Peter Laurenzano v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-2020
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-2020
PETER LAURENZANO,
Petitioner – Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent – Appellee.
------------------------------
THE CENTER FOR TAXPAYER RIGHTS,
Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States Tax Court. (Tax Ct. No. 2203-25)
Argued: September 16, 2026 Decided: November 18, 2026
Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which
Judge King and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Uriel Israel Aryeh Hinberg, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. Matthew Steven Johnshoy, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
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JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Eric J. Konopka, LATHAM &
WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney
General, Ellen Page DelSole, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Carlton M. Smith, New York, New York; T.
Keith Fogg, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, for Amicus Curiae.
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AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Peter Laurenzano filed a petition to contest a notice of income tax deficiency in the
United States Tax Court. Because he failed to file within the time prescribed by Internal
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 6213(a), the Tax Court dismissed his petition for lack of
jurisdiction and held it had “no authority to extend this 90 day . . . period.” J.A. 41–42.
Laurenzano then appealed the Tax Court’s judgment to this Court. We now hold that
§ 6213(a)’s filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Further, we conclude that § 6213(a) is
subject to the ordinary presumption that equitable tolling can apply to a nonjurisdictional
deadline. For these reasons, we vacate the Tax Court’s decision and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
If the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) concludes that a taxpayer underpaid in a
particular tax year, it sends the taxpayer a “notice of deficiency.” I.R.C. § 6212(a). The
taxpayer can then contest the alleged deficiency by petitioning the Tax Court under I.R.C.
§ 6213(a) to contest the amount of tax liability. Section 6213(a) also sets out the timeline
for filing the Tax Court petition as “within 90 days . . . after the notice . . . is mailed.” I.R.C.
§ 6213(a). 1 If the taxpayer fails to timely file a petition, “the deficiency . . . shall be
assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary [of the Treasury].”
Id. § 6213(c).
1
Taxpayers outside the United States may have up to “150 days.” Id.
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On September 9, 2024, the IRS sent a notice of an income tax deficiency totaling
$14,151.87 to Laurenzano’s Maryland home. J.A. 23–33. Consistent with the deadlines
outlined above, this notice informed Laurenzano that he had 90 days or, if he were outside
the United States, 150 days to contest the deficiency. According to Laurenzano, he was on
a fishing trip in Florida and the Bahamas when the notice arrived at his home, so he
assumed that the 150-day deadline applied to him. Regardless of which deadline actually
applied, Laurenzano missed both because the Tax Court did not receive his petition until
February 19, 2025—a full 163 days after the IRS mailed the notice.
On the IRS Commissioner’s motion, the Tax Court dismissed Laurenzano’s petition
as untimely. In so doing, the Tax Court held that “even if the 150-day period were
determined to apply” to Laurenzano, he failed to timely file a petition and therefore the
court had no jurisdiction over his claim. J.A. 43. In addition, the court found that it had no
power to extend § 6213(a)’s filing deadline for equitable reasons, so it declined to consider
any argument on that point. J.A. 43–44.
Laurenzano then timely appealed. J.A. 56. This Court has jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1), so we have the authority to hear this
appeal.
II.
We review de novo both the Tax Court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction
and that equitable tolling is unavailable to any petitioner under § 6312(a) as a matter of
statutory interpretation. McLane v. Comm’r, 24 F.4th 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2022)
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(jurisdiction); see Bonnie v. Dunbar, 157 F.4th 610, 614 (4th Cir. 2025) (statutory
interpretation). After reviewing both issues under this standard, we vacate the decision of
the Tax Court and remand this case for further proceedings.
A.
The first question on appeal is whether § 6213(a)’s filing deadline is jurisdictional.
If it is, then Laurenzano’s claim on appeal ends.
In Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), the Supreme Court clarified that a
statutory requirement is jurisdictional only “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,” id. at 515 (emphasis
added). In the twenty years since Arbaugh, the Supreme Court has “almost uniformly
found” that statutory requirements at issue in its cases “failed to meet this demanding”
clear-statement test. Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 275 (2025) (citations omitted). 2
The clear-statement test “does not mean ‘Congress must incant magic words,’” but
it does require that “traditional tools of statutory construction . . . plainly show that
Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.” United States v. Kwai
Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 (2015) (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568
2
Prior to Arbaugh, the Supreme Court’s caselaw found jurisdictional defects from
time to time “without considering whether” Congress had placed “a limitation on a court’s
capacity to decide” or “a threshold requirement that a party had to satisfy in order to go
forward” independent of a court’s adjudicatory capabilities. Id. (citation omitted). But
Arbaugh represented a significant shift in which the Supreme Court “tried . . . to bring
some discipline to the use of” the jurisdictional label by focusing the inquiry on what
limitations Congress placed on a court’s power to adjudicate. Henderson ex rel. Henderson
v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011). Accordingly, our decision today follows the
Supreme Court’s lead in properly reviewing the bounds of the jurisdictional label.
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U.S. 145, 153 (2013)). To carry jurisdictional consequences, a procedural bar like
§ 6213(a)’s deadline must “mark the bounds of ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority.’”
Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.
443, 455 (2004)). In other words, the statute must make “a clear tie between the deadline”
and the court’s power to adjudicate. Id. at 207. When a statute simply “require[s] that the
parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” then it has laid out only a
“nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 548–49
(2019) (quoting Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435). In simplified terms, a jurisdictional rule
speaks to the adjudicatory authority of a court, but a claim-processing rule speaks to the
obligations of a party. See id. 3 Thus, to satisfy the Arbaugh test, § 6213(a)’s text and
structure must plainly show that the deadline connects to the Tax Court’s adjudicatory
powers.
As always, we begin with the text, and the relevant portion of § 6213(a) provides as
follows:
Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the
United States, after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is
mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or any legal holding in the District
of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax
Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.
3
To be clear, claims-processing rules are a common and valid means by which
Congress “promote[s] the orderly progress of litigation” by creating deadlines or other
procedural requirements. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435. However, unlike jurisdictional rules,
claims-processing rules may be “waived or forfeited,” need not be raised “by courts sua
sponte,” and can “allow for equitable exceptions.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 203. Thus, under
the appropriate circumstances, a claims-processing rule could allow a proceeding to
continue despite its late filing, whereas a jurisdictional deadline presents an insurmountable
bar to an untimely dispute. See id.
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“Notably absent from this language is a ‘directive[] to courts,’ a ‘reference to jurisdiction,’
and ‘language demarcat[ing] a court’s power.’” Oquendo v. Comm’r, 148 F.4th 820, 831
(6th Cir. 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Bondi, 606 U.S. at 274). In fact, the
language refers to what “the taxpayer may” do “[w]ithin 90 days, or 150 days,” I.R.C.
§ 6213(a) (emphasis added), not what the Tax Court is empowered to do. Therefore, on its
face, § 6213(a) directs a party to “take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,”
just as a claim-processing rule would do. Fort Bend, 587 U.S. at 549 (quoting Henderson,
562 U.S. at 435). The statutory text does not indicate that § 6213(a)’s deadline is
jurisdictional by setting the Tax Court’s authority to act.
Other portions of § 6213(a) also indicate that Congress knew how to connect a
deadline and a jurisdictional grant when it so chose. A mere two sentences after laying out
the filing deadline at issue here, Congress wrote the following sentence into § 6213(a):
“The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any
refund under this subsection unless a timely petition for a redetermination of the deficiency
has been filed and then only in respect of the deficiency that is subject of such petition.”
I.R.C. § 6213(a) (emphasis added). This latter provision makes a clear tie between a
petition’s timeliness and the Tax Court’s power to issue injunctive relief. In contrast, the
former sentence in § 6213(a) provides no similar direct link between a petition’s timeliness
and “the Tax Court’s power to review . . . redetermination petitions” generally. Culp v.
Comm’r, 75 F.4th 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2023). The different approaches taken within the same
statute are a strong indication that Congress intentionally declined to connect the Tax
Court’s power to review petitions and § 6213(a)’s deadline for seeking such review.
