Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and V.L., Appellants, v. E.P., Appellee. No. 2D22-4083 November 1, 2023 Appeal from the Department of Administrative Hearings. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant, Department of Revenue. No appearance for Appellant V.L. No appearance for Appellee E.P. LUCAS, Judge. The Department of Revenue (DOR) appeals a final administrative support order in which the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) did not have jurisdiction to award retroactive child support for a child who had reached the age of majority. We reverse. E.P. (father) and V.L. (mother) are the parents of two children. Both children share the same initials; so to avoid confusion, we will refer to the child born on April 25, 2006, as their younger child and the child born on July 11, 2004, as their older child. DOR initiated this Title IV-D case to establish paternity and child support for the couple's two children.1 A video proceeding was convened on November 16, 2022, at which time the ALJ heard the testimony and evidence of both parents and the arguments of DOR's counsel. Paternity was stipulated, as was the fact that both children had resided solely with the mother. The ALJ questioned whether she could award child support for the older child since the older child had turned eighteen eleven days prior to service of DOR's petition. DOR's attorney responded that the ALJ had the power to award support for the older child under the authority of Campagna v. Cope, 971 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ established paternity, calculated the amount of child support and offsetting credits, and announced an award of retroactive child support for both children. However, in the support order that was later entered, the ALJ reached a contrary conclusion about the older child. The order stated the older child "was no longer a 'child.' " The ALJ reasoned that she was without statutory authorization to enter retroactive child support for a child who had reached the age of majority. DOR then took this appeal. DOR challenges the ALJ's legal conclusion that DOAH was without jurisdiction to award retroactive child support for an emancipated child. 1 As the Fifth District observed, "DOR serves as Florida's child support enforcement agency pursuant to Title IV–D of the Social Security Act." Dep't of Rev. ex rel. Tisdale v. Jackson, 217 So. 3d 192, 194 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). 2 Because that concerns an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Beckford v. Beckford, 368 So. 3d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) ("Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review." (quoting Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010))); see also IOU Cent. Inc. v. Pezzano Contracting & Dev., LLC, 311 So. 3d 295, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("The issue of whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo." (citing Trerice v. Trerice, 250 So. 3d 695, 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018))). "In determining the meaning of a statute, we adhere to the supremacy-of- the-text principle—a principle recognizing that '[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.' " Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678, 681 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Page v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 308 So. 3d 953, 958 (Fla. 2020)). Sections 409.256 and 409.2563, Florida Statutes (2022), generally prescribe DOAH's authorization and the procedures for DOAH to adjudicate paternity and administrative support orders for Title IV-D cases. Pertinent here, section 409.2563 includes the following subsections: (1)(a) "Administrative support order" means a final order rendered by or on behalf of the Department pursuant to this section establishing or modifying the obligation of a parent to contribute to the support and maintenance of his or her child or children, which may include provisions for monetary support, retroactive support, health care, and other elements of support pursuant to chapter 61. .... (1)(g) "Retroactive support" means a child support obligation established pursuant to s. 61.30(17). .... 3 (2)(f) If there is no support order for a child . . . whose paternity is the subject of a proceeding under s. 409.256, the department may establish a parent's child support obligation pursuant to this section, s. 61.30, and other relevant provisions of state law. . . . The parent's obligation determined by the department may include any obligation to pay retroactive support . . . . .... (5)(a) After serving notice upon a parent in accordance with subsection (4), the department shall calculate that parent's child support obligation under the child support guidelines schedule as provided by s. 61.30, based on any timely financial affidavits received and other information available to the department. . . . .... (7)(e) An administrative support order must comply with ss. 61.13(1) and 61.30. Sections 409.256 and 409.2563 proceedings reference and rely, to a considerable degree, on chapter 61 and the child support statutes used in non-Title IV cases. See State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 1980) ("In the construction of such statutes the statute referred to is treated and considered as if it were incorporated into and formed part of that which makes the reference." (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, 698 (Fla. 1918))). Section 61.30, Florida Statutes (2022), in turn, provides, in pertinent part: (1)(a) The child support guideline amount as determined by this section presumptively establishes the amount the trier of fact must order as child support for a minor child, or a child who is dependent in fact and between the ages of 18 and 19 and who is still in high school and is performing in good faith with a reasonable expectation of graduation before he or she reaches the age of 19, in an initial proceeding for such support or in a proceeding for modification of an existing order for such support, whether the proceeding arises under this or another chapter. 4 .... (17) In an initial determination of child support, whether in a paternity action, dissolution of marriage action, or petition for support during the marriage, the court has discretion to award child support retroactive to the date when the parents did not reside together in the same household with the child, not to exceed a period of 24 months preceding the filing of the petition, regardless of whether that date precedes the filing of the petition. In determining the retroactive award in such cases, the court shall consider the following: (a) The court shall apply the guidelines schedule in effect at the time of the hearing subject to the obligor's demonstration of his or her actual income, as defined by subsection (2), during the retroactive period. Failure of the obligor to so demonstrate shall result in the court using the obligor's income at the time of the hearing in computing child support for the retroactive period. (b) All actual payments made by a parent to the other parent or the child or third parties for the benefit of the child throughout the proposed retroactive period. (c) The court should consider an installment payment plan for the payment of retroactive child support. In Campagna, 971 So. 2d at 248, this court construed section 61.30(17) to provide a limited ability for a parent to seek retroactive child support for a child who had reached the age of majority: We conclude that in light of section 61.30(17), if a child has turned eighteen but a parent resided with and supported the child before the child turned eighteen, the parent maintains his or her standing to recover the other parent's share of any support for the twenty-four months prior to the date of filing the petition pursuant to the child support guidelines. The statute itself does not contain any language suggesting that it intends to limit retroactive child support to claims made by a parent while the relevant child is still a minor. We are inclined to believe that a plain reading of the statute discloses no limitation based on the age of the child at the filing of the petition. 5 Campagna remains good law in this district. Given section 61.30's enmeshment within section 409.2563, our construction of section 61.30(17) in Campagna applies here. Consistent with Campagna, we conclude that the legislature has authorized DOAH to award limited, retroactive child support "if a child has turned eighteen but a parent resided with and supported the child before the child turned eighteen," so that DOR may "recover the other parent's share of any support for the twenty-four months prior to the date of filing the petition pursuant to the child support guidelines." See id. at 248. Applied here, the ALJ had the statutory authority to enter an award for the older child. There being no error charged to the oral pronouncement that preceded the order on appeal, we reverse and remand for the ALJ to enter an order in accordance with this opinion and the prior, oral ruling. Reversed and remanded with instructions. KHOUZAM and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 6