Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT WILLIE JOE JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. No. 4D2026-2529 [November 18, 2026] Petition for writ of prohibition from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Sarah Willis, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502012CF002290AXXXMB. Willie Joe Jones, pro se. No appearance for respondent. On Order to Show Cause PER CURIAM. We denied the pro se prohibition petition and frivolous emergency request in this case and issued an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a). Having considered petitioner’s response, we impose the sanction of precluding further pro se filing. The petitioner is a disbarred lawyer who was convicted after a jury trial in the underlying case of an organized scheme to defraud. 1 We per curiam affirmed his 2017 conviction and sentence in Jones v. State, 250 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The petitioner filed a timely Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appealed through counsel, and we per curiam affirmed in Jones v. State, 407 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (case number 4D2024-0364). 1 The Florida Supreme Court disbarred the petitioner in 2011 in case number SC2011-1032. Six months after we issued the mandate in case number 4D2024- 0364, the petitioner began filing AI-generated pro se documents in this Court, including an untimely motion for written opinion and several unauthorized documents in the above case. The petitioner also began a campaign of filing in the trial court. The circuit court’s online docket shows he has flooded the trial court with more than seventy documents since April 2025. In case number 4D2025-2333, the petitioner tried to appeal an order denying his motion for transfer and for statutory dismissal. This motion repeated a frivolous claim that the petitioner argued in case number 4D2024-0364. He contends that he is entitled to dismissal of the charges because he allegedly completed a veteran’s court program. The petitioner, however, was convicted and sentenced after jury trial. He was not admitted to a pretrial intervention program and is not entitled to dismissal of the charges. The petitioner has repeated this same frivolous argument in many of his filings. After the appeal in case number 4D2025-2333 was dismissed as untimely and rehearing was denied, the petitioner continued filing documents. We denied his unauthorized motions and cautioned him about sanctions for frivolous filing. In case number 4D2025-3808, the petitioner filed a frivolous writ proceeding that sought multiple forms of relief. In case number 4D2026- 0136, the petitioner filed a frivolous belated appeal petition. We denied both petitions by order. In this “Emergency Petition for Writ of Prohibition,” the petitioner claims the trial court improperly ruled on the timeliness of his motion to disqualify and that, by doing so, the judge is automatically disqualified. The petition cites the disqualification rule, which states: The judge against whom an initial motion to disqualify under subdivision (e) is directed may determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. If any motion is legally insufficient, an order denying the motion shall immediately be entered. No other reason for denial shall be stated, and an order of denial shall not take issue with the motion. 2 Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h) (emphasis added). The petitioner contends that the emphasized language above precludes a trial court from determining the timeliness of a motion to disqualify. Whether a motion is timely, however, concerns its legal sufficiency. Wall v. State, 238 So. 3d 127, 142–43 (Fla. 2018) (holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to disqualify as “legally insufficient” because it was time-barred). Here, the trial court did not violate the rule and properly concluded that the petitioner had filed the motion outside the 20-day time limit. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(g). In Santa Catalina Townhomes, Inc. v. Mirza, 942 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), we held that the timeliness of a motion to disqualify is beyond our scope of review if the trial court did not expressly rule on timeliness. Id. at 464. Santa Catalina, however, has been abrogated by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Wall, which shows that the timeliness of a motion to disqualify concerns its legal sufficiency. 238 So. 3d at 142. See also Asay v. State,769 So. 2d 974, 970 n.12 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e reject Asay’s reliance on Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059, 1062 n.5 (Fla. 1999), in support of the argument that because the trial judge considered this motion on the merits, the State’s argument that the motion was untimely became moot . . . . Our statement in . . . Quince was dicta and should not be read to support the proposition that if a trial judge makes alternative rulings that a claim is meritless and procedurally barred, the disposition on the merits renders moot the alternative ruling that the issue is procedurally barred.”). Appellate courts review the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify de novo. Wall, 238 So. 3d at 142. The Florida Supreme Court in Wall reached the timeliness issue, even though the trial judge had not addressed timeliness in its order. Id. at 135. In any event, Santa Catalina shows that a trial court can decide the timeliness of a motion to disqualify. The petitioner also raises a frivolous argument that the trial court must be disqualified because it treated one of the petitioner’s many confounding filings—“Defendant’s Verified Motion for Ruling on Pending Motion to Strike APD Case-Log, For Specific Record Identification, for Clarification of Record Basis, and to Correct Clerical Mischaracterization of Case Status”—as an untimely motion for rehearing. The trial court properly denied the frivolous motion, which attempted to continue arguing the previously-denied rule 3.850 motion. The trial court cautioned the petitioner about sanctions for further frivolous filing. None of this provides any basis to disqualify the trial court. 3 The petitioner provides an “Emergency Jurisdictional Update” which repeats his frivolous claim that this matter is somehow an emergency. Abuse of emergency filing procedures disrupts court operations and is sanctionable. Eclectic Synergy, LLC v. Seredin, 435 So. 3d 1074, 1076 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). Finally, the petition contains a hallucinated citation to a non-existent case. The petitioner’s response to the order to show cause tries to characterize the fake citation as a “transcription error,” but it is an obvious AI-hallucination. “The submission of fictitious or fabricated case law— whether the product of carelessness, misunderstanding, or reliance on generative artificial-intelligence tools—is sanctionable.” Francois v. Vive Fin., LLC, 433 So. 3d 795, 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026); Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.515(d)(2). Abusive AI filing poses a serious threat to the orderly administration of justice. Lisandrillo v. Palozzi, No. 4D2026-2262, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1992; 2026 WL 2727559, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Sep. 16, 2026). We have recently sanctioned other vexatious pro se litigants for abusive AI filings. See, e.g., Avery v. Beauzil, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1068 (Fla. 4th DCA May 27, 2026); Gouldy v. Chiasson, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1498 (Fla. 4th DCA July 22, 2026). The petitioner’s response to the sanctions order to show cause is unapologetic and instead repeats and raises new frivolous arguments. In addition to the response, the petitioner filed more unauthorized documents—a “supplemental memorandum” and an “appellate notice.” The response and other filings, which are again AI-generated, convince us that the petitioner has no intention of stopping his campaign of frivolous filing, and that he will continue flooding this Court with AI-generated “slop.” Lisandrillo, 2026 WL 2727559 at *1. Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is directed to reject any future filings by petitioner Willie Joe Jones unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of the Florida Bar. Sanctions imposed. MAY, LEVINE and FORST, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 4