Todd Lee Hamiter v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJanuary 15, 2020
Docket2D18-2104
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
TODD LEE HAMITER, DOC #551648, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D18-2104
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________ )
Opinion filed January 15, 2020.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Nick Nazaretian,
Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant
Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
Todd Lee Hamiter seeks review of an order revoking his probation and
imposing sentence after he admitted violating a condition of his probation. Following
our independent review of the record pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967); see also In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1991), we affirm without
comment the revocation of his probation. As set forth below, however, we remand for
entry of a corrected order of revocation, vacate the amended judgment rendered April
25, 2019, and reverse the denial of Hamiter's motion to correct sentencing error. We
also certify a question regarding what constitutes a "minor sentencing error" that can be
addressed on the merits within an otherwise "no merit" Anders brief.
I. The Anders Appeal
Hamiter admitted that he violated condition 5 of his probation by testing
positive for cocaine. The trial court accepted the admission and revoked his probation.
Before sentencing, Hamiter moved to withdraw his admission, and the trial court denied
the motion. On appeal, Anders counsel recommends review of this issue but asserts
that he can find no meritorious argument suggesting reversible error. We agree with
counsel's assessment. Because we note that the revocation order fails to specify the
condition of probation that the trial court found Hamiter to have violated, however, we
remand for the court to enter an amended revocation order specifying that condition.
See Freeman v. State, 225 So. 3d 929, 930 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (remanding for entry of
an amended order of revocation of probation "to reflect the conditions of probation . . .
that he admitted to violating").
II. Motion to Correct Sentencing Error
On February 13, 2019, after filing his notice of appeal, Hamiter filed a
motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b)(2)(B). The sole issue in that motion was the erroneous imposition of an
additional $50,000 fine and $2500 five-percent surcharge upon his sentencing for the
probation violation.
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The trial court filed its order granting the motion on April 16, 2019. As
defense counsel argues in the Anders brief, however, the motion had to have been
resolved and the order filed no later than April 15, 2019. See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.800(b)(2)(B) (requiring that the motion be resolved and that the order ruling on the
motion be filed within sixty days).1 We therefore find ourselves in the unhappy position
of having to declare the order—and the trial court's ensuing amended judgment
rendered April 25, 2019—a nullity and deeming the motion denied. See id.; De La
Fuente v. State, 58 So. 3d 394, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). From the limited record before
us, however, we agree with the trial court that the $50,000 fine plus $2500 surcharge
was duplicative of a fine that had previously been imposed. Accordingly, we reverse the
deemed denial of Hamiter's motion and remand for the trial court to (again) grant the
motion and enter an amended judgment.
III. Certified Question
In addressing the merits of Hamiter's sentencing challenge in this context,
we take the opportunity to raise the following concern. In In re Anders Briefs, 581 So.
2d at 152, the Florida Supreme Court held that "minor sentencing errors" may be raised
in Anders briefs:
[I]ndigents in their first appeal as of right should not lose their
Anders rights simply because counsel are able to identify
some relatively minor sentencing issues in "no merit"
briefs. . . . Therefore, appellate courts are to follow the
Anders procedure fully even when costs or other minor
sentencing errors are raised in "no merit" briefs; but the
Anders procedure is not appropriate where counsel raise
substantial sentencing errors of any kind.
1Although a trial court may extend the sixty-day period for good cause, the
trial court did not do so, and the period cannot be extended after it has already run. See
McGuire v. State, 779 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
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Although In re Anders Briefs generally identified issues related to costs as an example
of such minor sentencing errors, neither that opinion nor the original Anders opinion
itself provides further guidance regarding the types of errors that fall within that
category.2
In Harrison v. State, 146 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), receded from on
unrelated grounds by Mills v. State, 177 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), the First
District considered several challenges to "relatively minor sentencing errors"—all related
to fines, costs, fees, and surcharges—that had been raised in a "no merit" Anders brief.
Defense counsel asserted five errors amounting to about $570 in the defendant's favor.
As usual in the Anders context, the Office of the State Attorney General
was not required to file an answer brief and did not do so. In a short opinion, the First
District affirmed Harrison's convictions and sentences and remanded for the trial court
to correct the erroneously imposed costs "and to afford Appellant adequate notice and
an opportunity to object" to one of the assessed costs. See Harrison v. State, 39 Fla. L.
