Steven Francis D'Amico v. Robert Connor, Warden
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledFebruary 22, 2021
Docket1D20-1253
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
____________________________
NO. 1D20-1253
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STEVEN FRANCIS D’AMICO,
Appellant,
v.
ROBERT CONNOR, Warden,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Liberty County.
David M. Frank, Judge.
February 22, 2021
LONG, J.
The trial court dismissed D’Amico’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The petition challenged the legality of his
conviction. He is incarcerated in Liberty County. He petitioned in
Liberty County rather than in Broward County where he was
adjudicated and sentenced. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus
should normally be filed in the county of the petitioner’s detention.
Coakley v. State, 43 So. 3d 790, 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). But if the
petition attacks the validity of a judgment or sentence, the court
that entered the judgment and imposed the sentence has
jurisdiction. Torres v. State, 208 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Dismissal, rather than transfer, of petitions is proper if they
seek:
the kind of collateral postconviction relief available
through a motion filed in the sentencing court, and which
(1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for
postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise claims
that could have been raised at trial or, if properly
preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence,
or (3) would be considered a second or successive motion
under rule 3.850 that either fails to allege new or
different grounds for relief that were known or should
have been known at the time the first motion was filed.
Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245−46 (Fla. 2004). Though his
petition is meritless, D’Amico’s claim sought the type of relief
available through a postconviction motion in the sentencing court.
Transfer to the sentencing court was not appropriate because, if
considered as a motion for postconviction relief, the petition would
be untimely, successive, and raise claims that could have been
raised at trial or on direct appeal—any one of which would be
sufficient for dismissal. It was, therefore, properly dismissed by
the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
ROWE and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Steven Francis D’Amico, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daniel R. Burke, Assistant
General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for
Appellee.
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