Full Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Case No. S26C1061 November 3, 2026 The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment. The following order was passed: EAGER HOLDINGS, LLC et al. v. MONICA PATEL The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in this case. All the Justices concur. Court of Appeals Case No. A25A1820 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA Clerk’s Office, Atlanta I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk PINSON, Justice, concurring in the denial of certiorari. In this dispute between managers and members of a lim- ited liability company, the petitioners sought a declaratory judg- ment about the legal effects of one member’s (allegedly unauthor- ized) withdrawal of her capital contribution from the LLC. Among other things, the petitioners (the LLC and its managers) asked for declarations that the member’s withdrawal breached the terms of the LLC’s operating agreement and extinguished her membership interest in or waived her rights with respect to the LLC. The petitioners sought these declarations because they faced uncertainty about their future acts under the operating agreement, like making capital calls or distributions, administer- ing voting, and determining who had various rights under the agreement. In other words, the petitioners needed to know what their rights were under the LLC’s operating agreement before taking certain steps which might or might not be legally author- ized. To me, that sounds like a properly stated claim for declar- atory relief. The Declaratory Judgment Act was “designed to ‘give additional protection to persons who may become involved in an actual justiciable controversy, in that they differ between them- selves as to what their rights are, and who wish to find them out before taking some dangerous step which might or might not be authorized.’” Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 96 (2024) (quot- ing Shippen v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 68 (1945)). This means that to state a claim for declaratory judgment, “a party need only allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in which future conduct depends on resolution of uncertain legal relations.” Gardei v. Tay- lor, S25G1209, slip op. at 4 (Ga. Oct. 14, 2026) (2026 WL 3067754, at *4) (quoting City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 285 Ga. 231, 234–35 (2009)). That’s exactly what the petitioners did here, and so I very much doubt that the Court of Appeals was right that they failed to state a claim for declaratory relief. 1 Indeed, a legal entity seeking to clarify and settle the rela- tive rights of its members so that it can take certain actions going forward without risking liability or other legal risks strikes me as just the sort of thing that declaratory judgments are meant for. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Eternal Vigilance Action, Inc., 321 Ga. 771, 791 (2025) (Declaratory Judgment Act’s “pur- pose is to remove the cloud of uncertainty with regard to the pro- priety of some future act or conduct, which is properly incident to his alleged rights and which if taken without direction might rea- sonably jeopardize his interest” (cleaned up)); GeorgiaCarry.org v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 299 Ga. 26, 30 (2016) (appellant stated a claim for declaratory relief where he sought determina- tion of whether a person with a proper license may carry a weapon on the grounds of the garden in accordance with OCGA § 16-11- 127(c) where appellant was a member of the garden and had a proper carry license but had been asked to leave because of non- compliance with the garden’s weapons ban); SJN Properties v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 802–03 (2015) (“[D]eclaratory relief is proper only where the party seeking such relief faces some uncertainty or insecurity as to rights, status, or 1 The Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners didn’t “allege that any such situations have presented themselves or that they will face any of those hypothetical situations,” but of course, Georgia’s notice pleading require- ments do not require such specific allegations to state a claim for declaratory relief. See Hotels.com, 285 Ga. at 234 (“To state a claim for declaratory judg- ment, a party need only allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in which future conduct depends on resolution of uncertain legal relations.”). See also OCGA § 9-11-8 (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claims show- ing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and a “demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems himself entitled”). 2 legal relations, upon which its future conduct depends.”); Ho- tels.com, 285 Ga. 231, 235 (2009) (city properly stated a claim for declaratory judgment where it sought relief from “uncertainty as to whether it [was] authorized to demand access to [online travel companies’] books and records in order to estimate and assess taxes due under the hotel tax ordinance”). And a published deci- sion holding that these circumstances do not present an actual controversy that supports a claim for declaratory relief raises a question of gravity that would warrant review by this Court. I nonetheless agree with the Court’s decision to deny re- view of this case for a different reason: I’m not sure these decla- rations remain necessary to protect the petitioners’ rights. That’s because the member who had allegedly withdrawn her capital contribution has since returned that money to Eager Holdings’ bank account. The parties may well have different views about the legal effect of returning that money (and for that matter, about the legal effect of withdrawing it earlier), but there is little question that it complicates whether this Court could even reach the question of gravity that this case might otherwise present. After all, the declarations the petitioners sought each have to do with the effect of the withdrawal on their relative rights. If the withdrawal has been effectively undone, there would be no need in this case for a declaration about its legal effects, and so there would be no need for a decision of this Court about whether a re- quest for such a declaration is a properly stated claim for declar- atory relief. And the likelihood that we would not be able to reach and resolve the legal question of gravity that a case would other- wise present is a strong reason not to spend the limited resources of the parties and this Court on certiorari review. See State v. Ro- man, 322 Ga. 571, 572 (2025) (Pinson, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (recognizing that neither error by the Court of Ap- peals nor identification of a legal question of sufficient gravity is 3 enough on its own to warrant certiorari review where, “for exam- ple, … answering that question wouldn’t matter to the outcome of the underlying case.” ); Victory Media Grp., LLC v. Dep’t of Transp., 319 Ga. 16, 17, 20 (2024) (Peterson, P. J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (agreeing that certiorari was not war- ranted despite apparent error because the Court could not “reach the open constitutional question”). For that reason, although I harbor serious doubts about the reasons the Court of Appeals gave for concluding that the peti- tioners failed to allege an actual or justiciable controversy in this case, I agree with the Court’s decision to deny further review. I am authorized to state that Justice Bethel joins in this concurrence. 4