Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed August 26, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ Nos. 3D24-1690 & 3D24-1934 Lower Tribunal Nos. F85-27788, F88-18402 & 04-21999-CA-01 ________________ Aaron Shaw, Petitioner/Appellant, vs. State of Florida, Respondent/Appellee. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami- Dade County, Laura Shearon Cruz and Lourdes Simon, Judges. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Shearon Cruz and Lourdes Simon, Judges. Aaron Shaw, in proper person. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg and David Llanes, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent/appellee. Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM. Aaron Shaw challenges, both via appeal (case number 3D24-1934) and certiorari (case number 3D24-1690), an October 17, 2024 trial court order that found Shaw had failed to establish probable cause that Shaw's condition had changed such that it would be safe to discharge Shaw from his civil commitment under Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act (the "Act").1 Without further elaboration, we dismiss Shaw's certiorari petition for lack of jurisdiction.2 Further, because Shaw was afforded due process and because the trial court's order is supported by competent, substantial evidence, we affirm the appealed order. 1 Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act, also known as Florida's "Sexually Violent Predator Act" provides, among other things, that certain convicted sexual predators remain civilly committed until rehabilitation is proven. Chapter 394, Part V affords a detainee with a limited hearing to establish whether there is probable cause that a change in condition renders him safe to be released. § 394.918(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). 2 We lack certiorari jurisdiction to review a challenged order when the alleged harm caused by the order can be remedied on plenary appeal. Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998); DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass'n, 313 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (dismissing a petition for writ of certiorari and finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant certiorari relief, as the petitioners did not suffer a harm that could not be remedied on appeal). Orders, such as the instant one finding no probable cause under section 394.918(3), are reviewable by appeal and not by certiorari. See Gelish v. State, 394 So. 3d 114, 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). 2 I. Relevant Background From the limited record, it appears that Shaw was originally charged with sexual battery, coerced by threat, in October 1985. Although it is not clear, it appears Shaw was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. After he was released, he re-offended in June 1988, when he was charged with and convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and kidnapping. Thereafter, while incarcerated, Shaw was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer in September 1988. The victim was a corrections officer whom Shaw grabbed and attempted to fondle. The record is replete with instances of violence by Shaw during his incarceration. In 1992, he again assaulted a corrections officer, this time with a mop wringer. The record shows that Shaw was charged multiple times throughout his incarceration in connection with separate incidents of: biting a staff member, kicking a staff member, and placing his hands around a staff member’s neck. The record also shows that, at some point, Shaw was found with an eighteen-inch, homemade knife. This list is not exclusive. On Shaw’s release from prison, the State filed an involuntary civil commitment petition pursuant to the Act. The civil commitment proceedings were then set for trial. The court determined that Shaw was a sexually violent predator pursuant to section 394.917 of the Act, and Shaw was civilly 3 committed to the Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”) on May 5, 2008. He has remained committed since that time, although his commitment has been interrupted several times for re-incarceration for new criminal convictions. Shaw was re-admitted to FCCC in 2020. Pursuant to section 394.918(1) of the Act, Shaw's status is reviewed annually. Shaw may petition the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing limited to determining whether Shaw has established probable cause that his condition has so changed he is safe to be discharged.3 For this purpose, Dr. Melanie Mercado conducted an evaluation on April 30, 2024, examining Shaw’s long record and history. Shaw declined to be present and/or be interviewed for purposes of the evaluation. Mercado’s report covered the period spanning April 1, 2022, to May 4, 2023, and relied on two previous Sexually Violent Predator evaluation reports (both from 2004) from two previous doctors, Department of Children and Families’ records, and FCCC Clinical and Administrative Records. The report outlined Shaw’s pattern of poor attendance and refusal to participate in treatment programs. Of note, Dr. Mercado stated, along with a detailed list: 3 “If the court finds probable cause on the safety and re-offending issues [following the hearing], the court conducts a bench trial to determine the individual's entitlement to release.” Abaunza v. State, 278 So. 3d 207, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); see § 394.918(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). 