Svyatoslav Mangushev v. Alpha Team, LLC
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
Date FiledOctober 29, 2026
DocketSC2025-1262
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Florida
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2026
Svyatoslav Mangushev, SC2025-1262
Petitioner(s) Lower Tribunal No(s).:
v. 4D2025-2201;
062017CA000351AXXXCE
Alpha Team, LLC,
Respondent(s)
The “Petition for Writ of Certiorari” is hereby treated as a
petition to invoke all writs jurisdiction and is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because Petitioner has failed to cite an independent
basis that would allow the Court to exercise its all writs authority,
and no such basis is apparent on the face of the petition. See
Williams v. State, 913 So. 2d 541, 543-44 (Fla. 2005); St. Paul Title
Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 1980).
No motion for rehearing will be considered by this Court.
COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
BARRIOS, J., concurs in result.
TANENBAUM, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
TANENBAUM, J., concurring in result.
The petitioner seeks review of a final order. This court initially
CASE NO.: SC2025-1262
Page Two
treated his petition for certiorari properly as a notice to invoke this
court’s review jurisdiction. We clearly do not have jurisdiction, and
we could dismiss on that basis alone. See Art. V, § 3(b), Fla. Const.
(setting out various bases on which we can exercise discretionary
review jurisdiction). Simple and easy.
So it is bewildering that the court would go through the
academic exercise of then treating the petition as one invoking “all
writs jurisdiction,” only to state that no basis for doing so appears
on the face of the petition. There are two problems with this
approach.
Most importantly, there is no such thing as “all writs
jurisdiction” at all, and it makes no sense to re-characterize the
petition as invoking such non-existent jurisdiction. The Florida
Constitution authorizes this court to issue, among other things, “all
writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” Art. V,
§ 3(b)(7), Fla. Const. (emphasis supplied). This means that the
court must first have a basis under section 3(b)(1) through (6) to
exercise jurisdiction, and if it does, then it may issue one or more
CASE NO.: SC2025-1262
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specified writs necessary to preserve that jurisdiction. Again,
nothing in section 3(b)(1) through (6) provides the necessary
underlying authority to permit the review the petitioner is seeking
here, so there is no jurisdiction to be preserved. That should be the
end of the matter.
Additionally, there is no separate bag of remedies called “all
writs” available for the asking. Unless the petitioner is seeking one
of the four prerogative writs listed in section 3(b) (e.g., mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto, or habeas)—and he is not—it is
incumbent on the petitioner to specify the one of over a hundred
common-law writs historically available in England that he is
seeking to preserve this court’s otherwise extant jurisdiction. See
Antiquities of the Law, 1 ALB. L.J. 247, 247 (1870) (listing and
describing many such writs). The petitioner here asks for certiorari
review. A writ of certiorari is one of those many ancient writs that
we could issue under the proper circumstances (viz.: when
necessary to review a non-final order causing irreparable harm in a
matter where we will have direct appellate jurisdiction over the
CASE NO.: SC2025-1262
Page Four
eventual final order). Those circumstances, however, are not
present in this case.
Dismissal, of course, is the proper disposition. The order
dismissing this cause, however, does more work than is necessary—
in a constitutionally inaccurate way and in pursuit of no apparent
meaningful end.
A True Copy
Test:
SC2025-1262 10/29/2026
SC2025-1262 10/29/2026
CD
Served:
GEORGE LAMBERT
JOHN HENRY PELZER
4DCA CLERK
BROWARD CLERK
HON. KEATHAN BRISCOE FRINK