Antonious White v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 6, 2022
Docket2D21-1211
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
ANTONIOUS WHITE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D21-1211
April 6, 2022
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Mark F. Carpanini,
Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Daniel Muller,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Elba Caridad
Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
Antonious White appeals from the order modifying his
probation, arguing that the trial court fundamentally erred by
failing to conduct an adequate Faretta1 inquiry before allowing him,
without counsel, to admit that he had violated the conditions of his
probation. Because White did not have the assistance of counsel at
the violation hearing and did not waive his right to counsel, we
reverse.2
In March 2021, White's probation officer filed an affidavit
asserting that White had violated his probation in two different
cases by possessing and using methamphetamine. At the violation
hearing, White appeared pro se. The trial court asked White if he
wanted counsel, and White responded only that he "was thinking
[he] was just going to get [his probation] reinstated." The State then
made White an offer, and after some discussion, the court offered to
appoint counsel if White "want[ed] to talk to a lawyer about [his]
options." White declined counsel, opting for a sentence of 180 days
in jail. He then admitted the alleged violations.
The trial court modified White's probation, ordering 180 days
in county jail, entry into the in-jail substance abuse treatment
1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2 The State properly concedes error.
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program, a drug evaluation, treatment if necessary, and enhanced
drug testing. If White completed the substance abuse treatment
program, the remainder of the jail sentence would be vacated.
This appeal followed.
"Under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Faretta [v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)], an accused has the right to self-
representation at trial." Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla.
2008). "[O]nce a defendant makes an unequivocal request for self-
representation, the trial court must 'hold a hearing[ ] to determine
whether the defendant is knowingly and intelligently waiving his
right to court-appointed counsel.' " Eib v. State, 191 So. 3d 977,
979 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 378). The court is also required to inform
defendants about the disadvantages and dangers associated with
self-representation. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(2) ("A defendant
shall not be considered to have waived the assistance of counsel
until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and
a thorough inquiry has been made into both the accused's
comprehension of that offer and the accused's capacity to make a
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knowing and intelligent waiver."); Goldsmith v. State, 937 So. 2d
1253, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
In Florida, the right to counsel has been extended to all
probation violation hearings. See State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23
(Fla. 1985); see also Brady v. State, 910 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2005). And "unless there has been an informed waiver [of the
right to counsel, a probationer] is entitled to counsel, and it must
be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to
the revocation charges." Brady, 910 So. 2d at 390 (alteration in
original) (quoting Hicks, 478 So. 2d at 23). Failing to inquire
whether a probationer has knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to counsel constitutes fundamental error requiring reversal.
See id.
White was entitled to counsel at his violation hearing, and the
record fails to establish that he knowingly and intelligently waived
that right. Although the trial court asked White if he wanted
counsel to be appointed, it did not conduct a Faretta hearing.
Accordingly, we reverse the order modifying White's probation and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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