4 During this review period, Mr. Shaw continued to struggle with resistance to rules and supervision. This was evidenced by incurring multiple Behavioral Management Reports (BMRs) and noncompliance with recommendations included in his Integrated Care Plan (ICP). . . . Mr. Shaw incurred a total of 20 [BMRs] during the review period. All of the 20 BMRs received were substantiated. Ultimately, Dr. Mercado concluded that Shaw needs further treatment to avoid reoffending if released. Shaw was notified of his right to petition for release on April 30, 2024, along with notice of the probable cause hearing and Shaw’s right to be represented by counsel at the hearing. In preparation for the probable cause hearing, another medical professional, Dr. Amy Swan, was appointed by the trial court to examine Shaw. This time, Shaw cooperated and participated. Dr. Swan’s report contains a detailed and comprehensive timeline of Shaw’s convictions, actions, and dangerous behavior. Relying on Shaw’s history, the twenty BMRs, and Dr. Swan’s interview with Shaw, Dr. Swan concluded that Shaw remains an “extremely dangerous sexual predator” who, “without a doubt, continues to meet criteria” and “[i]f he is released into the community, his propensity to commit acts of violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.” She described Shaw as having an “extremely psychopathic” indifference while still denying his actions in the 5 face of abundant and substantiated evidence. In her view, his conduct is consistent and unlikely to change, resulting in a high risk if ever released. On October 17, 2024, the trial court held a chapter 394 probable cause hearing. Shaw attended via the Zoom platform. At the commencement of the proceedings, there was a delay as Shaw announced that he was in a “suicide cell” with no clothes on, in a restrictive smock, and without his legal documents. The hearing recessed for a little over half an hour to allow Shaw to put on clothes and obtain his legal papers. Thereafter, Shaw objected to the hearing stating he had a pending motion and a right to have a doctor present to support his defense. The trial court disagreed, stating that section 394.918(1) entitled Shaw to an examination, of which he had two, and provided a method for requesting another person to evaluate him, which the court may appoint. Following Shaw’s objection, the hearing continued, and the trial court gave Shaw the opportunity to present evidence that his condition had changed, in response to which he abruptly logged off. The trial court then gave Shaw over ten minutes to sign back on and, after receiving confirmation from the center that Shaw had intentionally logged off, the trial court concluded the hearing, allowed the State to submit a proposed order based on the evidence, and found that Shaw had an opportunity to be heard. 6 In its order, dated October 17, 2024, the trial court found that, “[u]pon the Court’s consideration of the April 30, 2024, treatment report and Dr. Swan’s September 16, 2024, evaluation report, and the Respondent presenting no evidence that his condition has changed so that he is safe for release,” Shaw continues to meet the criteria for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator pursuant to sections 394.910-394.931, Florida Statutes. Shaw timely appealed the order. II. Analysis A. Due Process4 We first address Shaw's multiple, conclusory claims that he was denied due process. We conclude that Shaw was not deprived of due process because (i) he was provided with the statutorily required notice of his right to request a probable cause hearing, and (ii) at the probable cause hearing, Shaw was provided with an opportunity to be heard. A & S Ent., LLC v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 282 So. 3d 905, 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“[W]here a government entity provides notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, satisfying the requirements of procedural due process, a defendant's 4 We review de novo a due process challenge. Alan v. West, 420 So. 3d 566, 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). 7 voluntary failure to meaningfully participate in those proceedings will not vitiate the protections accorded.”). B. Competent Substantial Evidence5 The record in this case supports the trial court’s findings. The trial court relied on ample evidence, including two expert reports by Doctors Swan and Mercado, coupled with Shaw’s failure to present any evidence to the contrary. Nothing in the record suggests probable cause exists that Shaw’s condition has changed. In sum, both experts deemed him to be a sexually violent predator based on, among other things, twenty BMRs that mirrored the behavior and the findings of previous professionals who had access to Shaw in the more than sixteen years he has been committed. Critically, Dr. Swan’s findings are based on an actual interview with Shaw in which he continues, to this day, to deny all accusations – claiming all are lies. Against a considerable amount of contrary evidence, Shaw’s only support in favor of release amounted to statements that he is impotent, including a seven-page, self-serving missive. The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Shaw should be 5 We review a trial court’s no probable cause findings under section 394.918(3) to determine whether the order's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Gelish v. State, 394 So. 3d 114, 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (citing Abaunza, 278 So. 3d at 210). 8 released and the trial court’s order was supported by competent and substantial evidence. See Abaunza, 278 So. 3d at 210. III. Conclusion We conclude that Shaw, having been accorded both notice and an opportunity to be heard, was not deprived of his right to due process. The trial court’s findings are supported by ample competent, substantial record evidence. Affirmed. 9