Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-0434 _____________________________ STEVEN FRANCIS D’AMICO, Appellant, v. MARVIN CLEMMONS, et al., Appellees. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Ronald W. Flury, Judge. June 11, 2020 SALVADOR, TATIANA R., ASSOCIATE JUDGE. Steven Francis D’Amico appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of mandamus challenging a prison disciplinary report. Mr. D’Amico claims that the dismissal inappropriately denied him access to court as guaranteed under the First Amendment and procedural due process. Additionally, Mr. D’Amico asserts that the dismissal of the petition was inappropriate under the doctrine of equitable tolling. We find that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and therefore affirm the order entered below. I. Appellant is an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections. On September 12, 2016, Appellant received a prison disciplinary report (DR) for inciting riots. Following a hearing on the DR, he was found guilty of the disciplinary infraction and was ordered to 60 days’ confinement and the loss of gain time. Appellant exhausted his administrative remedies on October 7, 2016. After completing the administrative grievance process, Appellant filed his petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court on December 2, 2016, attacking the DR hearing evidence and process. Finding that Appellant filed his petition beyond the 30- day jurisdictional deadline, thus divesting the court of jurisdiction to address Appellant’s claims, the trial judge entered an order dismissing the petition. It is from this order that Appellant now appeals. II. This Court reviews a trial court’s determination of jurisdiction de novo. Spatcher v. State, 228 So. 3d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Actions challenging prison disciplinary proceedings must be initiated within 30 days of when the order becomes final. § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. “This time period is jurisdictional and, thus, a mandamus petition filed more than 30 days after the final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding must be dismissed.” Whitfield v. Dep’t of Corrections, 107 So. 3d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (emphasis added). Since Appellant failed to comply with the requirement that he commence an action challenging a disciplinary proceeding in court within 30 days after the final administrative disposition, his petition was properly dismissed, and the merits not considered. See Higueras v. Crosby, 924 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“Because the petition was not filed within 30 days of rendition of the order sought to be reviewed, this court’s jurisdiction was not timely invoked and the petition must be . . . dismissed on jurisdictional grounds”). Nonetheless, Appellant asserts that due to various equitable considerations he should have been allowed to file the petition late. The instances in which a time limit under section 95.11, Florida Statutes, can be tolled are expressly delineated in an exhaustive list found in section 95.051. Appellant’s claims do not fall under any of the listed exceptions. Therefore, the time to file Appellant’s 2 petition challenging a DR can neither be tolled nor extended. See § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (“A disability or other reason does not toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, s. 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law.”). Because the 30-day time limit within which to file his petition is jurisdictional, Appellant’s equitable tolling arguments must fail. See, e.g., Dep’t of Corrections v. Chesnut, 894 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (equitable tolling may be used to extend deadlines that are not jurisdictional). Thus, the court correctly dismissed Appellant’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. III. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the trial court dismissing Appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus. KELSEY and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Steven Francis D’Amico, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kristen J. Lonergan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees. 3