Full Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules November 2, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1441. MCWILLIAMS v. MEGHRIAN. WATKINS, Judge. This appeal arises from a child custody modification proceeding in which the trial court, inter alia, awarded John Meghrian (“Father”) attorney fees, permanently enjoined Stephanie McWilliams (“Mother”) from making any “disparaging” statements about Father “via social media or other means,” and modified child support. Mother appeals, and for the reasons below, we vacate the trial court’s final order and remand for further proceedings. The parties are the parents of one child, born in 2008. Under a May 2023 consent final order, they agreed to joint physical custody. In August 2024, Father filed a modification petition, seeking sole physical custody of the child, child support, and attorney fees. Father also claimed that Mother was in contempt of provisions of the consent order requiring her to share the cost of extracurricular activities and medical expenses. Mother opposed Father’s requests for relief. After the parties presented evidence at a temporary hearing in November 2024, the trial court issued a temporary order awarding Father “physical custody” of the child and requiring Mother to pay him $1,467 in monthly child support. In support of its child support ruling, the court found that Father’s monthly gross income was $8,249.29 and Mother’s monthly gross income was $15,307.50. The trial court held a final hearing in August 2025 before issuing a final order in November 2025. The final order provided that there would be “no change in the child support detailed in the Temporary Order[,]” again found that the parties’ monthly gross incomes were $8,249.29 and $15,307.50, and ordered that Mother’s child support obligation was $1,467.25 per month. In addition, after considering Father’s request for 100 percent of his attorney fees ($28,671.16), the court ordered Mother to reimburse him in that amount. The court also found Mother in willful contempt of the May 2023 consent order and ordered her to reimburse Father for her portion of the child’s activity and medical 2 expenses. Within that provision of the final order, the court ordered Mother not to disparage Father. The final order also incorporated and adopted Father’s proposed parenting plan. Mother filed an application for discretionary review,1 which we granted. This appeal follows. 1. Mother argues that the trial court erred in awarding Father attorney fees without specifying a statutory basis for the award. Father responds that remand is unnecessary because “the parties themselves understood from early on that OCGA § 9-15-14 was in play[.]” Generally, an award of attorney fees is not available in Georgia unless authorized by statute or contract. ... When there is more than one statutory basis for the attorney-fee award and neither the statutory basis for the award nor the findings necessary to support an award is stated in the order and a review of the record does not reveal the basis of the award, the case is remanded for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and the entry of any findings necessary to support it.2 1 See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2); Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 46–47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017). 2 Viskup v. Viskup, 291 Ga. 103, 106(3) (727 SE2d 97) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 3 Here, the trial court’s final order does not specify a statutory basis for the award of attorney fees to Father, and the record does not reveal the basis for the award. Father’s complaint to modify custody requested attorney fees under both OCGA §§ 19-9-3(g) and 19-6-15(k),3 and, as noted above, he contends on appeal that the award was entered under OCGA § 9-15-4. It is unclear from the record whether the court awarded fees under one of these statutes or under some other statute. Because the record shows multiple statutory bases for the attorney fees award, “it was incumbent upon the trial court to indicate which statute was relied upon in making its award.”4 As to Father’s contention that we can discern from the record that the trial court based its award solely on OCGA § 9-15-14, the trial court did not articulate the evidentiary basis for the award. 3 OCGA § 19-9-3(g) authorizes an award of attorney fees in a child custody action, while OCGA § 19-6-15(k)(5) authorizes such an award in proceedings to modify child support. 4 Hall v. Hall, 335 Ga. App. 208, 212–13(2) (780 SE2d 787) (2015) (“Because the record before us indicates [several] plausible statutory bases for the attorney fees award ... and nothing in the record eliminates either statute as a basis of the award, it was incumbent upon the trial court to indicate which statute was relied upon in making its award. We therefore must vacate the award of attorney fees and remand the case for the trial court to articulate the statutory basis for its award.”). 4 Accordingly, we vacate the award of fees and remand for the trial court to articulate the basis for its award and for the entry of any findings necessary to support it.5 2. Mother argues that the final order and accompanying parenting plan included unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.6 The final order directed Mother to “immediately cease all disparagement of [Father] whether via social media or other means.” The final order also adopted and incorporated the parenting plan proposed by Father, which provided that the parties “will not speak badly of each other or the members of the family of the other parent.” In his response brief, Father argues that Mother waived her constitutional challenge to the non-disparagement injunction by failing to object when the trial court stated, from the bench, that she “can’t do” this kind of disparagement and by failing to make a post-judgment motion below. 