Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed August 19, 2020. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D19-1957 Lower Tribunal No. 16-14141 ________________ Pedro Malha, Appellant, vs. Laura Losciales, Appellee. An appeal from a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Victoria Del Pino, Judge. Francisco J. Vargas, Esq. P.A., and Francisco J. Vargas, for appellant. Ronald H. Kauffman, P.A., and Ronald H. Kauffman, and Raquel A. Lacayo- Valle, for appellee. Before LOGUE, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ. MILLER, J. Appellant, Pedro Malha, the father, appeals a series of post-decretal orders adversely adjudicating his motion to compel, in favor of appellee, Laura Losciales, the mother. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)(b). On appeal, the father contends that, by authorizing the mother to reenroll the children in athletics and requiring the provision of transportation to certain competitive events, the lower tribunal impermissibly modified the final judgment. Finding the court merely enforced the terms of the judgment in order to effectively resolve a parental stalemate, we affirm. BACKGROUND The father and mother wed in 1997, and their union produced three children, A.M., aged sixteen, B.M., aged fourteen, and L.M., aged nine.1 After less than a decade of marriage, the parties divorced in Portugal. Although the final decree resolved all issues of property entitlement, it did not address any matters relating to the children. In 2016, the father petitioned for a parenting plan in Miami-Dade County. The mother filed a counterpetition, and, in early 2018, the lower court ratified a parenting plan, submitted jointly by the parties. Pursuant to the plan, the parties agreed to the following: 1 The children’s ages are derived from the settlement agreement, which omits the specific months of birth. 2 All extracurricular activities, including organized activities such as sports teams, lessons or special training, for the minor children must be mutually agreed upon by the parents in accordance with shared parental responsibility. Neither party shall unreasonably withhold their consent. The children’s present extracurricular activities are agreed upon by both parents. Additionally, in contemplation of the visitation arrangement, the parties stipulated: “the parent exercising time sharing with the minor children shall transport the minor children with the necessary equipment within the parent’s possession to and/or from all mutually agreed upon extracurricular activities.” The agreement authorized alternating weekend visitation, “[p]rovided the mother [was] not traveling with the children out of state or in state for tournaments, games or competitions.” Further, the parties allocated financial obligations incurred in conjunction with participation in extracurricular activities, including travel expenses. Although all three of the children were traditionally dedicated to in various sporting activities, their involvement in youth travel teams has increased in the past year. Naturally, greater participation requires an escalating time commitment. The children are expected to attend frequent practices, in addition to regularly traveling outside of their local community for various games and tournaments. In early 2019, the father filed a motion to compel, purportedly seeking to enforce his right to shared parental responsibility. Specifically, he sought to curtail 3 the sporting commitments of the children and eliminate his obligation to transport the children to certain competitive events during his timesharing.2 The lower tribunal duly convened a hearing on the motion, and, after considering the relative merits of the parties, along with the language reflected within the parenting plan, entreated the parties to reach an agreement as to enrollment and participation in the relevant activities. The court further ordered the parties to avail themselves of court-based services. The mother subsequently filed a motion for clarification, seeking guidance as to the parameters of the ruling. The court conducted another hearing and issued a supplemental order, authorizing the mother to reenroll the children in their respective leagues and directing the father to transport the children to those competitive events scheduled during his timesharing. The instant appeal ensued. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The standard of review in this case is dual: our assessment of whether the trial court ‘modified’ the [parenting plan] within the meaning of section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes [(2020)], is a de novo review, while the trial court’s findings of fact and rulings based on the evidentiary record are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” Wade v. Wade, 159 So. 3d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) 2 The father further sought to divest the mother of her ability to track the children through global positioning system (GPS) technology. 4 (citing Eldridge v. Eldridge, 147 So. 3d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); Valladares v. Junco–Valladares, 30 So. 3d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)).3 ANALYSIS “Under the principle of shared parental responsibility, major decisions affecting the welfare of the child are to be made after the parents confer and reach an agreement.” Gerencser v. Mills, 4 So. 3d 22, 23 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (citing § 61.046(16), Fla. Stat.). However, in cases in which the parents cannot reach agreement on such a decision, “the dispute should be presented to the trial court for resolution.” Lane v. Lane, 254 So. 3d 570, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (citing Dickson v. Dickson, 169 So. 3d 287, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). In resolving the impasse, the lower tribunal must be guided by a consideration of the best interests of the child. Id. (citing Dickson, 169 So. 3d at 290; Gerencser, 4 So. 3d at 23-24; Sotnick v. Sotnick, 650 So. 2d 157, 159-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). Here, the stipulated plan allows for shared decisions over extracurricular activities. Nevertheless, because the parties’ efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement proved futile, the dispute was properly submitted to the court. Further, as the agreement prohibited the unreasonable withholding of consent, the court was 3 “The interrelationships between the findings of fact and the conclusions of law is what makes the standard of review ‘mixed.’” Jarrard v. Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332, 338 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). 5 properly permitted to explore the facts and circumstances surrounding both continued participation and transportation. At the time the parties executed the parenting plan, the children were already heavily involved in athletics. By including a provision that the “present extracurricular activities are agreed upon by both parents,” and allocating continuing enrollment expenses and other relevant allowances for league travel, the agreement clearly anticipated a continuation of such participation. Additionally, by all accounts, the children appear to be willing partakers, thriving in their respective endeavors. Considering these circumstances, along with the adage that “[t]he procedural aspects and logistics of transportation of the children . . . ordinarily are within the discretion of the trial judge,” the decision below, overruling the father’s objection to continued participation by the children in athletics, is amply supported by the existing record. Wade, 159 So. 3d at 1009; see Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error.”). Further, as the trial court did not “change the status quo [or] alter the rights and obligations of the parties,” but merely rejected the unreasonable withholding of consent, we conclude the decision was grounded in enforcement of the existing 6 terms of the judgment. 4 Bustamante v. O’Brien, 286 So. 3d 352, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (citing Roque v. Paskow, 812 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). Finally, we reject the contention the resultant decision was “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable [or that] . . . no reasonable man [or woman] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. 4 Here, the father sought to be relieved from any obligation to transport the children to their athletic commitments and requested a modification of the same. Thus, it is axiomatic that any complained of error was invited. See Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197, 202 (Fla. 2001) (“Under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not make or invite error at [the] trial [court] and then take advantage of the error on appeal.”) (citation omitted); Fuller v. Palm Auto Plaza, Inc., 683 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“It is well settled that under the invited error rule ‘a party cannot successfully complain about an error for which he or she is responsible or of rulings that he or she has invited the trial court to make.’”) (citation omitted). 7