Full Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC2024-0922 ____________ THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, vs. OMAR MEDINA, JR., Respondent. October 29, 2026 PER CURIAM. We have for review a report of referee recommending that Respondent, Omar Medina, Jr., be found not guilty of misconduct. 1 We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to Respondent’s guilt. BACKGROUND On June 20, 2024, The Florida Bar filed a formal complaint against Respondent. The Bar alleged that Respondent failed to appear at a case management conference, ordered by the U.S. 1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, resulting in his client’s suit being dismissed. Respondent then filed a motion to vacate the dismissal and attached a signed affidavit. The Bar alleged that the motion and affidavit included statements that were knowingly false. The Bar argued that this conduct violated Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct), 4-3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal; lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer), and 4-8.4(a) (Misconduct; lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct). After conducting a hearing on guilt, the assigned referee found that the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made false statements to a tribunal and recommended that Respondent be found not guilty of the charged rule violations. The Bar now seeks review of the referee’s report, asking us to find Respondent guilty of violating the relevant Bar rules and to remand for a hearing on sanctions. Respondent asks -2- us to approve the report of referee in its entirety. We hereby approve the report. FINDINGS OF FACT The referee found that the disciplinary charges in this case center on statements in the second paragraph of the affidavit Respondent attached with his motion to vacate: The undersigned affiant failed to meet in the case management conference because I did not receive the appropriate notice of the hearing. Moreover, there was no communication received regarding the hearing. Counsel investigated why no notice was received and was able to determine that despite having notified the court and opposing counsel o[f] the appropriate email addresses inexplicably the clerk of this court sent notices to email addresses that do not exist and have not existed as part of the plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm for more than 10 years. Respondent made similar statements in the sixth paragraph of his motion to vacate, writing: Additionally undersigned counsel had properly notified the court and counsel of the appropriate email addresses to use however inexplicably the clerk of this court sent notices to email addresses that do not exist and have not existed as part of the plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm for more than 10 years. The Bar alleged that several statements in these passages violated rule 4-3.3(a)(1). In particular, the Bar objected to -3- Respondent asserting that he did not receive appropriate notice of the conference, that he had notified the court and opposing counsel of the appropriate email addresses, and that the clerk of court had “inexplicably” sent notice to email addresses that had not existed with Respondent’s firm for more than 10 years. Notably, Respondent also wrote: “The more significant importance is the fact that [Respondent] has had difficulty with the pacer system” (PACER being the federal court public records access and filing system) and learned after missing the conference that his PACER account had been deactivated for years. Respondent suggested that this problem was “one of the possible reasons” he missed the conference, offering no other possible reasons. The referee found that Respondent had mismanaged his PACER account and did not understand how the federal court filing system worked under the relevant local rules. Respondent believed that designations he had made in state court would be used by the federal court upon removal of the case. In accordance with the PACER handbook and local rules, the local district court clerk sent notice of the case management conference to three email addresses that Respondent listed in his PACER account many years earlier: -4- omedina@medinalawfirm.com; cgoldthwait@medinalawfirm.com; and imorfin@medinalawfirm.com. The referee found that the “omedina” address was still in use by Respondent at the time he filed his motion to vacate, that the “cgoldthwait” address had been inactive for more than 10 years, and that it was unclear from the evidence presented how long the “imorfin” address had been inactive. The referee explained that at the hearing on Respondent’s motion to vacate, the presiding district judge confronted Respondent about the fact that he was using one of the email addresses to which notice had been sent. Respondent said he never intended to blame the clerk of court and should have been clearer in his motion that while notice had been sent to the “omedina” address, neither he nor his staff ever saw any emails relating to the conference. He posited that the notice might have made it to his server but not to his inbox. He apologized and took the blame for mismanaging his emails and PACER account, saying he did not want to blame his staff because it was his responsibility. The referee found that Respondent’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing showed a lack of understanding as to the -5- manner in which federal courts notice litigants and counsel. The referee found that Respondent made appropriate email designations in state court and genuinely (though mistakenly) assumed the clerk of court would update its e-filing with the pleadings made in the state court system—an assumption that was inconsistent with the PACER handbook and local rules. The referee found that Respondent failed to update the clerk of court in a way that would