Full Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S24Z1139, S25Z0722 Inquiry Concerning Judge Shermela J. Williams Decided: September 22, 2026 Per Curiam. Shermela J. Williams is a former judge of the Fulton County Superior Court, having served from January 2021 to Feb- ruary 2026. During her tenure as a judge, the Judicial Qualifica- tions Commission (“JQC”) initiated these disciplinary matters against her, alleging 32 violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”). Following a hearing, the JQC Hearing Panel found that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence 28 of those counts and that discipline is authorized under the Georgia Con- stitution for all counts. The Hearing Panel concluded that remov- ing Williams from the bench was proper and filed its report and recommendation with this Court. Following that filing, the par- ties fully briefed the issues before this Court. However, while this case was pending, Williams resigned her judicial position. And it is that resignation that presents the difficult question remaining in this case. Judicial discipline cases often carry a number of complex and interconnected factual and legal questions. We are frequently tasked with determining whether sufficient evidence of a partic- ular violation or violations exists, whether that evidence provides clear and convincing proof of a violation or violations, whether the violation warrants discipline under the Constitution, and what sanction or sanctions should be imposed. Those questions are not particularly difficult in this case. The fact of Williams’s resigna- tion, however, is a different matter. We are in agreement that the JQC provided clear and convincing proof of multiple serious vio- lations of the CJC and that those violations would, ordinarily, support removal from office. But because Williams resigned her judicial office, we conclude that she cannot be removed from that same office. So we must determine what, if anything, we can and should do next. Having reviewed the factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation of discipline from the Hearing Panel, as well as the initial and supplementary briefing submitted by the Direc- tor and counsel for Williams, we hold as follows. With respect to the counts for which Williams was found responsible, the Hearing Panel’s findings are supported by the evidence presented, and thus, are not clearly erroneous. We adopt those factual findings and conclude that they do present clear and convincing evidence of the violations found by the Hearing Panel. Further, we con- clude that those proven violations would ordinarily warrant re- moval from office of a sitting judge. But we dismiss this case with- out prejudice because Williams cannot be removed from an office she does not hold, and we decline in this case to assert any au- thority we may have to sanction former judges. Our dismissal without prejudice expressly authorizes the JQC to reinstate pro- ceedings if Shermela J. Williams becomes a judicial candidate or judge in the future. See Inquiry Concerning Judge Gerald John- son, 316 Ga. 876, 878–79 (2023). In the event the JQC reinstates proceedings under such circumstances, those proceedings will re- sume in the same procedural posture as this proceeding occupies at the conclusion of this opinion (i.e., the alleged violations having 2 been found to be proven by clear and convincing evidence and to be of a nature that warrant discipline — leaving only the imposi- tion of discipline for the consideration of the Court). 1. Background and Procedural History Williams was admitted to the State Bar of Georgia in 2011, and on March 6, 2020, she qualified to run for the office of judge of the Fulton County Superior Court. In June 2020, she won a contested election and began serving as a Fulton County Superior Court Judge on January 1, 2021. Williams was re-elected by Ful- ton County voters in 2024 with no opposition. In June 2024, the JQC filed formal charges against then- Judge Williams, alleging 17 counts of misconduct across multiple provisions of the CJC, including 20 counts of failure to timely rule on matters before her. The JQC filed an additional set of charges in February 2025, alleging 15 counts of misconduct. Before the final hearing, the Director withdrew Count 6 in the second set of charges as duplicative of Count 15 in the first set of charges. Wil- liams admitted to the majority of the failure-to-timely-rule charges. 1 A consolidated final hearing on both sets of charges was held on May 21–23, June 26–27, and July 14, 2025. The Hearing Panel issued its Report and Recommendation on October 2, 2025, finding that the Director had proven by clear and convincing evi- dence 14 of the 17 counts in the first set of charges and all 14 counts in the second set of charges. The Hearing Panel concluded that discipline was constitutionally authorized given Williams’s 1 Prior to closing arguments at her hearing, Williams filed an Amended Admissions and Stipulations to Formal Charges, which was signed only by her rather than being presented by counsel. However, in the Exceptions, counsel argued that the admissions were prepared by counsel on Williams’s behalf. 