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For similar reasons, other provisions in the Internal Revenue Code bolster our
conclusion that the deadline at issue here is not jurisdictional. The Tax Code is filled with
provisions containing clear links between a jurisdictional grant and a deadline. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (“In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the individual
may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the
appropriate relief available to the individual under this section if such petition is filed”
timely. (emphasis added)); I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1) (“The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction
over any action brought by a taxpayer . . . to determine whether the Secretary [of the
Treasury]’s failure to abate interest under this section was abuse of discretion . . . if such
action is brought” timely. (emphasis added)). The absence of such clear language in
§ 6213(a) again suggests that Congress did not intend to connect the 90-day deadline to the
Tax Court’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent strongly supports the view that the 90-day
deadline in § 6213(a) is not jurisdictional. Most recently, Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner,
596 U.S. at 204, involved the filing deadline in I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1), which provided that a
“person may, within 30 days of a determination under [§ 6330], petition the Tax Court for
review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to
such matter).” I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1). Although the parenthetical at the end of the foregoing
provision spoke to the Tax Court’s authority, the Supreme Court still held that the “text
does not clearly mandate [a] jurisdictional reading.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204. Section
6330’s text did not specifically delineate whether the “matter” over which the Tax Court
had jurisdiction was all petitions or “petitions filed within” the deadline. Id. And the parties
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each had grammatical and structural points supporting their interpretations. See id. at 204–
06. The Court found that, while one could use § 6330’s text to make “a plausible
interpretation” that the statute was jurisdictional, “[w]here multiple plausible
interpretations exist—only one of which is jurisdictional—it is difficult to make the case
that the jurisdictional reading is clear.” Id. at 205 (citing Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277,
287 (2011)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that § 6330(d)(1) failed to satisfy the
clear statement rule required for jurisdictional deadlines. Id. at 205–06.
If the filing deadline in Boechler fell short of being jurisdictional, it is hard to see
how the more attenuated 90-day deadline in § 6213(a) is jurisdictional. The statute in
Boechler contained at least some grammatical connections between the jurisdictional
language and the deadline. Indeed, the deadline and the grant of jurisdiction appeared in
the same sentence. But there is no such jurisdictional language at all grammatically related
to the 90-day deadline in § 6213(a). As explained above, the word “jurisdiction” does not
appear in § 6213(a) for several sentences after the 90-day deadline is introduced and does
not specifically relate back to it. Section 6213(a) simply reflects what a taxpayer must do
to properly contest a notice of deficiency: file a petition in the Tax Court.
After considering all these factors, we conclude that § 6213(a) does not meet the
“very demanding” clear statement rule laid down in Arbaugh. Riley, 606 U.S. at 275
(citations omitted). And we are not alone in this conclusion. Since the Supreme Court
handed down Boechler, every circuit to address the jurisdictional question has reached the
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same result. 4 See Culp, 75 F.4th at 202; Oquendo, 148 F.4th at 831; Buller v. Comm’r, 160
F.4th 266, 269 (2d Cir. 2025); Maniktala v. Comm’r, 186 F.4th 548, 554 (8th Cir. 2026);
Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 188 F.4th 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2026).
And none of the IRS Commissioner’s arguments urging us to hold otherwise have
merit.
First, this Court’s prior precedent does not control the jurisdictional analysis here in
light of the Supreme Court’s intervening caselaw. Admittedly, in two pre-Arbaugh cases,
we found § 6213(a) to be jurisdictional, but with no analysis as to why. See Kiker, 218 F.2d
at 393 (affirming a Tax Court’s dismissal of an untimely petition for lack of jurisdiction);
Lundy, 45 F.3d at 866. Neither case provided a reasoned explanation for its summary
conclusion that the 90-day deadline was jurisdictional. In Kiker, we merely noted the
petition “was too late.” 218 F.2d at 392. In Lundy, the jurisdictional analysis consisted of
Before Boechler, most circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, found the deadline
4
jurisdictional. See Tilden v. Comm’r, 846 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2017); Organic Cannabis
Found., LLC v. Comm’r, 962 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2020); Lundy v. IRS, 45 F.3d 856,
866 (4th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by, Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235
(1996); Kiker v. Comm’r, 218 F.2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1955). These circuit decisions,
therefore, do not address Boechler, in which the Supreme Court found a Tax Code deadline
was nonjurisdictional despite having at least plausible grammatical connection to the Tax
Court’s adjudicatory power. Only one circuit has found § 6213(a)’s deadline jurisdictional
since Boechler. See Allen v. Comm’r, No. 22-12537, 2022 WL 17825934, at *1–2 (11th
Cir. Dec. 21, 2022). Although that circuit’s unpublished opinion recognized Boechler’s
holding, it determined that Boechler was not “clearly on point” with prior circuit precedent
and therefore concluded that a circuit case predating even Arbaugh was binding. Id. at *2
(quoting Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th
Cir. 2003)). We think that this conclusion underestimates the strength and significance of
Arbaugh and its progeny, including Boechler. Accordingly, we do not find persuasive the
cases that consider § 6213(a)’s deadline to be jurisdictional as they fail to recognize the
significant jurisprudential shift in Arbaugh and related cases.