5 See Viskup, 291 Ga. at 106(3). 6 See Baskin v. Hale, 337 Ga. App. 420, 426–27(3) (787 SE2d 785) (2016). See generally Yntema v. Smith, 319 Ga. 801, 802 n.1 (906 SE2d 748) (2024) (Peterson, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 5 But the record belies Father’s contention that Mother acquiesced to the trial court’s ruling. During the final hearing, the trial court stated, “So, Ms. McWilliams, when we’re dealing with, you know, parents — and I understand what you said. You’re putting your truth out there and saying your truth. Disparagement doesn’t care about the truth. It just means that you’re putting down another parent.” Mother responded, “Yeah.” The court concluded: And so publicly like that is something that you just — you can’t do, and so we want to be careful about that. There’s a reason that we’re careful about that. Things on social media get back to kids. They just do. And I think that we’re all — we’re all cognizant of that in this day and age, but we have to be careful about what we put out there. And if we can’t say anything nice, we just don’t need to say anything at all, and that’s the best rule to live by in terms of this. So that’s — that’s kind of what we need to — what we need to work on there. Mother’s response during the court’s vague admonition did not amount to acquiescence or an affirmative waiver. Father also argues that Mother previously agreed to a similar restriction in the 2023 consent order. However, that order only provided that “[n]either Parent nor their relatives shall disparage the other Parent [in] the minor child’s presence”; it did 6 not mention disparagement by social media or other means. Thus, Mother’s agreement to the prior disparagement provision also did not amount to waiver of this challenge. As to Mother’s failure to assert her constitutional challenge before the trial court, it is true that “[b]ecause this Court is a court for the correction of errors, we will not consider matters, even of constitutional magnitude, that were not raised and ruled upon in the trial court.”7 However, the injunction, in its objectionable form, was not entered until the final order. And Mother raised the issue in her application for discretionary review, which was her first opportunity to do so.8 Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is instructed to address the constitutional issue in the first instance. As we do not reach the constitutional issue, we need not decide whether, as Father argues, it is moot because the child has reached 18 years of age. 3. Mother also contends that the trial court erroneously relied on stale income evidence from the temporary hearing in making its child support award. Mother 7 Stewart v. Johnson, 358 Ga. App. 813, 814 (856 SE2d 401) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 See Styles v. State, 308 Ga. 624, 628–29(3) n.4 (842 SE2d 869) (2020); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Monroe, 379 Ga. App. 791, 792–93(1) (931 SE2d 244) (2026). 7 argues that, under the reasoning of Pace v. Pace,9 the trial court would have first had to give express notice of its intent to rely on temporary hearing evidence. “In Georgia, determining each parent’s monthly gross income is the first step that a court must take in calculating child support under our child support guideline[s].”10 Under the guidelines, a trial court is only allowed to impute a parent’s income if he or she fails to produce reliable evidence of income and the court has no other reliable evidence of his or her income or income potential.11 The guidelines apply “not only to initial determinations of child support, but also to modification actions, and are the expression of the legislative will regarding the calculation of child support and must be considered by any court setting child support.”12 Here, the trial court stated on the record that it was declining to consider the evidence presented at the final hearing and was instead relying on its findings from the 9 287 Ga. 899, 901 (700 SE2d 571) (2010) (holding that, “absent express notice to the parties, it is error for a trial court to rely on evidence from the temporary hearing in making its final custody determination” (emphasis added)). 10 Franco v. Eagle, 361 Ga. App. 506, 507(1)(a) (864 SE2d 675) (2021). See also OCGA § 19-6-15(b)(1), (f). 11 OCGA § 19-6-15(f)(4); Franco, 361 Ga. App. at 508–09(1)(a). 12 Park-Poaps v. Poaps, 351 Ga. App. 856, 868(6) (833 SE2d 554) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 temporary hearing eight months earlier. The court explained that “we had a really lengthy hearing in detail about expenses and income at the last hearing” and that the court was “sort of leery to do a whole lot different about that right now because we had gone through so much.” Although Father argues on appeal that the trial court considered Mother’s updated income presentation and found it not credible, the court noted that both parties had contended their income had decreased and the court was “most comfortable” using the amounts from the prior hearing. On remand, the court should clarify its reasoning in ordering “no change in the child support detailed in the Temporary Order[.]”13 In sum, we vacate the grant of attorney fees, the injunction (both in the final order and in the incorporated parenting plan) restricting speech, and the order of child support. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. McFadden, P. J., and Padgett, J., concur. 13 See Cotting v. Cotting, 261 Ga. App. 370, 372(2) (582 SE2d 527) (2003) (vacating trial court’s order and remanding for further clarification because this Court was “in the dark regarding the trial court’s intent, as well as the basis for its ruling,” and we could not properly review the order). 9