Shuron Hester v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledFebruary 4, 2021
Docket1D19-1604
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D19-1604
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SHURON HESTER,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Lester Bass, Judge.
February 4, 2021
PER CURIAM.
The appellant appeals from a March 2019 trial court order
prohibiting him from filing further pro se pleadings. We affirm the
order on appeal.
We previously affirmed the appellant’s convictions for capital
sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. See Hester v.
State, 149 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The appellant proceeded
to file six more appeals in this court, none of which had merit. The
trial court, meanwhile, repeatedly had warned the appellant
against additional frivolous filings. The trial court later dismissed
another of the appellant’s postconviction motions, and in its order,
the trial court directed the appellant to show cause why sanctions
should not be imposed. The appellant responded to the show cause
order and appealed the dismissal of his latest postconviction
motion at the same time. A month later, the trial court rendered
the sanction order now on review.
The appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the order because his appeal of a previous order was pending
at the time. It is true that “[w]hen the jurisdiction of the appellate
court attaches, it is exclusive as to the subject covered by the
appeal.” Willey v. W.J. Hoggson Corp., 105 So. 126, 128 (Fla. 1925).
Conversely, though, that jurisdiction is not exclusive as to those
matters not covered by the appeal. See Crichlow v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of U.S., 152 So. 849, 850 (Fla. 1933) (rejecting
argument that lower court loses jurisdiction over matters not
“covered by the appeal”); Schultz v. Schickedanz, 884 So. 2d 422,
414 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“[A] trial court is divested of jurisdiction
upon notice of appeal except with regard to those matters which do
not interfere with the power and authority of the appellate court
or the rights of a party to the appeal which are under consideration
by the appellate court.” (quoting Palma Sola Harbour Condo., Inc.
v. Huber, 374 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)).
Courts have “the inherent authority to limit abuses of the
judicial process by pro se litigants whose frivolous or excessive
filings interfere with the timely administration of justice.” Flowers
v. State, 278 So. 3d 899, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); cf. Attwood v.
Singletary, 661 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 1995). Such a matter is
“independent and collateral,” and the trial court did not lose
jurisdiction to address its outstanding show-cause order simply
because the appellant had already appealed the denial of his
postconviction motion. Cf. Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651
So. 2d 701, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (noting that a trial court
retains jurisdiction to consider sanctions for discovery abuses and
violations of court orders because such a matter is “independent
and collateral”).
As to the merits of the order on appeal, in 2017, the trial court
cautioned the appellant that continued successive pro se filings
could subject him to sanctions. The appellant was clearly on notice
that he could not file successive or frivolous claims, yet he
continued to do so. The appellant failed to show the trial court
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acted outside of its discretion to prohibit future pro se filings. See
Edwards v. State, 192 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (affirming
trial court order prohibiting appellant from future pro se filings
where appellant failed to provide any grounds to find his multitude
of filings were not an abuse of process and a waste of judicial
resources).
AFFIRMED. The Court warns the appellant that any of his
future filings that it determines to be frivolous may result in the
imposition of sanctions, including a prohibition against any
further pro se filings in this Court and a referral to the appropriate
institution for disciplinary procedures as provided in section
944.279, Florida Statutes (2019).
ROBERTS, NORDBY, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Shuron Hester, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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