Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT BELL TRANSPORT, LLC, c/o MICHAEL J. BELL, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES c/o FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, Appellees. No. 2D22-469 November 30, 2022 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Hugh D. Hayes, Judge. Derek Verderamo and Adam A. Carney of Verderamo Law, Naples, for Appellant. Angeline Attila, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Bradenton, for Appellee. ATKINSON, Judge. Bell Transport, LLC, c/o Michael J. Bell (Bell) appeals the trial court's nonfinal ex parte order finding probable cause for the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) to seize Bell's 1993 Peterbilt Semi Truck (truck). Because the Department failed to file its ex parte application for a determination of probable cause within ten business days after the date it seized the truck as required by section 932.703(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2021), we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On December 17, 2021, the Department seized Bell's truck pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, section 932.703(1)(a). On January 6, 2022, the Department filed an ex parte application to determine whether probable cause existed for the seizure of the truck pursuant to section 932.703(2)(a). The trial court entered an order granting the Department's application. After receiving notice of the trial court's order, Bell filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Department's ex parte application was untimely filed since January 6, 2022, was more than ten business days after the date that the truck was seized. The Department argued that it had timely filed its application because December 22 and 30, 2021, were not business days within the meaning of section 932.703(2)(a). In support of its argument, 2 the Department relied on the governor's announcement on December 13, 2021, that state offices would be closed for business on December 22 and 30, 2021. The trial court agreed with the Department and denied Bell's motion for reconsideration. "In interpreting a statute, [a court's] task is to give effect to the words that the legislature has employed in the statutory text," Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022), and what those words "convey, in their context, is what the text means," Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). In doing so, courts "normally seek[ ] to afford the law's terms their ordinary meaning at the time [the legislature] adopted them." Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Niz- Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021)). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Lab. Corp. of Am., 339 So. 3d at 323 (citing Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018)). In relevant part, section 932.703(2)(a) provides, "When a seizure of property is made under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the seizing agency shall apply, within 10 business days after 3 the date of the seizure, to a court of competent jurisdiction for an order determining whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the property." (Emphasis added.) The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act does not define the term "business days." "[W]here a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense." Couch v. State, 326 So. 3d 750, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quoting State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980)). The parties agree that the language of section 932.703(2)(a) is unambiguous. They also agree that the term "business days" is commonly understood to mean Monday through Friday—the weekdays on which most businesses historically have been open for business—and that the term excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays—even if some businesses are open for business on these days. Cf. Metro Dev. Grp. v. 3D-C & C, Inc., 941 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("The parties to a contract are free to contract as they choose and to provide—or not to provide—that contractual deadlines falling on a weekend or holiday be extended to the next business day."); Day: business day, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A day that most institutions are open for business, usu. a 4 day on which banks and major stock exchanges are open, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and certain major holidays."). December 22, 2021, fell on a Wednesday, and December 30, 2021, fell on a Thursday. Wednesdays and Thursdays are business days according to the ordinary meaning of the term unless the particular Wednesday or Thursday is a day on which a holiday is observed. December 22, 2021, may have been a holiday for purposes of section 932.703(2)(a) because that date was designated as a holiday by the chief judge of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud Admin. 2.514(a)(6) (" 'Legal holiday' means . . . (B) any day observed as a holiday by the clerk's office or as designated by the chief judge."). However, neither December 22 nor December 30, 2021, was a holiday on which most businesses are closed. Cf. Day: business day, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A day that most institutions are open for business, . . . excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and certain major holidays."). Even presuming arguendo that the governor has the authority to declare holidays that alter the meaning of "business day" as that phrase is used in statute or judicial rule, nothing in the governor's pronouncement that state agency offices would be closed on 5 December 22 and 30, 2021, purported to designate these dates as legal holidays or to extend any statutory deadlines; therefore, the governor's statement does not change the fact that these dates were business days for purposes of section 932.703(2)(a). And the argument that a governor does have such authority might prove too much—if, for example, the governor had given all agencies under his purview the entire months of December and January off, would that mean the application for a probable cause order was not due until some time in February? To ask that question is to answer it. Therefore, at least December 30, 2021, was a "business day" within the meaning of section 932.703(2)(a). Counting December 30 as a business day, the Department filed its ex parte application eleven business days after the date it seized Bell's truck. The Department argues on appeal that December 22 and 30, 2021, were not business days within the meaning of section 932.703(2)(a) because the seizing agency (the Department itself) was not open for business on these days. The Department argues that since the seizing agency is the subject of the statutory provision, business days for purposes of section 932.703(2)(a) are only those days on which the seizing agency is open for business. This 6 argument fails to account for the ordinary meaning of the term business days in the context of the statute. Nothing in section 932.703(2)(a) indicates that "business days" means only days on which the seizing agency is open for business any more than it means only days in which a private business happens to be open. If Ebenezer Scrooge decided to close his office for the entire week of Christmas to give Bob Cratchet some long-overdue time off, that would not deprive every weekday during that week of its business day status. And a magnanimous state agency head has no more authority to alter the ordinary meaning of business day by edict than does an erstwhile miserly businessman who's seen the ghost of Christmas future. Further, interpreting the term business days in the manner argued by the Department would essentially allow a party to determine its own deadlines; a seizing agency could theoretically extend its statutory deadlines indefinitely by simply closing its offices for business indefinitely. Nothing in section 932.703(2)(a) supports such an interpretation. To the contrary, when it comes to litigation deadlines, it is the legislature or the disinterested tribunal that typically establishes generally applicable time frames by 7 statute or rule; to allow the interested and adversarial parties to set them arbitrarily defies common sense. Cf. § 932.703(2)(a) (emphasis added) (requiring the seizing agency to "apply, within 10 business days after the date of the seizure, to a court of competent jurisdiction" (emphasis added)). January 6, 2022—the date on which the Department filed its ex parte application for a determination of probable cause to seize Bell's truck—was more than ten business days after December 17, 2021—the date the Department seized the truck. Therefore, the trial court erred by granting the Department's ex parte application and by denying Bell's motion for reconsideration. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded with instructions. KELLY and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 8