Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 1 of 18 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-2020 PETER LAURENZANO, Petitioner – Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent – Appellee. ------------------------------ THE CENTER FOR TAXPAYER RIGHTS, Amicus Supporting Appellant. Appeal from the United States Tax Court. (Tax Ct. No. 2203-25) Argued: September 16, 2026 Decided: November 18, 2026 Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Wynn joined. ARGUED: Uriel Israel Aryeh Hinberg, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Matthew Steven Johnshoy, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 2 of 18 JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Eric J. Konopka, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Ellen Page DelSole, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Carlton M. Smith, New York, New York; T. Keith Fogg, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, for Amicus Curiae. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 3 of 18 AGEE, Circuit Judge: Peter Laurenzano filed a petition to contest a notice of income tax deficiency in the United States Tax Court. Because he failed to file within the time prescribed by Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 6213(a), the Tax Court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction and held it had “no authority to extend this 90 day . . . period.” J.A. 41–42. Laurenzano then appealed the Tax Court’s judgment to this Court. We now hold that § 6213(a)’s filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Further, we conclude that § 6213(a) is subject to the ordinary presumption that equitable tolling can apply to a nonjurisdictional deadline. For these reasons, we vacate the Tax Court’s decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. If the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) concludes that a taxpayer underpaid in a particular tax year, it sends the taxpayer a “notice of deficiency.” I.R.C. § 6212(a). The taxpayer can then contest the alleged deficiency by petitioning the Tax Court under I.R.C. § 6213(a) to contest the amount of tax liability. Section 6213(a) also sets out the timeline for filing the Tax Court petition as “within 90 days . . . after the notice . . . is mailed.” I.R.C. § 6213(a). 1 If the taxpayer fails to timely file a petition, “the deficiency . . . shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary [of the Treasury].” Id. § 6213(c). 1 Taxpayers outside the United States may have up to “150 days.” Id. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 4 of 18 On September 9, 2024, the IRS sent a notice of an income tax deficiency totaling $14,151.87 to Laurenzano’s Maryland home. J.A. 23–33. Consistent with the deadlines outlined above, this notice informed Laurenzano that he had 90 days or, if he were outside the United States, 150 days to contest the deficiency. According to Laurenzano, he was on a fishing trip in Florida and the Bahamas when the notice arrived at his home, so he assumed that the 150-day deadline applied to him. Regardless of which deadline actually applied, Laurenzano missed both because the Tax Court did not receive his petition until February 19, 2025—a full 163 days after the IRS mailed the notice. On the IRS Commissioner’s motion, the Tax Court dismissed Laurenzano’s petition as untimely. In so doing, the Tax Court held that “even if the 150-day period were determined to apply” to Laurenzano, he failed to timely file a petition and therefore the court had no jurisdiction over his claim. J.A. 43. In addition, the court found that it had no power to extend § 6213(a)’s filing deadline for equitable reasons, so it declined to consider any argument on that point. J.A. 43–44. Laurenzano then timely appealed. J.A. 56. This Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1), so we have the authority to hear this appeal. II. We review de novo both the Tax Court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction and that equitable tolling is unavailable to any petitioner under § 6312(a) as a matter of statutory interpretation. McLane v. Comm’r, 24 F.4th 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2022) 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 5 of 18 (jurisdiction); see Bonnie v. Dunbar, 157 F.4th 610, 614 (4th Cir. 2025) (statutory interpretation). After reviewing both issues under this standard, we vacate the decision of the Tax Court and remand this case for further proceedings. A. The first question on appeal is whether § 6213(a)’s filing deadline is jurisdictional. If it is, then Laurenzano’s claim on appeal ends. In Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), the Supreme Court clarified that a statutory requirement is jurisdictional only “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,” id. at 515 (emphasis added). In the twenty years since Arbaugh, the Supreme Court has “almost uniformly found” that statutory requirements at issue in its cases “failed to meet this demanding” clear-statement test. Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 275 (2025) (citations omitted). 