3 pattern of misconduct and dishonesty. In so doing, the Hearing Panel concluded that Williams had violated multiple rules of the CJC and recommended as a sanction that she be removed from office. Williams filed a Notice of Exceptions to the Report and Rec- ommendations (“Exceptions”), see JQC Rule 24(F), arguing that the Hearing Panel ignored or failed to properly credit mitigating evidence and that the recommended discipline was unfair and dis- proportionate. The Director filed a response to those Exceptions. 2. Analysis As discussed more below, we agree with and affirm the Hearing Panel’s findings that Williams’s misconduct with respect to 28 of the 32 counts (S24Z1139: Counts 1–3, 7–17; S25Z0722: Counts 1–5, 7–15) was proven by clear and convincing evidence. Those counts relate to four separate matters: (1) Williams’s ex parte communications with a party in a divorce case assigned to her; (2) a personal phone call made to opposing counsel on behalf of a family member; (3) the unlawful detention of a witness; and (4) numerous failures to timely rule. After considering and reject- ing a preliminary procedural challenge from Williams arising from her denied motion to quash, we consider each of these four matters in turn within the following analytical rubric. First, we review the Hearing Panel’s findings as to Wil- liams’s conduct with respect to each matter. “We generally review factual findings by the JQC Hearing Panel for clear error and de- fer to the Hearing Panel’s credibility determinations.” Inquiry Concerning Judge Peterson, 319 Ga. 316, 319 (2024) (quoting In- quiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer II”), 316 Ga. 855, 860 (2023)). See also Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer I”), 315 Ga. 841, 847 (2023). Williams argues in her Exceptions to the Report and Recommendation that the Hearing Panel’s factual findings as to each of the matters at issue are clearly erroneous 4 because, she says, the Panel did not credit evidence that sup- ported different findings and did not interview witnesses who could have provided helpful testimony on her behalf. But the rec- ord does not compel different findings, and “[t]o the extent the record contains evidence that could support findings in either di- rection, the Hearing Panel was authorized to make the findings that it did.” See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 319. After thoroughly review- ing the record and the parties’ briefing, we conclude that the Hearing Panel’s findings that are material to our ultimate conclu- sion in this case are supported by evidence in the record and are not clearly erroneous. And we defer to and adopt those findings, as outlined below. Next, we consider whether, by “clear and convincing proof,” the findings support the Hearing Panel’s conclusions that Wil- liams’s actions amounted to violations of the CJC rules as charged. Id. at 320 (quoting Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 847). And we review the Hearing Panel’s legal determinations de novo. Id. As explained below, we agree with the Hearing Panel’s conclusions that Williams violated multiple provisions of the CJC. And finally, we agree with the Hearing Panel’s conclusion that the proven violations are sufficient to support its recom- mended sanction – removal from office. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a) (setting forth five grounds for disci- pline: “for willful misconduct in office, or for willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office, or for habitual intemper- ance, or for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute”). The fact that the proven viola- tions warrant removal from office does not end our analysis as it generally would, however, because Williams has resigned from her judicial position during these proceedings. Thus, we are faced 5 with the question of whether the Constitution authorizes us to impose the sanction we have determined is warranted for Wil- liams’s actions in light of the fact that she no longer holds judicial office. For the reasons explained below, we decline to impose dis- cipline at this time. And we further decline the JQC’s invitation to assert any inherent authority we may have to impose some other sanction. Accordingly, we decline to impose sanctions against Williams unless she again pursues or obtains judicial of- fice. (a) Preliminary Challenge Williams first challenges the Hearing Panel’s denial of her motion to quash, arguing that the Panel applied the wrong legal standard to her motion and that its denial violated her due pro- cess rights under the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VIII. We disagree and affirm the de- nial of her motion to quash. On the first day of the hearing, Williams filed a motion to quash formal charges or, in the alternative, a request to stay the disciplinary proceedings for a full evidentiary hearing on her mo- tion to quash. Williams’s motion alleged that Judges Stacey Hy- drick and Victoria Darrisaw, who served on the investigative panel that initiated the instant proceedings, failed to disclose “significant financial and public support” for the incumbent judge whom Williams originally defeated in her first election. Williams further alleged that Judge Hydrick failed to disclose that she knew two of the witnesses against her. Williams argued that this undisclosed conduct amounted to an appearance of impropriety in violation of CJC Rule 1.2, 2 which deprived her of a fair tribunal 2 CJC Rule 1.2 provides: 6 and violated her due process rights under both the state and fed- eral constitutions. The Hearing Panel denied the motion to stay the proceedings. And following oral argument, the Panel denied the motion to quash, finding the motion untimely under the scheduling order because the information was publicly available. 