Weekly D381 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 17, 2014) (withdrawn and superseded on rehearing).
After that opinion issued, however, the State moved for rehearing,
rehearing en banc, and certification of a question of great public importance. See
Harrison, 146 So. 3d at 77. Thereafter, the First District withdrew its original opinion
and substituted a new one, granting the motion for rehearing in part and granting the
request to certify a question of great public importance. Recognizing that rule 3.800(b)
2Indeed, the original opinion carves out no exception but appears to
contemplate the filing of an Anders brief only where "counsel finds [his client's] case to
be wholly frivolous." Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (emphasis added).
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(which went into effect after In re Anders Briefs was decided) provides a procedure for
addressing sentencing errors during the initial stages of an appeal and that "an
appellate court benefits from an adversarial presentation on all claims of error," the First
District certified the following question:
CAN APPOINTED COUNSEL CHALLENGE A TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF A RULE 3.800(b) MOTION TO
CORRECT MINOR SENTENCING ERROR IN AN ANDERS
"NO MERIT" BRIEF? IF SO, WHAT STEPS SHOULD
APPELLATE COURTS TAKE, CONSISTENT WITH IN RE
ANDERS BRIEFS, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1991), TO ENSURE
ADVERSARIAL TESTING OF MINOR SENTENCING
ISSUES RAISED BY ANDERS COUNSEL PRIOR TO THE
COURT'S DECISION ON THE MERITS OF THOSE
ISSUES?
Harrison, 146 So. 3d at 79-81.
The supreme court declined to consider the question. See State v.
Harrison, 153 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 2014) (table decision denying the State's petition for
review).3 Consequently, we assume that appointed counsel may continue to challenge
a trial court's denial of a rule 3.800(b) motion to correct a minor sentencing error in an
Anders "no merit" brief.
In Harrison, the error was limited to fines, costs, and fees totaling about
$570. In Hamiter's case, the amount in question is $52,500. Like our sister court, we
question whether it is generally appropriate to correct a "minor sentencing error" without
3The First District has since adopted a procedure involving the issuance of
a "Harrison Order," by which it directs the State to respond to a claim of sentencing
error raised in an Anders brief. See, e.g., Cousnard v. State, 188 So. 3d 936, 936 (Fla.
1st DCA 2016). As of this writing, this court has no such procedure in place, but nothing
prevents an individual panel from ordering a response from the State.
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subjecting the asserted error to adversarial testing.4 But our question here concerns the
point at which a "minor sentencing error" becomes a "major sentencing error," which
can be a slippery inquiry. See Rashid v. State, 932 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA
2006) ("There is no bright line test for determining what constitutes a 'minor sentencing
error' and what makes an error 'substantial,' thereby removing it from Anders
procedure."). Although the error before us involves costs, which the supreme court
identified as a category of minor sentencing error, In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d at
152, and errors concerning costs may pale in significance to errors concerning, for
example, length of incarceration, we are not so cavalier (or so cynical as to the
likelihood of its recovery in any event) as to lightly dismiss a $50,000-plus mistake as
"minor."
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the revocation of Hamiter's probation but remand for entry of a
corrected revocation order and for vacatur of the amended judgment rendered April 25,
2019. We reverse the deemed denial of Hamiter's rule 3.800(b)(2)(B) motion to correct
sentencing error and remand for entry of an order granting the motion and entry of an
amended judgment consistent with that order. Finally, we certify the following question
as one of great public importance:
ASSUMING APPOINTED COUNSEL MAY CHALLENGE IN
AN ANDERS "NO MERIT" BRIEF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DENIAL OF A RULE 3.800(B)(2) MOTION TO CORRECT A
4We recognize that that question is not so urgent in this particular case,
given that the State voiced no objection to the granting of Hamiter's motion below. Cf.
Rashid v. State, 932 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("Here, the state conceded
in its response filed in the trial court that the PRR sentence is illegal on the possession
count. We see no reason to remove this issue from the Anders procedure in these
circumstances.").
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"MINOR SENTENCING ERROR," WHAT
CONSIDERATIONS INFORM THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER THE SENTENCING ERROR IS, IN FACT,
"MINOR"?
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions; question
certified.
VILLANTI and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
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