2 The clear-statement test “does not mean ‘Congress must incant magic words,’” but it does require that “traditional tools of statutory construction . . . plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 (2015) (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 2 Prior to Arbaugh, the Supreme Court’s caselaw found jurisdictional defects from time to time “without considering whether” Congress had placed “a limitation on a court’s capacity to decide” or “a threshold requirement that a party had to satisfy in order to go forward” independent of a court’s adjudicatory capabilities. Id. (citation omitted). But Arbaugh represented a significant shift in which the Supreme Court “tried . . . to bring some discipline to the use of” the jurisdictional label by focusing the inquiry on what limitations Congress placed on a court’s power to adjudicate. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011). Accordingly, our decision today follows the Supreme Court’s lead in properly reviewing the bounds of the jurisdictional label. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 6 of 18 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)). To carry jurisdictional consequences, a procedural bar like § 6213(a)’s deadline must “mark the bounds of ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority.’” Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)). In other words, the statute must make “a clear tie between the deadline” and the court’s power to adjudicate. Id. at 207. When a statute simply “require[s] that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” then it has laid out only a “nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 548–49 (2019) (quoting Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435). In simplified terms, a jurisdictional rule speaks to the adjudicatory authority of a court, but a claim-processing rule speaks to the obligations of a party. See id. 3 Thus, to satisfy the Arbaugh test, § 6213(a)’s text and structure must plainly show that the deadline connects to the Tax Court’s adjudicatory powers. As always, we begin with the text, and the relevant portion of § 6213(a) provides as follows: Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or any legal holding in the District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. 3 To be clear, claims-processing rules are a common and valid means by which Congress “promote[s] the orderly progress of litigation” by creating deadlines or other procedural requirements. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435. However, unlike jurisdictional rules, claims-processing rules may be “waived or forfeited,” need not be raised “by courts sua sponte,” and can “allow for equitable exceptions.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 203. Thus, under the appropriate circumstances, a claims-processing rule could allow a proceeding to continue despite its late filing, whereas a jurisdictional deadline presents an insurmountable bar to an untimely dispute. See id. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 7 of 18 “Notably absent from this language is a ‘directive[] to courts,’ a ‘reference to jurisdiction,’ and ‘language demarcat[ing] a court’s power.’” Oquendo v. Comm’r, 148 F.4th 820, 831 (6th Cir. 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Bondi, 606 U.S. at 274). In fact, the language refers to what “the taxpayer may” do “[w]ithin 90 days, or 150 days,” I.R.C. § 6213(a) (emphasis added), not what the Tax Court is empowered to do. Therefore, on its face, § 6213(a) directs a party to “take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” just as a claim-processing rule would do. Fort Bend, 587 U.S. at 549 (quoting Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435). The statutory text does not indicate that § 6213(a)’s deadline is jurisdictional by setting the Tax Court’s authority to act. Other portions of § 6213(a) also indicate that Congress knew how to connect a deadline and a jurisdictional grant when it so chose. A mere two sentences after laying out the filing deadline at issue here, Congress wrote the following sentence into § 6213(a): “The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund under this subsection unless a timely petition for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then only in respect of the deficiency that is subject of such petition.” I.R.C. § 6213(a) (emphasis added). This latter provision makes a clear tie between a petition’s timeliness and the Tax Court’s power to issue injunctive relief. In contrast, the former sentence in § 6213(a) provides no similar direct link between a petition’s timeliness and “the Tax Court’s power to review . . . redetermination petitions” generally. Culp v. Comm’r, 75 F.4th 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2023). The different approaches taken within the same statute are a strong indication that Congress intentionally declined to connect the Tax Court’s power to review petitions and § 6213(a)’s deadline for seeking such review. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 8 of 18 For similar reasons, other provisions in the Internal Revenue Code bolster our conclusion that the deadline at issue here is not jurisdictional. The Tax Code is filled with provisions containing clear links between a jurisdictional grant and a deadline. