Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT FREDDIE L. SOLOMON, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 2D21-1320 January 21, 2022 Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Donald G. Jacobsen, Judge. Freddie L. Solomon, pro se. PER CURIAM. Freddie Solomon appeals from the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), in which he alleged that his sentence is illegal because he was designated a habitual felony offender (HFO) and prison releasee reoffender (PRR) for the same offense and the portions of the sentence imposed under each designation are impermissibly equal. Because the part of the record that the postconviction court attached to its order does not conclusively refute Solomon's claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D). "A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief . . . ." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1). A sentence is illegal within the meaning of rule 3.800(a) if it imposes a punishment that no trial court could impose under the entire body of sentencing law under any set of factual circumstances. See Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1186-87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). "A trial court may impose a single sentence pursuant to both the PRR and habitual felony offender (HFO) statutes but the HFO portion of the sentence must be longer than the PRR portion of the sentence." Flint v. State, 313 So. 3d 791, 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) 2 (quoting Atmore v. State, 242 So. 3d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)). Seeming to acknowledge this, the postconviction court denied Solomon's claim, noting that Solomon was convicted of aggravated battery and "sentenced to thirty years as a Habitual Felony Offender with the first fifteen years also designated as a Prison Releasee Reoffender. As the incarcerative portions of the sentence are not equal, and the HFO sentence is greater than the PRR sentence, Defendant's sentence is legal." The sentence described by the postconviction court would be legal, but the written sentence attached to the postconviction court's order does not support the postconviction court's description—it states that Solomon was sentenced to thirty years, and "1st 15 years of sentence is as PRR to run consec. as habitual offender." This wording creates the appearance that the HFO sentence and PRR sentence are each fifteen years, which would be impermissible. See id.; Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 658-59 (Fla. 2000) (holding that an HFO sentence must be greater than a PRR sentence for a single offense and cannot be equal). While the postconviction court's finding may be correct, the court failed to attach to its order a copy of the oral pronouncement 3 of sentence, which "controls and constitutes the legal sentence imposed." Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007). Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court's order and remand for further proceedings. If the postconviction court again denies Solomon's motion, it must attach to its order those portions of the record that conclusively refute his claim. Reversed and remanded. NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and ATKINSON JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 4