Black Knight Servicing Technologies, LLC v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJanuary 6, 2021
Docket1D20-1492
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D20-1492
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BLACK KNIGHT SERVICING
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES,
LLC,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Virginia Norton, Judge.
January 6, 2021
LONG, J.
Black Knight appeals the trial court’s order compelling
arbitration. Black Knight argues PennyMac waived its right to
arbitration when, after Black Knight sued PennyMac in Florida
state court for breach of contract, PennyMac responded by suing
Black Knight’s parent company in a California federal court. The
lawsuit was carefully worded and does not mention PennyMac’s
contractual relationship with Black Knight. While the only action
taken by PennyMac in the state court proceedings was to compel
arbitration, Black Knight argues the federal lawsuit constitutes a
waiver of PennyMac’s contractual right to arbitrate. We disagree
and affirm. Both arbitration and contract law compel this result.
“The general definition of waiver, namely ‘the voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a known right or conduct which
implies the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known
right,’ applies to the right to arbitrate.” Pearson v. Peoples Nat’l
Bank, 116 So. 3d 1283, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting
Raymond James Fin. Services, Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So. 2d 707,
711 (Fla. 2005)). “[The] party arguing waiver of arbitration bears
a heavy burden of proof.” Eden Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Eden III, Inc.,
840 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Miami Dolphins,
Ltd. v. Cowan, 601 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)).
“All doubts regarding waiver should be construed in favor of
arbitration rather than against it.” Marine Envtl. Partners, Inc. v.
Johnson, 863 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also Qubty
v. Nagda, 817 So. 2d 952, 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (same); Zager
Plumbing, Inc. v. JPI Nat. Const., Inc., 785 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla.
3d DCA 2001) (same); K.P. Meiring Const., Inc. v. Northbay I & E,
Inc., 761 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (same). PennyMac’s
filing of a separate lawsuit raising separate claims against a
separate entity does not establish an evidentiary basis of its intent
to relinquish the right to arbitration with Black Knight. In fact, it
may show the opposite; PennyMac’s carefully worded federal
lawsuit suggests an intent to safeguard its arbitration right.
Black Knight’s burden is high, and it presented only the
lawsuit itself to show PennyMac’s intent to relinquish its
contractual right to arbitration. There is doubt as to PennyMac’s
intent, and we must resolve all doubts against waiver and in favor
of arbitration. We therefore find the trial court was correct to
compel arbitration. *
AFFIRMED.
OSTERHAUS and NORDBY, JJ., concur.
* We leave the issue of appellate attorney’s fees to the
arbitrator. Both parties’ fee motions are denied.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Cristine M. Russell, A. Graham Allen, Edward McCarthy, III, E.
Carson Lange, and Samuel J. Horovitz of Roger Towers, P.A.,
Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, Celia C. Falzone
of Akerman LLP, Jacksonville, and William P. Heller and
Lawrence D. Silverman of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for
Appellee.
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