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (“In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the individual may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section if such petition is filed” timely. (emphasis added)); I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1) (“The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction over any action brought by a taxpayer . . . to determine whether the Secretary [of the Treasury]’s failure to abate interest under this section was abuse of discretion . . . if such action is brought” timely. (emphasis added)). The absence of such clear language in § 6213(a) again suggests that Congress did not intend to connect the 90-day deadline to the Tax Court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent strongly supports the view that the 90-day deadline in § 6213(a) is not jurisdictional. Most recently, Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. at 204, involved the filing deadline in I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1), which provided that a “person may, within 30 days of a determination under [§ 6330], petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1). Although the parenthetical at the end of the foregoing provision spoke to the Tax Court’s authority, the Supreme Court still held that the “text does not clearly mandate [a] jurisdictional reading.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204. Section 6330’s text did not specifically delineate whether the “matter” over which the Tax Court had jurisdiction was all petitions or “petitions filed within” the deadline. Id. And the parties 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 9 of 18 each had grammatical and structural points supporting their interpretations. See id. at 204– 06. The Court found that, while one could use § 6330’s text to make “a plausible interpretation” that the statute was jurisdictional, “[w]here multiple plausible interpretations exist—only one of which is jurisdictional—it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading is clear.” Id. at 205 (citing Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 287 (2011)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that § 6330(d)(1) failed to satisfy the clear statement rule required for jurisdictional deadlines. Id. at 205–06. If the filing deadline in Boechler fell short of being jurisdictional, it is hard to see how the more attenuated 90-day deadline in § 6213(a) is jurisdictional. The statute in Boechler contained at least some grammatical connections between the jurisdictional language and the deadline. Indeed, the deadline and the grant of jurisdiction appeared in the same sentence. But there is no such jurisdictional language at all grammatically related to the 90-day deadline in § 6213(a). As explained above, the word “jurisdiction” does not appear in § 6213(a) for several sentences after the 90-day deadline is introduced and does not specifically relate back to it. Section 6213(a) simply reflects what a taxpayer must do to properly contest a notice of deficiency: file a petition in the Tax Court. After considering all these factors, we conclude that § 6213(a) does not meet the “very demanding” clear statement rule laid down in Arbaugh. Riley, 606 U.S. at 275 (citations omitted). And we are not alone in this conclusion. Since the Supreme Court handed down Boechler, every circuit to address the jurisdictional question has reached the 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 10 of 18 same result. 4 See Culp, 75 F.4th at 202; Oquendo, 148 F.4th at 831; Buller v. Comm’r, 160 F.4th 266, 269 (2d Cir. 2025); Maniktala v. Comm’r, 186 F.4th 548, 554 (8th Cir. 2026); Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 188 F.4th 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2026). And none of the IRS Commissioner’s arguments urging us to hold otherwise have merit. First, this Court’s prior precedent does not control the jurisdictional analysis here in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening caselaw. Admittedly, in two pre-Arbaugh cases, we found § 6213(a) to be jurisdictional, but with no analysis as to why. See Kiker, 218 F.2d at 393 (affirming a Tax Court’s dismissal of an untimely petition for lack of jurisdiction); Lundy, 45 F.3d at 866. Neither case provided a reasoned explanation for its summary conclusion that the 90-day deadline was jurisdictional. In Kiker, we merely noted the petition “was too late.” 218 F.2d at 392. In Lundy, the jurisdictional analysis consisted of Before Boechler, most circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, found the deadline 4 jurisdictional. See Tilden v. Comm’r, 846 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2017); Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Comm’r, 962 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2020); Lundy v. IRS, 45 F.3d 856, 866 (4th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by, Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996); Kiker v. Comm’r, 218 F.2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1955). These circuit decisions, therefore, do not address Boechler, in which the Supreme Court found a Tax Code deadline was nonjurisdictional despite having at least plausible grammatical connection