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one sentence: “If the taxpayer does not file a petition for redetermination within 90 days of
the mailing of the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
Tax Court in the first place.” 45 F.3d at 866 (footnote omitted). These “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings” are the sort of “unrefined dispositions . . . that should be accorded
‘no precedential effect’ on the question” of jurisdiction post-Arbaugh. Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). Instead,
they are precisely the sort of unexplained characterization of a provision as “jurisdictional”
that the Supreme Court rejected in Arbaugh and following cases. See, e.g., Wilkins v.
United States, 598 U.S. 152, 160 (2023) (“If a decision simply states that ‘the court is
dismissing “for lack of jurisdiction” when some threshold fact has not been established,’ it
is understood as a ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]’ that receives ‘no precedential effect.’”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, these prior decisions do not support
the Commissioner’s position.
Second, none of the Commissioner’s interpretive arguments succeed. As we have
already explained, contrary to the Commissioner’s assertions, the first sentence of
§ 6213(a) directs the action of only the taxpayer—not the Tax Court—and, therefore,
provides no clear tie between a jurisdictional grant and the filing deadline. Nonetheless,
the Commissioner references “a raft of related statutory provisions” to argue that Congress
intended the 90-day deadline to be jurisdictional. Response Br. 7. At most, the
Commissioner uses these provisions to argue administrative burdens may arise if some
petitions filed after the deadline were permitted to proceed. But ministerial consequences
of a nonjurisdictional deadline are not “unmistakable evidence, on par with express
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language addressing the court’s jurisdiction,” necessary to satisfy a clear-statement rule.
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 418 (2023). Accordingly, these arguments fail.
Therefore, for all the reasons explained above, we hold that § 6213(a)’s filing
deadline is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.
B.
Having concluded that § 6213(a) is nonjurisdictional, we next reach the question of
whether that provision allows for equitable tolling. The Tax Court concluded below that
the rule was jurisdictional and consequently it had no authority to extend some form of
equitable relief to the taxpayer. That result would follow because jurisdictional rules “do
not allow for equitable exceptions.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 203 (citations omitted).
By contrast, nonjurisdictional rules like § 6213(a) enjoy a presumption that they
“are . . . subject to equitable tolling.” See id. at 209 (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veteran Affs.,
498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). And since § 6213(a)’s filing deadline is not jurisdictional, we
must consider whether the equitable tolling presumption applies to it. As explained below,
we hold that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling applies to § 6213(a)’s filing
deadline.
The doctrine of equitable tolling permits courts to “pause[] the running of, or toll[],
a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some
extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing timely action.” Lozano v. Montoya
Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014) (citation omitted). Equitable tolling “is a traditional feature
of American jurisprudence and a backdrop principle against which Congress drafts
limitations periods.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 208–09 (citation omitted). For that reason, the
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doctrine presumptively applies to nonjurisdictional deadlines unless “there [is] good reason
to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” Arellano v.
McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 7 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997)).
A statutory provision that “speaks in strict, mandatory terms” can be read as denying
the presumption of equitable tolling. Enbridge Energy v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan, 146 S.
Ct. 1074, 1082 (2026). Further, when a statute “sets forth its time limitation in unusually
emphatic form” or “in a highly detailed technical manner,” it can be read as negating the
application of equitable tolling. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350 (citations omitted). Moreover,
a longer filing deadline can cut against the presumption of equitable tolling. See, e.g.,
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 49 (1998) (holding that equitable tolling is
“incompatible” with an act that includes a “generous” 12-year limitations period).
