a claim-processing rule. Our administrative order stating that “[a] document is not considered filed until the filing fee is paid” is also a claim-processing rule. ADM22-007 at 4 (emphasis omitted). Finally, the Superior Court’s unwritten policy that an email filing after 5:00 Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 14 of 31 p.m. is considered filed the next business day is also a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule.7 Taitano had the opportunity to challenge the timeliness of the filing but instead waived any objection. See RA, tab 14 at 1-2 (Statement Non-opposition to GWA’s Mot. Accept, Apr. 20, 2023). The Superior Court granted GWA’s motion from the bench. See RA, tab 24 at 1 (Min. Entry, Apr. 23, 2024). Because the relevant rules are non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules, the Superior Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the petition for judicial review, and we therefore have jurisdiction over this appeal. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [21] Generally, “[w]e examine whether the trial court properly determined that the CSC’s decision was in accordance with the law and supported by substantial evidence.” Charfauros, 2022 Guam 19 ¶ 16 (quoting Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Mesngon), 2014 Guam 35 ¶ 5). However, “under 4 GCA § 4402, and Appellate Division precedent, any action of the CSC requires the vote of four commissioners to be enforceable.” Limtiaco v. Guam Fire Dep’t, 2007 Guam 10 ¶ 65 (footnote omitted). This procedural quirk of the CSC is known as the “Rule of Four.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that because “no findings can be issued from the 7 GWA argued that neither Administrative Order No. ADM22-07 nor its predecessor ADM21-657 contains language that support such a policy. See RA, tab 7 at 7 (Mot. Accept Filing as Timely, Mar. 24, 2023). Administrative Order No. ADM21-657 states that “Judiciary of Guam facilities are open to the general public for all court business between the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday to Friday.” Re: Seventeenth Updated Order Relative to Court Operations Under Exigent Circumstances Related to COVID-19 (Coronavirus), ADM21-657 at 2 (Admin. Order No. ADM21-657, July 30, 2021). That order also provides that the Superior Court Clerk’s Office is open for in-person filing between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Id. at 3. Assuming Administrative Order No. ADM21-657 supports the Superior Court’s policy that an email filing after 5:00 p.m. (or 4:00 p.m.) is filed the next day, see RA, tab 9 (Decl. Theresa G. Rojas, Mar. 24, 2023), Ex. A at 1-2 (Email between jsdesoto@guamwaterworks.org & efilecivil@guamcourts.org, Mar. 7, 2023); id., Ex. D at 2 (Email between tgrojas@guamwaterworks.org & shermosilla@guamcourts.org, Mar. 10, 2023), it is a court-made rule subject to waiver or forfeiture if the party does not properly raise it. See People v. Pinaula, 2023 Guam 2 ¶ 19. But this language merely defines public access hours; it does not logically support the conclusion that electronic filings submitted after 5:00 p.m. but before midnight are deemed filed the next day. Moreover, interpreting Administrative Order No. ADM21-657 to mean that filings after 5:00 p.m. are deemed filed the next day would conflict with Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 77(a), which provides: “The courts shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading or other proper paper, of issuing and returning mesne and final process, and of making and directing all interlocutory motions, orders, and rules.” Guam R. Civ. P. 77(a). However, we need not reach any potential conflict between Superior Court policy and the Rules of Civil Procedure because Taitano waived any objection to a late filing. Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 15 of 31 Commission without four concurring votes, the court is therefore precluded from reviewing findings whenever an adverse action appeal is disposed of by the Rule of Fours.” Guerrero, 1992 WL 153005, at *2. We see no reason to depart from this approach. Thus, when a case is disposed of by the Rule of Four, courts are limited to a de novo review of “whether the agency decision ‘was in accordance with law.’” See Fagan, 2006 Guam 11 ¶ 12 (citing 5 GCA § 9240 (2005); 22 GCA § 9122 (2005)). IV. ANALYSIS A. It Is Unreasonable to Presume a Letter Is Received the Day It Is Mailed [22] GWA suggests that there is only one iteration of the “mailbox rule” and that it governs the NPAA here. See Appellee GWA’s Br. at 4, 16-17 (May 14, 2025). However, a cursory review reveals that this phrase is applied to many different concepts. For example, there is a rule for court filings of inmates sent by prison mail system. E.g., Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275 (1988). There is a general rule for filing court documents by mail. See, e.g., Horton v. Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 2020 IL App (1st) 200022-U, ¶ 20. There is a rule for acceptance of a contract by correspondence. 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:33 (4th ed. (May 2025 Update)). There is a rule for the timely mailing of tax documents to the IRS. 35 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Tax Enforcement § 10 (Feb. 2026 Update). There is a rule governing the mailing of substituted service in a civil lawsuit. 72 C.J.S. Process § 78 (Mar. 2026 Update). And there is a rebuttable presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped, and mailed reaches its destination at the usual time. See Melwani, 2010 Guam 7 ¶ 20; Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932). [23] GWA incorrectly conflates several of these concepts. The chapter of the GWA Rules governing disciplinary actions for certified, technical, and professional employees states that “[s]ervice by mail is complete upon mailing.” GWA Pers. R. & Regs. 11.200C, § 17.0. GWA Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 16 of 31 claims that this provision “replicates the language of the mailbox rule.” Appellee GWA’s Br. at 20. But GWA’s arguments conflate substituted service by mail with the presumption of mail delivery. Further compounding this confusion, GWA primarily relies on a case dealing with the timely mailing of an extension to file a tax return. See id. at 20-21, 24 (citing Lewis v. United States, 144 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998)).8 The presumption of mail delivery should not be conflated with other distinct concepts like the mailing of substituted service. [24] This court has recognized that “proper mailing of a document raises a rebuttable presumption that the document was timely received by the addressee” and that without more, a mere claim of non-receipt is “insufficient to rebut the presumption.” Melwani, 2010 Guam 7 ¶ 20. Sometimes referred to as the “common law mailbox rule” or the “mail delivery rule” to distinguish it from related concepts, see, e.g., Schikore v. BankAmerica Suppl. Ret. Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 961- 63 (9th Cir. 2001); Lee v. State, 182 P.3d 1169, 1171 (Ariz. 2008), this rule “is commonly used for the numerous types of documents sent to individuals by federal, state, and local governmental entities,” 200 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 263 § 10 (July 2025 Update). Application of this rule commonly arises in cases dealing with “notices of garnishment, right-to-sue letters from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, unemployment benefits administrative hearings, administrative hearings regarding denial of medical benefits, notification of suspension of driver’s license, notification of action by family services agencies, and notification of action by public welfare agencies.” Id. (footnotes omitted). “Where the date of delivery is at issue and not 8 The decision in Lewis v. United States, 144 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998), is wholly inapposite because it was decided under a provision of the Internal Revenue Code which “specified that the postmark ‘shall be deemed to be the date of delivery [to the IRS].’” Lewis, 144 F.3d at 1223 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1)); see also id. at 1225 (White, J., dissenting) (“The taxpayers in this case clearly understand that reliance on the common law mailbox rule provides no help to them (indeed, as just noted, they lose if it provides the governing law) . . . .”). The other cases upon which GWA relies, see Appellee GWA’s Br. at 20-30 (citing In re Bucknum, 951 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Melwani v. Arnold, 2010 Guam 7; Palo Alto Town & Country Vill., Inc. v. BBTC Co., 521 P.2d 1097 (Cal. 1974) (in bank)), are straightforward applications of the presumption of mail delivery which do not support the proposition that “service” is equivalent to “receipt.” Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 17 of 31 supported by specific proof (such as a dated receipt), cases commonly adopt three days for a letter sent by first class mail.” Id. (citing Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2007)). [25] However, the presumption of mail delivery is usually inapplicable when a letter is sent via certified mail with return receipt requested. This court has explained that “Certified Mail through the U.S. Postal Service provides written proof of mailing, and Return Receipt service provides written proof of delivery.” Pineda v. Pineda, 2005 Guam 10 ¶ 15. Some courts have held that the presumption does not apply to certified mail at all. E.g., Card v. City of Cleveland, 2017-Ohio- 7173, 95 N.E.3d 1066, at ¶ 31; Simms v. Zucco, 280 A.3d 1226, 1236 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022); Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 814 A.2d 1108, 1114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). But even courts that apply the presumption to certified mail recognize that the presumption is rebuttable, and “[a] return receipt is prima facie evidence of the delivery of the letter on the date shown on the return receipt.” See M.D. & Assocs., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 749 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); see also Hayes v. N.J. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 108 F.4th 219, 222 (3d Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff can rebut the three-day presumption by presenting evidence of delayed receipt.”); Woodies Holdings, LLC v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 113, 118 (2015) (“Several Courts of Appeal also have held that the lack of a return receipt when a letter was sent certified with return receipt requested rebuts the presumption of delivery.”); State v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 694 N.Y.S.2d 896, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“The very reason for transmitting mail by certified mail is to avoid reliance on the presumption of receipt.”), aff’d as modified, 708 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 2000). [26] Certified mail may actually take longer to deliver than ordinary mail. E.g., Iacoponelli v. Curro, 260 So. 2d 166, 169 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (“[D]elivery and receipt of certified mail may, and does in many instances, require a longer period of time than does ordinary mail because of the Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 18 of 31 requirement that someone must be present to receipt [sic] for delivery of certified mail.”). The government cannot send notice to an employee by certified mail with return receipt requested and then presume the employee received notice automatically upon mailing. Cf. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235 (2006) (“[T]he use of certified mail might make actual notice less likely in some cases—the letter cannot be left like regular mail to be examined at the end of the day, and it can only be retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time.”). We note that GWA Rules require a NPAA or NFAA to be sent by certified mail but do not mandate return receipt. GWA Pers. R. & Regs. 11.200C, § 16.2. This means GWA may either send notice by certified mail without a return receipt and rely on the presumption of delivery, or send notice by certified mail return receipt requested and rely on the date of the return receipt. But even where no return receipt is requested, “[c]ertified mail provides the sender with a mailing receipt and tracking number to verify delivery . . . .” Smith v. Munford Police Dep’t, No. 2:18-cv-02435-TLP-cgc, 2019 WL 2476752, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tenn. June 12, 2019). In a rare case, a party may be able to rely on the presumption of mail delivery despite sending notice via certified mail return receipt requested— such as where neither a return receipt nor unclaimed mail is returned to the sender and the tracking number is inconclusive. Cf. Jones, 547 U.S. at 225 (holding that where notice of tax sale, sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, was returned as unclaimed, “the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so”). [27] It is undisputed that the NPAA was sent to Taitano’s P.O. Box via certified mail, return receipt requested. GWA did not produce the return receipts as part of the administrative record. Had it been able to do so, this would have been prima facie evidence of when Taitano received the NPAA. It appears that this may be one of the rare cases where the mail delivery rule applies to Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Taitano), 2026 Guam 3, Opinion Page 19 of 31 certified mail return receipt requested because the sender neither received a return receipt nor was the mail returned to them as undelivered. But even assuming the presumption of mail delivery could be relied on in this case, GWA fired Taitano l