ensure he received electronic filings and was negligent in maintaining his PACER account. However, the referee also found that Respondent’s negligence did not rise to the level of misconduct and his lack of comprehension of the federal filing system did not prove that he knowingly made false statements to the court. Notably, at one point during the disciplinary hearing, Bar counsel asked questions about when the “imorfin” address had last been used, and Respondent testified that Ms. Morfin may have worked for him as recently as 2022. However, later in the hearing, Respondent stated that he believed the earlier line of questioning had been about a different assistant, Ms. Bland, who worked for him more recently. Respondent testified that he did not know the -6- dates of Ms. Morfin’s employment. The referee found that the most recent active usage of the “imorfin” address had not been established. ANALYSIS In a Bar discipline case, a “referee’s findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.” Fla. Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Fla. 2005) (citation omitted). If the referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the referee. Fla. Bar v. Schwartz, 284 So. 3d 393, 396 (Fla. 2019). When reviewing a referee’s recommendations of guilt, the referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the recommendations. Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005). Ultimately, the party challenging a referee’s findings of fact or conclusions regarding guilt has the burden of showing “that there is no evidence in the record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions.” Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, -7- 620 (Fla. 2007). A party cannot meet this high burden “simply by pointing to contradictory evidence” when there is also competent, substantial evidence that supports the referee’s findings. Fla. Bar v. Glick, 693 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1997). Here, the Bar argues that the evidence introduced at the disciplinary hearing shows that Respondent violated rule 4-3.3(a)(1) and therefore violated rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(a), and it argues that the referee erred in finding otherwise. We find no clear error in the referee’s finding that the Bar failed to prove every element of the charged rule violations, particularly the “knowingly” element, by clear and convincing evidence. The Bar makes inferences of fact and points us to contradictory evidence in the record, but the referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and will not be reweighed. Notably, the referee identified only a single “untrue” statement in the motion and affidavit: Respondent’s assertion that the local federal clerk sent notice to email addresses (plural) that did not exist and had not existed as part of his law firm for more than 10 years. From the evidence and testimony presented at the disciplinary hearing, the referee found that only the “cgoldthwait” -8- address had been inactive for more than 10 years. The “imorfin” address was found to have been inactive for an unknown period of time, and the “omedina” address was still being used. However, while Respondent’s statement was incorrect, the referee found that the Bar failed to prove that Respondent knew he was making an untrue statement at the time. We approve this finding. The Bar relies on Florida Bar v. Grieco, 389 So. 3d 1257, 1262 (Fla. 2024), for the proposition that to prove the knowingly element, the Bar need only show that the lawyer deliberately engaged in the activity in question. The Bar argues that Respondent’s “activity” was knowingly typing words into his motion and affidavit and then knowingly filing those documents. The Bar contends that it did not have to prove that Respondent knew his statements were false at the time he wrote and filed the motion. The Bar’s interpretation of this element is contrary to our case law. In Florida Bar v. Miller, 863 So. 2d 231, 234 (Fla. 2003), we explained that the record evidence showed that “Miller intentionally deceived the federal court,” and we pointed to evidence in the record showing that Miller knew his statements were untrue at the time they were made. -9- The Bar’s reliance on Grieco is also misplaced, for in Grieco, we declared that “competent, substantial evidence in the record supports the referee’s finding that Grieco deliberately engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct by making repeated false or misleading statements.” 389 So. 3d at 1264. We emphasized that our holding was based on the referee’s findings about Grieco’s “shifting narrative” and efforts to deliberately mislead, particularly the referee’s finding that “on more than one occasion, Grieco intentionally deceived or misled the public.” Id. Here, the referee found the opposite, finding that Respondent never intended to mislead the federal court. And we reiterate—the Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the charged lawyer knew he or she was making false statements at the time the statements were made. However, even if the Bar were operating under the correct standard, we must still assess whether the referee erred in finding that the Bar failed to prove that Respondent knew he was making false statements to the court. The Bar claims Respondent knowingly made a false statement by stating that the clerk “sent notices to email addresses that do not exist and have not existed as - 10 - part of the plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm for more than 10 years.” The Bar argues that if only a single email address was inactive for more than 10 years, then Respondent’s statement about multiple inactive email addresses being noticed was a false statement. The Bar acknowledges that the “cgoldthwait” email address was inactive for over 10 years, but it argues that the “omedina” address was never inactive, and