3 See CJC Rule 2.11(A), Cmt. [2] (“The public filing of a campaign contribution disclosure report or financial disclosure statement shall be deemed disclosure to all parties of the information con- tained therein.”). Despite deeming the motion untimely, the Panel proceeded to consider and then deny the motion on the mer- its, finding that the JQC rules governed recusal for the investiga- tive panel and that, under that standard, neither judge member was required to recuse. See JQC Rule 3(F)(2). Moreover, even as- suming the CJC applied, the Panel found none of the grounds for recusal applied to this case. Finally, the Panel found that, even if Judge Hydrick’s recusal had been required, there would still be a quorum because another judge would still be on the investigative panel. See JQC Rule 3(C) (quorum for formal charges requires at least one judge to be on the investigative panel). In her Exceptions filed in this Court, Williams argues that the Panel applied the wrong legal standard to her motion when it treated it as a belated motion to recuse under JQC Rule 3(F)(2) (A) Judges shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public con- fidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. (B) An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. Judges shall participate in establishing, maintaining, and en- forcing high standards of conduct and shall personally observe such standards of conduct so that the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective. 3 Williams concedes she filed her motion on the first day of the final hearing, outside the pretrial motion deadline, but argues she filed the motion when she first became aware of the alleged conflict. 7 rather than applying the recusal standard under the CJC. See CJC Rule 2.11(A) (providing instances in which a judge should disqualify herself from a proceeding). Williams argues that the CJC standard applies because it always governs a judge’s con- duct, and there is no exception for when a judge is serving on the investigative panel of the JQC. Williams’s argument that CJC Rule 2.11 governs when a judge should be disqualified from his service on the investigative panel is incorrect. CJC Rule 2.11 standards for disqualification patently ap- ply in the context of the judge’s work as a judge in presiding over cases. But when a judge is acting as a member of a JQC investi- gative panel, that judge is not presiding over any case as a judge. It is the prospect of presiding in a judicial capacity that triggers the recusal provisions of the CJC, and there is no question that Judge Hydrick was not presiding in such a capacity when acting as a member of the investigative panel. Indeed, in defining the “investigative panel,” the JQC Rules note that it is “responsible for the prosecutorial and administrative functions of the Commis- sion.” Investigative Panel, JQC Terminology. See also CJC Rule 2.5, Cmt. [4] (noting that while “the primary role of judges is to serve as the arbiters of facts and law for the resolution of dis- putes,” they may also have other, administrative and/or policy- making duties to which some of the requirements of the CJC ap- ply differently or not at all); JQC Rule 3; OCGA § 15-1-21(e)(2)(A) (providing that “[t]he investigative panel shall be responsible for … [t]he investigative, prosecutorial, and administrative functions of the commission”). Accordingly, JQC Rule 3(F)(2) governs recusal for investigative panel members. See JQC Rule 3(F)(2) (“A member of the Investigative Panel shall recuse himself or herself from any matter in which recusal would be required of a prosecu- tor under Georgia law and the Georgia Rules of Professional Con- 8 duct for lawyers, treating the Commission as the member’s cli- ent.”). And Williams does not argue how any of that Rule’s grounds for recusal were met here. Williams further argues that she was denied due process when her motion was denied without an opportunity for her to conduct further discovery into the alleged conflict and present ev- idence at a hearing. Again, we disagree. The Georgia Constitution explicitly provides that “[n]o action shall be taken against a judge except after hearing and in accordance with due process of law.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VIII. “Based on this provision, this Court has said the JQC’s authority to enforce the Code is not unlimited, inasmuch as the Constitution requires the Commission to afford due process to judges and provides for this Court to review the imposition of discipline.” Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 849 (cleaned up). See also id. (“the gravity of the judicial discipline proceeding requires that it be fundamentally fair and in keeping with the basic requirements of due process” (cleaned up)); Hood v. Carsten, 267 Ga. 579, 580 (1997) (“The fundamental idea of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (quotation marks omitted)). Here, Williams was afforded due process. A hearing was held on her motion to quash, and Williams cites no authority that due process requires permitting the additional dis- covery she sought here. See Hood, 267 Ga. at 580 (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the partic- ular situation demands.” (cleaned up)). She in fact obtained the information on which she based her motion, albeit belatedly. That motion failed not because the underlying factual basis was insuf- ficiently developed but because the CJC recusal standard did not apply. She does not explain, nor is it apparent to us, how addi- tional detail would have changed this outcome. 9 We turn now to the events giving rise to the charges against Williams. (b) Ex Parte Communications in a Pending Action With respect to Counts 1–3 in case number S24Z1139, the Hearing Panel found the following facts and made the following conclusions pertaining to Williams’s ex parte communications in a pending matter. (i) The Hearing Panel’s Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to the Material Facts Pertaining to Counts 1–3 in Case Number S24Z1139 In September 2021, the father of Brandy Alexander’s child filed a petition for modification of parenting time and contempt against her, and the case was assigned to Williams. Alexander had previously served as a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) in unrelated cases before Williams. Alexander and Williams also had discussed being members of the same sorority. Alexander’s attorney contacted Williams’s chambers to re- quest that a senior judge be appointed to Alexander’s case in- stead. 4 Williams subsequently called Alexander on her cell phone regarding the request and indicated to Alexander that even though her staff attorney warned her that the conversation would be ex parte, Williams was comfortable making the call because she and Alexander were members of the same sorority. As to Al- exander’s request that a senior judge be appointed, Williams in- dicated that she would retain the case rather than transfer it, move the case off the general calendar, and close the courtroom 4 Williams’s staff attorney denied speaking with Alexander’s attorney, but the Hearing Panel found that the staff attorney was not a credible witness and credited the testimony of Alexander’s attorney. 10 to protect Alexander’s privacy. A portion of this conversation occurred on speaker phone in the presence of another witness — a senior attorney in Alexan- der’s office — who confirmed the substance of the conversation and testified that Williams stated several times that, because she and Alexander were members of the same sorority, Williams “had [Alexander’s] back.” Before the Hearing Panel, Williams confirmed that she called Alexander but claimed that she was initially unclear what the call was about after receiving a note from her staff that simply read, “Brandy Alexander Senior Judge.” She denied that her staff attorney expressed concern about the ex parte nature of her con- versation with Alexander. Williams claimed that she realized only during the course of the conversation with Alexander that the conversation was in reference to Alexander’s own pending case. According to Williams, she then explained the process of ap- pointing a senior judge to a case, told Alexander she would keep the case, and discussed other case logistics and scheduling. The Hearing Panel credited Alexander’s and the senior attorney’s tes- timony regarding the substance of this call. And Williams did as Alexander testified she had promised to do with respect to her case. At the hearing on Alexander’s domestic case, opposing counsel questioned the unusual procedure used in setting the case for a hearing, with counsel noting that she had not received a re- sponse from Williams’s staff regarding an earlier email in which she inquired why the case had been diverted from the normal course. Williams responded that she pulled Alexander’s case from the mass calendar in light of the fact that Alexander had other cases pending before Williams in her capacity as a guardian ad litem. Williams did not inform opposing counsel of the ex parte 11 conversation. Opposing counsel moved for Williams to recuse from the case, though she eventually withdrew the motion. Before the Hearing Board, Williams blamed her staff for opposing counsel’s lack of knowledge, claiming that her staff failed to follow her instruction to contact opposing counsel and inform them about her conversation with Alexander. The Hearing Board rejected this explanation, highlighting the fact that Wil- liams failed to disclose the ex parte conversation to opposing counsel, even when counsel expressed her obvious confusion and indicated that she never received a response from Williams’s staff as to why the case was proceeding on a different track. Alexander and the opposing party eventually filed a motion to recuse Williams. 5 Williams discussed that motion on a phone call with a friend, Edidiong Aaron, who testified before the hear- ing panel. According to Aaron, Williams admitted to initially call- ing Alexander, whom she did not identify by name, and inquired about her request for a senior judge. Williams also discussed with Aaron a pending motion to recuse, her frustration with the mo- tion, and her concern that, if she recused, it would appear she had done something wrong which could hurt her in a future election. Williams disputed saying as much, but the Hearing Panel did not credit her testimony. Because evidence presented at the hearing supports the Hearing Panel’s findings that are material to our ultimate conclu- sion, those findings, as recounted above, are not clearly errone- ous. