Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-2346 _____________________________ MICHAEL H. BROOKS, Appellant, v. EMILY H. BROOKS, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. Kelvin C. Wells, Judge. April 20, 2021 PER CURIAM. This appeal arises from a Final Judgment of Dissolution granting Appellant and Appellee shared parental responsibility over the minor child born of their marriage, while also awarding Appellee with ultimate decision-making authority as to all the child’s major life decisions. We reverse in part and remand with instructions consistent with this opinion. We affirm as to all other issues. At the final hearing held on the issues of parental responsibility and time-sharing, Appellant was asked whether he had ever represented to a physician or insurance company that he was suffering from “any issues associated with anger.” When Appellant testified that he didn’t recall doing so, Appellee’s counsel attempted to introduce photographs of an application for disability benefits and other related records. These records, filled out by a physician, indicated that Appellant had represented that he was suffering from such issues. Over Appellant’s objections, the trial court allowed the photographs of the records to be admitted into evidence under seal exclusively for impeachment and rebuttal. 1 Nonetheless, the trial court’s order also relied on Appellant’s disability records as substantive evidence of Appellant’s mental health. 2 A court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Black v. State, 920 So. 2d 668, 689 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). A court’s discretion is limited by the evidence code and applicable case law; an erroneous interpretation of these 1 Appellant’s counsel objected several times on the bases that the disability benefits application was not filled out by Appellant nor was it in his handwriting, and that this Court’s decision in Brooks v. Brooks, 239 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), barred the records’ admission into evidence. Neither argument constitutes grounds for reversal. See Luttrell v. Roger Holler Chevrolet, 625 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that medical records filled out by the claimant’s physician “which claimant himself signed were properly admissible under Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which allows the introduction of a witness’s prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of impeachment.”); Brooks, 239 So. 3d at 761 (holding that Appellant’s disability records were not discoverable but not addressing the admissibility of the records if obtained outside of discovery). 2 The record does not indicate any other significant source of information that would have enabled the trial court to find that Appellant’s “history and diagnosis of multiple mental/psychiatric issues . . . have resulted in him seeking various therapy and treatment.” Appellant’s limited testimony that he was “out twice on disability” does not account for the trial court’s detailed factual findings on this issue. Nor does Appellee’s testimony (or that of her family members) about Appellant’s fits of anger and violence account for the trial court’s references to official medical diagnoses, treatments, or therapy. 2 authorities is reviewed de novo. McCray v. State, 919 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The Florida Evidence Code addresses limited admissibility and states that, “[w]hen evidence that is admissible . . . for one purpose, but inadmissible as . . . for another purpose, is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict such evidence to its proper scope . . . .” § 90.107, Fla. Stat. (2020). Accordingly, the trial court acted properly in limiting the admissibility of the photographs of Appellant’s records to impeachment and rebuttal. Once the trial court ruled that the disability records were to be used exclusively for impeachment and rebuttal, however, so too was the court restricted to those limited usages. By relying on the disability records as substantive evidence of Appellant’s mental health, the trial court failed to abide by its own ruling and it also failed to comply with the Florida Evidence Code, requiring evidence to be restricted to its proper scope when it is admissible for one purpose (here, impeachment/rebuttal) but inadmissible for another purpose (here, substance). § 90.107, Fla. Stat. (2020). See Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 813 (Fla. 1996), as revised on denial of reh’g (Oct. 16, 1997) (“Under section 90.107, Florida Statutes (1995), evidence that is admissible for one purpose may be inadmissible for another purpose. Consequently, it is error to take the position that once material ‘is received in evidence, it will be received for any probative value it may have on any issues before the court.’” (quoting Parsons v. Motor Homes of America, Inc., 465 So. 2d 1285, 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)); see also FLORIDA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 301.5 EVIDENCE ADMITTED FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE (“The (describe item of evidence) has now been received into evidence. It has been admitted only [for the purpose of (describe purpose)] [as to (name party)]. You may consider it only [for that purpose] [as it might affect (name party)]. You may not consider that evidence [for any other purpose] [as to [any other party] [(name other party(s)].”). Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in adopting Appellee’s twenty-five page proposed order verbatim. It is a close question whether reversal is required on this basis as to the substantive issue presented. See Cole Taylor Bank v. Shannon 772 So. 2d 546, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“Reversal is required . . . 3 where the record establishes that the final judgment does not reflect the trial judge’s independent decision on the issues of a case.”). Because we reverse and remand with instructions to develop a parenting plan that does not consider Appellant’s disability records as substantive evidence of his mental health, we further require that the final judgment entered clearly reflect the trial court’s independent decision-making. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. MAKAR, KELSEY, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Olivia Brooks of Brooks Law, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Clayton J.M. Adkinson of Adkinson Law Firm, LLC, DeFuniak Springs, for Appellee. 4