Willie Joe Jones v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket4D2026-2529
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
WILLIE JOE JONES,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
No. 4D2026-2529
[November 18, 2026]
Petition for writ of prohibition from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Sarah Willis, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502012CF002290AXXXMB.
Willie Joe Jones, pro se.
No appearance for respondent.
On Order to Show Cause
PER CURIAM.
We denied the pro se prohibition petition and frivolous emergency
request in this case and issued an order to show cause why sanctions
should not be imposed. Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a). Having considered
petitioner’s response, we impose the sanction of precluding further pro se
filing.
The petitioner is a disbarred lawyer who was convicted after a jury trial
in the underlying case of an organized scheme to defraud. 1 We per curiam
affirmed his 2017 conviction and sentence in Jones v. State, 250 So. 3d 76
(Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The petitioner filed a timely Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion which the trial court denied after an evidentiary
hearing. The petitioner appealed through counsel, and we per curiam
affirmed in Jones v. State, 407 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (case
number 4D2024-0364).
1 The Florida Supreme Court disbarred the petitioner in 2011 in case number
SC2011-1032.
Six months after we issued the mandate in case number 4D2024-
0364, the petitioner began filing AI-generated pro se documents in this
Court, including an untimely motion for written opinion and several
unauthorized documents in the above case. The petitioner also began a
campaign of filing in the trial court. The circuit court’s online docket
shows he has flooded the trial court with more than seventy documents
since April 2025.
In case number 4D2025-2333, the petitioner tried to appeal an order
denying his motion for transfer and for statutory dismissal. This motion
repeated a frivolous claim that the petitioner argued in case number
4D2024-0364. He contends that he is entitled to dismissal of the charges
because he allegedly completed a veteran’s court program.
The petitioner, however, was convicted and sentenced after jury trial.
He was not admitted to a pretrial intervention program and is not entitled
to dismissal of the charges. The petitioner has repeated this same
frivolous argument in many of his filings.
After the appeal in case number 4D2025-2333 was dismissed as
untimely and rehearing was denied, the petitioner continued filing
documents. We denied his unauthorized motions and cautioned him
about sanctions for frivolous filing.
In case number 4D2025-3808, the petitioner filed a frivolous writ
proceeding that sought multiple forms of relief. In case number 4D2026-
0136, the petitioner filed a frivolous belated appeal petition. We denied
both petitions by order.
In this “Emergency Petition for Writ of Prohibition,” the petitioner
claims the trial court improperly ruled on the timeliness of his motion to
disqualify and that, by doing so, the judge is automatically disqualified.
The petition cites the disqualification rule, which states:
The judge against whom an initial motion to disqualify under
subdivision (e) is directed may determine only the legal
sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of
the facts alleged. If any motion is legally insufficient, an order
denying the motion shall immediately be entered. No other
reason for denial shall be stated, and an order of denial shall
not take issue with the motion.
2
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h) (emphasis added). The
petitioner contends that the emphasized language above precludes a trial
court from determining the timeliness of a motion to disqualify.
Whether a motion is timely, however, concerns its legal sufficiency.
Wall v. State, 238 So. 3d 127, 142–43 (Fla. 2018) (holding that the trial
court properly denied the defendant’s motion to disqualify as “legally
insufficient” because it was time-barred). Here, the trial court did not
violate the rule and properly concluded that the petitioner had filed the
motion outside the 20-day time limit. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin.
2.330(g).
In Santa Catalina Townhomes, Inc. v. Mirza, 942 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2006), we held that the timeliness of a motion to disqualify is beyond
our scope of review if the trial court did not expressly rule on timeliness.
Id. at 464. Santa Catalina, however, has been abrogated by the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in Wall, which shows that the timeliness of a
motion to disqualify concerns its legal sufficiency. 238 So. 3d at 142. See
also Asay v. State,769 So. 2d 974, 970 n.12 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e reject Asay’s
reliance on Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059, 1062 n.5 (Fla. 1999), in
support of the argument that because the trial judge considered this
motion on the merits, the State’s argument that the motion was untimely
became moot . . . . Our statement in . . . Quince was dicta and should not
be read to support the proposition that if a trial judge makes alternative
rulings that a claim is meritless and procedurally barred, the disposition
on the merits renders moot the alternative ruling that the issue is
procedurally barred.”).
Appellate courts review the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify
de novo. Wall, 238 So. 3d at 142. The Florida Supreme Court in Wall
reached the timeliness issue, even though the trial judge had not
addressed timeliness in its order. Id. at 135. In any event, Santa Catalina
shows that a trial court can decide the timeliness of a motion to disqualify.
The petitioner also raises a frivolous argument that the trial court
must be disqualified because it treated one of the petitioner’s many
confounding filings—“Defendant’s Verified Motion for Ruling on Pending
Motion to Strike APD Case-Log, For Specific Record Identification, for
Clarification of Record Basis, and to Correct Clerical Mischaracterization
of Case Status”—as an untimely motion for rehearing. The trial court
properly denied the frivolous motion, which attempted to continue arguing
the previously-denied rule 3.850 motion. The trial court cautioned the
petitioner about sanctions for further frivolous filing. None of this provides
any basis to disqualify the trial court.
3
The petitioner provides an “Emergency Jurisdictional Update” which
repeats his frivolous claim that this matter is somehow an emergency.
Abuse of emergency filing procedures disrupts court operations and is
sanctionable. Eclectic Synergy, LLC v. Seredin, 435 So. 3d 1074, 1076 n.1
(Fla. 4th DCA 2026).
Finally, the petition contains a hallucinated citation to a non-existent
case. The petitioner’s response to the order to show cause tries to
characterize the fake citation as a “transcription error,” but it is an obvious
AI-hallucination. “The submission of fictitious or fabricated case law—
whether the product of carelessness, misunderstanding, or reliance on
generative artificial-intelligence tools—is sanctionable.” Francois v. Vive
Fin., LLC, 433 So. 3d 795, 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026); Fla. R. Gen. Prac. &
Jud. Admin. 2.515(d)(2).
Abusive AI filing poses a serious threat to the orderly administration
of justice. Lisandrillo v. Palozzi, No. 4D2026-2262, 51 Fla. L. Weekly
D1992; 2026 WL 2727559, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Sep. 16, 2026). We have
recently sanctioned other vexatious pro se litigants for abusive AI filings.
See, e.g., Avery v. Beauzil, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1068 (Fla. 4th DCA May 27,
2026); Gouldy v. Chiasson, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1498 (Fla. 4th DCA July
22, 2026).
The petitioner’s response to the sanctions order to show cause is
unapologetic and instead repeats and raises new frivolous arguments. In
addition to the response, the petitioner filed more unauthorized
documents—a “supplemental memorandum” and an “appellate notice.”
The response and other filings, which are again AI-generated, convince us
that the petitioner has no intention of stopping his campaign of frivolous
filing, and that he will continue flooding this Court with AI-generated
“slop.” Lisandrillo, 2026 WL 2727559 at *1.
Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is directed to reject any future
filings by petitioner Willie Joe Jones unless such filings are signed by a
member in good standing of the Florida Bar.
Sanctions imposed.
MAY, LEVINE and FORST, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
4