Section 6213(a) does not have any textual indication cutting against equitable
tolling. No express language in the provision prevents equitable tolling from applying.
Further, § 6213(a) uses the permissive language that “the taxpayer may file a petition”
rather than more mandatory language like “shall.” I.R.C. § 6213(a) (emphasis added).
Compare Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204 (holding that equitable tolling applies to a deadline
that described what a taxpayer “may” do), with Enbridge Energy, 146 S. Ct. at 1082
(holding that the use of “shall” is consistent with a finding that equitable tolling does not
apply). Moreover, the filing deadline is “neither emphasized nor set out in a technical way.”
Culp, 75 F.4th at 203. Finally, the 90-day limit is relatively short, which does not indicate
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a “generous” limitations period that could negate a presumption in favor of equitable
tolling. Accordingly, the text supports the applicability of equitable tolling.
The structure of § 6213(a) is also consistent with a reading in favor of equitable
tolling. Generally, “the explicit listing of exceptions . . . indicate[s] . . . that Congress did
not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the
statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352. If “many of the specific exceptions reflect
equitable considerations,” then it “heightens [this] structural inference” against equitable
tolling. Arellano, 598 U.S. at 9. Here, none of the four relevant exceptions to § 6213(a)’s
deadline cut against the ordinary presumption in favor of tolling. 5 Specifically, as another
court of appeals has observed, these exceptions are “neither many (the [four] here are less
than the six in Brockamp or fifteen in Arellano), nor are they set our explicitly or ‘in a
highly detailed technical manner.” Culp, 75 F.4th at 203–04 (quoting Brockamp, U.S. at
350).
As in Boechler, § 6213(a)’s filing “deadline also appears in a section of the Tax
Code that is unusually protective of taxpayers and a scheme in which laymen, unassisted
by trained lawyers, often initiate the process.” 596 U.S. at 209 (quoting Auburn, 568 U.S.
5
The relevant exceptions are: First, a “Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
District of Columbia” cannot count as the “last day” of the filing period. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
Second, a petition “shall be treated as timely” if it is filed by the date listed on the notice
of deficiency itself—even if the listed date comes after the 90- or 150-day deadline. Id.
Third, the deadline pauses to allow for corrections to certain excise taxes. I.R.C. § 6213(e).
And fourth, the clock stops while a “debtor is prohibited” from filing a petition because of
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case “and for 60 days thereafter.” I.R.C. § 6213(f).
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at 160) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation all indicate that equitable tolling may apply to the § 6213(a) filing deadline.
We recognize that earlier this year the First Circuit reached a different conclusion
regarding the availability of equitable tolling. 6 In Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner,
the First Circuit concluded that § 6213(a)’s “filing deadline may not be equitably tolled”
because it has nine exceptions that already account for delineated equitable considerations.
188 F.4th at 58. 7
Although we ultimately do not find Kyick Holdings’ equitable tolling analysis
persuasive, we agree that four of the nine purported exceptions discussed in Kyick Holdings
are, in fact, exceptions relevant to our analysis of equitable tolling. Specifically, these are
the exceptions to the 90-day deadline when either the last day of the filing period is a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday in the District of Columbia, I.R.C. § 6213(a); the notice
6
The First Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to have reached the question of
equitable tolling and held that it does not apply. Four other circuits, however, have found
that equitable tolling does apply to § 6213(a)’s filing deadline. See Culp, 75 F.4th at 205
(3d Cir.); Oquendo, 148 F.4th at 833–34 (6th Cir.); Buller, 160 F.4th at 271 (2d Cir.);
Maniktala, 186 F.4th at 555 (8th Cir.).
7
These purported exceptions all appear in the Internal Revenue Code. They are (1)
§ 6213(a)’s 150-day deadline for taxpayers outside the United States; (2) § 6213(a)’s
clause not counting a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday as the last day of the filing period;
(3) § 6213(a)’s clause treating petitions as timely filed if filed by the date listed on the
notice; (4) § 6213(e)’s exception for certain excise taxes; (5) § 6213(f)’s exception for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases; (6) § 7451(b)(1)’s provision regarding inaccessible filing
locations; (7) § 7508(a)(1)(c)’s provision extending a deadline for service members in
combat zones or contingency operations; (8) § 7508A(a)(1)’s provision extending
deadlines for taxpayers in certain emergency situations; and (9) § 7502(a)’s provision
treating timely mailing as timely filing. See Kyick Holdings, 188 F.4th at 57–58.