to the Tax Court’s adjudicatory power. Only one circuit has found § 6213(a)’s deadline jurisdictional since Boechler. See Allen v. Comm’r, No. 22-12537, 2022 WL 17825934, at *1–2 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022). Although that circuit’s unpublished opinion recognized Boechler’s holding, it determined that Boechler was not “clearly on point” with prior circuit precedent and therefore concluded that a circuit case predating even Arbaugh was binding. Id. at *2 (quoting Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003)). We think that this conclusion underestimates the strength and significance of Arbaugh and its progeny, including Boechler. Accordingly, we do not find persuasive the cases that consider § 6213(a)’s deadline to be jurisdictional as they fail to recognize the significant jurisprudential shift in Arbaugh and related cases. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 11 of 18 one sentence: “If the taxpayer does not file a petition for redetermination within 90 days of the mailing of the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax Court in the first place.” 45 F.3d at 866 (footnote omitted). These “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” are the sort of “unrefined dispositions . . . that should be accorded ‘no precedential effect’ on the question” of jurisdiction post-Arbaugh. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). Instead, they are precisely the sort of unexplained characterization of a provision as “jurisdictional” that the Supreme Court rejected in Arbaugh and following cases. See, e.g., Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 160 (2023) (“If a decision simply states that ‘the court is dismissing “for lack of jurisdiction” when some threshold fact has not been established,’ it is understood as a ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]’ that receives ‘no precedential effect.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, these prior decisions do not support the Commissioner’s position. Second, none of the Commissioner’s interpretive arguments succeed. As we have already explained, contrary to the Commissioner’s assertions, the first sentence of § 6213(a) directs the action of only the taxpayer—not the Tax Court—and, therefore, provides no clear tie between a jurisdictional grant and the filing deadline. Nonetheless, the Commissioner references “a raft of related statutory provisions” to argue that Congress intended the 90-day deadline to be jurisdictional. Response Br. 7. At most, the Commissioner uses these provisions to argue administrative burdens may arise if some petitions filed after the deadline were permitted to proceed. But ministerial consequences of a nonjurisdictional deadline are not “unmistakable evidence, on par with express 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 12 of 18 language addressing the court’s jurisdiction,” necessary to satisfy a clear-statement rule. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 418 (2023). Accordingly, these arguments fail. Therefore, for all the reasons explained above, we hold that § 6213(a)’s filing deadline is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. B. Having concluded that § 6213(a) is nonjurisdictional, we next reach the question of whether that provision allows for equitable tolling. The Tax Court concluded below that the rule was jurisdictional and consequently it had no authority to extend some form of equitable relief to the taxpayer. That result would follow because jurisdictional rules “do not allow for equitable exceptions.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 203 (citations omitted). By contrast, nonjurisdictional rules like § 6213(a) enjoy a presumption that they “are . . . subject to equitable tolling.” See id. at 209 (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). And since § 6213(a)’s filing deadline is not jurisdictional, we must consider whether the equitable tolling presumption applies to it. As explained below, we hold that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling applies to § 6213(a)’s filing deadline. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits courts to “pause[] the running of, or toll[], a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing timely action.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014) (citation omitted). Equitable tolling “is a traditional feature of American jurisprudence and a backdrop principle against which Congress drafts limitations periods.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 208–09 (citation omitted). For that reason, the 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 13 of 18 doctrine presumptively applies to nonjurisdictional deadlines unless “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 7 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997)). A statutory provision that “speaks in strict, mandatory terms” can be read as denying the presumption of equitable tolling. Enbridge Energy v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan, 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2026). Further, when a statute “sets forth its time limitation in unusually emphatic form” or “in a highly detailed technical manner,” it can be read as negating the application of equitable tolling. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350 (citations omitted). Moreover, a longer filing deadline can cut against the presumption of equitable tolling. See, e.g., United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 49 (1998) (holding that equitable tolling is “incompatible” with an act that includes a “generous” 12-year limitations period). Section 6213(a) does not have any textual indication cutting against equitable tolling. No express language in the provision prevents equitable tolling from applying. Further, § 6213(a) uses the permissive language that “the taxpayer may file a petition” rather than more mandatory language like “shall.” I.R.C. § 6213(a) (emphasis added). Compare Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204 (holding that equitable tolling applies to a deadline that described what a taxpayer “may” do), with Enbridge Energy, 146 S. Ct. at 1082 (holding that the use of “shall” is consistent with a finding that equitable tolling does not apply). Moreover, the filing deadline is “neither emphasized nor set out in a technical way.” Culp, 75 F.4th at 203. Finally, the 90-day limit is relatively short, which does not indicate 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 14 of 18 a “generous” limitations period that could negate a presumption in favor of equitable tolling. Accordingly, the text supports the applicability of equitable tolling. The structure of § 6213(a) is also consistent with a reading in favor of equitable tolling. Generally, “the explicit listing of exceptions . . . indicate[s] . . . that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352. If “many of the specific exceptions reflect equitable considerations,” then it “heightens [this] structural inference” against equitable tolling. Arellano, 598 U.S. at 9. Here, none of the four relevant exceptions to § 6213(a)’s deadline cut against the ordinary presumption in favor of tolling. 5 Specifically, as another court of appeals has observed, these exceptions are “neither many (the [four] here are less than the six in Brockamp or fifteen in Arellano), nor are they set our explicitly or ‘in a highly detailed technical manner.” Culp, 75 F.4th at 203–04 (quoting Brockamp, U.S. at 350). As in Boechler, § 6213(a)’s filing “deadline also appears in a section of the Tax Code that is unusually protective of taxpayers and a scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, often initiate the process.” 596 U.S. at 209 (quoting Auburn, 568 U.S. 5 The relevant exceptions are: First, a “Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia” cannot count as the “last day” of the filing period. I.R.C. § 6213(a). Second, a petition “shall be treated as timely” if it is filed by the date listed on the notice of deficiency itself—even if the listed date comes after the 90- or 150-day deadline. Id. Third, the deadline pauses to allow for corrections to certain excise taxes. I.R.C. § 6213(e). And fourth, the clock stops while a “debtor is prohibited” from filing a petition because of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case “and for 60 days thereafter.” I.R.C. § 6213(f). 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 15 of 18 at 160) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the traditional tools of statutory interpretation all indicate that equitable tolling may apply to the § 6213(a) filing deadline. We recognize that earlier this year the First Circuit reached a different conclusion regarding the availability of equitable tolling. 6 In Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, the First Circuit concluded that § 6213(a)’s “filing deadline may not be equitably tolled” because it has nine exceptions that already account for delineated equitable considerations. 188 F.4th at 58. 7 Although we ultimately do not find Kyick Holdings’ equitable tolling analysis persuasive, we agree that four of the nine purported exceptions discussed in Kyick Holdings are, in fact, exceptions relevant to our analysis of equitable tolling. Specifically, these are the exceptions to the 90-day deadline when either the last day of the filing period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday in the District of Columbia, I.R.C. § 6213(a); the notice 6 The First Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to have reached the question of equitable tolling and held that it does not apply. Four other circuits, however, have found that equitable tolling does apply to § 6213(a)’s filing deadline. See Culp, 75 F.4th at 205 (3d Cir.); Oquendo, 148 F.4th at 833–34 (6th Cir.); Buller, 160 F.4th at 271 (2d Cir.); Maniktala, 186 F.4th at 555 (8th Cir.). 7 These purported exceptions all appear in the Internal Revenue Code. They are (1) § 6213(a)’s 150-day deadline for taxpayers outside the United States; (2) § 6213(a)’s clause not counting a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday as the last day of the filing period; (3) § 6213(a)’s clause treating petitions as timely filed if filed by the date listed on the notice; (4) § 6213(e)’s exception for certain excise taxes; (5) § 6213(f)’s exception for Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases; (6) § 7451(b)(1)’s provision regarding inaccessible filing locations; (7) § 7508(a)(1)(c)’s provision extending a deadline for service members in combat zones or contingency operations; (8) § 7508A(a)(1)’s provision extending deadlines for taxpayers in certain emergency situations; and (9) § 7502(a)’s provision treating timely mailing as timely filing. See Kyick Holdings, 188 F.4th at 57–58. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 16 of 18 of deficiency lists a date later than the deadline, I.R.C. § 6213(a); the Secretary of the Treasury is determining whether to correct certain excise taxes, I.R.C. § 6213(e); or a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case prohibits the petitioner from filing, I.R.C. § 6213(f). Each exception explicitly affects the deadline in § 6213(a), so they are clearly exceptions relevant to our present discussion. But, as explained above, these four exceptions are not so numerous or highly technical as to disturb the ordinary presumption in favor of equitable tolling. But we disagree with Kyick Holdings’s additional equitable tolling analysis because it sweeps up five purported “exceptions” that are simply irrelevant for our present purposes. Indeed, one exception that the First Circuit identified in § 6213(a) is not really an exception. The 150-day filing period in § 6213(a) does not extend the 90-day deadline; rather, it is a separate deadline for taxpayers outside the United States for whom the 90- day deadline would not apply anyway. See I.R.C. § 6213(a). But, more importantly, Supreme Court precedent shows that the four exceptions outside § 6213 cited in Kyick Holdings do not rebut the presumption in favor of equitable tolling. The tax provision at issue in Boechler, I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1), was also subject to these four tolling provisions outside § 6213 that the First Circuit cites. In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged “that the deadline [in Boechler was] already subject to tolling provisions found elsewhere in the Tax Code—for example, tolling [was] available to taxpayers located in a combat zone or disaster area.” 596 U.S. at 210. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that § 6330(d)(1) could be equitably tolled and that the existence of the other delineated tolling provisions in the Tax Code would not overcome the presumption in favor of 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 17 of 18 generally available equitable tolling, especially in light of the permissive, nontechnical “language” of § 6330 or the “single” direct “exception” to § 6330. Id. (citation omitted). We also find that Kyick Holdings’ treatment of its purported exceptions unpersuasive for another reason. The First Circuit makes too much of Enbridge Energy, a recent Supreme Court case holding that the deadline to remove civil cases to federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) could not be tolled. See Kyick Holdings, 188 F.4th at 56–58. Enbridge Energy involved at least six equitable exceptions which were either in § 1446(b) itself or which “explicitly incorporate[d] § 1446(b)(1)’s time limit” modified “to allow equitable, case-specific exceptions.” 146 S. Ct. at 1078. These exceptions, particularly the ones which incorporate the time limit, “would be inexplicable and unnecessary if Congress already understood § 1446(b)(1) to” allow “equitable tolling.” Id. In contrast, many of the proffered exceptions cited in Kyick Holdings do not directly incorporate § 6213(a)’s deadline, so they have less connection to the deadline than the exceptions noted in Enbridge Energy had to § 1446(b)(1). Moreover, Enbridge Energy is distinguishable textually because the provision at issue there included “strict, mandatory terms” like “shall,” which bolstered the Supreme Court’s conclusion that equitable tolling did not apply. Enbridge Energy, 146 S. Ct. at 1077 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). But, as explained above, § 6213(a) contains much more permissive language indicating that Congress did not intend a fixed jurisdictional deadline. For all of these reasons, we see Kyick Holdings as an outlier, and the decisions of our sister circuits in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits as far more persuasive. Therefore, we conclude that § 6213(a) allows for equitable tolling in appropriate cases. In 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2020 Doc: 64 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 18 of 18 holding that equitable tolling is available for petitioners who miss § 6213(a)’s deadline, we offer no view on whether Laurenzano is entitled to any equitable relief in this case. That is a question for the Tax Court on remand, Boechler, 596 U.S. at 211, to determine in the first instance. III. The Tax Court erred in dismissing Laurenzano’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. As we have explained, § 6213(a) does not divest the Tax Court of the power to hear an untimely petition based on the 90-day deadline, and consequently the Tax Court also has the authority to apply equitable tolling based on the facts of a particular case. For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the Tax Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED 18