Orsborn, Warden v. Long

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0938 Myra Orsborn, Warden v. Patricia Warrington Long On Appeal from the Superior Court of Hart County No. 25HV00265 Decided: September 9, 2026 LAGRUA, Justice. This appeal arises from the grant of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was filed by Patricia Warrington Long in connection with her 2023 guilty plea to vehicular homicide and other crimes. In granting Long’s petition, the habeas court ruled that Long’s court-appointed plea counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to inform Long that she could move to withdraw her guilty plea within the term of court and by failing to give her copies of discovery materials containing information that could support her potential defenses at trial. Myra Orsborn (“the Warden”) appealed, contending that the habeas court erred in granting habeas relief to Long because she failed to meet her burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984), to show that her plea counsel was deficient or that she was prejudiced by any such deficiency. For the reasons that follow, we agree that Long has not shown she was prejudiced by any deficient performance by plea counsel, and thus, we reverse the habeas court’s rulings in this case.  1. Pertinent factual background and procedural history. (a) Indictment and plea. On May 21, 2020, Long was arrested for DUI and related charges after she hit a pedestrian and fled from the scene. The victim—an 89-year-old woman—died in the hospital ten days later. On May 17, 2021, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Long for the following counts: homicide by vehicle in the first degree predicated on Driving Under the Influence (DUI)-Less Safe (Count 1); DUI-Less Safe (Count 2); homicide by vehicle in the first degree predicated on reckless driving (Count 3); reckless driving (Count 4); homicide by vehicle in the first degree predicated on hit and run (Count 5); hit and run resulting in serious injury or death (Count 6); driving while license suspended (Count 7); and obstruction of officers (Count 8). In June 2023, Long entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to Counts 1 through 4 and 6 through 8 of the indictment, and the trial court sentenced Long to 15 years in prison on Count 1; five years of probation on Count 6; 12 months of probation on Count 7; and 12 months of probation on Count 8. Counts 2, 3, and 4 merged with Count 1, and Count 5 was nolle prossed by the State. At the time of her plea, Long was represented by a court- appointed attorney who had been in practice for 25 years and served as a “DUI specialist” for the public defender’s office. Prior to entering her guilty plea, Long met with her plea counsel at his office on multiple occasions to discuss her case. Although plea counsel did not provide Long with copies of the discovery materials—including, as relevant here, the victim’s medical records and video footage from the responding officers’ body cameras (“body-cam footage”) depicting the victim being treated at the scene and capturing a few statements from witnesses and medical personnel—plea counsel advised Long that she could 2 review those materials at his office at any time and he would take as much time as necessary to review the discovery materials with her. Additionally, plea counsel advised Long that, although some witnesses said the victim may have been in the roadway when the collision occurred, plea counsel did not think the victim’s location would have much impact on Long’s potential defenses at trial because Long was charged with, among other things, homicide by vehicle predicated on a hit-and-run offense. Plea counsel told Long that, based on his experience, the victim’s death from a stroke a little over a week after the collision—particularly given the victim’s age—would not refute the significant injuries the victim sustained from the collision or that the collision was ultimately the cause of the victim’s death. Moreover, the State was threatening to reindict Long as a habitual violator, which would increase her sentence exposure from 22 years to 27 years. For these reasons, Long decided to enter a guilty plea. On June 7, 2023, the trial court held a hearing at which the State, Long, and her attorney appeared. At the outset of the hearing, the State made a proffer of the facts giving rise to the charges against Long. As articulated by the State in that proffer, around 6:00 p.m. on May 21, 2020, Long was exiting an apartment complex onto Peachtree Road in Brookhaven when she struck the victim with her car. After briefly exiting her vehicle and speaking to one of the bystanders, Long returned to her car and drove away. One of the witnesses on the scene called 911 to report the incident. When law enforcement officers arrived, they found the victim in the roadway in front of the apartment complex, “conscious but not aware.” Eyewitnesses provided law enforcement officers with a description of Long and her license plate number. Law enforcement officers ran the license plate number and obtained Long’s name and residential address, which was the same apartment complex adjacent to where the accident occurred. 3  When Long returned to the apartment complex approximately an hour and a half later, she was driving her vehicle, and upon exiting the vehicle, law enforcement officers spoke to her and advised her of her Miranda rights. 