it points to testimony elicited at the disciplinary hearing in which Respondent suggested that the “imorfin” email address could have been used by a former assistant, Ms. Morfin, within the past 10 years. As stated above, pointing to contradictory evidence will not establish clear error when there is also record evidence in support of the referee’s findings. Here, Respondent testified that he thought Bar counsel’s questions about Ms. Morfin had been referring to a different assistant who worked for him more recently. Bar counsel did not definitively pin down when the “imorfin” address was last active, and, more importantly, Bar counsel failed to elicit that Respondent knew, at the time he filed his motion, that the “imorfin” address had been active more recently than he suggested in his motion and affidavit. - 11 - The Bar’s next argument concerns Respondent’s remark about the clerk “inexplicably” sending notice to inactive email addresses. The Bar contends that this statement can only be interpreted as Respondent blaming the clerk of court when he knew that his own negligence was to blame for missing the conference. Notably, the referee wrestled with this issue, declaring that he considered the “inexplicably” statement for three days before ultimately finding that it was just a statement. While the clerk’s actions were certainly not “inexplicable” with an understanding of the PACER system and local rules, given Respondent’s lack of understanding of the federal system (as found by the referee), Respondent may well have been sincerely confused by the clerk’s actions given the information he had at the time. Moreover, shortly after stating that the clerk “inexplicably” sent notice to inactive email addresses, Respondent wrote “[t]he more significant importance is the fact that [Respondent] has had difficulty with the pacer system” and stated that he learned after missing the conference that his PACER account had been deactivated for years. Respondent suggested that this problem was “one of the possible reasons” he missed the conference, and he - 12 - offered no other possible reasons. Thus, while the Bar insists that the only interpretation of Respondent’s “inexplicably” remark is that he was blaming the clerk of court for his own failure to appear at the conference, Respondent immediately offered an explanation for his failure to attend, and that explanation assigned the blame to himself. We therefore find no error in the referee’s finding that the “inexplicably” remark was just a statement—more specifically, an expression that Respondent could not explain at that time why outdated email addresses had been used to notice the conference. Next, the Bar argues that in his motion to vacate, Respondent accused opposing counsel of engaging in fraud on the court. The Bar interprets this as Respondent falsely blaming opposing counsel for his own failure to attend the case management conference. But Respondent’s fraud on the court assertion was part of an argument made early in his motion on why he believed the case should not have been removed to federal court in the first place. His “fraud on the court” statement was not even referring to the missed case management conference, let alone blaming opposing counsel for his absence at that conference. - 13 - The Bar’s next argument is that Respondent knowingly made a false statement when he said that he “properly notified the court and counsel of the appropriate email addresses to use.” The referee found that Respondent “did update the Clerk of Court of his address; just not in a way that would ensure he would receive electronic filings.” This finding is supported by Respondent’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing. When questioned about his statement on properly notifying the court of the appropriate email addresses, Respondent answered: “I did. My understanding is, as [opposing counsel] testified, that the whole file was copied, including my email designations that were the active emails . . . .” Thus, though Respondent had not in fact “properly notified the court” of the correct email addresses, testimony in the record supports the referee’s finding that Respondent sincerely believed, at the time he filed his motion to vacate, that the designations he made in state court had been transmitted with the case upon removal to the federal system. Therefore, we find no error in the referee’s finding that the Bar failed to show that Respondent knowingly made a false statement when he asserted that he had properly notified the court of the correct email addresses. - 14 - Finally, the Bar argues that the referee clearly erred in concluding that no competent, substantial evidence was presented showing that Respondent received any PACER filings. Because the referee was referring to actual notice, we find no clear error in the referee’s determination. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the referee’s findings of fact are supported by evidence in the record. Because the referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and because the referee’s legal conclusions and recommendations drawn from the findings of fact are not clearly contradicted by the record evidence, we approve the report of referee and find Respondent not guilty of violating rules 3-4.3, 4-3.3(a)(1), and 4-8.4(a). Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Respondent, Omar Medina, Jr. It is so ordered. COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, BARRIOS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar - 15 - Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, and Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Complainant Donald A. Smith, Jr. of Smith, Tozian, Daniel & Davis, P.A., Tampa, Florida; and David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte, Gilbert, McNamara & Caldevilla, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Respondent - 16 -