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of deficiency lists a date later than the deadline, I.R.C. § 6213(a); the Secretary of the
Treasury is determining whether to correct certain excise taxes, I.R.C. § 6213(e); or a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case prohibits the petitioner from filing, I.R.C. § 6213(f). Each
exception explicitly affects the deadline in § 6213(a), so they are clearly exceptions
relevant to our present discussion. But, as explained above, these four exceptions are not
so numerous or highly technical as to disturb the ordinary presumption in favor of equitable
tolling.
But we disagree with Kyick Holdings’s additional equitable tolling analysis because
it sweeps up five purported “exceptions” that are simply irrelevant for our present purposes.
Indeed, one exception that the First Circuit identified in § 6213(a) is not really an
exception. The 150-day filing period in § 6213(a) does not extend the 90-day deadline;
rather, it is a separate deadline for taxpayers outside the United States for whom the 90-
day deadline would not apply anyway. See I.R.C. § 6213(a). But, more importantly,
Supreme Court precedent shows that the four exceptions outside § 6213 cited in Kyick
Holdings do not rebut the presumption in favor of equitable tolling. The tax provision at
issue in Boechler, I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1), was also subject to these four tolling provisions
outside § 6213 that the First Circuit cites. In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly
acknowledged “that the deadline [in Boechler was] already subject to tolling provisions
found elsewhere in the Tax Code—for example, tolling [was] available to taxpayers located
in a combat zone or disaster area.” 596 U.S. at 210. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found
that § 6330(d)(1) could be equitably tolled and that the existence of the other delineated
tolling provisions in the Tax Code would not overcome the presumption in favor of
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generally available equitable tolling, especially in light of the permissive, nontechnical
“language” of § 6330 or the “single” direct “exception” to § 6330. Id. (citation omitted).
We also find that Kyick Holdings’ treatment of its purported exceptions
unpersuasive for another reason. The First Circuit makes too much of Enbridge Energy, a
recent Supreme Court case holding that the deadline to remove civil cases to federal courts
in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) could not be tolled. See Kyick Holdings, 188 F.4th at 56–58.
Enbridge Energy involved at least six equitable exceptions which were either in § 1446(b)
itself or which “explicitly incorporate[d] § 1446(b)(1)’s time limit” modified “to allow
equitable, case-specific exceptions.” 146 S. Ct. at 1078. These exceptions, particularly the
ones which incorporate the time limit, “would be inexplicable and unnecessary if Congress
already understood § 1446(b)(1) to” allow “equitable tolling.” Id. In contrast, many of the
proffered exceptions cited in Kyick Holdings do not directly incorporate § 6213(a)’s
deadline, so they have less connection to the deadline than the exceptions noted in Enbridge
Energy had to § 1446(b)(1). Moreover, Enbridge Energy is distinguishable textually
because the provision at issue there included “strict, mandatory terms” like “shall,” which
bolstered the Supreme Court’s conclusion that equitable tolling did not apply. Enbridge
Energy, 146 S. Ct. at 1077 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). But, as explained above,
§ 6213(a) contains much more permissive language indicating that Congress did not intend
a fixed jurisdictional deadline.
For all of these reasons, we see Kyick Holdings as an outlier, and the decisions of
our sister circuits in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits as far more persuasive.
Therefore, we conclude that § 6213(a) allows for equitable tolling in appropriate cases. In
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holding that equitable tolling is available for petitioners who miss § 6213(a)’s deadline, we
offer no view on whether Laurenzano is entitled to any equitable relief in this case. That is
a question for the Tax Court on remand, Boechler, 596 U.S. at 211, to determine in the first
instance.
III.
The Tax Court erred in dismissing Laurenzano’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. As
we have explained, § 6213(a) does not divest the Tax Court of the power to hear an
untimely petition based on the 90-day deadline, and consequently the Tax Court also has
the authority to apply equitable tolling based on the facts of a particular case. For these
reasons, we vacate the decision of the Tax Court and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
VACATED AND
REMANDED
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