1 At that time, officers noted that Long “smelled of alcohol”; “she was slurring her words”; “her eyes were glossy”; and “she had trouble keeping her balance.” Law enforcement officers also learned that Long’s license was suspended. Long told the officers that she had consumed “one glass of wine about 4:00 p.m.” Law enforcement officers then conducted field sobriety tests, some of which Long failed and some of which she could not complete “because she couldn’t follow instructions,” and Long was placed “under arrest for DUI.” 2 The victim, who sustained a “fractured skull, subdural hematoma, and pelvic fracture” in the collision, was transported to the hospital where she never regained consciousness and died from a stroke on June 1, 2023, approximately ten days after being struck by Long’s vehicle. Long was then arrested on additional charges, including multiple counts of vehicular homicide. The State advised the trial court that Long had “an extensive history of DUI and traffic violations” beginning in 1988 and had been charged with or convicted of numerous offenses, including: (1) DUI in Clarke County; (2) speeding in Clarke County; (3) speeding in Dougherty County; (4) possession of open container in Cobb County; (5) DUI in Cobb County in 2011; (6) DUI and possession of a scheduled substance in Cobb County in 2012; (7) DUI in Butts County in 2012; (8) DUI in Sandy Springs in 2015; and (9) DUI and habitual violator in Stewart County in 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 2 During her arrest, Long tried “to pull away,” causing “herself and the officer to fall to the ground[,] which [was] the basis of the obstruction charges in this case.” 4 2016. The State informed the trial court that, based on the nature and circumstances of the incident at issue, as well as Long’s criminal history, it would be “asking for 22 to serve 15 years in custody.” Long was then given an opportunity to address the underlying facts and the sentence recommended by the State. Long’s plea counsel advised the trial court that Long was offering to plead guilty “to everything” prior to trial because—while there was “really no evidence of a DUI at the moment of the collision,” since any “evidence of drinking” occurred “about 90 minutes to two hours after the collision,” and even though Long might contest the victim’s location at the time of the collision3 and her cause of death if the case went to trial—Long recognized that “the hit and run portion of the charges would be the most difficult at trial” because Long “did not stay at the scene” or “leave her information,” and the elderly victim was seriously injured in the accident and died ten days later without ever leaving the hospital. As to Long’s criminal history, plea counsel advised the trial court that Long conceded she had been convicted of DUIs and “a couple of speeding tickets.” Addressing Long’s “DUI history,” plea counsel explained that, over the past 30 years, Long had been through two divorces, and her first husband “was an alcoholic.” Plea counsel stated that Long’s “alcoholism began” when her first marriage ended in her early 40s, and it was during this time period—“from around 2010 to 2016”—that “there were a string of DUIs.” Plea counsel advised the trial court that, after Long was 3 Plea counsel stated that “a factual dispute” likely existed for the jury to resolve as far as the victim’s location when Long hit her because, while some witnesses said that the victim was walking on the sidewalk when Long “jumped the curb” and struck the victim with her car, others indicated that the victim was walking in or crossing the roadway when the accident occurred. 5 convicted of “habitual violator DUI” in 2016, she entered an inpatient rehabilitation program for six months, following which she “attended AA regularly” and “maintained her sobriety for about a year and a half.” Plea counsel then addressed Long’s lengthy professional career and her close ties to her children and family, noting that Long’s mother passed away in 2017, which— though not “an excuse”—can be “precisely the type of event in someone’s life that triggers relapse and unfortunately for her it did.” Finally, plea counsel asked the trial court to consider, in sentencing Long, the following factors: (1) Long’s “life of family and hard work”; (2) her unfortunate addiction, which led to her criminal record and multiple DUIs; (3) her attempt to address her addiction by going into “an inpatient facility” and “continu[ing] with AA”; (4) the “pure[ly] accident[al]” nature of this incident, which occurred while Long “was turning out of a driveway onto a busy street” traveling about “10 miles an hour”; (5) the fact that the victim may have been in the roadway when the collision occurred; (6) the fact that the victim was conscious when she entered the hospital and that the cause of her death would be a “trial issue”; and (7) Long’s willingness to plead guilty given that “somebody died and she has a bad driving history.” Plea counsel also pointed to other DUI cases where trial courts had taken similar factors into consideration in giving lesser sentences—all of which were “tragic cases often involving reckless behavior or addiction problems that [led] to someone’s death.” On this basis, plea counsel asked the trial court to sentence Long to 20 years “to serve nine years in custody.” Following the proffer by the State and Long, the trial court informed the parties that, based on Long’s prior criminal history and the circumstances surrounding this incident, the trial court 6 would “accept the State’s recommendation of 22 to serve 15” if Long decided to enter a guilty plea. Plea counsel then asked for time to confer with Long, and a recess was taken, after which plea counsel confirmed that Long was “ready to take the plea offer.” At that point, the trial court questioned Long and confirmed the following with respect to her desire to accept the State’s plea offer: (1) Long was not under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, or other substances; (2) her attorney had explained the charges against her; (3) she had sufficient time to review and discuss the case with her attorney; (4) she knew she could talk to her attorney in private if she had a question; (5) her decision to go forward with the plea hearing was “knowing and voluntary”; (6) she understood her constitutional and legal rights, which were then explicitly laid out by the State; (7) she was “more than satisfied” with the “services and advice” of her attorney; (8) she understood the recommended sentence was 22 years to serve 15 in custody with certain conditions; (9) she understood that the trial court was not “bound by any promises or recommendations” and could “impose up to the maximum sentence and mandate that [Long] serve those charges consecutively”; (10) she understood that, “if the judge impose[d] a sentence greater than the … plea, then [Long] would have the right to withdraw [her] plea at the time of sentencing”; and (11) she understood that the plea could be “used to enhance sentencing on other convictions in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions, including federal court.” The trial court asked Long whether her attorney had discussed her habeas corpus and appellate rights and the timeframe for asserting those rights, and Long responded that plea counsel had done so. After finding that “there [was] a factual basis to accept the plea” and that Long’s waiver of her constitutional rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the trial court accepted Long’s plea and sentenced her as recommended by the State. 7  (b) Habeas proceedings. Two years later, on June 6, 2025, Long filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Hart County (the “habeas court”), arguing that her plea counsel was ineffective and, as a result, her guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Specifically, Long asserted that her plea counsel denied her the effective assistance of counsel (1) by failing to inform Long of “her ability to withdraw her guilty plea within the term of [c]ourt”; and (2) by failing to share discovery materials with Long that would have allowed her to argue that the victim may have been in the roadway when the collision occurred and that the victim’s injuries from the accident “were not the direct cause of her death.” Long alleged that, if she had known about these potential defenses, she would not have pleaded guilty. The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing on August 18, 2025. At the hearing, Long’s plea counsel was called to testify. Plea counsel testified that both he and the trial court had advised Long of her “habeas rights and her 30-day appeal right” before she took the plea, but he could not recall whether he specifically told her she could also file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea within the term of court. Plea counsel also testified that, before Long entered her plea, he gave her multiple opportunities to come to his office to review all of the discovery materials they received from the State, including the body-cam footage and the victim’s medical records. 4 Plea counsel also acknowledged that several of the issues 4 At the habeas hearing, Long showed portions of the body-cam footage to plea counsel and asked him about the victim’s medical records. But Long never introduced the body-cam footage or the medical records into evidence, and they are not part of this record on appeal. 8 in this case might have been contested had the case gone to trial, including the location of the victim when she was struck, whether Long was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, and potentially what caused the victim’s death. However, plea counsel explained that his primary concerns about going to trial were Long’s hit and run charge; the fact that several eyewitnesses saw Long leave the scene after striking the elderly victim with her car, seriously injuring her; the victim’s death about a week later; Long’s numerous DUI convictions; and Long’s habitual violator conviction, which would have resulted in a longer sentence if Long were convicted after a jury trial. Plea counsel also testified that it was ultimately Long’s decision about whether or not to take a plea, and based on his conversations with her, he was “confident that she understood what was happening”; “she understood the weight of the evidence against her”; and she knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea in this case. Long also testified at the hearing, but she did not address her claim that plea counsel failed to advise her of her right to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea or testify that he never advised her of this right. Additionally, Long conceded that plea counsel offered to review the discovery materials with her at his office and that she went to his office several times prior to entering her plea. Long testified, however, that she “had no idea” about the body-cam footage and she never had the opportunity to see the victim’s medical records. According to Long, after she entered her guilty plea, she hired a civil attorney to obtain a copy of the body-cam footage and the victim’s medical records, and she then paid a doctor to look at the victim’s medical records and issue a report. Long testified that the doctor’s report reflected that the victim’s medical records “would have been helpful in [Long’s] defense,” and if she “had that information, [she] never would have 9 taken the plea that [she] took.” 5 Long said that she felt “pressured” into taking a plea without having all the information she was “legally entitled to” or that would have “help[ed] [her] in going to trial.” Following the hearing, the habeas court granted Long’s claim for habeas relief, concluding that her plea counsel’s failure to “disseminate … discovery evidence” and “key information” to Long about her potential defenses and his failure to “inform [Long] of her ability to withdraw her guilty plea within the term of [c]ourt” “deprived” Long of the “[e]ffective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” The habeas court thus vacated Long’s 2023 convictions and sentences and ordered that she be retried. The Warden filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on February 23, 2026. 2. Legal analysis. On appeal, the Warden challenges the habeas court’s determination that Long’s plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise Long of her right to withdraw her guilty plea within the term of court and by withholding information contained in discovery. The Warden asserts that, because the record does not demonstrate that plea counsel performed deficiently in these respects or that Long was prejudiced thereby, the habeas court erred in granting relief on these grounds. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of counsel at critical stages of a criminal 5 The doctor did not testify at the habeas hearing, and his report was not admitted at the hearing or otherwise made part of this record on appeal. 10 proceeding, including when he enters a guilty plea.” Lee v. United States, 582 US 357, 363 (2017) (quotation marks omitted). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must satisfy the two-part Strickland test and demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Powell v. State, 309 Ga. 523, 526 (2020) (citing Strickland, 466 US at 687). In the guilty plea context, a defendant does this by showing that “‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 US 52, 57–59 (1985)). See also Lee, 582 US at 364– 65 (holding that, “when a defendant claims that his counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” (quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, where “the defendant’s decision about going to trial turns on his prospects of success and those are affected by the attorney’s error,” the defendant “must also show that he would have been better off going to trial.” Lee, 582 US at 365 (citing Premo v. Moore, 562 US 115, 118 (2011); Hill, 474 US at 59). In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead 11  guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. Hill, 474 US at 59. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task, and the strong societal interest in finality has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.” Lee, 582 US at 368–69 (cleaned up). When we consider a habeas court’s ruling granting relief premised on ineffective assistance, we adopt the habeas court’s findings of fact unless they are “clearly erroneous,” but “we conduct a de novo review of whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether any purported deficiency was prejudicial.” Emmons v. Bryant, 312 Ga. 711, 716 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). See also Nelson v. Wilkey, 309 Ga. 203, 208 (2020) (“On appeal, this Court defers to a habeas court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the facts to the law de novo in determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether any purported deficiency was prejudicial.”). After applying that standard here, we conclude that the habeas court erred in granting Long’s claims for relief on ineffectiveness grounds because, even if Long’s plea counsel performed deficiently, Long failed to show that she suffered prejudice under 12 Strickland: that is, she failed to show that, but for plea counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance, she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Lee, 582 US at 364–65; Hill, 474 US at 59. Here, Long was present at the plea hearing when the State made a proffer of the facts and circumstances supporting the criminal charges against her and when the State informed the trial court of its recommended sentence of 22 years in prison to serve 15 in custody. As such, Long knew that she was accused of striking an 89-year-old pedestrian with her car, which resulted in serious injuries to the victim; leaving the scene immediately after the accident; returning to the scene an hour and a half later