Richard E. Kelly v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMarch 10, 2021
Docket1D20-2551
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D20-2551
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RICHARD E. KELLY,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Mark W. Moseley, Judge.
March 10, 2021
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
KELSEY and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur; B.L. THOMAS, J., concurs
with opinion.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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B.L. THOMAS, J., concurring.
Richard E. Kelly appeals the denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion
to correct illegal sentence.
In 1987, Kelly was convicted and sentenced on three counts of
sexual battery (using slight force) and one count of kidnapping. His
sentence included imprisonment for a term of natural life on the
kidnapping charge. This Court affirmed the judgment and
sentence on March 9, 1988. See Kelly v. State, 522 So. 2d 389 (Fla.
1st DCA 1988).
Prior to his instant appeal, Kelly filed the following appeals
and petitions with this Court—none of which resulted in the
granting of relief: 1D91-1725 & 1D93-2225 (postconviction
appeals–unknown type), 1D97-1000 (rule 3.850 appeal), 1D03-
1011 (petition for writ of prohibition), 1D04-4255 (rule 3.800
appeal), and 1D13-1581 (rule 3.800 appeal).
On July 28, 2020, Kelly filed the instant motion, challenging
the legality of his life sentence on the kidnapping charge. He
asserted that his sentencing guidelines scoresheet was in error.
Kelly argued that the prior felony convictions listed on the
scoresheet were from September 14, 1973, at which time “Florida's
Burglary, Sexual Battery, Robbery and Assault Statutes did not
divide Florida statutes by degrees.” He claimed that, because the
degrees of these offenses were ambiguous, pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(5), they should have been
scored as third-degree felonies. Kelly concluded that once his
scoresheet is properly calculated, the total score would be 386
points, with a sentencing range of between 17 and 22 years.
On August 13, 2020, the lower court summarily denied the
motion. Citing to Harris v. State, 674 So. 2d 110, 111 n.1 (Fla.
1996), the court indicated that felonies in Florida were first
classified by degrees beginning January 1, 1972. It also reasoned
that when a prior offense is not classified by degree, it can be
scored by reference to the more current, analogous statute. The
court found the scoresheet was not miscalculated. It also found
that, even if it were recalculated to bring the sentencing range
below life imprisonment, “the sentencing court could still have
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imposed an upward departure sentence of life imprisonment based
on Defendant's escalating pattern of criminal conduct, which it
appeared inclined to do.”
The lower court correctly denied relief. For a motion filed
under rule 3.800(a) more than two years after the conviction
became final, any scoresheet error is harmless if the trial court
could have imposed the same sentence using a corrected
scoresheet. See Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 243 (Fla. 2007).
Kelly asserts his prior felonies took place before Florida began
classifying them by degrees. The Florida Supreme Court has
provided the following guidance on how to handle this type of
situation: “Just as a court is directed to score federal and out-of-
state convictions by reference to the analogous or parallel Florida
statute, a trial court should similarly score a Florida conviction
received before crimes were classified by degrees.” Harris, 674 So.
2d at 112.
Appellant’s scoresheet included prior record points for three
life felonies, three first-degree felonies punishable by life, one
second-degree felony, three third-degree felonies, and two
misdemeanors. (R. 48.) The lower court attached documentation
regarding seven of the prior convictions—three for rape (73-2120,
73-2396, and 73-2667), three for robbery (73-2119, 73-2149, and
73-2392), and one for assault with intent to commit first-degree
murder (73-2121). Kelly received concurrent sentences in those
cases, resulting in a total punishment of 25 years’ imprisonment.
He contests the points allocated for the rape and robbery offenses
but does not contest any of the other items on the scoresheet.
Under section 794.011(5)(c), Florida Statutes, the least serious
form of sexual battery is a second-degree felony. Thus, at the least,
each rape conviction could be scored as a second-degree felony.
Under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, the least serious form
of robbery is a second-degree felony. Thus, at the least, each
robbery conviction could be scored as a second-degree felony. After
recalculating the scoresheet in accordance with the above—seven
second-degree felonies, three third-degree felonies, and two
misdemeanors—Appellant’s point total would be 524, with a
recommended range of life.
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As a result, even with a corrected scoresheet, the trial court
could still have imposed the same sentence, and any error in this
regard was harmless. See Brooks, 969 So. 2d at 243.
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Richard E. Kelly, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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