Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-2792 _____________________________ DEONSEY LONTE JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Lacey Powell Clark, Judge. April 21, 2020 B.L. THOMAS, J. Appellant challenges the lower court’s denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence. We affirm. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of burglary of a dwelling while armed, armed robbery with a firearm, and simple robbery. The trial court sentenced Appellant, as a prison releasee reoffender, to life in prison, with a mandatory minimum of life, on the burglary and armed robbery counts, and to 15 years in prison, with a 15-year mandatory minimum term, on the simple robbery count. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment and sentence and issued a mandate in 2008. On March 28, 2018, Appellant filed the instant motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Appellant argued that the mandatory minimum term imposed on count 3 was illegal because it was not orally announced. The lower court denied the motion, finding that the sentencing transcript clearly showed that the trial court orally announced a sentence of 15 years, which was both the minimum and maximum under the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute. On appeal, Appellant again argues that the mandatory minimum term on count 3 is illegal because it was not orally announced and that the court could not later impose the term outside of the presence of Appellant and his counsel. We affirm because the record refutes Appellant’s claim. Florida courts have held that, where the oral pronouncement is ambiguous but the record clearly shows the trial court’s intent, the proper sentence is what the judge intended it to be. See Henry v. State, 930 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“However, even if we were to find the oral pronouncement ambiguous, the trial judge’s intent controls.”); State v. Harris, 129 So. 3d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“Florida law is clear that when the trial judge’s oral pronouncement of a sentence is ambiguous, but the judge’s intention is discernible from the record, the proper sentence is what the judge intended the sentence to be.” (citing Jackson v. State, 615 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)). The sentencing transcript shows that Appellant qualified and was being sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. Appellant’s trial counsel stated that the court’s hands were tied because of Appellant’s status. The court also noted that it was required to impose the 15-year term. Further, in discussing another issue, the court later stated that count 3 was a prison releasee reoffender sentence. Thus, the transcript clearly shows that the court intended to orally impose the 15-year term as both the primary sentence and as the mandatory minimum term due to Appellant’s status as a prison releasee reoffender. Accordingly, Appellant’s sentence is legal, and the lower court properly denied the motion. This Court’s records reflect that, in addition to this case, Appellant has filed at least seven prior postconviction petitions and appeals in this Court related to Escambia County Circuit 2 Court case number 2005-CF-5751B: 1D10-1463, 1D10-4480, 1D10- 3603, 1D12-3648, 1D14-0029, 1D14-5715, 1D16-4179. These cases reveal a history of filing frivolous postconviction motions and petitions. Appellant has not obtained relief in any of these cases, and his current appeal is frivolous. The courts have a responsibility to ensure every citizen’s right of access to the courts. See Peterson v. State, 817 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 2002); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”) Allowing unlimited frivolous filings burdens the public and the victims who have an entitlement to finality. See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980) (“An absence of finality casts a cloud of tentativeness over the criminal justice system, benefiting neither the person convicted nor society as a whole.”). Because frivolous motions and petitions use limited judicial resources, placing an unnecessary burden on the courts and the public, a bar on pro-se filing is sometimes required for the “protection of the rights of others to have the Court conduct timely reviews of their legitimate filings.” Pettway v. McNeil, 987 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 2008); see also Peterson, 817 So. 2d at 840 (“This Court has a responsibility to ensure every citizen’s right of access to the courts . . . A limitation on [the petitioner’s] ability to file would further the constitutional right to access for other litigants because it would permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims filed by others.”). Accordingly, pursuant to State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999), Appellant shall show cause within 20 days of the date of this opinion why he should not be barred from filing further pro-se filings in this Court related to the judgment and sentence in Escambia County Circuit Court case number 2005-CF-5751B. Appellant is advised that the failure to comply with the terms of this opinion within the time allowed may result in the imposition of sanctions without further opportunity to be heard. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.410. 3 We also direct the Clerk of the Court to provide a certified copy of this order to the Florida Department of Corrections to be forwarded to the appropriate institution or facility for disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department as provided in section 944.279, Florida Statutes (2019). We need not give Appellant an opportunity to respond before imposing sanctions under section 944.279, Florida Statutes (2019). Flowers v. State, 278 So. 3d 899, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“Conversely, a court can refer an inmate to the DOC for disciplinary proceedings under section 944.279 based on frivolous court filings without giving him notice or an opportunity to respond.”). AFFIRMED. LEWIS and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Deonsey Lonte Johnson, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 4