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 323. (ii) Williams Violated CJC Rules 1.2(A), 2.4(B), and 2.9(A) The Hearing Panel concluded that the Director proved by 5 Williams denied the motion but then voluntarily recused. 12 clear and convincing evidence that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.2(A) (Count 1), 2.4(B) (Count 2), and 2.9(A) (Count 3) in case number S24Z1139 in connection with this ex parte communica- tion. 6 We agree. Crediting the testimony of Alexander, her attorney, and the senior attorney in Alexander’s office over Williams’s account, the Hearing Panel found that Williams called Alexander—with whom Williams had a professional relationship—discussed Alex- ander’s pending case, and implied that Alexander would receive favorable treatment. The Hearing Panel also rejected Williams’s testimony that she did not realize her staff had failed to inform opposing counsel of the ex parte call even after counsel inquired about the case being moved from the mass calendar at the hear- ing. In sum, the Hearing Panel found that Williams testified un- truthfully about this incident and that she allowed her relation- ship with Alexander to affect how she handled the case. Williams’s untruthful testimony regarding this incident underscores her consciousness of wrongdoing. Cf. Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 871 (judge’s actions in stalling and obfuscating “when con- fronted with the consequences of [his] actions” were indicative of 6 CJC Rule 1.2(A) provides: “Judges shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartial- ity of the judiciary.” CJC Rule 2.4(B) provides: “Judges shall not permit family, social, po- litical, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s ju- dicial conduct or judgment.” CJC Rule 2.9(A) provides: “Judges shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. Judges shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte com- munications, or consider other communications made to them outside the pres- ence of the parties, or their lawyers, concerning a pending proceeding or im- pending matter,” subject to certain exceptions. 13 “conscious wrongdoing motivated by self-interest”). Accordingly, we have no difficulty concluding, as the Hearing Panel did, that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that by so acting, Williams failed to promote public confidence in the inde- pendence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of CJC Rule 1.2(A); permitted her relationship with Alexander to influence her judicial conduct and judgment in violation of CJC Rule 2.4(B); and participated in ex parte communications not re- quired under the circumstances, communications that were in- tended to provide Alexander with procedural benefit and were not disclosed to opposing counsel in violation of CJC Rule 2.9(A). See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 339–40 (holding that ex parte communica- tions violated CJC Rules 1.2(A) and 2.9(A)); Inquiry Concerning Anderson, 304 Ga. 165, 166–67 (2018) (holding that a judge vio- lated CJC Rule 2.9(A) when he communicated with parties to a lawsuit individually). (iii) Williams’s Conduct Constitutes Willful Misconduct in Office Such that Discipline is Authorized Under Paragraph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution Having determined that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.2(A), 2.4(B), and 2.9(A), we now turn to whether the Georgia Constitution authorizes discipline for these violations. The Hear- ing Panel found that Williams’s actions constituted willful mis- conduct in office because she acted in bad faith. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a). We agree. “[W]illful misconduct in office” means “actions taken in bad faith by the judge acting in her judicial capacity.” Peterson, 319 Ga. at 328 (quotation marks omitted). For an action to be taken in “bad faith,” the duty breached by the judge must be known to her and the judge must be “acting with some self-inter- est or ill will.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). See also Coomer II, 14 316 Ga. at 866 (“Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negli- gence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.” (cleaned up)). Here, Williams was clearly acting in her judicial capacity when she contacted Alexander about her pending case. See Peter- son, 319 Ga. at 341. And the Hearing Panel’s findings that she acted in bad faith are supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. With respect to the three counts collectively, the Panel determined that Williams’s staff advised her not to call Alexander ex parte, that she did so anyway, that she acted with the purpose of benefitting Alexander based on their relationship, and that she attempted to mislead opposing counsel and the investigators as to what had occurred. The Panel noted that while Williams acknowledged the ex parte phone call, she attempted to justify her actions and, when that failed, attempted to deflect blame. These credibility determinations were based in significant part on the Panel’s observations of Williams’s live testimony, as well as the testimony of other witnesses. And these credibility determi- nations are “the kind of finding to which we offer considerable deference.” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866. The Panel’s finding of bad faith is supported by the record and is therefore not clearly erro- neous. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 328. As such, we agree that Wil- liams’s actions constituted “willful misconduct in office” and that discipline is authorized. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a). 7 7 The Hearing Panel alternatively concluded that an additional consti- tutional basis existed that would warrant discipline: that Judge Williams’s conduct with respect to this matter constituted judicial conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. 15 Accordingly, based on the Panel’s findings that her actions were taken in her judicial capacity and in bad faith, Williams’s conduct constitutes willful misconduct in office, such that Para- graph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution authorizes discipline for her actions with regard to this matter. See id. See also Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 860–73 (holding that a judge’s violations of CJC Rule 1.1 and 1.2(A) — which were not done negligently but with self- interest and showed that he could not “be trusted to handle judi- cial matters before him with honesty and integrity” — amounted to bad faith). (c) Phone Call on Behalf of a Family Member With respect to Counts 4–5 in case number S25Z0722, the Hearing Panel found the following facts and made the following conclusions pertaining to a phone call made by Williams on her uncle’s behalf. (i) The Hearing Panel’s Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to the Material Facts Pertaining to Counts 4–5 in Case Number S25Z0722 Shortly after a domestic contempt case was filed against her uncle, Williams left a message for a junior attorney listed as counsel of record for the opposing party and whose firm had an- other case pending in front of Williams, to call Williams on her personal cell phone after hours. When she spoke to the associate, Williams introduced herself as “Judge Williams” but claimed she was not calling in her capacity as a judge but rather in her per- sonal capacity on behalf of her uncle, who was representing him- VII(a). We need not decide whether that determination was correct, however, because Paragraph VII(a) authorizes discipline on the ground that Williams committed willful misconduct in office. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 328 n.13. 16 self in the case. The Hearing Panel credited the associate’s testi- mony that Williams then began advocating for her uncle — spe- cifically, Williams discussed the merits of the case, requested an extension on her uncle’s behalf, and opined that she would have dismissed the case had it come before her. Two days later, the associate received an email from Williams’s uncle; the email had apparently been forwarded to the associate, was notably sophisti- cated, and used legal terminology not typically used by pro se lit- igants. Williams was evasive about the substance of the call, which received some significant discussion by the Panel, with the Panel using her testimony to emphasize her lack of truthfulness and candor. The associate believed, and the Hearing Panel found, that Williams drafted the email on her uncle’s behalf. Evidence presented at the hearing supports the Hearing Panel’s findings that are material to our ultimate conclusion. Thus, those findings, as recounted above, are not clearly errone- ous. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 323. (ii) Williams Violated CJC Rules 1.2(B) and 1.3 The Hearing Panel concluded that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Williams violated CJC Rules 1.2(B) 8 (Count 4) and 1.3 9 (Count 5) in connection with this mat- ter. We agree. 8 CJC Rule 1.2(B) provides: “An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. Judges shall participate in establish- ing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall person- ally observe such standards of conduct so that the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.” 9 CJC Rule 1.3 provides: “Judges shall not lend the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of the judge or others.” 17 The Hearing Panel credited the associate’s testimony re- garding the substance of the call with Williams and, after making a credibility determination regarding Williams’s evasive testi- mony on this point, found that she deliberately contacted the jun- ior associate on the case because she would be the easiest to in- fluence with regard to her uncle’s case, that she did so after-hours, and that she wrote a follow-up email regarding his case on his behalf. In sum, the Hearing Panel found Williams’s testimony about this interaction to be untruthful, which indicated her con- sciousness of wrongdoing. Accordingly, we have no difficulty con- cluding, as the Hearing Panel did, that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Williams did not exhibit the high standards of conduct required of judges when she requested