while visibly intoxicated; failing to pass or complete field sobriety tests administered to her at the scene; operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and with a suspended license; and having multiple DUI convictions and a habitual violator conviction, which would have increased her sentence exposure to 27 years. See OCGA §§ 40-5-58 and 40-6-393. Long also knew that the victim sustained a “fractured skull, subdural hematoma, and pelvic fracture” in the collision and was transported to the hospital where she never regained consciousness and died from a stroke approximately ten days later. Additionally, Long was present when her plea counsel advised the trial court that Long indisputably struck the 89-year- old victim with her car and left the scene before law enforcement arrived, and when he conceded that the victim suffered serious injuries as a result of the collision and died a little over a week later without ever leaving the hospital. Plea counsel then acknowledged that, for these reasons, Long had no viable defense to the homicide-by-vehicle predicated on hit-and-run charge and wanted to plead guilty. And, before Long entered her guilty plea, 13 Long affirmatively represented to the trial court that she understood the charges against her; she had sufficient time to review and discuss the case with her attorney; she understood her constitutional and legal rights; she understood the recommended sentence against her; she wanted to enter a guilty plea; and she knew and understood her habeas corpus and appellate rights and the timeframe for asserting those rights. While Long later argued at the habeas hearing that her plea counsel withheld discovery materials from her that would have supported affirmative defenses regarding the victim’s location at the time of the accident and medical condition at the time of her death, the record reflects that, prior to entering her guilty plea, Long’s attorney gave her multiple opportunities to review the discovery in this case—which included the victim’s medical records and the bodycam footage at issue. And, even though Long elected not to review that discovery before the plea hearing, she was nevertheless aware of the information it contained regarding the victim’s location when she was struck by Long’s car and her death from a stroke ten days after the accident because those issues were openly discussed at the plea hearing in Long’s presence before she entered her guilty plea. Additionally, although Long testified at the habeas hearing that she “never would have taken the plea” if she had been aware of information contained in a report generated by a medical doctor she hired to review the victim’s medical records after entering her guilty plea, Long did not present any testimony from that doctor about the contents of that report or his conclusions about the victim’s cause of death, and she did not admit that report into evidence at the habeas hearing. “Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how [s]he would have pleaded 14 but for his attorney’s deficiencies” and “should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences” about the decision to enter a plea. Lee, 582 US at 369. So, here, while Long claimed, in part, that plea counsel withheld evidence from her that would have caused her to go to trial had she been aware of it before entering her plea—namely, the body-cam footage and the victim’s medical records—the “contemporaneous evidence” of record shows that Long was already aware of the circumstances reflected in those discovery materials, i.e. the victim’s location at the time of the accident and the victim’s cause of death, because those issues were explicitly addressed by Long’s plea counsel at the hearing prior to the entry of Long’s guilty plea. As to the habeas court’s conclusion that Long’s plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Long of her right to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea within the term of court, that conclusion was erroneous because there is no evidence in the record to show that Long would have elected not to enter a guilty plea and would have insisted on going to trial—in other words, no showing of any prejudice under Strickland—if she had been aware of this right prior to pleading guilty to the charged crimes. See Lee, 582 US at 364–65. Indeed, Long did not even address this issue at the habeas hearing. The record also clearly reflects that Long was advised of her appellate rights, including the timeframe for asserting those rights, and she could have appealed her guilty plea within that timeframe had she elected to do so. As detailed above, the record here is wholly devoid of any evidence showing that, but for plea counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, Long would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial, particularly given that Long was charged with homicide-by-vehicle predicated on hit-and-run and 15 DUI and the “prospects of acquittal [on those charges] at trial were grim.” Lee, 582 US at 365. Accordingly, because Long has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced by any deficiencies in plea counsel’s performance, the habeas court erred in granting Long relief on her ineffectiveness claims, and its ruling is reversed. See id. at 364–65; Hill, 474 US at 59. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. 16