that the least experienced attorney on the case call her at a time when that junior attorney was more likely to be isolated, improp- erly discussed her uncle’s case in violation of CJC Rule 1.2(B), and lent the prestige of her office to advance her uncle’s, and by ex- tension, her own, interests in violation of CJC Rule 1.3. See In- quiry Concerning Judge Anthony Peters, 289 Ga. 633, 634 & n.4 (2011) (concluding that judge’s inappropriate use of judicial office to advance family member’s personal interests constituted a vio- lation of former CJC Canon 2(B), which is substantially similar to current CJC Rule 1.3). (iii) Williams’s Conduct Is Prejudicial to the Administra- tion of Justice Such that Discipline is Authorized Under Para- graph VII(a) of the Georgia Constitution With respect to Counts 4 and 5, the Hearing Panel con- cluded that Williams’s conduct was prejudicial to the administra- tion of justice because her actions, though outside her judicial ca- pacity, were taken in bad faith. We agree. “When a person who is a judge acts outside of that capacity, 18 this Court’s ability to discipline the judge is more limited. In order for actions taken outside of a judge’s judicial capacity to constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and thus within our constitutional power to discipline, those actions must be taken in bad faith.” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 861 (cleaned up). Thus, we may discipline Williams for her violation of CJC Rules 1.2(B) and 1.3 only if her conduct was carried out in bad faith. See Peterson, 319 Ga. at 336. The Hearing Panel found that Williams contacted the jun- ior associate after normal business hours. Although Williams tes- tified that she called the associate on the case because she was the signatory, the Panel did not credit that testimony and found instead that Williams contacted the least senior attorney on the matter because she would likely be the easiest to influence. Wil- liams conceded at the hearing that she should not have made the phone call and that doing so was a “complete lapse in judgment” triggered by extreme emotional stress arising from the illness of her grandmother and the death of her mother. However, the Panel noted that Williams was dishonest during her initial testi- mony regarding this event, equivocating on the material and damaging parts of the call and then revising her testimony only after the associate testified. The Panel found that Williams was not forthcoming and that her actions in this respect were not merely negligent but were motivated by self-interest. Those find- ings are not clearly erroneous, so we conclude that Williams’s ac- tions were taken in bad faith. Accordingly, we conclude that her actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute and that discipline is au- thorized. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII(a). See also Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 871 (noting that where a judge, “when confronted with the consequences of [his] actions, does not coop- 19 erate or try to rectify his wrongs, but stalls and obfuscates … pre- sent[s] a picture of not mere negligence, but conscious wrongdoing motivated by self-interest”). (d) Jailing of Molly Dennis With respect to Counts 1–3 in case number S25Z0722, the Hearing Panel found the following facts and made the following conclusions pertaining to the jailing of Molly Dennis. (i) The Hearing Panel’s Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to the Material Facts Pertaining to Counts 1–3 in Case Number S25Z0722 The facts relating to this incident are generally undis- puted. As part of a contentious divorce action assigned to Wil- liams, Dennis, who was then in her early twenties and had been accused of damaging and stealing items from her father’s home, testified on her mother’s behalf. Dennis admitted to breaking some photos and flushing some of her father’s medicine down the toilet but otherwise denied theft or damage. During that proceed- ing, there were instances of general courtroom “misbehavior and disruption” by Dennis and her mother, which Williams repri- manded. Dennis later testified to the Hearing Panel that, at var- ious points during the proceeding, Williams questioned and lec- tured Dennis, filed her nails, used a cell phone, and took a phone call. During closing arguments of that proceeding, Williams or- dered the courtroom deputy to place Dennis in custody. The dep- uty handcuffed Dennis and walked her to the front of the court- room, where Williams lectured her on potential sentences for cer- tain felony offenses that, in Williams’s opinion as a former prose- cutor, Dennis had arguably committed. Williams then directed 20 the deputy to “[g]o show her what the cell looks like,” and in- structed counsel to continue with closing arguments. The deputy placed Dennis in a holding cell, locked the cell door, and left her alone in the cell for 15 to 45 minutes. 10 Dennis, still handcuffed, was eventually returned to the courtroom and Williams again lec- tured Dennis, this time regarding her behavior and involvement in her parents’ divorce. Only after that lecture were the handcuffs removed. Evidence presented at the hearing supports the Hearing Panel’s findings that are material to our ultimate conclusion, so we conclude that those findings